Advaita Epistemology

P. K. SUNDARAM, M.A, Ph.D.

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
1984

Madras University Philosophical Series—No. 11

GENERAL EDITOR :
DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

ADVAITA EPISTEMOLOGY

ADVAITA EPISTEMOLOGY

with special reference to Istasiddhi

BY

P. K. SUNDARAM, M.A., Ph.D.,
Professor of Philosophy
Dr. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy
University of Madras

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
1984

Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Madras in 1960

First Published 1968
Second Edition 1984

Price Rs. 35/-

PRINTED IN INDIA
RATHNAM PRESS, 41, BADRIAN STREET, MADRAS-1.

FOREWORD

(To the First Edition)

Dr. P. K. Sundaram, at present Reader in Philosophy at this Centre, was a Research Fellow of this University in the years 1954–'56. The thesis which he wrote then was approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1960. It is now published as No. 11 in the University Philosophical Series.

The subject of the thesis is Advaita Epistemology with special reference to Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. Every system of Indian philosophy bestows considerable attention to a discussion of the problem of knowledge. The aspects relating to this problem are: analysis of the knowledge-situation, the number and nature of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*), the nature of validity or truth; the theory of invalidity or error; can error be overcome, if so, how? Advaita follows the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā in empirical matters; but it has its own distinctive features in regard to epistemology as called for by its basic truth that the ultimate reality is the nondual Spirit, Brahman-Ātman.

The most popular Advaita manual of epistemology is Dharmarājādhvarin's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. This has been expounded by more than one scholar and has also been translated into English more than once. As this work is designed to serve as but an introductory text, even as the *Tarkasaṅgraha* is for Nyāya, the more complicated and difficult questions are not considered here. One of the vexed questions concerns 'error'. There are various theories of error in Indian philosophy. These are technically called *khyāti-vādas*. The *locus classicus* where these theories are examined thoroughly from the standpoint of Advaita is Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. The present editor drew largely from this work while discussing this problem in chapter two of his work *The Philosophy of Advaita* (with special reference to Bhāratītīrtha Vidyāraṇya). The late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri started translating the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* into English, but did not

complete the translation. When Dr P. K. Sundaram joined the Department of Philosophy in 1954, he was advised to undertake a study of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* with a view to base an exposition of Advaita Epistemology thereon. A major portion of Part Three of his thesis follows closely Vimuktātman's examination of the theories of error. He has made use of other Advaita classics also to render his exposition of Advaita epistemology complete, and to exhibit the metaphysical implication of the epistemological discussions.

The printing of this work has taken more time than was expected. Uniformity in printing could not be achieved because after the first few formes were printed by one press, the rest of the work had to be entrusted to another press. The errors in printing are regretted.

MADRAS
November 12, 1968

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

PREFACE

The present work, Advaita Epistemology, was the thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Madras University in 1959. I record my grateful thanks to my esteemed Professor and Chief Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A.,Ph.D., Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, who has, at every step of my endeavours, instructed and educated me. Only at his instance, the work '*Iṣṭa-siddhi*' was taken up by me for studies. But for his active sympathy and constant encouragement the work would not have been completed. My thanks are due in a large measure to Sri Panditaraja S. Subrahmanya Sastri (Reader in Sanskrit, University of Madras), with whom I read the text of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*.

I am grateful to the authorities of the Madras University for the facilities that they provided me with for study and research. I also thank the authorities of the University Grants Commission for the publication of this work.

January, 1959. P. K. SUNDARAM

PREFACE

(To the Second Edition)

Advaita Epistemology has gone in for the second editlon due to demand. I thank the authorities of the University of Madras for sanctioning this second edition. I thank Dr. R. Balasubramanian, the present Director, The Dr. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Unlversity of Madras, for taking an active interest in the publication of this edition.

I regret the possible printing errors.

Even then, I thank the printers for the good job they have done.

Madras
20—6—1984

P. K. SUNDARAM

CONTENTS

PART IV

Chapter I

Chapter II

INTRODUCTION

I

In the present thesis, an attempt has been made to present the chief aspects of the Advaita epistemology with special reference to that great polemic Advaitic work, the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman, supplemented, wherever necessary, by the shorter, but equally valuable, work, the *Nyāyamakaranda* of Ānandabodha, who, most probably, was Vimuktātman's disciple, and who, naturally, acknowledges the great authority of Vimuktātman in deciding the philosophical issues. The views of the other great *Ācāryas*, like Maṇḍana, whose works are classed as the *Maṇḍana-prasthāna*, as against the *Śaṅkara prasthāna*, and who was the senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, Sarvajñātmamuni, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Citsukha, Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraṇya, Jñānaghanapāda and Appayya Dīkṣita are also, as and when required, incorporated in the thesis.

This is so because Vimuktātman, in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, discusses mainly the diverse theories of error, only to establish the theory of *māyā*. His interest thus being the vindication of the theory of *māyā*, he does not deal with other matters concerning a theory of knowledge like the sources of knowledge, nature and test of truth, and knowledge and reality. So, the first half of the thesis, so to say, is devoted to these topics and the second half to the theories of error and transcendence of error which is release. Thus the plan of the thesis is: (1) Sources of Knowledge, (2) Knowledge, Truth and Reality, (3) Error and (4) Transcendence of Error.

II

Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* has been published by the Gaekwad Oriental Series (No. LXV) in the year 1933, critically edited with a valuable introduction and illuminating notes by Professor M. Hiriyanna of Mysore along with the extracts from the commentary on the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, called *Vivaraṇa* by Jñānottama.

The work, *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, has been looked upon as one of the very important treatises constituting what is known as the *Siddhi* literature. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, at the end of his *Advaita-siddhi*, refers to three *Siddhi* works, viz., *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and *Brahma-siddhi*.[1] Madhusūdana Sarasvatī himself lived only in the last three quarters of the seventeenth century. So, the other three *Siddhis*, *Iṣṭa*, *Naiṣkarmya* and *Brahma* must be fairly old. The other two works that are included in the *Siddhi* literature are *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* of Sadānanda and the *Svārājya-siddhi* of Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī.

The *Brahma-siddhi* of Maṇḍana may be said to devote itself to the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and testimony (*pramāṇa*) of Brahman indicated in the expression *brahmajijñāsā*, the *what* of the desire to know Reality. The *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* of Sureśvara is interested in showing the *how* of Brahman-knowledge, i.e., whether it is by knowledge alone or by action that release is secured. The *Iṣṭa-siddhi* of Vimuktātman engages itself rather in the question of the *why* of Brahman-knowledge than in *what* or *how*, enquiring into the nature and cause of the error that is the world. The *Advaita-siddhi* of Madhusūdana can be said to sum up all the ideas coming within the purview of Brahman-knowledge, thus establishing Brahman as the only Reality transcending the phenomenal and the empirical. Thus, ontology, ethology and epistemology may be said to be the content of the *Brahma-siddhi*, the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* respectively.[2]

The *Iṣṭa-siddhi* has been important not only in the eyes of the Advaitins but also thinkers of the other schools of thought. Rāmānuja in his *Śrī Bhāṣya* and Yāmunācārya in his *Ātma-siddhi* refer to *Iṣṭa-siddhi*[3] Vedānta Deśika refers to *Iṣṭa-siddhi* in his

---

1. *Advaita-siddhi*, N. S. Edn. 1917, p. 900
siddhīnām iṣṭa-naiṣkarmya-brahmagān'miyaṁ cirāt
advaitasiddhir-adhunā caturthī samajāyata.

2. See Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri's *Introduction* to *Brahma-siddhi*, p. xxiii.

3. Prof. Hiriyanna's *Introduction* to *I.S.*, p. xi.; See p. 21 of *Siddhitraya* printed at Conjeevaram: pages 45–69. The words "*yānubhūtirajāmeyā*"

Sarvārtha-siddhi on *Tattvamuktākalāpa.*[4] He quotes, *verbatim*, the first stanza of *Iṣṭa-siddhi* in his *Tattva-ṭikā* and states that the summary of the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* in the *Śrī Bhāṣya* is according to the arguments of that stanza.[5] Among the Advaitic teachers, Citsukha, Amalānanda, and Bhāratītīrtha Vidyāraṇya refer to *Iṣṭasiddhi.*[6]

---

etc, occurring in the very first verse of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, are used by Yāmunāeārya. See the *Mahāpūrvapakṣa* in the *Śrī Bhāṣya* (N. S. Edn.) particularly page 61, beginning with the words "*svatassiddha*". Also compare p. 86 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya* beginning with '*smṛtirnabhāhyaviṣayā*' with *I. S.* IV. 17. Rāmānuja uses the word '*anubhūti*' in the sense of Brahman and this is from the first verse of *I.S.*, *yānubhūtiḥ*, etc.

4. pp. 417-8 Benares Edn. (*Sarvārtha-siddhi* quotes the verse from *Iṣṭa-siddhi* (Chapter I, 140) beginning with *durghaṭatvam avidyāyāḥ bhūṣaṇam, na tu dūṣaṇam. Bhāvaprakāśikā* explains this as follows: *iti kārikā iṣṭasiddhisthā-atra vadan ityanabhidhāya paśyannityuktyā neyaṁ kārikā maṇḍanamiśrīyā athāpi etat arthaḥ tat sammata iti tanmate iṣṭasiddhikṛdukta-dūṣaṇam aparihāryam iti bodhitam - etena iṣṭasiddhikṛtaḥ brahmājñānavāditayā naitadgrantha-saṅgatiriti śaṅkā parāstā*, etc., etc. See *Bhāvaprakāśa* (Ed. By Vidwan S. Narasimhacar, University of Mysore Oriental Library Publications, 1940), p. 390.

5. See article on *Iṣṭa-siddhi* by Prof. M. Hiriyanna in J.O.R. Vol. V., 1931, p. 327. The verse is as follows:

yānubhūtir-ajāmeyānantātmānandavigrahā
mahadādi jaganmāyā-citrabhittiṁ namāmi tām.
See *Tattva-ṭīkā* (Conjeevaram Edn.), Part II, p. 34

6. See *Tattvapradīpikā*, (N. S. Edn.) p. 381.
jñātorthas-taj jñaptirvā ājñānahāniriti
iṣṭasiddhikārair abhidhānāt.
Also *Kalpataru* on *Bhāmatī*, (N. S. Edn.) p. 932.
evaṁ hṛdi nidhayārtham iṣṭasiddhikṛto jaguḥ
atmaivājñānahānirvā tadapyātmaiva śiṣyate.

Sarvajñātman refers, according to the commentators on *Saṁkṣepasārīraka*, to the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. See Hiriyanna's article in J. O. R. Vol. V., 1931. Also Madhusūdana's commentary on verse 14 of Chapter IV of *Saṁ. Sār.*, Benares Edn. The expression '*muktikovidāḥ*' is explained by Madhusūdana as '*iṣṭasiddhikārāḥ*'. Madhusūdana also refers to *Iṣṭa-siddhi* in his *Advaita-siddhi*. Ānandabodha quotes Vimuktātman in several places of his *N. M.* Bhāratītīrtha quotes a verse from *Iṣṭa-siddhi* (Chapter I, p. 207). See *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* – Tr. By

Professor Hiriyanna quotes authority from the *Śrikaṇṭhacarita* of Maṅkhaka, a work that was composed in Kashmir in the first half of the 12th century, revealing thereby that one Ramyadeva, a reputed Vedantic teacher, had commented on the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, and that not only in South India but also in the North, Vimuktātman's name was well-known as an authority on Advaita to be reckoned with.

III

The details above set forth go to show, not merely how renowned Vimuktātman was, but also at what probable period he lived. The fact that Rāmānuja, according to Vedāntadeśika, adopts phrases from the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* as embodying certain Advaitic concepts in order to refute them, helps fixing the date of Vimuktātman as not, at any rate, later than the 12th century A.D. The date is pushed further back when it is seen that Yāmunācārya was aware of the work as a standard treatise on Advaita worth refutation by him. And 1100 A.D., was the date of Yāmunācārya. Allowing some time to elapse for the work to become well-established and credited with an authority all its own, the date of the composition of the work may be fixed as 1050 A.D., as the inferior limit.[7] And the fact that the *Śrikaṇṭhacarita*, which belongs to the 12th century A.D., mentions the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* shows that this inferior limit is not quite improbable.

Professor Hiriyanna argues, in support of 850 A.D., as the superior limit of the work, that Vimuktātman refers to Bhāskara[8]

S. S. S. Sastri, Section lxxxii. Rāmādvaya refers to *Iṣṭa-siddhi* in his *Vedāntakaumudī* and speaks as though he is guided by Vimuktātman's views.

7. See Hiriyanna's *Introduction* to *I. S.*, p. xii.

8. *I.S.*, Ch. I. *Kā* : 36 and 42. The *Kārikās* are:
nānyatra kāraṇāt kāryaṁ na cet tatra kva tadbhavet
nanevetyupamāyogād darśanābhāsatocyate – 36.
nanvanirvacanīyatve sadasattvaviparyayāt
durghaṭau khyātibhādhau stāṁ nāsaccet tatkathaṁ na sat – 42.
Vivaraṇa on *I. S.* says: bhāskaramatāvalambanena – *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 500

who can be taken to have flourished in the first half of the ninth century. From this it is possible to place Vimuktātman between 850–1050 A.D., says Professor Hiriyanna. Udayana refers to Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*. Udayana himself is assigned to 984 A.D. Vimuktātman is thus later than Bhāskara, that is, later than the 9th century A.D.

Vimuktātman quotes Sureśvara and Kumārila and differs from Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana and Sureśvara are considered the contemporaries of Śaṅkara. The date of Śaṅkara is usually considered to be 788-820 A.D. But there is also an opinion[9] according to which Maṇḍana must be later than Bhartṛhari and earlier than Śālikanātha. Bhartṛhari's date is 591–651 A.D. Śālikanātha's date is 650–730 A.D. So, Maṇḍana is placed between 615–695 A.D. So Śaṅkara's date also is pushed back to 632–564 A.D.[10]

Then, Vimuktātman, since he disagrees from Maṇḍana, on certain points like *Jivanmukti* and the locus of *ajñāna*,[11] must be definitely later than 700 A.D. And, Ānandabodha refers to Vācaspati Miśra[12] whose date is taken to be 841 A.D. If Ānandabodha were a disciple of Vimuktātman, the latter cannot be earlier than 850 A.D.[13] And Ānandabodha refers to *Iṣṭa-siddhi*.[14] Vācaspati criticises Bhāskara and quotes a verse from him. (See *Kalpataru*). Ānandabodha quotes Vācaspati while Vimuktātman criticises Bhāskara. Thus Vācaspati is later than Bhāskara (first half of 9th Century A.D.) and Ānandabodha is later than Vācaspati. Vimuktātman is later than Bhāskara but

---

9. Prof. Kuppuswamy Sastri – *Introduction* to *B. S.*, p. lviii.
10. Article by T. R. Cintamani, *Date of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya and some of his predecessors*. *J.O.R.*, Vol. III. 1929, pp. 39 to 56.
11. *I.S.*, pp. 74–78 and Chapter VI.
12. *N.M.*, pp. 163, 197.
13. Prof. M. Hiriyanna's article on *Iṣṭa-siddhi* in *J. O. R.* Vol. V. 1931, p. 331.
14. *N M.*, p. 359. Quotes a line from *Iṣṭa-siddhi*.
mithyābhāvena bhūtaṁ kiṁ mithyānᵓśān na naṅkṣyati.

earlier than Ānandabodha. Thus 850 A.D., as Prof. Hiriyanna estimates it, seems to be the most acceptable.

Professor Das Gupta, however, places Vimuktātman so near as 1200 A.D. Dr Paul Hacker thinks that his period is around 10th century A.D. Vācaspati criticises Maṇḍana in his *Bhāmatī*, (according to *Kalpataru* on IV-1.15 of the *Brahma-sūtras*). Professor Paul Hacker has suggested that Vācaspati's date is 976 A.D. Vācaspati says at the end of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* that it was composed in the year 898 (*vasvaritavasuvatsare*). If this refers to Saṁvat era, the year will be 841 A.D. Paul Hacker suggests that it refers to Śaka era which will correspond to 976 A.D.[15] In this case, Ānandabodha's date will be later than 976 A.D. And so Vimuktātman's date will fall just in the proximity of this date.

IV

Iṣṭa-siddhi is so named because it is the author's *iṣṭa*, viz., the defence of the doctrine of *māyā*.[16] The first five chapters are devoted to the establishment of the theory of indeterminability. In error, it is the indeterminable that appears, not the cognition of the Vijñānavādin, nor the void of the Mādhyamika, nor is error merely the non-discrimination of memory and perception as the Prābhākaras urge, nor even is it perception-otherwise, as the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas would believe. All these explanations fail because they do not satisfactorily account for the riddle that is illusion. And illusion is a riddle; otherwise it will cease to be illusion. No amount of theorising will explain away the experience of the illusory object here and now. So, it is not totally unreal. Yet illusion gets sublated by right knowledge. It is not real in the sense in which the shell is real, for example; it is indeterminable.

The world partakes of this indeterminability of *māyā* also, beings a product. Thus, the fact of illusion, the fact of change

---

15. See Dr K. Kunjunni Raja's paper in the Adyar Bulletin Vol. XXIV. parts 3-4.

16. ato māyātmā eko mayeṣṭaḥ siddhaḥ – *I. S.*, p. 347.
vyacicaramavidyāṁ tāṁ ata iṣṭārthasiddhaye – *ibid* : VIII. 28.
taṁ māṁ natvā iṣṭasiddhyartham vivṛṇomi. *Maṅgalācaraṇa. I.S.* p. 1.

and causality perceived in life in the world, can be said to be only the work of *māyā* which is its material cause.

The theory of error that comes in for one of the most brilliant dialectical criticisms at the hands of Vimuktātman is the theory of perception otherwise, particularly of the Bhāṭṭas.[17] The second, third, the fourth and the fifth chapters are entirely devoted to the refutation of the *anyathākhyāti* view. In Chapters Six and Seven, the author analyses the question of the locus of nescience and the issue of the oneness or the manyness of souls. The last and the eighth chapter discusses the question of the removal of nescience. Vimuktātman's special and unique contribution in regard to this theory is said to be the declaration that the removal of nescience is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, nor neither, but belongs to a fifth category, *pañcamaprakāra.* While Vimuktātman holds this view in the first chapter of his work and in the last chapter also, he lends countenance to two alternative theories, viz., (i) that removal of nescience is Brahman itself, and (ii) that it is indefinable like nescience itself. Still it is the *pañcamaprakāra* theory that has come to be associated with Vimuktātman.

These are the contents of the chapters of the thesis that come at the end.

To my knowledge, this great Advaitic work, *Iṣṭa-siddhi*[18] and also Ānandabodha's *Nyāyamakaranda,* have not been presented to the English-knowing scholars in any way that can be called elaborate and exhaustive. However, the interest of this thesis being primarily epistemological, the ontological questions touched upon by Vimuktātman have not been given chief emphasis.

---

17. The Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas differ only in this: The Bhāṭṭas do not agree that the illusory silver is an object of supra-normal perception, *alaukika pratyakṣa.*

18. Vimuktātman seems to have written another work called *Pramāṇa-vṛtti-nirṇaya.* An incomplete transcript of the original MS., is available in the Adyar Library, Madras.

ABBREVIATIONS

Aita. up.	—	*Aitareya Upaniṣad*
A. S.	—	*Advaita-siddhi*
Bṛh. up.	—	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
Bṛh. vār.	—	*Bṛhadāraṇyavārttika of Sureśvara*
B. S.	—	*Brahma-siddhi*
B. S. V.	—	*Brahma-siddhi-vyākhyā*
Chānd. up.	—	*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*
C. T., N. M.	—	*Citsukha's Ṭikā on Nyāyamakaranda*
G. O. S.	—	*Gaekwad Oriental Series*
I. S.	—	*Iṣṭa-siddhi*
Iśa. up.	—	*Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad*
J. O. R.	—	*Journal of Oriental Research, Madras*
J. V., I. S.	—	*Jñānottama's Vivaraṇa on Iṣṭa-siddhi*
Kā.	—	*Kārikā*
Kaṭha up.	—	*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*
Kena up.	—	*Kena Upaniṣad*
Māṇḍ. Kā.	—	*Māṇḍūkya Kārikās*
Muṇḍ. up.	—	*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*
N. Bh.	—	*Nyāya-Bhāṣya*
N. M.	—	*Nyāyamakaranda*
N. V.	—	*Nyāyavārttika*
P. P. V.	—	*Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*
Saṁ. Śār.	—	*Saṁkṣepaśāriraka*
S. B.	—	*Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras*
S. Bindu	—	*Siddhānta Bindu*
S. D. S.	—	*Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*
S. L. S.	—	*Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*
Śvet. up.	—	*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*
Taitt. up.	—	*Taittiriya Upaniṣad*
T. P. H.	—	*Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras*
T. S.	—	*Tattvaśuddhi*
V. P.	—	*Vedānta paribhāṣā*
V. S.	—	*Vedānta-Sūtras*

CHAPTER I

THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
PERCEPTION

1

The doctrine of vṛtti

To the Advaitin, nescience, which is positive, is the cause of all empirical distinctions of knower, known and knowledge.[1] The instruments of knowledge as well as that knowledge itself, along with the empirical ego which knows are relegated to the domain of nescience. Obscuring *ajñāna* is compared, in the *Siddhānta-bindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvati, to a jewel which makes the fire ineffectual; and if a particular plant (here the plant being the *vṛtti*, or mental modification), is placed near it, the power of fire is revived. Knowledge presupposes the distinction of the knower from the known. This division is unnatural and is brought about by the concealing and projective capacities of nescience. Nescience disguises the Truth by the richness of plurality. Nescience covers the all-pervading Self just as a finger placed in front of one's eyes covers the solar disc.[2]

The degeneration into plurality where alone empirical knowledge is possible, follows the superimposition of the not-self on the Self, as silver is superimposed on the shell in the silver-illusion. While in fact the Self is free and unattached to anything, for the reason

---

1. S'aṅkara's *Adhyāsabhāṣya:* tametam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanoritare-tarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ laukikāḥ pravṛttāḥ. *S. Bindu* puts it: pratyakṣādīnaṁ tu bādhitaviṣayatayā bhramatvepi-vyavahārasāmarthyena prāmāṇyābhimānāt — *G. O. S.*, Vol. LXIV. Tr. by P. C. Divanji. p. 36.

2. *S. Bindu*, p. 31. Āvaraṇa being defined as ignorance accompanied by the absence of a *vṛtti* produced by a means of knowledge, which is capable of producing the consciousness that a thing which exists and appears does not exist and does not appear. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

that there is nothing besides it for it to be related to, all the tedious distinctions of knowing. knower and known, subject and object, and the consequent usages, are mistakenly attributed to the Self, and the world of empirical activity is generated. The moment this superimposition drops away, there is no knowership and consequently, there is no operation of the means of knowledge. When there is no false identification ofthe senses with the Self, sense-activity like perception, etc., also cease; for, sense-activity is possible only for a knower. When there is no knower, how can there be any sense-activity? It is nescience that conjures up all cognitive functions. As it has transformed itself into the world of variety, so it has evolved itself into that cognitive instrument called the "Internal Organ" or the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

In a cognitive act, the nescience-generated internal-organ goes out through the channel of the eyes, etc., pervades the object, takes its own form. As the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* puts it: "Just as the water of the tank, going out through a hole, and entering fields through channels, comes to have a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ, too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight, etc., and reaching the locality of contents like pot is modified in the form of content like pot."[3] To the objection why the *antaḥkaraṇa* should modify itself and take the form of the object, Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-siddhi* replies that taking the form of the object only gives the capacity to the modification to remove the veil of nescience.

This modification is called technically a *vṛtti*. That aspect of Intelligence which is defined by egoity (which is the internal organ defined by the body) is the knower *(pramātā)*. That aspect of Intelligence which is defined by cognitive process (that connects the egoity with the object), is the means of cognition *(pramāṇa)*. That aspect of Intelligence defined by the element of fitness for manifestation present in the object (which pervades the object,

3. I *Pariccheda*, Ch. I. Tr. by S. S. S. Sastri. Madhusūdana Sarasvati uses the same simile in his *Advaita Siddhi*; but uses the simile of molten copper and solar light in his *S. Bindu*. See also T. M. P. Mahadevan's *Philosophy of Advaita* I p. 11. *ajñāna-nivartana-yogyatvasya tad-ākāratvarūpatvāt*, *A. S.*, p. 483.

assumes the form of the object and invests it with the character of objectness), is the cognition or *pramiti*.[4]

The Intelligence conditioned by nescience in the form of the object like pot is the content-consciousness, *viṣaya-caitanya*; conditioned by the modification of the internal organ is the cognitive-consciousness, *pramāṇa-caitanya*; and conditioned by the internal organ is the cogniser-consciousness, *pramātṛ-caitanya*. Thus it is nescience that makes one Intelligence appear in three aspects, *viṣaya-caitanya, pramāṇa-caitanya*, and *pramātṛ-caitanya*.[5] Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, however, speaks of four aspects. The portion of the Self defined by the internal organ is the knower, the aspect defined by the operation is the means of knowledge, the aspect defined by fitness for manifestation, residing in the object, is the act of knowledge. Fourthly, as for the object, it is *Brahma-caitanya* residing in the object.[6]

It is the function of *vṛtti* to manifest objects. Or, the *vṛtti* forges a connection between the Self conditioned by the object and the knowing-self and undraws the veil covering the Self conditioned by the object, According to both the authors of *Vivaraṇa* and *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, who hold the image theory, *pratibimbavāda*, the function of the *vṛtti* is to establish contact and lift the obscuring veil of nescience in that object thereby making the object-self and the subject-self non-different. According to the authors of *Vedānta-kaumudī* and *Prakaṭārtha*, on the occasion of the sense-object contact, the *manas* transforms itself, being activated by the moral destiny *(adṛṣṭādi kṣubdham)*, into the form of long ray reaching to the object. *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, earlier, has expressed the same idea. According to Rāmādvaya, author of *Vedānta-kaumudī*, the pure consciousness underlying the mind that lay dormant is stirred by the transformation of the mind into the psychosis or *vṛtti* and thus sets aside the veil that was drawn over it. The psychosis is the

---

4. *S. Bindu*, p. 33.

5. tasya ca abhivyaktasya caitanyasya ekatve'pi abhivyañjakāntaḥkaraṇa-bhāgabhedāt tridhā vyapadeśo bhavati. *S. Bindu*, p. 33.

6. *Ibid.*

transparent transmitter of consciousness to the object. Thus, the subjective and the objective elements get united (*(saṁśleṣa-pratyaya)* and, thence, results the cognition "I know the object". Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says in his *Advaita-siddhi* that the *vṛtti* manifests the *adhiṣṭhāna-caitanya* which is present but is unmanifest. In the case of mediate knowledge, there is no contact with the object, and so it is merely mental. In the case of immediate knowledge, the manifestation is of the object. According to Vācaspati Miśra who holds the *avaccheda* or limitation theory, the *vṛtti* has the function of sundering the veil of nescience that covers the soul and is the material cause of the universe.[7]

But, then, why should the soul require a *vṛtti* at all, if it were Intelligence itself? The reason is that the Intelligence has the omnipresent nescience for its adjunct and it cannot be directly one with the objects, since it is not the material cause of the objects. For example, the generic character 'cowness', though omnipresent, is not associated with horse, etc., though it is associated with a particular, possessing a dewlap. Similarly, Intelligence is associated with the internal organ, though not with the objects.[8]

So, the instrumentality of an internal organ is necessary for the contact of Intelligence with the external objects. It is the *vṛtti* again that manifests the non-difference of the Intelligence-Self from the Intelligence-defined-by-object. Or, we may say that it is through

---

7. *S. Bindu*, p. 34.

According to the Vivaraṇa school of thought the function of the *vṛtti* is to remove the obscuration over Brahman which is the material cause of the world, by first establishing a connection with it. So the function of the *vṛtti* is twofold here; connecting and enlightening. The obscuration of Brahman means being the object of the individual's ignorance. Accorping to *avacchedavādins* of the *Bhāmatī* persuasion, as the individual soul itself is the material cause of the world, only the obscuration is removed and nothing more, since the soul as the material cause is always connected with the object. So here the function is only one.

8. *S.L.S.*: Tr. by S. S. S. Sastri, p. 166.

the association with a *vṛtti* in respect of a particular object that the obscuring nescience is lifted. So, the functions of *vṛtti* are there (1) for the sake of contact of the object with Intelligence (2) for the manifestation of non-difference of Intelligence-Self from the object-defined Intelligence, or (3) for the removal of the obscuring nescience with regard to the particular object.[9]

According to Bhāratītīrtha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī there is no destruction of obscuration *(āvaraṇa)* by the *vṛtti*,, as otherwise, even the cognition of a pot will bring about release It only overpowers, and does not destroy, the obscuration.[10] Others put it in a different form. The author of *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* holds that *ajñāna* is one only which has several effects, while the author of *Iṣṭa-siddhi* agrees with him but says that there are many *ajñānas* with regard to an object. When knowledge arises, only one *ajñāna* perishes and the others persist. The author of *Vedānta-kaumudī* says that when there is a thunderbolt falling upon a crowd only one of them may be killed while others may only disperse; so also when one *ajñāna* is dispelled, other *ajñānas* may persist. It cannont be objected that if one *ajñāna* is removed, there will be other *ajñānas* acting as obstacles to the manifestation of the objects; for the very removal of one *ajñāna* is a guarantee or safeguard against the obscuration by other *ajñānas*. So long as the removal of *that* and one *ajñāna* continues to be there, the manifestation of the object also continues to be there. Or if the reference here is to the *nānā'jñānapakṣa* of the *Bhāmatī* school according to which there are as many *ajñānas* as

---

9. *S.L.S.*, p. 187. These are respectively called (1) *ciduparāga*, (2) *abhedābhivyakti* and (3) *āvaraṇābhibhava*. The Advaitin does not recognise the relation called *samavāya*, as the Naiyāyika does. He admits the relation of *tādātmya* or identity only. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* says : the application of modes of sense-contact (viz.. conjunction, identity with what is in conjunction, and identity with what is non-different from what is in conjunction) is in respect of generating the paychosis that manifests consciousness. p. 26.

10. *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha*, p. 72.
See T. M. P. Mahadevan : *Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 14. *S. Bindu* puts it: uttejakena maṇerva vṛttyāvaraṇasya abhibhavaṅgikārāt. p. 35.

there are individual souls, even then, so far as one individual alone is concerned, there should be liberation if ignorance is lifted. To this objection, it is replied that though ignorance with reference to one object is lifted, ignorance with regard to other objects may persist and so there is no question of instantaneous liberation when an object is known. The doubt that in that case, even *brahmajñāna* will not *destroy* the *ajñāna* and will have to be supposed only to overpower it, need not be seriously entertained because the intuition arising out of the *Mahāvākyas* is the truth and is not contradictable unlike the knowledge arising through perception, etc., which are strictly in truth not *pramā* at all but only *bhrama*.

Anyway, it is only that Intelligence which is manifested by the internal organ that is the cause of the experience of objects. Only through the internal organ can there be any association, and without any such association. no cognition is possible. But again, mere existence of the internal organ is not enough to reveal objects. The psychosis should reach and take on the form of the object. Where, however, there is no operation of the internal organ, and there is still cognition as in the experience of happiness, etc., it is the internal organ that has transformed itself into a *vṛtti* and is manifested by the witness-consciousness, because of sameness of locus of the *vṛtti* and consciousness conditioned by pleasure and pain.

With regard to the possible doubt that, on the supposition of the intervention of *vṛtti* in the matter of forging a connection between the knowing Self and the object, the knowledge of merit and its absence, etc , and of Brahman must take place without the intervention of the *vṛtti* because they are themselves connected with the inner organ, the Advaitin's reply is that the Self is not in harmony with those particular objects.[11] This absence of harmony is due to the obscuration by nescience in the *Brahma-caitanya*. This obscuration can be lifted only by the intervention

11. caitanyasya tattadākāratvābhāvāt, *Ibid.*, p. 35. This means that there is no relation like image, etc., svapratibimba ityādisambandhena dharmādi-sambaddhatvābhāvāt. See *Śrīratnāvali* on *S. Bindu*, Kumbhakonam Edn., p. 138.

of *vṛtti*. When Brahman is pure but obscured, the knowing Self is connected with it by a *vṛtti* of *antaḥkaraṇa* which gives rise to knowledge or manifestation. Where the object is unobscured but impure as in the case of illusory silver appearing in the mother-of-pearl, the connection is to be established by the *vṛtti* of nescience. But in the case of pleasure, pain, etc., which are unobscured and pure, there is no necessity of a *vṛtti* of the internal organ to connect. In the case of merit and demerit, etc., a psychosis is required not only to make them clear, but also to break the veil of nescience over them.[12] However, the *vṛtti* which causes the manifestation of object is only figuratively called "knowledge."[13] As the Vivaraṇakāra puts it: "Because of the figurative designation of "knowledge" in respect of the *vṛtti* of the internal organ."[14]

Again it can be asked how there could be a modification of the internal organ which is partless. But the internal organ is not partless since it has a beginning.[15] The scripture, too, declares the origin of the internal organ thus: "That created the mind."[16] The same *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* declares that the *vṛtti* is a modification of the mind in the following terms: "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind."[17]

12. dharmādharmau tu asvacchatvāt āvṛtatvād vā. *Ibid.*

13. *V.P.*, p. 8.

14. antaḥkaraṇavṛttau jñānatvopacārāt. See also Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛh. up.*: III, 4, 2.

15. *V.*P., p. 8.

16. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*: I. ii. 1: tan mano' kuruta, ātmanvī syāmiti.

17. I. v. 3. kāmaḥ saṁkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā'śraddhā dhṛtiradhṛtir hrīrdhīrbhīrityetat sarvaṁ mana eva.
The Sāṁkhya system heralds the hypothesis of *vṛtti*. According to the *Sāṁkhyapravacana-bhāṣya*, the pure consciousness is the knower, the modifi cation *(vṛtti)*, is the *pramāṇa*: *pramā* is the reflection in consciousness of the modifications in the form of the objects, I. 87. *Puruṣa* or pure consciousness is not transformable. And so in the process of the apprehension of the object, *buddhi* is modified in the form of the object. The connection of the *Puruṣa*, as reflected in the *buddhi*, with the object is called knowledge.

18. pramākaraṇam pramāṇam: *V.P.*, p. 2.

2

Criterion of Validity

The distinctive cause *(karaṇa)* of valid knowledge is proof or evidence, *pramāṇa*.[18] According to Śaṅkara, a means of knowledge is or is not a means according as it leads or does not lead to valid knowledge. Otherwise even a post, for instance, would be considered a means of knowledge in perceiving sound, etc. With giving rise to valid knowledge, the means of knowledge has done its function. Even the scriptures reveal only the factual connections in which ends and means stand. What people make of this knowledge is their discretion and the scriptures are strictly neutral like the sun or the lamp. The valid means of knowledge reveal their objects as the sun or the lamp would manifest the things, both beautiful and ugly alike. Even the scriptures seek not to alter things, but make the unknown known. Knowledge is valid when it has for its content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated, if we exclude recollection.[19] Novelty, *anadhigatatva*, is introduced when recollection is ruled out. But non-sublatability, *abādhitatva*, is common to both the definitions of validity, that which excludes and that which includes recollection.

18a. Rāmādvaya, the author of *Vedānta-kaumudī* does not, according to Prof. Das Gupta, agree with this definition of Dharmarāja. He defines right knowledge as that which presents the object as it is, much in the Logician's way. This definition gives a more realistic basis for knowledge. Novelty also is not acceptable to Rāmādvaya as a criterion. The difficulty of conti- nuous perception of the same object and the fact of recognition militate against such a definition. Ajñāta-jñāpanaṁ pramāṇam iti tad asāram. But this seems to be the *prima facie* view. Śrī Harṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa- khādya* argues against the criterion of unsublatability on the ground that even a wrong cognition may not be contradicted by any other cognition. The faulty perception, again, may be sublated by another faulty perception, or the right perception itself may be contradicted by an erroneous one. If it is said that the contradiction can be only by a faultless perception we are arguing in a circle since we cannot say at any time what faultless perception is without some reference to the fact of contradiction. According to Citsukha. commentator on Śrī Harṣa's work, it is not possible to say whether any piece of knowledge will continue to remain uncontradicted for all time.

3

The Validity of Recollection

Among Indian philosophers there is difference of opinion as to the validity of memory. The Prābhākaras, for example, treat recollection as valid knowledge. All knowledge is valid, and is either direct experience, *anubhava* or recollection, *smṛti*. Errors arise, not in cognitions, but only in the consequent conduct. Praśastapāda gives memory an independent place as a *pramāṇa*.[19] Viśvanātha in his *Nyāyasūtra-vṛtti* does not regard memory as a distinct and independent source of knowledge, since in memory, there is only reproduction of a past experience in the same form and order in which it existed and has since ceased to exist.[20] However, some Logicians are inclined to include memory among the valid cognitions but only in so far as it is not contradicted or sublated. Laugākṣi Bhāskara in his *Tarkakaumudi* frames his definition of means of proof so as to cover remembrance.[21]

Memory is true only in so far as it follows the original perception without, in the meantime, being obscured by intruding perceptions. "The more purely reproductive the imagery is, the

---

19. See *Padārthadharma-saṅgraha* on memory. However, remembrance can be dropped from the panel of *pramāṇas*, as is done by the Naiyāyika, on the ground that it is only a reproduction of the past. See *Sarva-siddhāntasāra-saṅgraha*: v. 33. Vallabha argues in his *Nyāyalīlāvati* that memory informs us of objective facts as *past*. Nay, it is as much presentative as *anubhava* since it tells us about an objective order of things. Rassell agrees with this view. See his *Analysis of Mind* p. 173. Memory is an independent source of knowledge because it alone tells us about the past, says Prabhācandra on behalf of Jainism. See his *Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*.

    Praśastapāda brings memory under true knowledge along with perception, etc., while the syncretist school following Nyāya tradition groups memory as exclusive of perception, etc. For Śridhara's view, see his commentary on *Padārthadharma-saṅgraha* relating to remembrance. See also A. B. Keith: *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 53f.

20. 1. I. 3.

21. S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 116; also *Tarkakaumudi*, p. 7.

more it has of the nature of memory".[22] And, if the original perception is valid, its memory also is valid.[22a] In *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, memory is admitted to be valid in so far as it is not sublatable, in the manner of some Logicians. But that memory is valid is not the same as to say that memory is an independent source of knowledge. Memory does not reveal anything that is not revealed by anything else. As the *Yoga-sūtras* put it, *anubhūtaviṣayā saṁpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*. It has no *anadhigatatva*, though it may have *abādhitatva*.

But if novelty or *anadhigatatva* is insisted on as an essential condition for validity, a difficulty as pointed out by the author of *Vedānta-kaumudī* arises as to the continuous cognition of one and the same object; the second instant of the cognition of the same object does not have anything as a novel content, and so, it will have to be declared invalid. The cognitions subsequent to the first are, on this view, only memory of the first cognition which has grasped the presented object, and memory. if tested by the criterion of novelty, falls short. But this difficulty is more imaginary than real. First, cognitive stream cannot be divided into distinctive, separate moments. The cognition of pot is a single integral psychosis of the internal organ. Once the psychosis arises, it continues till another arises opposed to it. So it is not proper to sunder the single cognitive process into discrete atomic moments one succeeding the other discontinuously.[22b] Secondly,

---

22. D. J. B. Hawkins: *The Criticism of Experience*, p. 97. See Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛh. up*, IV, 3, 6.

22a. See: *Tarkāmṛta*: pūrvānubhavasya yathārthatvāyathārthatvābhyāṁ smaraṇamapi ubhayarūpaṁ bhavati.

G. F. Stout in the West held that when we remember, what we remember is something past, but the remembering nonetheless takes place in the present and demands a *present* representation. This representation is not what we remember, for it is *present*. Obviously, the past cannot be in the present. Both the fact of representation and the object represented must have to be referred in any account of memory.

22b. kiñca siddhānte dhārāvāhika-buddhisthale na jñāna-bhedaḥ, kintu yāvad ghaṭaspuraṇaṁ tāvad ghaṭākārāntaḥkaraṇa-vṛttir ekaiva, na tu nānā. Ānandajñāna in his *Tarka-saṁgraha* and Rāmādvaya in his *Vedānta-*

even accepting that there are distinct moments in one continuous cognition, each moment of cognition has a novel content that is characterised by that moment alone in which it is cognised. Moreover, the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* says that time which is colourless and which is, therefore, not usually considered as an object of the senses, is yet cognised.[22c] This is so perhaps because it comes in association with the content which is characterised by it. In other words, as there are moments in cognition, on our present supposition, each cognition in the series can have a new content, only if the object of cognition, too, is, corresponding to the succeeding moments, new. If cognitions are characterised by time, so are objects. Hence, it is the object corresponding to the moments of cognitions in time that is cognised. This "time-quality"[23] is what is meant by saying that time is perceived along with the object as qualified by that.[24] Thirdly, it cannot be said that the cognitions subsequent to the first one are equivalent to memory, because even the subsequent cognitions are produced by the same conditions as give rise to the first cognition; while memory is purely a mental act, these subsequent cognitions face an object which is present here and now. So, they are not past knowledge but only present knowledge. And, unless the cognition is continuous, there cannot be the consciousness that one is perceiving the same object and that it is the same

---

kaumudī hold that there is a plurality of nesciences to be destroyed in the perception of an object and that in a quick succession the nesciences are destroyed by a successive series of cognitions in time. For Vimuktātman's concept of the plurality of *ajñānas*, see the chapter on *Ajñāna* of this book.

22c. Rāmādvaya differs from Dharmarāja on the question of the perception of time also. Perception of time, according to him, is only the perception of the succession of cognitive acts; what is called the present time is only the fusion of successive moments of time into one concrete duration. These moments so fused are only successive awarenesses. So, the clause referring to the present time is not included by Rāmādvaya in the definition of perception, *na kālaḥ pratyakṣagocaraḥ*. See Das Gupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 212.

23. See D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 24.

24. V. P., p. 4.

consciousness that is so cognising. So, while discontinuity is accepted for the sake of argument, the Advaitin believes that cognition is not momentary but continuous even as the object is not momentary but one manifestation of a nescience that is continuous and persistent. Thus, a valid source of knowledge is that the content of which is not contradicted and is novel, and a valid knowledge is that which is not contradicted.[25] Śaṅkara writes: A thing that is known through some means of knowledge to have a certain characteristic retains that characteristic even in a different place, time or condition; otherwise, all functioning of the means of knowledge would stop.[25a]

4

Number of Pramāṇas

Six sources of knowledge are accepted by the Advaitin.[26] They are perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-cognition. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas also accept all these six. As a matter of fact, generally the Advaitins follow the Bhāṭṭas in all empirical categories and usages.[27] The Cārvāka materialists accept only perception. Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas accept perception and inference. Sāṁkhyas accept perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas take the comparison also as a *pramāṇa*. The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas accept five *pramāṇas* with presumption while the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins accept six, adding non-cognition or *anupalabdhi*.

According to Kumārila, presumption or *arthāpatti* cannot be brought under inference. In inference, it is the *probans* or the *hetu* which is known first and later on, through this, the *sādhya* or the major term is to be proved. But both of these cannot be

---

25. pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇam. tatra smṛtivyāvṛttaṁ pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārtha-viṣayakajñānatvaṁ; smṛtisādhāraṇaṁ tu abādhitārtha-viṣayaka-jñānatvam. V. P., p. 3.

25a. *Bṛh. up.*: II, 1, 20.

26. tāni pramāṇāni ṣaṭ, pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdārthāpattyanupalabdhibhedāt. V. P., p. 6.

27. vyavahāre bhaṭṭanayaḥ.

apprehended at the same time. It is only here that *arthāpatti*, as a *pramāṇa*, differs from inference. *Arthāpatti* is available in cases where, for example, the absence of the living Devadatta from the house is unintelligible without the presumption of his existence somewhere outside the house. Devadatta must exist outside or inside the house. But the mind cannot stay in the contradiction, and, so, without presuming the external existence of Devadatta, even the perceived non-existence of Devadatta inside the house cannot be understood. The presumption of his existence outside supplies the missing link in the understanding of the position. "*Arthāpatti* is thus the result of *arthānupapatti* or the contradiction of the present perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge."[28] But there is no such contradiction in inference.

With regard to non-cognition, *anupalabdhi*, Kumārila argues that the non-existence of a thing "cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence".[29] And it cannot be perceived by any other *pramāṇa*. Non-apprehension is not perception because there is no sense-contact; nor is it inference. If it is said that wherever there exists an object, there is the perception of it; and naturally where there is no perception of an object in a place, its absence is inferred, this 'absence of perception' and 'absence of existence' are precisely the things to be accounted for. It is only through non-cognition as a *pramāṇa* that these negations are perceived. Either it is want of knowledge or it is absence of the object. In either way, negation as a separate category must be accepted. Again: what is meant by saying that one perceives "only" the ground when the jug or jar is not there? Mere perception cannot produce the knowledge of the negation of the jug for, even where there is the jug, there is

28. Das Gupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 393. According to Prabhākara: "It differs from inference since an element of doubt enters into the facts observed, which can be removed only by the assumption of something else. In inference there is no room for any element of doubt". S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 393, II Edn., 1931. See Kumārila, *Ślokavārtika*, Eng. Trans. by Jha, p. 230.

29. *Ibid.*: also V. Sec. 9, Jha's translation, pp. 243 to 252.

the perception of the ground. And, "the non-perception of an object generates the notion of negation[30] immediately and not through other negations". Thus *anupalabdhi* is a separate *pramāṇa*.

5

Pratyakṣa or Direct Perception

Pratyakṣa has been defined as that which is the distinctive cause of valid perceptual knowledge.[31] The first and foremost characteristic of perception is its immediacy and directness. This immediacy follows from the fact that in perceptual knowledge, the non-difference of the cognitive consciousness from the content-defined consciousness is brought about through the psychosis. Perceptual knowledge is itself[32] consciousness which is immediate. So, the immediacy of the perceptual knowledge[33] is derived from the metaphysical nature of Reality, that is profound consciousness, and is direct, *aparokṣa*. It is this Reality-Intelligence that is called perceptual knowledge when through the psychosis and the sense-contact, a revelation of the object is brought about. All perceptual knowledge refers to this Reality-Consciousness only, which, though really has no beginning or end, yet seems to have them by the transference to it of the attributes of psychosis which originates and disappears. Conversely, the name 'knowledge' given to the psychosis is, thus, figurative only because knowledge does not have a beginning.[34]

---

30. Das Gupta: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 399.

31. pratyakṣa-pramākaraṇam pratyakṣam. *V.P.*; p. 7.

32. pratyakṣapramā tu atra caitanyameva, *Ibid.* Citsukha holds in his *Tattvapradīpikā* that while the perceptual consciousness and experience are direct and immediate, the *aparoksatva* of the Self has got a further characteristic of *avedyatva* or non-objectness. The objects of experience are immediately given, no doubt. But they are still *objects*. The Self, on the contrary, is both immediate and non-object.

33. While the perceptual cognition is determined by the non-difference of the cognitive consciousness from the content-defined consciousness, the perceptual character present in the content consists in the non-difference from the cogniser, *V.P.*, p. 12 and p. 20.

34. vṛttau jñānatvopacāraḥ, *V.P.*, p. 8. which is also the opinion of the Vivaraṇakāra: antaḥkaraṇavṛttau jñānatvopacārāt. The *Bṛh. up.*, says:

Consciousness, *caitanya*, is three-fold. (1) *Viṣaya-caitanya* (content-consciousness), (2) *Pramāṇa-caitanya*, (cognitive consciousness) and (3) *Pramātṛ-caitanya* (cogniser-consciousness). It is the manifestation of one and the same Intelligence-consciousness as three. What is impartite appears as partite. This metaphysical identity of the *tripuṭī*, the trio of knowledge, the knower, the known and the knowledge, is the *rationale* of all perceptual knowledge. If perception is immediate non-difference of the subject from the object, it is because they are one in fact. Otherwise the identity cannot be brought about. The object is only consciousness limited, even as the cognitive consciousness is consciousness limited by the psychosis of the internal organ, and the cogniser is consciousness limited by the internal organ. Perception can be characterised either from the point of view of cognition or from the point of view of the object. From the point of view of cognition, it is defined as the non-distinction of the consciousness defined by cognitive process (*pramāṇacaitanya*) and the same defined by the object (*viṣayacaitanya*), through the spatial superimposition of the psychosis on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object is the non-difference of the object from the knower who is *caitanya* conditioned by *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind. Some problems arising out of this doctrine will be considered later.

The perceptual process happens in the following way: (1) The internal organ, which is of the nature of light, goes through the sense of sight, etc., and, reaching to the locality of contents like pot is modified in the form of contents like pot. This modification or modalisation is called a "psychosis".[35] The object

---

dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva. 'It thinks as it were', 'shakes as it were'. Ātman through the mind *seems* to think. In fact there is no thinking either in the Self or in the mind.

35. *V.P.*, p. 13. Comparable to the '*species impressa*' of the Greek scholastics. To Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist school, all knowing takes place through the assimilation of the subject to the object. But this assimilation does not reside in the knowing. Knowing is *sui generis* and cannot be defined. Though a *species impressa* is required for the process of assimilation, no *species expressa* is required for the cognitive

of perception and the psychosis come to be in the same locus outside.[36] This identity is rendered possible by the fact that both of them, psychosis and the object, are only consciousness conditioned.[37] The same fact of non-difference explains the perceptual character of the cognitions like "I am pleased", "I am miserable". Consciousness defined by pleasure, misery, etc., and consciousness defined by those respective psychoses, come to be one; and hence, the immediacy of perception of misery, or pleasure.[38]

(2) The simultaneous presence in time is the second requirement of perception because there cannot be non-difference arising out of sense-contact between two entities which exist at different times. Also, the psychosis should not be that of recollection. The psychosis and the object should belong to the present.[39]

(3) To avoid the difficulty here, viz., the contingence of perceptual character for the cognition of merit and demerit through verbal testimony because of the requirement of simultaneity being fulfilled here, the further requirement is added that the object must be *fit* for perception. For example, mind is not an object though it is present. Fitness, or competency is another determinant of perceptual character.[40]

The only way to decide which object is competent for perception and which not, is the pragmatic one of judging by the consequence brought about by the intrinsic nature of things.[41]

Thus, non-difference, competence and simultaneity constitute perceptibility.

---

act. The object is directly known. D. J. B. Hawkins, *The Criticism of Experience*, p. 116.

36. bahirekatra. *V.P.*, p. 13.

37. ghaṭāvacchinnacaitanyasya tadvṛttyavacchinnacaitanyasya ca abhinnatā— *V.P.*, p. 14.

38. *V.P.*, p. 21.

39. vartamānatvaṁ viṣaya-viśeṣaṇaṁ deyam. *V.P.*, p. 15.

40. yogyatvasyāpi viṣayaviśeṣaṇatvāt. *V.P.*, p. 16.

41. phalabalakalpyaḥ svabhāva eva śaraṇam. *Ibid.*

6

The Meaning of Non-difference

Three views are enumerated in the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* pertaining to the meaning of non-difference implied in the immediacy of perception under *abhedābhivyakti*, the other two purposes of the *vṛtti* being *ciduparāga* and *āvaraṇābhibhava*.

(1) The identification of the object-defined and the internal-organ-defined intelligences through a psychosis is what is called the manifestation of non-difference. This is *abhedābhivyakti*. Since the *Jīva* is finite, the psychosis links the knower with the known. Here by the identification through the psychosis, the nature of the *Jīva* is brought about for the Brahman-Intelligence defined by the object. So, though what manifests the object is the Brahman-Intelligence defined by the object, yet in fact it is the *Jīva* that so manifests the object because of its identification with Brahman-Intelligence defined by the object.

(2) The second view does not accept this identification of Brahman, the prototype and the object-defined, with the *Jīva* that stands in the position of reflection, since there exists an adjunct viz. the internal organ like a mirror. If the object-defined Brahman-Intelligence is identified or becomes one with the *Jīva* through the *vṛtti*, then, because there is the adjunct or the *upādhi* at the time of such identification, there cannot be any conjunction for Brahman-Intelligence with that object and consequently the object will not be known to Brahman. But what really happens is, the object-defined Brahman-Intelligence is reflected in the proximate part of the *vṛtti* associated with the object and this reflection is what manifests the object. There is the identification only of this *reflection* with the *Jīva*. Thus, the non-difference of the subject with the reflection of the substrate of the object, viz., the object-defined Brahman—Intelligence, is brought about. The psychosis helps manifesting this identity of subject and object-consciousnesses.

(3) The third view does not countenance the indirect identification which supposes a *tertium quid* in the form of reflection. It

holds that the superimposition is direct and that it is the object-defined Brahman-Intelligence which is in the position of the prototype and is the substrate, that manifests the object. The manifestation of non-difference is the identification of the Intelligence characterised *per accidens* (*upalakṣaṇa*) by virtue of being the prototype, with the Jiva, though there is difference between it and the *Jiva* in so far as the character of the *Jiva* is internal-organ-defined consciousness which is *per proprium* (*upādhi*) and the *sākṣi* is conditioned by the internal organ *per accidens*, (*antaḥkaraṇopahitacaitanyam*).[42] The psychosis lifts the cloud of nescience concealing the object and consequently the intelligence conditioned by the object shines forth and the object is manifested.

In the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, it is said that the psychosis in the form of pot being in conjunction with pot, and pot-defined consciousness being non-different from consciousness defined by that pot-psychosis, there is the perceptual character for the pot-cognition.[43] This happens because the consciousness defined by both is the same. Since, thus, it is the non-difference of consciousness that determines the perceptual character of cognition, and ensures the immediacy, one need not hold[44] that the object-defined Brahman-Intelligence causes in the proximate part of the psychosis associated with the object a reflection, and that it is this reflection that is non-different from the Intelligence, that is the substrate of the object. Because, it remains to be asked: Is the reflection different or non-different from the cognitive consciousness? If the first, the perceptual character of cognition cannot be said to be determined by non-difference of the cognitive consciousness from the content-defined consciousness. If the second, then, it can be accepted that there is non-difference between the object-defined consciousness and the cognitive consciousness through the psychosis. The doubt that, if there be non-difference through psychosis, there will result the nature of *Jiva* for the object-defined Brahman,

42. See *S.L.S.*, Vol. I, p. 191, Sec. 5, 123.

43. *V.P.*, p. 14.

44. See *S.L.S.*, Vol. I, p. 189, Section 5, 122.

and as *Jīva* is limited and finite, then, there being no conjunction for Brahman at that time with the object, the object cannot be known to Brahman and that there will be no omniscience for Him is needless. For, the identity that is asserted is only that of consciousness,[45] and not of the adjuncts. In perception, the aspect of immediacy is due to non-difference; the cognition of the object is due to the psychosis. In other words, while directness of perception is due to non-difference, the cognition of the object as having a certain form is due to the psychosis taking the form of the object, and lifting the nescience with regard to the object. For, however non-different the substrate consciousness may be, the object is known by the subject in a cognition. It is not the object that is non-different from the subject; if it were, there will be no cognition of the object in the external world, or as Dharmarāja himself puts it, it may be objected that one should say "I am the book" and not "I know the book" if the subject and object were identical. Prakāśātman says that the reason why one does not say 'I am the book' but only 'I know the book' is that in the case of the perceiving subject, the consciousness illumines the unity of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, its *vṛtti* and the object resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the revelation of the object to which the function of the psychosis is directed in spatial superimposition. The difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus traced to the mode of the *vṛtti* in relation to the percipient and the perceived object. So, we will have to say that, while the non-difference is affirmed between the *pramāṇa-caitanya* or for that matter *pramātṛ-caitanya*, and *viṣaya-caitanya*, it is done on a metaphysical ground, while the cognition of the object through the psychosis is the epistemic act of knowing. Rāmakṛṣṇa commenting on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, admits that there is the immediate contact of the object only with the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and not with the cogniser (*pramātṛ-caitanya*). He defends the position of Dharmarāja Adhvarin only on the ground that Dharmarāja in his *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* was following the Viva-

---

45. *S.L.S.*, Vol. I, p. 191, Sec. 5. 123

raṇakāra's opinion and the other traditional writers.[45a] Das Gupta observes that the reference to Vivaraṇakāra in this connection is wrong as the Vivaraṇakāra, though he said that the perceptibility of the object consists in its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge, here understands by the expression *'samvit'*, only a cognitional idea or sense-knowledge and not the cogniser (*pramāṭṛ*) as Rāmakṛṣṇa would take it. *Tattvadīpana* explains the word *'samvit'* as follows: *saṁvicchabdena indriyārtha-saṁprayoga-ja-jñānasya vivakṣitatvāt.*[45b] As the author of the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* puts it, immediacy is asserted in the perception of *external* objects, and not in the way of Vijñānavādins to whom there is no external object at all. The direct and immediate relation of the object to the subject is what constitutes perceptibility of the object, says the *Vivaraṇa.*[45c] Prof. Das Gupta puts the matter in a nutshell when he says: "...on the occasion of a cognitive operation...both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened...by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact"...[45d] The Advaita account thus differs, according to Das Gupta, from the Nyāya theory that cognition is the quality of the Self as knower, from the Bhāṭṭa view that cognition is unperceived movement, or transformation of the Self to be inferred from knownness of the object and from the Vijñānavādin's theory that cognition does not have a corresponding external reality.

So, the metaphysical concept of non-difference is offered only to account for immediacy in perceptual knowledge, in answer to

---

45a. viṣayasyāparokṣatvaṁ saṁvidabhedāt iti vivaraṇe tatra tatra ca sāṁpradāyikaiḥ pramātrabhedasyaiva viṣaya-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇatvenābhidhānād evam uktam: *Śikhāmaṇi* on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Venkateswara Press, Bombay, p. 65.

45b. *Tattvadīpana*, Banaras, 1902, p. 104, Quoted by Das Gupta, *op. cit.*

45c. *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, p. 50. *avyavadhānena samvid upādhitā aparokṣatā viṣayasya.*

45d. *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 211. See also *S.L.S.* on the subject.

the question: how can the subject know the object which is outside? The *vṛtti* is the physiological psychology of perception, and the cognition of the object is the epistemology of the whole process. One can say that 'philosophic non-difference, and not scientific causality' is the key to perception. According to the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and the Vivaraṇa school of thought, the perceptual character of the sensory knowledge is not determined by the contact of the senses with the object. The immediacy of cognition is not sense-generated because of the contingency of immediacy even for inference etc., which are but mediate and mind-generated, if mind is considered a sense. Further, there will be the mediateness even for the knowledge of God because it is not sense-generated.[46] So it is only the non-difference of *vṛtti-caitanya* with the *viṣaya-caitanya* i.e. the *caitanya* being one in both that determines the perceptual character and immediacy.

Is manas or antaḥkaraṇa a sense-organ?

Between the main Vedānta schools, the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī, the latter holds that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is a sense-organ, and the former holds that it is not. According to Vācaspatimiśra, the knowledge of happiness, misery etc., are valid, *pramā*, since they are generated by the *manas* which is a sense-organ; and all sense-generated knowledge is valid. To the Vivaraṇa school, knowledge of happiness, misery, etc., is not valid since it is not sense-generated but is manifested by the Witness-Self, *sākṣibhāsya*. It happens in the following way: In the case of consciousness defined by pleasure, misery etc., and consciousness defined by the psychoses of pleasure, misery etc., the two adjuncts being present in the same locus, the perceptual character, *pratyakṣatva*, for the experience of pleasure, misery etc., as "I am pleased", "I am miserable", arises.[47] Though cognition of happiness, misery etc., is internal perception it does not require the activity of a sense-organ as in the case of external perceptions like sight etc., since they are made manifest by the Witness-Intelligence. Mind is

46. *V.P.*, p. 12; also p. 29.

47. *V.P.*, p. 14.

only the locus of valid knowledge, and not an instrument.[48] The experience "I perceive this with the mind" is not an evidence for stating that mind is an instrument of perception. "Mind which is the material cause of cognition is also the efficient cause of the superimposition of cognition etc., on the Self."[49]

To the objection that the *Bhagavad-gītā* says: "The sense-organs with mind as the sixth"[50] and, therefore, it is clear that mind is the sixth sense, the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* answers: The word 'sixth' does not connote that the mind is the sixth sense-organ. There is no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by another sense-organ. When it is said: "Those who are five with the *yajamāna* eat the *iḍā*"[51] the number five connected with the *ṛtviks* is completed by the *yajamāna*, though he himself is not a *ṛtvik*. So also the case of *Mahābhārata* by which the number connected with the Vedas is completed, though *Mahābhārata* itself is not a Veda. Further, there are scriptural texts also to support, like: "Objects are superior to the sense-organs, the mind is superior even to objects".[52] To say that, if mind were not to be a sense-organ, there could be no immediacy for the perception of pleasure etc., is not right, since immediacy of cognition is not generated through the senses, but as was stated earlier, by the fact of non-difference of *vṛtti-caitanya* from *viṣaya-caitanya*.

Bhāratītīrtha in his *Pañcadaśī* tries to synthesise the two opposed views of *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa*; he characterises *manas* as an internal sense,[53] in support of the *Bhāmatī* view. There are of course certain arguments in favour of *Bhāmatī* view also.

---

48. *Bhedadhikkāra*, Tr. by S. S. S. Sastri, and T. M. P. Mahadevan, p. 3.
49. T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*, I Edn., p. 29.
50. XV. 7: mana ṣaṣṭhānīndriyaṇi karṣati.
51. yajamānapañcamā iḍāṁ bakṣayanti. The sentence "indriyaṇāṁ manaścāsmi" (among the senses, I am *manas*) should be interpreted in the same way as "nakṣatrāṇāṁ ahaṁ śaśi" (I am moon among stars). See *Maṇiprabhā*, p. 43.
52. *Kaṭha-upaniṣad*: III, 10.
53. T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*, I Edn., p. 30.

The *Gītā* says that "mind is superior to the senses", where it can be construed that the internal sense is superior to the external sense.[54]

Śaṅkara while commenting on the *Vedānta-sūtras*[55] says that while scripture holds mind not to be a sense-organ,[56] by mentioning mind separately from the sense-organs, the traditional code, *smṛti*, mentions eleven sense-organs. It is not unreasonable on the part of Vācaspati to have taken Śaṅkara as favouring his view.[56a]

If it is objected against Vācaspati that if mind is a sense-organ, *brahma-jñāna* since it originates through *manas* will be a *mānasa-jñāna* or mental knowledge, it is to be pointed out that Brahman is not the content of the knowledge born through the mind that is impure. The *phala* or the fruit of knowledge is the *cidābhāsa* or reflection of Intelligence in the *vṛtti* or psychosis. In the *brahmākāra-vṛtti* Reality-psychosis, Brahman is not manifested by the *cidabhāsa*, but, only the content of the mere psychosis. Moreover, if it is said that being content of *manas* is not accepted for Brahman, it is replied that being content of words, too, is not accepted for Brahman.[57] Shall this mean that

54. See *Vṛttiprabhākara* of Niścaladāsa, Tr. into Tamil, p. 50.

55. II. 4. 17.

56. *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*, II. 1. 3. etasmājjāyate prāṇo manas-sarvendriyāṇi ca.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* tries to establish the existence of mind apart from the senses and directing them. Its functions are given as desire, deliberation, doubt, faith, want of faith, patience, impatience, shame, intelligence and fear. If one is touched from behind, the mind knows the touch as that of a hand or that of a knee. So the internal organ that is the mind should be accepted as existing. Commenting on this passage, Śaṅkara does not pronounce any judgment as to whether mind is a sense-organ or no. See *Bṛh. up.*, 1. 5. 3.

56a. Vācaspati writes; manasastvindriyatve smṛteravagate kvacidindriyebhyo bhedenopādānaṁ gobālīvardhanvāyena. athavā indriyāṇāṁ vartamānamātraviṣayatvān manasastu traikālyagocaratvādbhedenābhidhānam. *Bhāmatī*: II. 4. 17.

57. yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha. *Taittirīyopaniṣad, Brahmānanḍavallī*; also see *Keṇopaniṣad*: yadvācānabhyuditam, etc.

the great texts declaring identity are fruitless? That will be repugnant to Advaita. For this should mean only that Brahman is not the content of the knowledge that originates from the express sense, *śakti-vṛtti*, of the words, but of that knowledge that originates from the implied sense, *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*, of words.[58] In the same way as in the knowledge originating from *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti* of words, Brahman is not the content of the *phala* of the *cidābhāsa-rūpa* but only the content of the *vṛtti* that removes the obscuration of nescience. Just as being content for knowledge born of words for Brahman is not totally denied, even so being content of the *mānasa-jñāna* for Brahman also is not totally denied. Only, Brahman is not the content of the *manas* which is impure, and is also not content of the *cidābhāsa* element in *manas*. Now, it cannot be said that there cannot be two *pramāṇas* in the matter of Brahman-knowledge, viz., scriptural texts and *manas*. For in the case of recognition, there are seen two sources of knowledge operating, viz., memory and perception. Immediacy doubtlessly results if *manas* is accepted as capable of originating Brahman-knowledge, more than it would if scriptural texts are accepted so.[59]

According to Vācaspatimiśra, it is the *prasaṅkhyāna*[60] or continued meditation rather than the *śravaṇa* or hearing, that is the

---

58. padārthaśca dvividhaḥ śakyo lakṣyaśceti *V.P.*, p. 69.

59. See *Vṛttiprabhākara* I, 19 and *Vicārasāgara* (IV Taranga) of Niścaladāsa, translated from Hindi by Brahmānanda Swāmin. See also: *S.L.S.*, Ch. III. 4. 3.

60. Brahmadatta and Maṇḍana adhere to this doctrine. Brahmadatta holds that the Upaniṣads, also like the ritualistic portions, intend injunctions, not for rituals, but for meditation. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads is to be found not in the statements like *tat-tvam-asi*, but *ātmetyevopāsīta* (*Bṛh. up.*, I. 4 7). After studying the statements like *tat-tvam-asi*, one should meditate on their purport. There is an interval of time between the acquisition of upaniṣadic knowledge and liberation. According to the *yathākratu-nyāya*, a person who knows the form of a deity mediately can render that knowledge immediate by continued meditation upon it. Similar is the case here. Maṇḍana holding the same opinion as Brahmadatta differs from the latter in that he holds that not meditation *itself*, but *jñāna*, the result of meditation, is the

cause of Brahman-knowledge. Vācaspati says: "The internal organ, aided by maturity of contemplation of the sense of the text, manifests in the case of the immediately experienced denotation of the "thou" its being the denotation of "that" through the negation of the respective adjuncts".[61] The Bhāmatī school holds that "the final intuition cannot be effective in destroying ignorance which is immediate unless it is itself immediate, that the immediacy can come only from the functioning of a sense-organ, and that this sense-organ is the mind."[62] The trained mind of a *yogin* or a *siddha* can intuit Brahman. To the story in which the enumerator was left out but realised himself immediately as the tenth by the declaration "Thou art the tenth",[63] the Bhāmatī school answers that the statement "Thou art the tenth" produces no intuition except through the mind. Mind is capable of producing that intuition because it is a sense-organ. Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Brahmasiddhi*, which the author of *Bhāmatī* follows in this matter, is definite that the knowledge arising out of the upaṇisadic texts like *Tat-tvam-asi* is indirect and mediate. This indirectness can be transmuted into direct vision or immediate realisation only by meditation.[64]

---

means to release. *śabdajñānābhyāsajanita-tṛtiyajñānādeva avākyārtha-pratipattiḥ. Candrikā* on *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XXXVIII, p. 114. See also *Candrikā* on *N. Siddhi*, for a reply to *prasaṅkyāna*, III, 90.

61. *S. L. S.* Ch. III. 4. 2. S. S. S. Sastri's Translation. Also *Bhāmatī*, II, 2, 10 and IV, I, 1. yathā gandharva-śāstrārtha-jñānābhyāsāhita-saṁskāra-sacivena śrotreṇa ṣaḍjādisvara-grāma-mūrcchanābhedam adhyakṣeṇekṣate evaṁ vedāntārthajñānāhita saṁskāraḥ jīvasya brahma-svabhāvam antaḥ-karaṇena. IV, 1. 2,

62. S. S. S. Sastri's Introduction to *S. L. S.*, p. 58.

63. See Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, III. 64-71; also *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*, Part I, verses 206-216; daśamastvam asityasmāt yathaivaṁ pratyagātmani, *Ibid*: I, 208.

64. tattvadarśanābhyāso lokasiddhaḥ.....abhyāso hi saṁskaraṁ dṛḍhayan pārvasaṁskāraṁ pratibadhya svakāryaṁ saṁtanoti: *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 35. In interpreting the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV. 4. 21) "vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvita", also Maṇḍana observes: dṛṣṭā ca jñānābhyāsasya samyagjñāna-

Sureśvarācārya maintains that direct Brahman-realisation arises only from hearing the great texts of the *śruti* and not from meditation.[64a] He does not accept the Nyāya view that the content of the verbal cognition is always indirect and relational.[65] The directness of the verbal testimony is evident in the story where one counted without reckoning himself as the tenth. According to Sureśvara verbal testimony is a *pramāṇa*, while *prasaṅkhyāna* is not.[66] Commenting on the text: "*vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvita*", Sureśvara writes that if the scriptural texts are not authentic source of knowledge with reference to Brahman, how can they be made authentic by repeated meditation? Repeated meditation of false knowledge, *viz.*—the knowledge of the world, is being practised unremittingly by all the people. But this kind of repeated meditation does not produce right knowledge of Brahman in them. On the contrary, as it is to be expected, the repeated meditation of that which is false will only strengthen the falsity.

Moreover, in "*vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvita*", there are no two knowledges. Sureśvara gives various interpretations of the words '*vijñāya*' and '*prajñāṁ*' to show this. (1) *Vijñāya* means the verbal cognition arising out of the text: *tat-tvam-asi*. *Prajñā* is the cognition of the true nature of the content of that declaration viz. Brahman. The first follows the word-sense, the second understands the object. After this there is no more desire to know as the fruit of all inquiry has been obtained. (2) *Vijñāya* denotes the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the content viz. Brahman by that knowledge which destroys the nescience. By *prajñā* is signified

---

prasādahetutā loke. *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 154.
nityamuktatvavijñānaṁ vākyādbhavati nānyataḥ |
vākyārthasyāpi vijñānaṁ padārthamsṛtipūrvakam || *Bṛh-vārt.* I. 206.
The knowledge arises on hearing the text "That thou art" annulling the previous illusions of duality in Ātman and forestalling all the future illusions at once.

64a. See: Jñānottama's *Candrikā* on *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, III, 69.

65. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*: Part III, verses 799 to 803.

66. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*: I Edn. p. 254.
vākyamānodbhavaṁ jñānaṁ yathāvastvitīryate |
yathāvastvapramotthaṁ ca citraṁ sarvajñaceṭṭitam ||

the pervasion of knowledge by its content. The use of this mutual pervasion is the origination of the new and uncontradicted knowledge of the Self. By the pervasion of knowledge by the content, viz. Brahman, the notion of difference between knower, known and knowledge is destroyed. Ātman-experience which is one results. And it is not impossible that from the unreal distinctions of knower, known and knowledge a real knowledge arises. An unreal tiger in the dream may wake the man up from his unreal dream. (3) *Vijñāya* can be taken to mean the instruction from the teacher. And *prajñā* stands for the sentence-sense of the textual instruction. Here the instructional knowledge is dependent on the teacher while the comprehension of the sentence-sense is one's own intuitive experience that is independent, since the sense of the texts is nothing else than one's own Self. (4) *Vijñāya* means the Brahmanhood of Ātman; *prajñā* means the Ātmanhood of Brahman. One should know the Brahmanhood of Ātman and then realize the Ātmanhood of Brahman. (5) *Vijñāya* refers to the senses of the individual words in *tat-vam-asi*, and *prajñā* refers to the sentence-sense.[66a] Bhāratītīrtha Vidyāraṇya, who belongs to the Sureśvara-Vivaraṇakāra school, says that hearing, *śravaṇa*, and not meditation, is alone the cause of immediate experience.[67] Reflection has only a subsidiary value in removing the obstruction through the notions of impossibility of Brahman-knowledge and the illusory notions of the contrary.

Śaṅkara is steering clear of the two exclusive positions taken by Vācaspati Miśra and Sureśvara. He holds that repeated meditation is necessary, nay, essential for those who are not in a position to grasp the meaning of the words in the great texts like "That Thou art".[67a] In the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, the teacher finds it necessary to repeat the teaching "That Thou art" to the student who again and again asks for more and more instruction even after having been told the truth. To the objection that it is not clear how the enunciation of the statement "That Thou

66a. See *Bṛh-vārt.* Anandasrama Edn., III, p. 185 ff.

67. *Vivaraṇapramēya-saṅgraha*, p. 128.

67a. *S.B.* IV, 1, 2.

art" can bring about enlightenment after repetition when it is not able to do so at the first hearing of it, Śaṅkara appeals to the evidence of experience to show that it is a matter of common observation that people *do* get the true sense of a statement by continued effort to understand it. Since the knowledge of the sentence follows the knowledge of the individual words composing it, continued attention may be necessary to get the meaning of the words clearly. But all this is said only with reference to students whose competence is in the process of development. It is undeniable that there may be, and are, a class of people to whom the meaning of the text "That Thou art" is at once clear even at the first hearing. In their case there is no question of progress in time. The illumination is total and entire. So, concludes Śaṅkara, repetition has got its own use.[67b] It is rather unfortunate, therefore, that later thinkers should have thought of raising a controversy on a purely theoretical basis.

The opponents to the Bhāmatī school urge that instrumentality in the form of a sense-organ does not belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa* because *antaḥkaraṇa* is the material cause of all psychoses. That which is the material cause of anything cannot itself be the instrument in its production. Clay which is the material cause of pot is not instrumental in the production of pot, but only the stick and the wheel are instrumental.[68]

An Estimate

In this controversy over the nature of *manas*, there is much to be said on both sides. But it all devolves upon the sense in which we use the word 'sense-organ'. Vācaspati's argument that

---

67b. yasya tu na eṣo' nubhavo drāgiva jāyate, taṁprati anubhavārtha eva avṛttyabhyupaṣamaḥ, *S.B.* IV, 1. 2. One should not lose the spirit of the text by mechanical repetition. Indeed, it is not for the loss of the bridegroom that the girl is given in marriage. na hi varaghātāya kanyām udvāhayanti.

68. See *Advaita-cintā-kaustubha*, II *Pariccheda*. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers *manas* to be a sense-organ, since only through its instrumentality pleasure and pain are experienced (*Nyāya-sūtra* and *Nyāya-bhāṣya* I, 1. 4) along with the Mīmāṁsakas and the Sāṁkhyas, the Jainas do not regard it so. See Sinha, *Indian Psychology*: *Perception*, p. 17.

manas is the instrument for internal perception and that, therefore, it is a sense-organ, cannot easily be set aside. Among the Mīmāṁsakas, Kumārila too holds that mind is a sense-organ. The cognition of pleasure is of the nature of immediate and direct perception. The definition of a sense-organ according to Kumārila is that its contact with the object brings about direct and clear perception of the object. If, for the perception of the external objects, in addition to *antaḥkaraṇa*, a psychosis is necessary, for the experience of pleasure and pain too a psychosis is felt to be necessary. Though it is argued that *antaḥkaraṇa* is the material cause of the *vṛtti* and that as such it cannot be an instrument or sense-organ, it will be more in consistency with the Advaitic presuppositions, on the whole, to realise that the question of perception, external or internal, arises only in the conditioned empirical existence of consciousness, and that *knowing* is intelligible only through an *antaḥkaraṇa* which conditions the pure consciousness. So, the question is whether the *antaḥkaraṇa* is a sense-organ in the same sense in which the ear, for example, is a sense-organ. The answer obviously is in the negative. *Manas* is common to the functions of all the sense-organs while it itself need not depend on any sense-organ. But all the same, according to Advaitic presuppositions, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is inert as much as the sense-organs. The conscious element, in the whole process, belongs only to the Self. Commenting on Ajātaśatru's question to Gārgya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (II, 1, 16), Śaṅkara states that in the context, 'consciousness' is the intellect or mind which is only an *instrument* of knowledge. And in refuting the materialist in the same Upaniṣad (IV, 3, 6), Śaṅkara is firm that mind also being an object like colour, etc., cannot be the agent of vision. It is only *through* the mind that one sees and hears. But this *one* is the Self, not the mind. Just as an emerald or any precious gem dropped into the milk for testing imparts its lustre to that milk, so does this luminous Self imparts its lustre to the organs and intellect. In this sense, then, *antaḥkaraṇa* is an instrument. As such, in the matter of the experiences of pleasure and pain, it alone can be the sense, if "sense" be the name for it. But then, while the sense-organs are merely the

gateways, *antaḥkaraṇa*, being of the nature of light, goes forth to reach the object of perception and is active.[69] So, we should say, while the sense-organs do not *know*, the internal organ knows, and also knows itself, though ultimately it is illumined by the consciousness-Self alone. But, then, consciousness-Self is the knower only when it is conditioned by the *antaḥkaraṇa*. When a person is asleep all the functions of mind which is a particular limiting adjunct of the Self are withdrawn and there is consequently no *knowing*. In dream, objects are perceived though the senses are not operative. Śaṅkara writes that dream also is a kind of perception.[69a] For all practical purposes, the internal organ is its own instrument. In so far as a *vṛtti* is felt to be necessary, and non-difference is asserted in the locus of psychosis and the feeling to ensure the immediacy of experience,[70] the mechanism that operates in the function of external perception is postulated in the case of the internal perception also, though the psychosis has not to go out to reach the object in this case.

On the whole, the suggestion could be ventured that *antaḥkaraṇa* is an instrument for internal perception, though not a sense-organ in the sense of a gateway or sense-orifice for external perception. And that the sense-organs are merely sense-orifices has not been accepted by the Advaitin and it is said that sight is of the nature of light, as much as the *antaḥkaraṇa* is, and sense of hearing goes out as the *antaḥkaraṇa* does. If sense means the instrument of knowing as it very much seems to mean in Advaita, then *antaḥkaraṇa*, as the name implies, is a sense.

Does the antaḥkaraṇa go out?

The Advaitic theory is that it is the function of the mind to go out to the object, take on its form, and manifest it. This 'going out' is not metaphorical, but actual, as the mind in Indian

69. In the *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* it is said that the visual sense itself, composed of light, goes out in long rays and reaches the object: p. 187. Sense of hearing too goes out. Thus, the *antaḥkaraṇa* becomes very much indistinguishable from the sense of sight and hearing.

69a. *Bṛh. up.*: II, 1, 17; II, 1, 18. See Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

70. *V.P.*, p. 24.

thought is the product of matter.'[71] Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan says that the theory that the mind goes out to the object in order to grasp it explains the perceptual process better than the impressionistic view of the West.[72] Mind participates even in the collection of the raw material of perception.[73] Dr. D. M. Datta observes: "An approach must be made from the side of our organism towards the object. Our sense must somehow approach the object itself. This direct approach will explain better the directness of perception and it will simplify also the problem of external localisation."[74]

The causal theory of perception lands us straight into subjectivism as the gulf between the object and the subject can never be bridged, and there cannot be any certainty whether what is known as an object is known aright or whether nothing had happened in the meanwhile, i.e., during the time-interval that light takes to traverse the distance from the object to the subject, to distort the whole process. Also, the sense-impressions and nerve-impulses at the end of the knower are least like the object. If what we get at our own end is only a sensation, the claim to knowledge of the object cannot be seriously maintained. Price in his book *Perception*[74a] asks what it is to see a tomato and says: "When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing I cannot doubt; that there exists a red patch of a round and some-what bulgy shape standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness." The "red round patch" is called a 'sense-datum.'

---

71. See T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 30.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
74. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
74a. p. 3. Quoted in R J. Hirst: *Problems of Perception*, p. 28.

The 'sensing' the sense-datum is knowledge by acquaintance, direct intuition; this is what Price calls 'Immediacy Assumption'. John Locke thought that we perceive ideas; Price thinks that immediacy should be attributed to 'sensing'. Any lack of clarity is due to the sense-datum, not to sensing which is always immediate and doubtless awareness. G. E. Moore put forward the after-images as typical examples of sense-data. Professor Ryle has criticised the 'sense-datum' theory in his *Concept of Mind* as follows.[74b] The theory rests on the logical howler of assimilating the concept of sensation to that of observation. The assumption is made that observation entails sensations and is reinterpreted as 'observing entails sensing sense-data', sense-data being momentary looks, whiffs, etc. But as 'sensing' is merely a pompous word for 'seeing' or 'observing', this means that observing entails observing sensations which is absurd. It involves an infinite regress, for the observing of sensations (sensing of sense-data), as a species of observing, must itself involve observing sensations, and so on. And 'having a sensation' is not observation. Moreover, the sense-datum theory of perceptual relativity fails because it involves talking of 'sensing an elliptical sense-datum', that is, seeing the elliptical look of a round dish, for example. But we cannot see looks any more than we can eat nibbles or smell whiffs.

Price adopts what is called the generative theory as against the selective theory. According to the former, the sense-data are generated by the action of external bodies on the sense-organs and by the subsequent processes in the nervous system. The latter theory holds that the function of the sense-organs and the nervous system is to select certain sense-data from the great variety of possible ones belonging to a given material thing. Price rejects this theory on the ground that it denies causal connection everywhere. It negatives the common criterion of such connection which is concomitant variation of the type which exists between somatic and environmental sense-data. Yet these sense-data are neither mental nor material. Still they do not 'occur in the void'; they belong (usually) to material things and are intimately united

74b. VII, 3.

with, and are prolongations of, the psycho-cerebral events on which they depend.

But what are material things? Are there unknown physical existents? Physical objects exist even when no sense-data occur. Russell developed (and later abandoned) the theory of *sensibilism*, according to which unsensed sense-data exist. These are called 'sensibilia'. As distinguished from this, there are possible *sense-data*, resembling J. S. Mill's "groups of permanent possibilities of sensation". A material thing is defined as a family of actual and possible sense-data. As still we are in the realm of sense-data only, this Factual Phenomenalism is not satisfactory and is superceded by Linguistic Phenomenalism which holds that any statement about a material object is equivalent to a set of statements about actual or possible sense-data. Thus the statement: "I saw a car" would be equivalent to: "I had car-like sense-data"; while the statement: "There is a car in the garage" will be rendered as: "If you had garage-like sense-data you would have car-like sense-data". Phenomenalists, of course, reject causal theory and hold what is called the Regulative theory. 'C causes E' means, 'whenever C occurs, E occurs'.

A. J. Ayer and G. A. Paul[74c] developed the Alternative Language Thesis by which they held that the various philosophies of perception are not theories that explain facts, but are simply alternative languages to express better the facts over which there is agreement. Thus the sense-datum theory of Price did not discover any sensing that is indubitable awareness; it only evolved a 'sense-datum language' which is an alternative to the everyday 'material object language.' There is no disagreement among philosophers about *facts* of perception. The concern is only about the language. Professor Malcolm,[74d] refuting traditional philosopher's argument that because of the possibility of illusions numberless tests and checks would be required to reach certainty in any perception,

---

74c. See R. J. Hirst: *op. cit.*; Ayer: *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*: Ch. I, pp. 46 ff.

74d. *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*: ed. Schilpp, pp. 346 ff.

differentiated between logical certainty and *empirical* certainty and the latter, he said, is certainty reached in normal perceptions.

Since difficulties are thus seen to be numerous in the account of perception, causal and otherwise, it seems that somehow a direct approach connecting the object with the organism should be maintained. This cannot be from the object for the reason of the aforesaid difficulties. So, the initiative now is from the mind. Instead of the lightwaves coming in, the mind-light goes out. "The going out of the subtle imperceptible senses may not then appear to be so absurd and misleading as it seems to be at first sight."[75] Prof. Jadhunath Sinha observes: "In the perception of an object, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), streaming out of the sense-orifices of the organism reaches the object, and is determined into a mode or *vṛtti* by taking the form of the object, which occupies the same position in space with the object. In this way, there is a correspondence or harmony between the mental order and the given order".[76] The result is: "dominance is given to the subject and the object is regarded as subordinate to the subject".[77]

Though both the object and the mind have only empirical existence, the mind has the advantage of reflecting the consciousness. So, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the *vṛtti* goes out to reach the object. "It is much easier to conceive *the outgoing* of the mind intelligised by the conscious self to the object than the *incoming* of the unconscious object to the mind".[78]

Though the case for the *antaḥkaraṇa* being *prāpyakāri* thus seems to be very strong, yet as Dr. Datta himself observes,[79] the difficulties are evenly balanced on the sides of Advaita and science.

---

75. Datta, *op. cit.*

76. *Indian Psychology*: *Perception*, p. 132.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Op. cit.*, p. 43. The Naiyāyikas hold, as against the Advaitins, that in the matter of hearing, it is the sound-waves that travel to the ears.

The difficulties on the Advaita theory seem to be: (1) It is said that *vṛtti* travels with the speed of light, reaches the object instantaneously, takes on its form and manifests it. This reaching-out is actual and not metaphorical. Even though the manifestation takes place physically at the object's end, the manifestation, as the phenomenon of *knowledge*, can occur only at the subject's end, viz., mind. Knowing itself is not a physical event. Now, considering the fact that the manifestation, too, is through a sense-organ only, *e.g.*, the eyes, and besides, if we suppose that the psychosis of the form of the object returns to the mind, as it does and should, all the difficulties mentioned with regard to the causal theory of perception will at once arise. Because, on the causal theory of perception, it is unaccountable how the light-vibrations could inform us about the object at all, which is so dissimilar to such electro-magnetic and nerve-processes, and the distance that separates the object from the subject, however infinitesimal it might be, makes us wonder whether, after all, the subject knows the object or merely knows things that happen in his own mind. Thus, the problem of perception continues to be as knotty as ever.

(2) On the supposition that it is the *antaḥkaraṇa* that travels from the subject to the object, an insurmountable difficulty arises with regard to the perception of certain distant objects which are no more at the time of perception. If a star is at a great distance from us, and if the *antaḥkaraṇa* takes time, as it should, to reach it, there is no guarantee that the star exists in the place by the time the light of *antaḥkaraṇa* reaches it. On the contrary supposition of light coming from the object, though the object might have gone out of existence, the light that started from it when it was there could impinge on the eye and excite the nerves and cause the perception. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri observes: "Science tells us that some stars are so far away that their light takes some years to reach us; so that, even if a star be now seen, we cannot be certain of its present existence; it may have perished, though the perishing will be known only

some years later. In such a case, how can we say that our sight reaches the star?"[80]

(3) It will be more consistent with the Law of Parsimony if we suppose that the light comes from the object and excites the nerve-termini than to suppose that light travels from the *antaḥkaraṇa*, reaches the object and returns to the mind which is a duplication.

(4) Fourthly, the simple fact of experience that we are able to see only with the aid of external light further strengthens the arguments that light whose source is extra-sensory reaches the eye.

(5) The instance of the photographic camera illustrates the point that light travels and makes its impact on the plate as on the retina. We can use the radio broadcasts as examples. The broadcast electro-magnetic vibrations are spread over the atmosphere. Wherever there is a reception set, with suitable mechanism, the waves can be translated into a song or a speech. But it is very difficult to accept this causal explanation too. An analysis, as we have seen, will show that this causal explanation inevitably leads to subjectivism and thoroughgoing solipsism. Can we be sure that we see the object at all if we know only what happens at the end of our sense-organs?

Yet the solution lies in the Advaitic theory itself. We see here that the purely epistemological question of perception can never be solved to the satisfaction of all unless it is erected on a metaphysical theory of the basic identity of the subject and the object. Man knows because objects are knowable. The broadcast waves are reconvertible into the song or the speech because they are not dissimilar to sound-waves essentially. The processes that start the perception in the brain are continuous and identical with the processes that start from the object. If physical vibrations excite the perception, it is because mind is continuous with nature. The activity of the mind consists in the arrangement of the sense-manifold and in building it into a

80. *V.P.*, notes, p. 188.

coherent system of knowledge. The *antaḥkaraṇa*, in Advaita, comprises four functions of doubt, certitude, pride and recollection.[81] This may be interpreted to mean that the mind passes from doubt to certitude in knowledge which is dovetailed into the centre of experience, 'the 'I', *ahaṅkāra*.

When the broadcast waves are converted into sound or speech, or when personalities are televised, no one raises a doubt whether the reproduction is actual and faithful. There is no reason why, then, the same should not be accepted in the case of perception, too. When the light waves are converted into nerve-impulses, and nerve-impulses into the image of percept, we can almost say that something like televising takes place in the brain, with this difference that it is consciousness that receives the impulse in the mind. That is, not only is there the vision, it is also known to be such. This is a possible explanation which seems to agree with the Advaitic presuppositions of the same *caitanya* appearing as threefold and making subject–object contact intelligible and at the same time saves knowledge from subjectivism.[81a]

---

81. manobuddhirahaṅkāraścittaṁ karaṇamāntaram |
saṁśayo niścayo garvaḥ smaraṇaṁ viṣayā ime ||

See *V.P.*, p. 26. According to the Sāṁkhyas, when an object excites the senses, the *manas* arranges the sense-impressions into a percept, the self-sense refers it to the self, and the *buddhi* forms the concept. S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 294; also *Tattva-kaumudi*, p. 36.

81a. D. G. Londhe has this criticism to make against the theory of *antaḥkaraṇa* going out. He observes: "How does the *vṛtti* take the form of the object at all, if, *ex hypothesi*, the object is veiled by *avidyā*? It is not the sense-contact that is regarded as removing the covering of ignorance as is naturally expected, but rather the *vṛtti* itself is understood as performing that function. It must be said, however, that there can be no *vṛtti* unless there is sense-contact, nor can there be any sense-contact until the *vṛtti* removes the veil of ignorance from the object. No way seems to have been found out of this difficulty. Somehow it is arbitrarily assumed that the internal organ is modified after the model of the external object. In the second place, the Vedantic doctrine of perception seems to fit in well only with the perceptions

Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Advaita admits the distinction between determinate and indeterminate, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*, perception.[82] Determi-

---

of a particular kind, i.e., the visual ones. *Proceedings of The Third Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1927, p. 157. Answering the powerful arguments of the followers of Madhva against the doctrine of *vṛtti* Madhusūdana says in his *Advaita-siddhi* that the function of the ray of light in illumination is that it dispels darkness; that it also spreads over the object is only an accidental fact, *viṣayeṣu abhivyakta-ciduparāge na tad-ākāratvamātram tantram.* Prof. Das Gupta summarises Madhusūdana's view as follows: "The mere fact that *vṛtti* may be in contact with an object does not necessarily mean that it assumes its form; thus, though the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* may travel upto the pole-star, or be in contact with objects having an atomic structure, that does not imply that all objects in the space intermediate between the eye and the star or the atoms should be perceived." (*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV, p. 242). Madhusūdana observes that there is no restriction that *antaḥkaraṇa* should come out only through other organs, *sarvatra tat-tad-indriyādhiṣṭhānasyaiva dvāratva-saṁbhavāt* (*Advaita-siddhi*, p. 482). In the case of pleasure, pain etc., there is no question of *antaḥkaraṇa* going out because, in their case, there is no veil to be lifted and the locus is the same.

82. pratyakṣaṁ dvividhaṁ savikalpaka-nirvikalpaka-bhedāt. *V.P.*, p. 26.

This distinction seems to have been made first by the Mīmāṁsaka thinkers. See Jwala Prasad; *Indian Epistemology*, p. 249. Bhaṭṭas believe that indeterminate perception is non-determined perception, *ālocana*, and apprehends the individual only which is the substrate of the generic and specific characters and not the characters themselves. The Prābhākaras maintain that indeterminate cognition perceives both the generic and the specific character in an undistinguished mass. That is, though the general and specific characters are preceived, they are not cognised as such. The perceived individual is not assigned to any class. Among the Naiyāyikas, to Vātsyāyana, it seemed that when an object is perceived with the apprehension of the name, we have determinate perception and, without that apprehension, indeterminate perception. Later logicians like Bhāsarvajña, Keśava Miśra and Annaṁbhaṭṭa accept the distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception. Gautama seems to regard all perceptual knowledge as determinate. Indeterminate knowledge is no knowledge at all. Vācaspati Miśra equates *avyapadeśya*, the *inexpressible* mentioned by Gautama as the first characteristic of perception, with indeterminate

nate perception is the cognition of relatedness as in the case "I cognise the pot"; and in indeterminate perception we do not cognise the relatedness but only the identity as in the cognition of the statement "This is that Devadatta", "That thou art". These statements do not express recognition but a directly perceived non-difference or identity. The determinant of perceptibility is not sense-generatedness but only the non-difference of *pramāṇa-caitanya* from *viṣaya-caitanya*, satisfying the conditions of perception viz., that the content should be present and competent to be perceived. If the objection is raised that in the verbal cognition "This is that Devadatta", there is an element of memory, it can be replied that such an element of memory is present in all perceptions.[83] And, in all the identity-texts, it is the content of purport, *tātpraya-tattvam*, that is the content of perception and not the word-senses. Otherwise, that is, if merely the word-senses be the content of sense-generated cognition, there is the contingence of the unintended relation being the content of such cognition. For example, when the father says to his son, "Drink poison", the content is not that the father wants his son to die of poisoning. When the son is about to do something very harmful to himself the father admonishes him that that particular course of action is as harmful as poison is. If mere relation of word-sense is the determinant here, the son

---

and *vyavasāyātmaka*, or the indubious with the determinate perception. To the Sāṁkhyas, indeterminate perception is simple apprehension of the object. To Rāmānuja, it is relational apprehension which apprehends the first individual of a class with its generic character in the shape of a structure. We see the individual for the first time, and though we are conscious of the generic character, we are not assigning it to any class as yet. When we recognise the generic character as common to the whole class after repeated perception, we have determinate perception. The Grammarians, like the Jainas, hold that there is no indeterminate perception at all. To them, knowledge is impossible except through some language and no object is cognised by itself and without being associated with the word signifying it. *na śósti pratyayo loke yatra śabdo na bhāsate.* Praśastapāda describes indeterminate perception as simple awareness, *ālocanamātra*, as Kumārila does, comparable to the unverbalised experience (*avyapadeśya*) of the child.

83. See D. M. Datta : *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 47.

should take poison, which is certainly not the father's intention. So, it is the purport of identity, *akhaṇḍārtha*[84] of the sentence that is the content of sentenee-generated cognition like "This is that Devadatta", and not the relation of word-senses. To have impartite sense is to have as purport the sense of stem alone.[85]

In so far as Advaita Vedāntins admit a sentence which is not synthetic but analytic and which expresses identity and not subject-predicate relation, they hold that indeterminate perception need not necessarily belong to the pre-judgment stage. If judgment is an act of thought expressible in words, "This is that Devadatta" is more than a judgment; it is a proposition, a judgment articulated. This view of the Advaitin goes directly counter to the view of the Grammarians or *Śābdikas* who hold that there cannot be an indeterminate knowledge at all on the ground that there can be no thought without language,[86] and that language has always determinate meaning. And the Grammarians would say that children and dumb creatures have determinate knowledge because of their knowledge of the names acquired in the previous births. But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas argue that since even the dumb and the children have knowledge even though their judgments are not expressed in language, indeterminate knowledge is possible. Vācaspati Miśra argues that objects cannot be identical with names, since children perceive objects without knowing their names. When one does not know the meaning of words, one has indeterminate perception. And even those who understand the meaning of terms have first indeterminate perception. But the perception recalls the subconscious

---

84. The marks by which the purport of a sentence is determined are six: (1) harmony with introductory and concluding statements; (2) repetition; (3) novelty of what is stated; (4) fruitfulness; (5) statements elsewhere, praising what is said here or condemning the opposite; (6) intelligibility in the light of reasoning.

85. See *Tattvapradīpikā*: Nirnaya Sagar Press, p. 109.
saṁsargāsaṅgi-samyagdhibetutā yā girāmiyam |
uktākhaṇḍārthatā yadvā tatprātipadikārthatā ||

86. vāgrūpaṁ tattvam. See *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, I, 1. 4. for the view of Bhartṛhari.

impression of the name perceived in the past. And, then, the indeterminate becomes the determinate.[87]

The Advaita Vedāntins flatly contradict the Grammarians by taking the bull by the horns, as it were; they say that indeterminate knowledge is possible even in the case of fully expressed judgments like "This is that Devadatta".[88] Indeterminate knowledge is not the merest animal perception, a hazy mass, a bare sensum, but an immediate knowledge of identity. It may belong to what may be called a late stage of knowledge, when judgments are explicitly formulated in propositional form. It partakes of the nature of direct perception, *aparokṣa*. This is in consistency with the Advaitic position that all valid perceptual knowledge is but consciousness, because of the scriptural statement "That (Brahman) which is direct and immediate".[88a] And perceptual character is not sense-generated, but is determined by the fact of non-difference which is immediacy. And it has been said that it is the purport, and not the relation between the word-senses, that is the determinant of the sentence-generated cognition.

In all indeterminate perception, only the *sat* or the existent Brahman is revealed,[89] as in "*san ghaṭaḥ*". The dialectics of

---

87. *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, I. 1, 4. See also S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 57.

88. "Every proposition, according to the Naiyāyikas, embodies and conveys a determinate cognition"—and indeterminate perception can never be expresed verbally. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 217.

88a. pratyakṣapramā tu atra caitanyameva, yat sākṣāt aparokṣāt iti śruteḥ—*V.P.*, p. 8,

89. This is said to be the logical development of the Nyāya view of *nirvikalpa* according to which a permanent reality, and not a momentary 'this' of the Bauddhas, is presented in *nirvikalpa* cognition. From this, it is easy to pass to the *sat* of the Advaitins which is said to be presented in indeterminate perception. Jayantabhaṭṭa urges that it is the same reality that is presented in both the determinate and indeterminate cognitions, with the only difference that in the determinate cognition we have a verbal communication.

Advaitins like Maṇḍanamiśra and Vimuktātman were employed to show that perception reveals only the existence-aspect, and differences are not intelligible. Perception does not reveal merely the difference; nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object; nor both of them simultaneously. For, the object must first be revealed before any difference is manifested.[90] Again: if unity of all things as "existents" (*sat*) was not realised in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognise the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is the most fundamental of experiences and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference.[91]

Nārāyaṇa in his *Mānameyodaya*, says: "Immediately after the contact with the senses there arises a confused cognition devoid of verbal accompaniment and comprehending the bare existence of substances etc., and this is called non-determinate."[92] When we consider the fact that the identity-cognition "This is that Devadatta" is a fully formulated proposition, which is considered indeterminate by the Advaitin, and that the Advaitins consider even perception as disclosing only non-different existent-aspect, it cannot be said that indeterminate perception, according to the Advaitins, is a confused perception. Even the verbal cognitions from the sentence as in "This is that Devadatta" can produce

---

tasmād ya yeva vastvātmā savikalpasya gocaraḥ
sa eva nirvikalpasya śabdollekhavivarjitaḥ.
kimātmakosāviti ced yad yad yadā pratibhāsate
vastupramitayaścaiva praṣṭavyā na tu vādinaḥ.
kvacijjātiḥ kvaciddravyaṁ kvacitkarma kvacitguṇaḥ
yadeva savikalpena tadeva anena gṛhyate.
iha śabdānusandhānamātram abhyadhikam param.

Nyāyamañjari—Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, p. 99. See Kuppuswami Sastri, *op. cit.*, p. 220-221.

90. See *Brahmasiddhi, Tarkakāṇḍa.* See chapter of "Dialectic of Difference", *infra* of this thesis.

91. Das Gupta : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 97. See also Sinha, *Indian Psychology*: *Perception*: p. 31.

92. P. 17, Adyar Edition.

knowledge of identity[93] which is indeterminate. Thus, according to the metaphysical presuppositions of Advaita, the beginning and end of all knowledge is identity, oneness, and indeterminacy. The initial cognition of objects as well as the immediate intuition of Reality through the scriptural statements like "That thou art" are indeterminate perception. We can say, then, that all determinate perceptions are result of nescience, while indeterminate perception is unrelational experience of consciousness. Śaṅkara says that all kinds of specific cognition belongs to the sphere of nescience.[94] The indeterminacy of the final consciousness, *samādhi*, is evident in the Yoga.

Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa-Samādhi

Samādhi is divided into two kinds; *saṁprajñāta* or *savikalpa* and *asaṁprajñāta* or *nirvikalpa*. In the *savikalpa-samādhi*, though there is no distinction of subject and object, there is yet present the operation of mental modes, which have Brahman as their object. This is the culmination of the yogic practice of concentration. But in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, even the mental modes are totally destroyed. In the *savikalpa-samādhi* there is the stream of *sajātīya-vṛttis*, i.e., psychoses which have the reality as their

---

93. Cf. "If sensation is present alone, we are below the perceptual level; judgement or something like judgement must be present also.....We are clearly beyond mere perceiving when judgement is made reflectively, when what we assert is no longer taken as simply presented, but is recognised as a venture of our own that may be mistaken".—Brand Blanshard: *Nature of Thought*: Vol. p. 53. F. H. Bradley distinguishes three levels of being. The lowest is the real of immediate feeling, the pre-relational experience of undifferentiaed wholeness. The next is the reflective, dialectical level, the realm of thought, in which the original unity of feeling is broken up by relations. The mind is the realm of reality.

94. *S.B.*, I. 4. 22. See *Brahma-sūtra*, IV. 4. 16. "(What scripture says about absence of all specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or union (Release); for this is manifested by the texts". Deep sleep where all speceific cognitions are absent is considered to be a blissful state. Man rises again into the waking state of the perception of variety only due to *avidyā* *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* puts it: "All these creatures go day after day into the Brahma-loka and yet do not discover it", VIII. 3. 2. See also Śankara's commentary on *Brahma-sūtras*, III. 2. 8-9.

object. "I am Reality" is the content of this stream.[95] It is the process of involution, or inversion of the order of the world-projection, beginning from the gross and ending in the Intelligence-Bliss, through the subtle.

The accessories of this *samādhi* are: *yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra,* which are external, and *dhāraṇā, dhyāna* and *samādhi* which are internal.[95a] *Yama* consists in truthfulness (*satya*), non-violence (*ahiṁsā*) non-stealing (*asteya*), celibacy (*brahmacarya*) and non-possession (*aparigraha*). *Niyama* is five-fold: *śauca, santoṣa, tapas, svādhyāya,* and *Īśvara-praṇi-dhāna: Śauca* is internal and external purity in thought, word and deed. *Santoṣa* is contentment. *Tapas* is restraint of the palate. *Svādhyāya* is the concentration on the *praṇavākṣara,* the mystic sound-symbol *Om.* Dedication of all deeds to the Lord is *Īśvara-praṇidhāna. Āsana* is right posture for meditation. *Prāṇāyāma* is the control of breath. *Dhāraṇā* is fixing the mind on the Self. *Dhyāna* is the directing all the functions of mind towards the Intelligence-Self.

Asaṁprajñāta, or *nirvikalpasamādhi* is the total annihilation of mental functions altogether and intuition of the distinctionless Reality. In the *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali, *saṁprajñāta-samādhi* is associated with *savitarka, savicāra, sānanda* and *sāsmita. Asaṁpra-jñāta-samādhi* is defined as *virāma-pratyayābhyāsa-pūrvaḥ saṁs-kāraśeṣónyaḥ.* Because of constant practice of detachment and dispassion, *paravairāgya,* all the *saṁskāras* of the mind are destroyed. But the wholesome *saṁskāra* of the practice of *paravairāgya* remains. From this *saṁskāra,* of course, no fresh chain of mental processes is started. This *asaṁprajñāta-samādhi,* therefore, must have to be distinguished from the *nirvikalpa-*

---

95. *Advaita-cintā-kaustubha*—IV Pariccheda Section on *Yoganirūpaṇa.*

95a. *Yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma,* and *pratyāhāra* are all the external accessories; while *dhāraṇā, dhyāna* and *samādhi* are internal accessories of *saṁprajñāta-samādhi.* The last three, however, are only external accessories of *asaṁprajñāta-samādhi.* See *Yoga-sūtras; Vibhūti-pāda,* 7 and 8. Vācaspati writes: *śravaṇa* and *manana* are *dhāraṇā; nididhyāsana* is *dhyāna; dṛṣṭi* is *samādhi. Bhāmatī* : II, 3, 39.

samādhi of the Vedāntin, or the Aupaniṣadayogin. Here, unlike the Pātañjalayoga, the nescience is withdrawn and dissolved in the Self. The process is to invert the elements and dissolve them into their source and locus.[95b] When this nescience, too, is finally dissolved into its locus, i.e., Self, *nirvikalpa-samādhi* results.

Sadānanda in his *Vedāntasāra* has said that in the *savikalpa-samādhi*, the distinction of the knower, known and knowledge does not vanish. The consciousness of identity is there in spite of the object-subject distinction. *Nirvikalpa-samādhi*, on the other hand, is not deep sleep, *suṣupti*. While sleep is nescience withdrawn into itself and there is no mental mode at all, in the *samādhi* there is a mental mode which is transformed into pure consciousness.[96] In Pātañjalayoga, in the *asaṁprajñāta-samādhi*, the mind is without any fresh *vṛttis* but functions in perfect control with only the *saṁskāra* or *paravairāgya*. That is why the *yogī* who is in this *samādhi* does not allow his body to fall flat on the ground. In sleep, on the contrary, the mind or *citta*, attains *laya* and that is why a sleeping body lies down. This is a difference between *suṣupti* and *samādhi*.

Perception of Universals, Relations etc.

On the subject of universals and relations, the Advaitins accept, on some points, the view of the Naiyāyikas.[97] So, it will not be out of place to start with the views of the Naiyāyikas and note when the Advaitins differ from them. The Naiyāyika is a realist as he holds that the universals exist as real entities.[98] "The

---

95b. janiviparitakramataḥ buddhyā pravilāpya pañcabhūtāni |
pariśiṣṭam ātmatattvaṁ paśyannāste yatiḥ kāpi ||

96. *Vedāntasāra*: (Jacob's Edn.) p. 129. See also Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perceptian*, p. 355. The steps of spiritual discipline that lead to *asaṁprajñāta-samādhi* are: (1) *śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti, samādhi* and *prajñā*, i.e. the desire to get liberated and faith, sustained contemplation of the truth, the natural possession of *dhyāna, samādhi* and then *saṁprajñāta-samādhi* respectively.

97. See D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*. p. 104.

98. sāmānyasya vastubhūtavāt: *Tarkabhāṣā* (Poona Edn.) p. 31. The Buddhists and the Cārvākas deny the possibility of universals. The

universal is not a mental construction, but a real essence abiding in the particulars".[99] Universal relations are thus real[100] as against the views of the nominalists and the conceptualists, for example, the Buddhists, who hold that there is no universal at all but only a name in general and that the universals are mental concepts, if they do not exist in nature, respectively. In the West, Hobbes wrote in his *Leviathan* (I, iv): "There being nothing in the world but names, for the things named are everyone of them individual and singular'. This was nominalism. John Locke denied both the Platonist and the Aristotelian theories. The universal is neither a form, nor is it an essence abiding really in the particulars. All things that exist are only particulars. Universals are not *in re*. In the universals, we leave the realm of being and enter that of discourse. The universal is a concept the content of which is supplied in experience. Locke hence was a conceptualist. Berkeley, too, insisted that if we concentrate on the particulars rather than on abstract universals, we will be saved from many errors. Matter, for him, was one such abstraction. The Buddhist's *Apohavāda* has both the conceptualist and the

---

Buddhist theory of *Apoha* holds that by omitting deliberately all the differences and distinctions of the extreme particulars, *svalakṣaṇas*, which alone are the objects of knowledge, we can identify them by common contrast. By neglecting the differences among cows and contrasting them with horses, for example, we say they are cows, or more accurately, non-horses. Thus, the universal is only a logical construction, a dialectical distinction, and is purely notional. "Their indirect reality is, so to speak, dynamic, as a guide of our purposive actions directed towards some point of efficient, external reality."—Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, Bibliotheca Buddhica: XXVI, 1930, p. 404.

The theory of *Apoha* was first started by Dignāga in his *Paramāṇa-samuccaya*. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* and Kumārila in his *Ślokavārtika* have subjected this theory to criticism from the realistic point of view. Udyotakara argues against *Apoha* that we cannot have a negative denotation without an idea of the positive content, and once we have the positive content, then no exclusion is necessary. Secondly, in the case of words like 'all' no exclusion is possible See S. C. Vidyabhushan, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 132.

99. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 69.

100. svābhāvikastu saṁbandho vyāptiḥ—*Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 35.

nominalist elements mixed in it. The universal is indirectly efficient though only a name or a notion. According to the Naiyāyikas, the universal is related to the individual by the relation of *samavāya* or inherence. Yet the universal is not born of the particulars.[100a] It transcends them and is eternal, very much like the Ideas of Plato. The universal is as much the object of indeterminate perception as the particular. Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of objects and their qualities, universal and particular. Again, the universal and the particular are perceived as distinct, though inseparable.[101] The universal and the particular are not related through the relation of *tādātmya* or identity, but only through *samavāya* or inherence as has been said.

The Naiyāyika, while expounding the six kinds of sense-contact with the object, mentions *samyoga, samyukta-samavāya,*

100a. The Buddhist refutation of realism of the Nyāya has an argument which compares well with an argument by Peter Abelard against William of Champeaux, an extreme realist in the matter of Universals. The Nyāya argument is: One particular cannot be the locus of many universals. Yet 'being a tree' and "being an Aśoka tree" are two universals and thus there is a particular supporting the universal 'tree' and another particular supporting the universal "Aśoka tree". If it is the same particular supporting both, then, there will be no existential difference between these universals. They will be synonymous. Dharmakīrti said that thus when one universal is known, everything else will be known. Abelard's argument is: What is the same essentially, although occupied by diverse forms, exists in individual things; it is necessary that one thing which is affected by some forms be another thing which is occupied by other forms, so that the animal formed by rationality is the animal formed by irrationality, and so the rational animal is the irrational, and thus contraries would be placed in the same thing at the same time. But Abelard did accept the universals and went to the extent of saying that universals are prototypes used by God as models in His creation.

101. This is usually expressed in the dictum: yenendriyeṇa yā vyaktiḥ gṛhyate tanniṣṭha-jātiḥ tadabhāveśca tenendriyeṇaiva gṛhyate.

In indeterminate perception, according to the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, the universal or generic character and the jar as the individual are perceived though there is no specific assignment of the jar to class. p. 58.

samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, samavāya, samaveta-samavāya, and *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva.* While *samyoga* is merely conjunction of the sense with the object, all the others except the last are based on the concept of *samavāya* or inherence. Either it is that the pot and the colour which are related through *samavāya* are in conjunction with the senses (*samyukta-samavāya*), or it is that the pot and the colour which are related through *samavāya,* and the colour and the *colourness* connected by *samavāya* are in conjunction with the sense (*samyukta-samaveta-samavāya*).

In the case of sound and the sense of hearing it is merely *samavāya,* because ear is only ether delimited according to the Naiyāyika. The soundness, the universal inherent in sound, is perceived indirectly through sound and the sense of hearing and this is *samaveta-samavāya.* The *samavāya* relation itself is perceived as an adjective to its locus. There is lastly the perception of non-existence as adjectival to the locus. It is *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva.*

The Vedantins do not accept *samavāya* at all as a relation. They accept only the relation of identity or *tādātmya.*[101a] However, they are one with the Naiyāyika in so far as they say that when the particular, say a jar, is perceived, the jarness also is perceived.[102] But they do not believe that the universal is eternal, existent in its own right apart from the particulars. The universal, jarness, for example, is the result of a synthesis positively and negatively. Positively, it is a generalisation of all the conceivable individuals without ignoring their individualities, the process being one of inference from particulars to universals. Negatively, individuals having common characters are brought into relation, the individualities being ignored for the moment.

The Naiyāyika will, in the context, say that the universals are perceived by the special kind of supernormal perception called

---

101a. tādātmyapratītesca dravyaguṇādināṁ samavāyakalpanānarthakyam. Again: kāryakāraṇayordravyaguṇādināṁ cāśvamahiṣavad-bhedabuddhyabhāvāt tādātmyam abhyupagantavyam. *S.B.*, II, 1, 18. See: Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

102. See D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 116.

sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti.[103] But the Advaitins will deny that there is any kind of perception like the one mentioned and urge that both positively and negatively as aforesaid, the process is one of inference or can be brought under the category of normal perception, and no supernormal perception need be postulated.[104]

The later Advaitins like Citsukhācārya are not inclined to accept the reality of the universal at all; because it can be neither perceived nor inferred.[105]

What is meant by a class-concept? It cannot be said that the class-concept arises when one sees one individual cow and has the notion of cow; and similarly, sees many cows, and, thus, comes to have the class notion of cowness. For, the above explanation does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow.[106] One cow had certain peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow. Similarly, another and yet another, just as we see the reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. Secondly, the perception of one and the same form (e.g., cow) in different individual cows

---

103. The other two supernormal perceptions are *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*, and *yogaja*. When one sees sandal at a distance, he also feels the fragrance. This is by *jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*. Capacity to reach any object through any sense is developed by yogic practices. This is *yogaja*. Jayanta concludes that that the perception of universal is *mānasa-pratyakṣa* or mental perception through the inner sense, *manas*, when co-existence is observed and no contradictory instance of the non-co-existence is seen. *Nyāyamañjari*, Viz. S. S., p. 121-23. Bertrand Russell holds thai we are directly acquainted with universals or general ideas, such as 'blue', 'diversity' and 'brotherhood'; this acquaintance, Russell calls 'conceiving.'

104. In the same way, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja* also are refuted by the Advaitins. We only infer the fragrance of the sandal from the perception of the sandal. And all instances of the so-called yogic perception can be accounted for either as *mānasa-pratyakṣa* (inner perception), or as vivid memory of the past or as vivid imagination of future possibilities. See S. Kuppuswamy Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 303.

105. *Tattvapradīpikā*, Nirnaya Sagar Edn., p. 303.

106. Das Gupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 156.

107. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 304.

cannot be regarded as the proof of the existence of the universal "cow". It is not possible to point out a single universal characteristic of cows. If it were, there will be no need to accept a class-concept "cow", because such a characteristic will be an individual characteristic, and not a class-concept. With the aid of that one universal characteristic, *eka-gosvabhāvatva* and even without the class-concept, it will be possible to recognise a cow anywhere.

Again: accepting the class-concept, is there a single trait in the cow that indicates the class-concept? If there were, one cannot point out this trait without a reference to the class-concept, and one cannot point to the class-concept without reference to this trait. Consequently, there will be mutual dependence. Further: does the class-concept, "cow", exist everywhere? Or only in cows? If the first, there will be utter confusion because the class-concept will apply to horses, buffaloes, etc., and there is also the contingence of all things being everywhere. If the second, then, it is right so far as the already existent cows are concerned; but how does it pass on to the new-born cow? The universal, being eternal according to the Naiyāyikas, cannot spring into being every time a cow is born. And, since the universal is partless, it cannot remain partly in the already existent cow and partly in the new-born.

Moreover: if there be a class-concept for each cow, there will be as many class-concepts as there are cows. If one class-concept were spread out over all the individual cows, then, to get the class-concept, all the cows must be brought together. Thus, one could not have any notion of a class-concept at all. The Buddhists also deny any possibility of universals being independently there. The indeterminate perception gives us the bare particular. Only at the determinate level, subjective contributions are made in order to get the class-nature etc., of the particular perceived. These are only conceptional abstractions from perceived particulars. Again, the relation between the universal and the particular can never be determined. It can neither be one of identity, nor difference. In the former case, it

will cease to be a principle having a function. In the latter, it will have no relation to the particular. Being different, if it existed everywhere, it will be perceived everywhere, both in the particulars and outside them. If it is not everywhere, but is limited to the particulars, does it come into being along with the particulars? Or does it come to be added on to them later? In the first case, it will not be independent; in the second, it will be only adventitious. Again, is the universal present in one particular alone? Or in all particulars, taken severally? Or in all particulars taken together? If the first, it cannot be present in the other particulars with the result that they would have no universal character: If the second, the universal will have to be taken as partite. If the third, the universal can never be perceived unless we have all the particulars together. Thus the Buddhists are the nominalists or one may even say, conceptualists of Indian thought, as has been noted already as against the Nyāya realists. Advaitin's criticism of realism here shows resemblance to the conceptualists. To them, however, the great universal the *Mahā-sāmānya*, viz. Brahman, is the only reality from which all particulars are non-different. Any division down from that ultimate reality as universal and particular is a relation, and like any relation is inexplicable. The Absolute is the only universal, if one may say so. Any extreme realism in the case of the universal must lead to such a position. The highest universal is the greatest truth while lesser universals are less real, in the same way as the particulars are less real than the universal, in the Platonic sense. Śaṅkara has a statement to the effect in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (II, 4, 9), that Brahman is the *mahā-sāmānya*.

While Advaitins generally accept the relation of *tādātmya* or identity, Citsukha will not concede even that. The relation between the universal and the particular cannot be one of identity, of inherence, or conjunction,[108] etc. Since the universal and the particular are not material substances, there cannot be any conjunction between them. There cannot be the intrinsic

108. adravyatvāt na samyogaḥ, sāṅkaryāt netarāvapi |
padārthāntarāpatter nānyasambandhasaṁbhavaḥ ||
—*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 305.

relation or identity of the universal with all the particulars because there is the contingence of everything being everything else.[109]

The Advaitins are one with the Buddhists in saying that no special relation like *samavāya* need be postulated for the perception of the universals. One says "This is a cow" and does not say "This is the class "cow" in this cow". So the individual is not the substratum of the universal, but identical with it. To the question that, if the universal is one with the substratum, one should perceive everything of the object when it is perceived, the Advaitin answers that the internal organ goes out and takes the form of the object and certain aspects only that come to the attention of the internal organ are perceived.[110]

Vimuktātman's view

As between the individual and the class, what is the individual? Does it exclude everything? Or is it the substance which indicates the class? If it is exclusion, since, in respect of shell as an individual substance, for example, and the shell-class between which there is mutual exclusiveness, there is still the notion "This shell is a substance", indicating the knowledge of identity through co-ordination, it is not impossible that with reference to two individual entities, there is knowledge of identity even without the class-nature being referred to. If it is said that with reference to two individuals which depend on and indicate one class-nature, there is no knowledge of identity, no; there is such knowledge of identity with reference to two cows as "This is a cow" though one is hornless and the other is lame.

And this knowledge of oneness is not of the oneness of class-nature. The expression "These two are cows" has the suffix of dual number. And there is no duality for the class.[111] Only

---

109. sarvavyaktiṣu sarvajātīnāṁ tādātmye samavāye vā sarvasya sarvātmatāpratītiprasaṅgāt. *Ibid*, p. 306.

110. D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 116.

111. na ca saikā dhīr jātāveva, gāvāviti gośabdā dvivacanotpātteḥ, na ca jāter dvitvaṁ vyaktyoriva. *I.S.*, p. 263.

the individuals are dual in number. But does not this admitted duality prove that individuals cannot be known as identical? No; because of their identity with their class-nature. Class-nature and the individual entities are not strictly different,[112] as pot and the cloth are. If the class-nature and the individual members of that class are totally different, then, any relationship between them becomes impossible. Nor, on that account, shall it be concluded that they are totally identical, because even then, the same contingence of the impossibility of any relationship will arise.[112a]

And identity is not always through the identity of class-nature. In the case of the knowledge of shortness in the vowel '*a*' (अ) the letter itself does not know any shortness or length; the length or shortness of tone is a superimposition and it is this latter that brings about the identity.[113] This happens even in the case of silver-illusion where silver is identified with shell. Neither of the above cases is one of generality and speciality, or substance and quality, or genus and individual.

After arguing that all cases of identity are not of class-individual relation and pointing out that the relation of the universal and the particular is neither difference nor non-difference, Vimuktātman goes on to declare that if there be no mutual identity between individuals intrinsically, it cannot be brought about through the aspect of class-nature also. If there be difference between the class-nature and the individual there cannot be identity of the individuals through that class-nature because of this very difference. If, on the other hand, the identity is said to be brought about by the class-nature, it has been said that

---

112. *I.S.*, III, *Kā*. 31.

112a. Professor Stout holds that the universal is a unity of class. This unity is a distributive unity and is ultimate. Any attempt at analysis leads to a vicious circle. See *The Nature of Universals and Propositions*, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. X. See also L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1923, p. 195.

113. *I.S.* III. *Kā*. 40. Even in the case of the knowledge of the cloth which is white it is not through the aspect of class-nature. *I.S.*, III. *Kā*. 39.

the identity is intrinsic and that it cannot be *brought about.* If identity is assumed to be brought about between the individuals through some other medium, it will be an error.[114] So while identity of things is intrinsic, the notion that it is brought about through the medium of class-nature in spite of difference among the objects is an error. This is in consonance with the central tenet of Advaita. In other words, assuming difference first among the objects and then trying to identify them through the class-nature is a hopeless task. One should suppose the basic identity of things, and the differences are superimpositions.

Śaṅkara's critique of relations

Śaṅkara criticises the doctrine of *samavāya,* by which the universal and the particular are supposed to be connected by the Naiyāyika.[115] If *samavāya* is a relation connecting two terms like the universal and the particular, then another relation between the *samavāya* and the universal, and, again, between *samavāya* and the particular must have to be postulated. This will lead to infinite regress. If it is maintained that the *samavāya* relation does not require another relation and is *sui generis,* there being no special distinction in *samavāya* in this case, the relation of *samyoga* or conjunction also should stand in no need of *samavāya,* for, the Naiyāyika holds that conjunction is a quality and as such is related to the substances it conjoins by *samavāya.* This is not acceptable to the Naiyāyika. Substance and qualities, universal and particular stand in relation of identity and, therefore, the assumption of *samavāya* relation is purportless.[116]

---

114. akṛtaṁ ced aikyam anyanimittaṁ bhinnayorbhāti tadbhrāntameva syāt, *I.S.*, p. 266.

Again: tasmād vyaktyor aikyamasti cet, tat svataḥ eva. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

115. *S.B.* II. 1. 18. It is in connection with establishing the non-difference of cause and effect that Śaṅkara criticises the theory of *samavāya.* The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, Sāṁkhyas and Buddhists alike decline to accept *samavāya.*

116. *S.B.*, II. 1. 18. "Connection requires two terms"—*S.B.* II. 2. 17. Thus relations are ultimately self-contradictory.

There is no proof for the existence of any connection, *samyoga* or *samavāya*, apart from the things which it connects. If it be said that there are names and ideas of *samavāya* and *samyoga* as there are ideas and names of the things that they connect, it is replied that one and the same thing gets varying names in accordance with its various relations with the things outside it. Devadatta is father, son, son-in-law, as he enters into these several relations with son, father, father-in-law etc. Similarly, two things that are connected constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which do not on that account become independent entities. The permanence of the connected things is no ground for thinking that the connection also is permanent.[117]

With regard to conjunction, it cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ because they have no parts. Conjunction is impossible in things which are partless.[118]

With reference to the Vaiśeṣika argument that *samavāya* should be assumed to exist between that which abides and that which forms the abode, Śaṅkara replies that only when the separateness of, say, cause and effect is established, the relation between them could be established; and only when the latter relation is established, separateness could be established. Thus, there is mutual dependence.[119] So the relation of *samavāya* cannot be seriously maintained. If the universals and particulars are inseparably connected by themselves, there is no need for a separate relation called *samavāya*.[120] The postulation of *samavāya* is, therefore, superfluous. When the concept of *samavāya* is found untenable, the edifice of Nyāya metaphysics collapses.[121] The Advaitin urges, then, that it is more parsimonious to assume

---

117. *S.B.* II. 2. 17. Also II. 2. 13

118. *S.B.* II. 2. 17.

119. *S.B.* II. 2. 17.

120. D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*: p. 108

121. *ibid.*

one reality of which everything is a manifestation than to assume that there are many entities connected by a *samavāya*.

Thus, the perception of universals etc., does not entail any separate *sannikarṣa* or contact. Since universals etc., are indistinguishably identical with the substance. "one kind of contact which takes place between a substance and its particular sense is sufficient to explain the perception of universals."[122]

122. *Ibid*, p. 115

CHAPTER II

INFERENCE

Inference is the distinctive cause of inferential cognition.[1] The distinctive cause, or special instrument, of inference is the knowledge of the pervasion, *vyāptijñāna*.[2] Inferential cognition is generated by the knowledge of pervasion, *vyāpti*. The difference between inference and reflective cognition, *anuvyavasāya-jñāna*, is that while in the former the inferential cognition is generated by the knowledge of pervasion functioning *as* cognition of pervasion,[3] it is not so in the latter. *Vyāpti* is the concomitance of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*.[4] It is of the nature of an apposition (of the *probans*) with a *probandum* located in all locations of the *probans* without exception. One sees smoke on the yonder hill. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. So, on yonder hill, there is fire. Smoke is the *liṅga* or the *probans* and fire is the *sādhya* or the major term, since it is the object of the inferential cognition. The smoke or the *probans* is the pervader or the *vyāpya*, and fire is the pervader or *vyāpaka*. When there is the cognition of characterisation of the subject by the *probans* in the form "This has smoke", and when there is awakening of the residual impression generated by the experience, "smoke is fire-pervaded", there results the inferential knowledge "This hill is fiery".[5]

---

1. anumitikaraṇam anumānam—*V.P.* p. 52
2. anumitikaraṇam ca vyāptijñānam—*ibid.*
3. vyāptijñānatvena – *ibid.*
4. vyāptiśca aśeṣa – sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇarūpā - *ibid.* p, 55. svaṁ vahnitvādikaṁ tadāśrayo vahnyādistadāśrayatvaṁ mahānasādāviti saṁbandhavākyārthaḥ. *Maṇiprabhā*.
5. *V.P.*, p. 54

   Logicians like Annaṁbhaṭṭa define *vyāpti* as that which consists in the *probans* being coexistent with the *probandum* or the thing to be inferentially established, which is pervasive of the *hetu*. Gaṅgeśa defines *vyāpti* as: hetuvyāpaka–sādhya–sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ vyāptiḥ. Sometimes *avinābhāva* is used in Nyāya literature as an equivalent of *vyāpti*. Thus, *vyāpti* includes both universality and invariableness.

While the distinctive cause (*karaṇa*) of inferential cognition is the knowledge of pervasion, the knowledge of pervasion is generated by residual impressions. Thus indirectly the residual impression of the experience of pervasion, as in the case of smoke in the hearth, is the cause (*kāraṇa*) of inferential cognition.[6] In fact, residual impression of the knowledge of pervasion is an intermediate operation.[7]

The distinctive cause of inferential cognition, of course, is the direct experience of the pervasion of fire and smoke in the kitchen. When smoke is observed on the hill, the residual impressions of this direct experience are aroused. Here, there is also the factor of the recollection of the pervasion (or *vyāpti*) which is the *vyāptismṛti*.[8] But even when there is the recollection of the pervasion, only the residual impression thereof is the cause of inferential cognition.[9] Moreover, if we accept recollection as the cause of the knowledge of pervasion of smoke by fire, we will have to accept that residual impressions are the cause of recollection. Hence, it is consistent with the Law of Parsimony if we accept the residual impression alone as the cause of inferential cognition.[10] Thus, while the distinctive cause, *karaṇa*, of inferential cognition is the cognition of pervasion, the intermediate operation, *vyāpāra*, is the residual impression or *saṁskāra*, and the result is the inferential cognition, *anumiti*.

---

6. tatsaṁskārasyaiva anumitihetutvāt – *ibid.* p. 53

7. tatsaṁskāro'vāntaravyāpāraḥ – *ibid.* p. 52

8. This recollection does not destroy the residual impressions. There is no rule that recollection should destroy residual impressions because a stream of recollection is an observed fact. smṛtidhārādarśanāt: *ibid.* p. 53

9. *ibid.*

10. "The residual impression, when awakened, may lead to the recall (*smaraṇa*) of the pervasion; but even without this recall, it may, as aided by *pakṣadharmatājñāna* (cognition of *probans* as present in the subject), lead straight to inferential cognition" — S. S. S. Sastri, *Notes on Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, p. 190.

1

The Question of the Tṛtīyalinga-parāmarśa

The Advaitin does not think, as the Naiyāyika does, that *liṅga-parāmarśa* has any part to play in inferential cognition, and he believes that the complex of the synthetic cognition in the Nyāya syllogism, known as the "*vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna.*" is superfluous. According to the Naiyāyika, on the contrary, there cannot be an inferential cognition without the *parāmarśajñāna.* Even in cases where the *anumiti* appears to arise directly from *vyāpti-jñāna* and *pakṣadharmatājñāna,* there *is* the presence of *parāmarśa* which is not noticed in the quick transition of the mind from the stage of the *pakṣadharmātajñāna* to *anumiti.*

Inference takes place as follows: There is first the experience of smoke along with fire in the kitchen etc. Then there is the certainty as to the pervasion of smoke by fire. Then, thirdly, at a subsequent time, there is the perception of the *probans,* viz., smoke on the hill. Then, the residual impressions of the original experience of the pervasion of smoke by fire are aroused, and, consequently, there is the revival of the memory of pervasion. There is now the perception of the *probans,* viz, smoke, as qualified by the pervasion of the *probandum* viz. fire. This is called *parāmarśajñāna.* After this, there is the inferential knowledge: "On yonder hill, there is fire." Accordingly *parā-marśajñāna* in its general form is this: "The minor term, viz., hill, has smoke which is pervaded by fire."

It is here that the Advaitin differs from the Naiyāyikas and says that the inferential cognition is secured even through the recollection resulting from the residual impressions of the pervasion of smoke by fire together with the knowledge of the *probans.* *Parāmarśa,* therefore, is not essential for inference. One need not postulate an intermediate stage of reflective self-consciousness of the subject as possessing *probandum-pervaded-probans*[11] as cause

11. na tu madhye vyāptismaraṇaṁ tajjanyaṁ "vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavān-ayam'-ityādi viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭajñānaṁ vā hetutvena kalpanīyam, gauravāt mānābhāvācca—*V.P.* p. 54

Also: na tu tṛtīyaliṅgaparāmarśo-numitau karaṇam-*ibid.* p. 59

for inferential cognition. If the Law of Parsimony is to operate, the *tṛtiyaliṅgaparāmarśa* or the correlation of the three terms, viz., major, minor and middle, is not necessary.

But there are reasons to believe that *tṛtiya-liṅga-parāmarśa* is indispensable even in inference for oneself, as the Naiyāyika rightly urges. The "yonder hill" is consciously correlated with 'fire' through the *probans* "because there is smoke", and the conclusion "On yonder hill there is fire" is obtained subsequently. If 'S' stands for "yonder hill", and 'P' for "fire" and 'M' for "smoke", S-M-P will be the *parāmarśa* and S-P will be the conclusion.

While S-P speaks of the *hill* as qualified by fire, S-M-P speaks of a *fact* of *connection*, that makes this qualification possible together with the relata without which any connection is impos-

---

The *gaurava* or porlixity arises as follows: The Naiyāyika, too, cannot help recognising causal relation, *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, between inferential cognition on the one side and the two cognitions, *vyāpti-jñāna* and *pakṣadharmatājñāna* on the other. If *parāmarśa* intervenes, there is yet another *kāryakāranabhāva* between this *parāmarśa* and *anumiti*, which is superfluous. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*: p. 253. The *Nīlakaṇṭha-prakāśikā* offers a slightly variant explanation of *gaurava*: vahnivyāpyo dhūmavān parvataḥ iti jñānadvayasya tava mate viśiṣṭaparāmarśaṁ prati kāraṇatvena klṛptasya kāraṇatve tu ananyathā-siddhatvamātrasya kalpanīyatayā lāghavamiti prābhākaraḥ śaṅkate.

The author of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* avers that even *vyāpti-smaraṇa* as a step in reasoning is not necessary. Mere revival of residual impressions, *saṁskārodbhodha*, with the *pakṣadharmatājñāna*, will do. To the same opinion, both Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Padmapāda are agreeable. Yathā pañcapādyāṁ svikṛtaṁ vyāptisaṁskāraviśiṣṭaṁ liṅgajñānam anumitihetuḥ natvantra vyāptismṛtiriti *Laghucandrikā*-Advaita Manjari Series, Kumbakonam, p. 396. udbuddha-vyāptisaṁskārasya parvatādau pakṣe dhūmādi-darśanānantaram anumiteḥ- *Sikhāmaṇi*, *Anumāna-pariccheda*.

The difference between the *saṁskārodbodha* and *smṛti* is brought out by *Maṇiprabhā* thus: "Devadatta is having the memory of things like pot, cloth etc., because he is having the residual impressions of pot, cloth etc." In this inference, residual impressions are used as a *hetu* for inferring the *smṛti* in Devadatta. Hence residual impressions are seen to give rise to inferential cognition as different from *smṛti*.

sible. While S-P is the inferential cognition, S-M-P is the cause for it. While S-M-P shows "how the reason actually relied upon is identical with what is known to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, in S-P the *probandum* is conclusively proved by a *probans* which is not vitiated by a counter-*probans* or by a stultifying proof"[12]. Secondly, *vyāpti* is defined as of the nature of an apposition (of the *probans*) with a *probandum* located in all locations of the *probans* without exception,[13] and this perception of *vyāpti* itself involves the *parāmarśa*, S-M-P, in any particular case. The Advaitins argue that the *vyāpti-smṛti* or even *saṁskārodbhodha* is enough to produce the inferential cognition. Coupled with this, there is this fact that it is the *sahacāra-darśana*, or perception of co-existence of S and P through M or the middle term, whether it be once or many times, that is important for inference. Sometimes, even a single instance is admitted to be enough for an inference. This means that even by the examination of a single or only instance where the *probans* and *probandum* are found together, an inference is made.[14]

---

12. See S Kuppuswami Sastri: *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 294.

13. vyāptiśca, aśeṣa-sādhanāśryāśrita-sāmānādhikaraṇa-rūpā-*V.P.*, p. 55.

14. tacca sahacāradarśanaṁ bhūyodarśanaṁ sakṛddarśanaṁ vā iti viśeṣo nādaraṇīyaḥ, sahacāradarśanasyaiva prayojakatvāt-*ibid.* But a single observation can yield a *vyāpti* like "Whatever is possessed of either an attribute or an action is a substance," as no exception to this general proposition can be conceived. D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 202

The Prābhākaras think that even a single observation (*sakṛddarśana*) is enough for having a knowledge of *vyāpti* though repeated observation is useful. Annaṁbhaṭṭa in his *Tarkasaṁgraha* criticises the view that the relation of invariable concomitance is known through *bhūyodarśana* or repeated observation. As Nilakaṇṭha in his *Prakāśikā* points out, the expression, *bhūyodarśana*, may mean (1) the repetition of the same first observation again and again, or (2) the observation of many instances of *sādhya* and *hetu* being together, or (3) many places where these are found together. In none of these three senses, a *vyāpti* can be made out since a single contradictory instance where the *hetu* is not concomitant with the *sādhya* will overthrow the induction. We cannot establish invariable concomitance of colour with savour even if we have observed them together in numerous places; nor will numerous

If this is a true inference, the only step that is involved here is S-M-P. Does not this show that of all things in inference S-M-P is the only one that seems really to matter?

2

Can repeated observations give us Vyāpti?

The question whether repeated observation can give us an inductive generalisation is a hackneyed one both in the Eastern and Western Logic. Repeated empirical observation can at most give only probability or practical certainty but not theoretical certainty. The risk of running into contradictory instances is always present. It has, therefore, all the defects of simple enumeration. However repeatedly we observe fire and smoke together, that will not give any knowledge as to *why* fire and smoke exist together, or how smoke is causally related to fire. And this causal discovery is possible, not on enumeration or repeated observation, but only on *analysis*. Though this analysis involves experiment and observation and may have to be repeated a number of times to make sure that there is no omission in reckoning the causal aggregate, yet what is most important is the analysis itself.

---

instances of the colour observed with savour give us any ground for concluding the presence of *vyāpti*. If we are asked to observe many times, how many times? asks Gaṇgeśa. There cannot surely be a *vyāpti* between a floor and a pen even if they have been observed a hundred times. This is the fallacy that besets induction through simple enumeration. Of course, Annaṁbhaṭṭa says that both co-existence and co-absence of the *sādhya* and *hetu* must be known-*vyabhicāra-jñāna-viraha-sahakṛtaṁ sahacārajñānam*. But here the fear of the contradictory instance can never be overcome. And *tarka*, i.e, "If smoke were present in the absence of fire, smoke could not be produced by fire: but the causal relation between fire and smoke is a well-recognised fact" does not help. How is it a well-established fact, unless through prior inference and observation?

The Buddhists urge that when two things are related as cause and effect, they are always and everywhere related to each other. They employ the method of *pañcakāraṇi* to discover a causal connection. This method corresponds to the Method of Difference.

This method of analysis is applicable, however, only in the most advanced experimental sciences. In the social sciences, for example, observation is an essential method. And repeated observation in the sense of accumulating data under varying conditions of place and time with a view to see that there is no inconstancy is the method in many of our practical activities. The value of repeated observation in our practical life, where theoretical accuracy is not always possible, cannot be minimised.

The Advaitins accept, as we shall see, only one type of inference, viz., *anvayi*. An inference is made on the *vyāpti* of the universal relation between the major and the middle terms. This universal relation is arrived at "through the observation of agreement in presence between the middle and major terms with the non-observation of any contrary instance."[15] This absence of any contrary instance or of inconstancy of the *hetu* is a condition-precedent in the Advaitic doctrine of the perception of *vyāpti*, as in the doctrine of the Naiyāyika. This fear of inconstancy, however, must be construed as caution. All laws and inductive inferences are liable to change or subject to correction. This is so because to know that there is no contradictory instance is to know the entire universe, which is, in the nature of the case, impossible for any finite mind. There will be always something which we do not know, and which may necessitate the modification of what we know already.[16] This liability to contradiction is the criterion by which the Advaitin measures the truth of things. This is in consonance with his larger theory of non-contradiction, *abhādhitatva*. What we experience is true only in so far as it is not sublated. What is given in experience, however much efficient pratically it might be, is essenceless, because it is ever subject to contradiction. What has its own *nature* is never subject to sublation. One cannot perhaps say that an *analysis* of the nature

15. S. C. Chatterjee: *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* - p. 296.

16. Attacking the doctrine of *Pañcakāraṇi* of the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas urge that one does not know all the conditions under which an effect is produced. *Ibid.* p. 268.

See *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā*: pp. 158–64 and *Nyāyamañjari*, pp. 113–17

of things will give us truth and the why of universal relations, for the simple reason that the so-called things really have no nature of their own. The heat of the fire and the cold of the ice are not distinct in the ultimate analysis. In this sense, then,[17] the utterance of caution with reference to the contrary instance is justified.[18]

3

Pakṣatā

Anumiti or inferential cognition can be defined as "the cognition which is produced by subsumptive reflection in association with subjectness,[19] or *pakṣatā*." And *pakṣatā* can be defined as "the absence of such certain knowledge of the major term as is associated with the absence of a desire to establish the major term". (*śiṣādhayaiṣavirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā*). According to the early Naiyāyikas it is merely "doubt regarding the presence of probandum" (*sādhyasandeha*). In other words, it is a doubt whether something could be correctly predicated of the *pakṣa* or the minor term. But doubt with regard to the presence of the *probandum* is not a necessary condition of inference, and a person who has

---

17. cf. "It shows how the validity of a generalisation from the particulars of experience depends ultimately on the discovery of certain common essences or universal characters of particular things". S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 273.

18. Repeated observation, according to the Naiyāyikas, is useful in eliminating all *upādhis* or conditions from the universal relation. For example, in the case of smoke from fire *wetness* of fuel is an *upādhi*, as there could be fire without smoke, i.e., red-hot iron. *Vyāpti*, in other words, should be unconditional. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* says that the observation of co-accompaniment attended with the absence of knowledge of exceptions is the means of apprehending *vyāpti*. If the knowledge of exceptions is certain then there is no *vyāpti*; if it is doubtful, there is difficulty in finding it out. This doubt has two sources: (1) as when we do not know whether it is a man or a post (2) as when there is the presence of *upādhi*. *e.g.*, wetness in fuel. See *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Book II, *Vyāptigrahopāya-siddhānta*. Also S. C. Vidyabhushan, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 428.

19. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, – *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 429. See *Tattvacintāmani* of Gaṅgeśa, Book II on *pakṣatā*.

actually seen the clouds in the sky may yet infer their presence from thunder. That is way, the later Logicians preferred the definition as given at the beginning, i.e., "absence of certain knowledge of the *probandum* as is associated with the absence of a desire to establish the *probandum*."

If one had a positive knowledge of the *probandum (sādhya-siddhi)*, there is no need for any inference, unless one has a desire to get the same knowledge through inferential reasoning. The desire for inference, therefore, neutralises the certain knowledge of the *probandum*.[20]

In the light of the above analysis of *pakṣatā*, two conditions under which inference can be said to take place are (1) there should be the absence of positive knowledge (*siddhyabhāva*) as to what is to be inferred; (2) one should feel a desire or have a will to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*). Both the old Naiyāyikas and the Advaitins admit that in order that there may be inference, there should be a doubt about the major term (*sādhya-sandeha*).[21] "We have a minor term where we are in doubt whether a certain subject is related to the major term."[22] This involves both the absence of certain knowledge and a desire. But even where there is a certainty otherwise, one may like to infer, as in the case of clouds. Hence the modern Naiyāyikas

---

20. The Naiyāyika principle then is: *uttejakābhāva-viśiṣṭa-pratibandhakā-bhāva*: non-existence of such counter-acting agent as is not associated with the absence of the neutralising agent. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *Op. cit.* p. 250-52. Universal certain knowledge of the *probandum* in every conceivable instance of *pakṣa* is described as: *pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena sādhyasiddhi*-as in the proposition: All S is P. Partial certain knowledge of the *probandum* in some *pakṣas*, as in "Some S is P" is described as: "*pakṣatāvacchedaka-sāmānādhikaraṇyena sādhyasiddhi.*

21. The *Nyāyabhāṣya* puts it: na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate 'kiṁ tarhi? saṁśayite'rthe. I. 1. 1. See also *Nyāyasūtra* I. 1. 41. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says: pakṣatvaṁ tu sādhya-sandehavattvaṁ sādhyagocara-sādhakamānābhāvavattvaṁ vā- *Advaita-siddhi*. p. 29. The alternative suggestion seems to be that want of certainty of proof, if not doubt, is an essential condition of inference.

22. S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 278.

would urge that doubt is not an essential condition of inference. Neither the absence of certainty, nor the will to infer, is a necessary condition for inference. The conditions, then, under which inference takes place are: (1) when there are both the absence of certainty and the presence of the will to infer, (2) when there is absence of both certainty and the will to infer, and (3) when there is presence of both certainty and the will to infer.[23] This is what is expressed in the formula that *pakṣatā* consists in the absence of that condition in which there are the presence of certainty and absence of the will to infer.[24]

As Madhusūdana Sarasvatī suggests, the alternative view that though there need not be doubt, there should be at least the absence of certainty or want of proof as a condition-precedent of inference is unassailable since in every operation of a means of proof there is the acquisition of some novel knowledge which was not available earlier. Inference should give a new knowledge or information. If this could be had otherwise than by inference or is had even earlier, one can perhaps get confirmation or corroboration, but it can never be called a new information. Want of certainty should, then, exist and it should be supplied by inference. Otherwise, inference ceases to be a *pramāṇa*.

Again, however certain the inferential cognition is, it is only a mediate certainty while perception is an immediate certainty. When, therefore, there is an immediate perceptual certainty with regard to anything, say, 'clouds', or the 'self', if one will seek for a mediate certainty of it to confirm or corroborate it, it implies a

---

23. *Ibid.*

24. siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa-siddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā. *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, pp. 309-10.

Laghucandrikā puts the view of the Modern Logicians thus: grāhaka-tarkābhāve sati sādhyābhāvavattvena saṁdigdhe dharmiṇi hetuniścayo'pi vyabhicārasaṁśayatayā doṣa eva. ata eva "vahniratviṣṭādīndriya-dharmasamavāyi dāhajanakatvād ātmavad" ityādi sādhakānumāneṣu maṇāvaprayojakatvamuktam. tatra vyabhicārasaṁśayasyādūṣaṇatve vyāpti-pakṣadharmatā-niścaya-saṁbhavenāprayojakatvoktersaṅgateḥ tasya dūṣaṇa-tvam āvaśyakam iti dīdhitāvuktaṁ "yadyapi". See *Advaita-siddhi* p. 29-30.

lack of certainty and not an attainment of certainty. If one, on witnessing or hearing about an incredible thing, pinches his flesh and feels the pain, to make it doubly sure that he is quite awake and normal, the surety does not exist there convincingly and totally. A doubt or want of certainty is present. To say, then, as the Naiyāyika does, that there could be inference when there is a will to infer, the presence of certainty being inconsequential, is to fly against facts.

Moreover, with regard to the knowledge of the Self, the scriptures declare that this knowledge is supreme and total. It destroys all doubts and dissolves all knots. If an inference is essential to verify the authenticity of the Scripture with regard to the Self, then, the Self, it should be presumed, has not so far been attained, and one should be supposed to perish in doubt. So, the Naiyāyika cannot cite the example of the seeker of Self employing inference to have certainty about the Self taught by Scriptures. All these things considered, it is quite proper to accept as the basic conditions of inference, the absence of certainty and the will to infer. Or, as Dr. Datta suggests, while the basic or essential condition is the absence of certainty, the will to desire is a causal factor.[25]

4

Types of Inference Depending on Probans

The Advaitin does not subscribe to the classification of inference into the merely positive (*kevalānvayi*), the merely negative (*kevalavyatireki*) and the combination of the positive-negative, (*anvayavyatireki*), *pūrvavat*, (from cause to effect), *śeṣavat* (from effect to cause) and the inference of the generality from

25. *Six Ways of Knowing*: p. 227. S. C. Chatterjee seems to agree with the modern Naiyāyikas in their emphasis on the will to infer as a function in inference, in spite of the presence of certainty. See *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 284. But if inference merely restates in another form what is already known, to wit, certainty, why should inference be employed at all? And, with regard to the presence of fire on the yonder hill, how can it ever be said that there was the certain knowledge that there was a fire there? If it was known, why the trouble of fresh inference now, unless there is some doubt lingering?

observed points of similarity, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.*[26] The last three, the Advaitin does not take notice of at all.[27] Of the rest, he accepts only one type of inference, viz., *anvayī* established through the method of agreement in presence coupled with non-observation of any exception".[28] This is not the same as *kevalānvayi* where the testing by the non-observation of any exception is not possible. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* says that inference cannot be merely of the nature of co-presence,[29] though co-presence cannot be excluded. Co-presence consists in having for *probandum* what is not a counter-correlate of absolute non-existence, according to the Advaitin.[30] And such a co-presence is not established in the case of Brahman because all the existing entities without exception are the counter-correlates of absolute non-existence located in Brahman. The Scripture declares; "There is no plurality whatever here."

The Advaitin does not accept *kevalavyatireki* or co-absence in inference either. To him, the cognition of pervasion determined by the

---

26. (1) The *Kevalānvayi* has affirmative concomitance alone as in: "Jar is nameable, because it is knowable like a cloth." In this instance, a negative concomitance is impossible because all things are nameable and knowable. (2) The *kevalavyatireki* has negative concomitance alone as in the syllogism; Earth is different from the rest (not-earth) for it has smell; whichever is not different from the rest (not-earth) has no smell, as water, This (earth) is not so, i.e. it does not have absence of smell or *gandhābhāva*, with which the absence of difference from not-earth (*pṛthivītarabhedābhāva*) is invariably concomitant (*vyāpya*); Therefore, it is not so; i.e., it is not devoid of difference from 'non-earth'. In cases like this, there is no example in which there is the affirmative concomitance: "whichever has smell has difference from non-earth". For all varieties of earth come under the *pakṣa* or the minor. (3) The *anvayavyatireki probans* has affirmative concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*) and negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*) with the *probandum*. e.g. "Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth"; this is positive. "Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a tank"; this is negative concomitance.

27. See *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 122 footnotes.

28. *Ibid.* p. 216.

29. taccānumānam anvayirūpameva, na tu kevalānvayi. p. 55.

30. *Ibid.* p. 26. atyantābhāvāpratiyogi-sādhyakatvam.

non-existence of *probans* where the *probandum* is also non-existent, since all inference is the apprehension of pervasion of the *probans* by the *probandum* without exception and inconstancy, is not acceptable. The inference by co-absence shall really be brought under *arthāpatti* or *presumption*. There cannot be an inferential cognition through mere co-absence alone, when there is no cognition of the pervasion of co-presence of smoke and fire. Thus, *kevalavyatireki* must be brought under *arthāpatti*. We have *arthāpatti* where that which is unintelligible in the absence of something is what is to be made intelligible, and that in whose absence somethingelse is unintelligible is what brings about intelligibility.[31]

What is the unintelligibility in the absence of the supposed cause? In the works of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, "it consists in being the counter-correlate of a non-existence which is the pervader of the non-existence of that which is postulated."[32] Usually examples such as "Earth is different from others" are given for *vyatireki* type of inference. In the syllogism "Earth is different from other elements, because it possesses odour", the *vyāpti* is negative in the form "whatever is not different from the other elements has no odour, e.g. fire, air, water or ether." It cannot be said positively "whatever has odour is different from the other elements." For odour is found only in the earth, and since it is the subject, there is no certainty whether the *probandum* viz., that it is different from other elements exists in it or not. So knowledge of the pervasion of co-absence, being negative, cannot give rise to any inferential cognition except through the indication of unintelligibility that calls for a postulation. That is, the possession of a quality by earth, not possessed by other elements, is not intelligible without being different from those elements.[33] But then, this postulation is no more an inference.[34]

---

31. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 89–90.
32. *Ibid.* tadabhāvavyāpakıbhūtābhāvapratiyogitvam. p. 94.
33. *Ibid.* p. 75. See also notes by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. 205.
34. D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 232–237.
yadā tu vyatireka-sahacāreṇa vyatireka-vyāptereva jñānaṁ tadā arthāpattividhayā dhūmasya prāmāṇyam. *Śikhāmaṇi*, p. 182.

If mere co-presence and co-absence are not acceptable to the Advaitin, for the same reasons, co-presence-*cum*-co-absence, too, is not acceptable. Inferential knowledge is obtained by the perception of concomitance to which there is no exception or inconstancy.[35]

5

Some Reflections on Anvayavyatireki and Kevalavyatireki

Anvayavyatireki: The Advaitin grants that inference is through *vyāpti* which is apprehended by perception of concomitance between the major and the middle which knows no inconstancy. But he denies that any inference is possible as to the concomitance of the major and the middle through the observation of cases where the absence of the major goes with the absence of the middle, as in the case "wherever fire is absent, smoke also is absent." While it is doubtful that the *kevalavyatireki* by itself will give any conclusive inferential knowledge, (as for that matter, *kevalānvayi*, too, cannot yield any inferential cognition on the Advaitin's showing), it is to be considered whether the *anvayi* inference is not further strengthened by a *vyatireki* inference. The universal concomitance of the major and the middle terms, as in "wherever there is smoke there is fire", can surely be supplemented by the negative instance, "where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a lake" as Rāmakṛṣṇa clearly granted. That is, not only should we know that smoke always goes with fire but also that smoke does not go with anything else. When one remembers Śrī Harṣa's argument against Udayaṇa that there is no knowing whether smoke goes with fire alone and whether smoke cannot be produced by anythingelse, the importance of this *vyatireki* inference will readily be appreciated.[36] Nothing that has no fire

---

35. *V.P.* p. 55.

36. See Das Gupta: *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 41.

cf. We may have doubt as to the concomitance of smoke with fire, arising from the uncertainty as to whether or not the universal character of 'smoke' is concomitant with somethingelse which can never be concomitant with fire.

has smoke. This hill has smoke. Therefore this hill is not one that has no fire.

Both the positive and negative inferences must go together if the cognition is to be conclusive. Even the Advaitin has reason to insist on the proviso of inconstancy in his inference by agreement, *anvayi*. This proviso should only mean that there should be nothing other than fire from which smoke could originate. This is only a different form of saying that one should be assured that nothing that is not fire has smoke. Thus, the Advaitin himself has incorporated the *vyatireki* in his *anvayi* type of inference. There is nothing wrong in accepting *anvayavyatireki*, therefore, in addition to *anvayi*, though the Advaitin need not accept the *kevalānvayi* under the dictates of his metaphysical presuppositions. But Rāmakṛṣṇa has his own answer to this as will be pointed out later.

6

On Kevalavyatireki

It is urged that in the *vyatireki* inference only the absence of a said concomitance is asserted between one particular major and no other, and the middle. For example, it is said that "nothing that is not different from fire, water, air and ether, has smell, and, therefore, earth is different from fire, water, air, ether". It is true that before one can get the universal major premise: "Nothing that is not different from fire, water, air, ether, has smell", one should know that anything, whatever it is, that is different from the four elements, has smell and that it is earth, and that, therefore, all inference should begin from the presence of universal concomitance, and not absence. But one can here attempt to show that even the concomitance by absence will by itself yield an inference.[37] Even according to the Advaitin,

---

niścitepyarthe prāmāṇya-saṁśayāhita saṁśayavat dhūmatvaṁ vahni-vyabhicārī vṛtti na vā iti saṁsayādapi tāddṛśa-saṁśayopapatteśca. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 339.

37. Rāmakṛṣṇa Paṇḍita, in his *Śikhāmaṇi* tries to argue that in the *kevalavyatireki*, the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the absence

bhūyodarśana, or repeated observation is not an essential factor in inference. It is the perception of concomitance that is determinative of pervasion or *vyāpti*. Fire, water, air and ether are observed to have a particular constitution which makes them lack a property *viz.*, smell. And this is not necessarily done by repeated observation. In other words, that fire, etc., lack smell can be known by the examination of fire etc., themselves, without reference to anything else. As such, can we not say that "a thing (whatever it is), if it is not different from fire etc., has no smell?" This implies that if anything has to have smell, it should be different from fire etc. This means again that the possession of smell means non-possession of the constitution of fire etc. In short, can we not make an inference, as in the above case, from what is known of certain things like fire etc., that they do not possess a certain property i.e., smell, and that this non-possession is due to their constitution, and that whatever possesses the same material constitution cannot have smell? And does not the fact that the earth has smell demonstrate that whatever it may be *positively*, it *is not* like fire, etc.?

While the Advaitin[38] tries to reduce *kevalavyatireki* to *arthāpatti*, the Naiyāyika tries to reduce *arthāpatti* to inference. If the essential element in *arthāpatti* is that a certain fact like

---

of the major and the absence of the middle, yields the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the middle and the major and generates an inference through the latter.

See D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 220.

See *Śikhāmaṇi*: svavyabhicāradhī-virodhi-dhī-viṣayavyāpti-jñānatvena vyāptijñānasyānumiti-hetutvāt. Venkateswar Press Ed., Bombay, p. 181. Rāmakṛṣṇa does not see eye to eye with Dharmarāja, in the kinds of inference. He accepts all the three kinds, *viz. kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvaya-vyatireki*. He sums up thus: vyatireka sahacāramātra jñāna-janyānvaya-vyāpt dhīr yatrānumiti-hetuḥ sa vyatirekī; yatra anvaya-saha-cāramātra-jñānajanyānumiti-hetuḥ so'nvayī; yatro-bhaya sahacāra-jñāna-janyā so'nvaya-vyatirekīti vibhāgopapatteḥ. *Ibid*, p. 182.

38. Together with the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Rāmakṛṣṇa thinks that in the syllogism: "The shell-silver is illusory, because of being seen; whatever is not like this, is different from this, like Brahman," there is *vyatireki*. *Maṇiprabhā*, p. 186.

Caitra's being alive and not being present in his house is unaccountable without presuming another fact like Caitra's being outside his house, could not *arthāpatti* be reduced to inference based on negative concomitance? The Prābhākaras urge in answer to this question that it is the doubt regarding Caitra being alive, and *not* the possible falsification of the knowledge of Caitra being alive, that constitutes the *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti.* Here, a doubt has been exalted to the seat of *pramāṇa.*[39] The Bhāṭṭas maintain that the basic element in the mental process involved in *arthāpatti* is *presumption* through negative concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) while the basic element in the mental process called *anumāna* is subsumption under positive concomitance.[40] Presumption belongs more to the realm of imagination or hypothesis than to inference. One says in the genuine cases of *arthāpatti* as in the case of Devadatta being alive, and not being found in the house, 'I presume' rather than 'I infer'. *Arthāpatti* is more a *hypo-thesis* than a *thesis.*[41]

But the Naiyāyika will urge that if one is forced to rely on negative concomitance exclusively, one's mind has to pass inevitably through a stage of positive concomitance, and that presumption is only the vague anticipation in imagination of what reason will systematically infer.[42] Thus, one finds the cases for the Naiyāyika on one side, and the Advaitin, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākaras on the other more or less evenly balanced.

Rāmakṛṣṇa differs from Dharmarāja in his acceptance of *kevalānvayi* with reference to ordinary things, while, however. he agrees with him in non-acceptance of *kevalānvayi* with reference to Reality. It is true that all the things without exception are the counter-correlates of absolute non-existence located in Brahman. But short of this negation in Brahman of the world, in the world of things, *kevalānvayi* can hold good without conflict with

39. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri: *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 186.
40. *Ibid.* p. 186-187.
41. *Ibid.* p. 187.
42. *Ibid.* p. 188.

cripture declaring the non-existence of things in Brahman since the sphere of application for the scripture is different. Rāmakṛṣṇa says that he follows the Vivaraṇācārya in this respect who has said that the Śruti denies only ultimate reality to things: *āgamena ca dvaitasya tattvāṁśabādhāt.* Rāmakṛṣṇa points out that *kevalānvayi* is possible in the case of pot and its non-existence, for example. Specifically, the conjunction or *saṁyoga* of pot with its locus will be always co-present with the absence of conjunction, *saṁyogābhāva,* of that pot with any other locus. Thus even when there is *saṁyoga,* there is its counter-correlate, *saṁyogābhāva* always without exception. Even in the all-pervasive space, things like pot occupy different places in it and for each different position of an object touching space, there will have to be the absence of that contacting touch in other positions where the object is not. This is co-presence without exception, with no negative instance. Rāmakṛṣṇa's definition is: *svavṛtti-virodhivṛttimad atyantābhāvā-pratiyogitvaṁ sādhyasya kevalānvayi-tvam.* This applies to all knowable and nameable things. When asked how this could apply to Brahman which is unknowable and unnameable, Rāmakṛṣṇa answers that Śaṅkara and Vācaspati have told us that Brahman as conditioned (*upahitacaitanya*) is an object of *vṛtti* (*vṛttilakṣaṇapramāviṣayatvāt*) and thus knowable. It is also nameable in the same manner since it is the object of the knowledge arising from the understanding of scriptural words (*padajanya-jñāna-viṣayatvāt*). Thus nameability can coexist with the absence of nameability for Reality from these two standpoints.

7

Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna

The Advaitin accepts the classification of inference into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* depending upon the purpose or aim.[43] According to the Naiyāyika, in the inference for oneself, there are only three members. In demonstrative inference, there are five members. They are: *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya,*

---

43. S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyaya Theory of Knowledge,* p 289.

and *nigamana*,[44] or the thesis set down, the reason, the exemplification, the subsumptive correlation and conclusion. According to Gautama these five elements are called members, *avayavāḥ*.[45] According to Vātsyāyana, the thesis or the *pratijñā* may be taken to stand for verbal testimony, the reason or the *hetu* for inference, the example or *udāharaṇa* for perception, and the subsumptive correlation or *upanaya* for analogy and the conclusion suggests that all these bear on the same problem.[46] The conclusion or *nigamana* is thus called the culmination of logical reasoning, *paramo nyāyaḥ*. Thus the Naiyāyikas urge that all the *pramāṇas* or sources of knowledge are pressed into service to demonstrate the force of the conclusion beyond a shadow of doubt.

In inference for oneself, *svārthānumāna*, however, the person makes out the relation of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and arrives at the universal generalisation, "wherever there is smoke there is fire", from his repeated observation in the kitchen. Then, he sees the smoke on the mountain. He remembers the generalisation "wherever there is smoke there is fire." Then the cognition arises: "This mountain has smoke which is pervaded

---

44. *Nyāyasūtras* I. 1.32. The Vaiśeṣikas, Praśastapāda for example, use the terms, *pratijñā*, *apadeśa*, *nidarśana*, *anusaṁdhāna* and *pratyāmnāya* for the five members of syllogism. *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 233.

45. There has been an earlier view (probably the reference is to the Jaina logician's syllogism illustrated by Bhadrabāhu) refuted by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* that the total members are ten, *viz*, *Jijñāsā* (desire to know), *saṁśaya* (doubt regarding the *probandum*), *Śakyaprāptiḥ* (belief in the probability of the *probandum* and in the probativeness of the proof), *prayojana* (the aim of discussion), *saṁśayavyudāsa* (the removal of doubt on proving the *probandam*), and other five members of the usual Nyāya syllogism. *Nyāyabhāṣya* I.1.32. *Nyāyavārtika* puts it thus: kathaṁ punar jijñāsādayo'vayavā na bhavanti? parāpratipādakatvāt. parapratipādakā ye vākyāṅgabhūtā itaretarāpratyayitenārthavanto vākyāṅgatām upayānti tevayavāḥ I. 1.32. Madhusūdana leaves it to the thinkers to adopt syllogism with any number: yathāmataṁ avayavāḥ prayoktavyāḥ. *Laghucandrikā* p. 31.

46. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. 1.1. sarveṣām ekārthasamavāye sāmarthyapradarśanaṁ nigamanam.

by fire". Then, the inferential cognition arises: "The mountain has fire".

But according to the Advaitins (as to the Mīmāṁsakas), even in the inference for others, which is a demonstration of the conclusion by a syllogism,[47] three members are enough, the first two or the last two being superfluous. Then *parārthānumāna* is of the form: The hill has fire; because there is smoke; and whatever has smoke has fire as is found in the kitchen.

Here "hill" is the minor term, *pakṣa*, of which fire is established. Fire is the major term, as it is the object of the inferential cognition, and it is that which is established of the hill. This happens through the instrumentality of the *probans* or *hetu*. The illustration of kitchen is acceptable to both the parties in the discussion because it is given in common experience. So the members are but three here, *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, that is, the first three members of the Nyāya syllogism are considered enough.[48] Or else, the last three, i.e., *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya*, and

---

47. parārthantu nyāya sādhyam. *V.P.* p. 57. *svārthānumāna*, according to the Advaitin, is that inference which is obtained by the knowledge of the pervasion through concomitance without the explicit formulation in propositions. Dignāga's definition is; parārthānumānantu svadṛṣṭārtha-prakāśanam. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ch. III. Praśastapāda defines it as: pañcāvayavena vākyena svaniścitārtha-pratipādanaṁ parārthānumānam. *Bhāṣya*, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, p. 231.

48. In his *Nyāyaprveśa*, Dignāga mentions only three members of the syllogism, and the third member states both an affirmative and a negative example, *viz.* this hill is on fire, because it has smoke; all that has smoke has fire, like a kitchen, and whatever is not on fire has no smoke, like a lake. See S. C. Vidyābhushan: *History of Indian Logic*, p. 290. Here, there is a major term, a minor term, a middle term and two examples. Dharmakirti is of the opinion that even the third member is unnecessary since the general proposition is implied in the reason. Disagreeing with Dignāga, Dharmakirti maintains in his *Nyāyabindu* that the example is contained in the middle term. In "The hill is fiery, because it is smoky, like a kitchen", the term 'smoky' includes the kitchen. Hence 'like a kitchen' may be omitted. Yet he avers that the example gives something specific while the middle term is general. *uktam abhedena...punarviśeṣeṇa darśanīyāvuktau.*

nigamana were accepted, omitting *pratijñā* and *hetu.*[49] For, the conclusion only states what the *pratijñā* declares. And *upanaya* repeats only what the *hetu* affirms.

To the Advaitin, it seems that the concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the qualification of the hill by smoke can be shown even with three members.[50] And the most important aspects of an inference are the above two only. What more does one require? Thus, the syllogism is either of the form:

The hill is fiery,
Because it smokes;
and whatever smokes is fiery, as the kitchen.

Or of the form:

Whatever smokes is fiery as the kitchen.
The hill smokes;
Therefore it is fiery.

The first form of syllogism starts with the conclusion and gives the grounds for that conclusion later, whereas the second form of syllogism is more formal since it gives the grounds first and draws the conclusion.

The difficulty with reference to the stand taken by the Advaitin and the Naiyāyika arises only because while the Advaitin believes that the Naiyāyika's *pratijñā* and the *nigamana*, and the *hetu* and the *upanaya* are more or less verbal restatements and, that, therefore, they can be done away with, the Naiyāyika affirms that each of the five members in a syllogism fulfils a distinct need. Each member answers to a separate *pramāṇa*, verbal, inferential, perceptual, analogical respectively, and the conclusion is not a

---

49. *V.P.* Ch. II. p. 57.

50. *Ibid.* The Buddhists admit only two members *viz*, *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*, but no *nigamana*. The Jaina logicians, Māṇikhyanandin and Devasūri hold that the syllogism "The hill is on fire because it smokes" is complete. See Devasūri's *Pramāṇanayatattvalokālaṁkāra*, Ch. III.

purposeless restatement of the thesis, *pratijñā*. Its purpose is to indicate "that the *probans* is not vitiated by the presence of a *counter-probans* proving the contrary (*asatpratipakṣatva*), nor stultified by stronger proof (*abādhitatva*)."[51] And the complex cognition, or subsumptive reflection, (*upanaya*) is there to show that the *probans* which is made out to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum* (*sādhyavyāpya*), should be specifically known to be present in the minor term.[52] Without this, the syllogism will not be complete. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri writes refuting the thesis in Randle's *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* that, "either *hetu* or *upanaya*, and either *pratijñā* or *nigamana* are superfluous and this superfluity is inherited from the time when the Nyāya was a method of debate and not yet a syllogism and in the case of the Nyāya school, the convention of five members may have been fixed by a desire to equate the four 'premises' with the four *pramāṇas*."[53]

Māṇikyanandin says in his *Parīkṣāmukhaśūtra*: Inference arises through knowledge of major term by the middle; *sādhanāt sādhyavijñānam anumānam*. Both Māṇikyanandin and Devasūri, however, say that for men of small intellect, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana* may be useful; mandamatīṁstu vyudpādayituṁ dṛṣṭāntopanayanigamanānyapi prayojyāni. See Vidyābhūshan; *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 202–3.

51. S. Kuppuswami Sastri: *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 288.

52. See S. C. Chatterjee: *Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 305.

53. See H. N. Randle: *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 167.

Both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara admit that the first member of the syllogism is restated in the concluslon, while the fourth is a combination of the second and the third. Still, all the five members are useful in debate, though unnecessary for the purpose of Logic. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* I. 1 39. Also I. 1.32. *Nyāya-vārtika* I. 1.39. Vātsyāyana says that *upanaya* and *nigamana* are essential since they serve on the strength of the general principle enunciated in the example, to confirm the reason and reassert decisively the proposition which was doubtful. The *upanaya* is not a mere analogous rejoinder because it is not based merely on similarity or dissimilarity indicated by its particle 'so' or 'not so', but on the general principle established by the example. The person Vātsyāyana refutes in this way is probably Nāgārjuna. See Vidyabhūshan's *History of Indian Logic*, p. 119–20.

"If syllogistic expression, like any other expression, directly or indirectly presupposes a hearer to whom it is addressed, if *nyāya-prayoga* or syllogistic expression finds a place only in inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), and if the process of reasoning in inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) is not syllogising, a strictly logical debate, as recognised by Gautama and his followers, must involve a self-contained syllogistic expression as its main part".[54] The aim of syllogism is (1) to specifically think of what has to be demonstrated, (2) to know the reason, (3) to know how the *vyāpti* is arrived at, (4) to known how the reason actually relied upon is identical with what is known to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, (5) to know that the *probandum* is conclusively proved by a *probans* which is not vitiated by a *counter-probans* or by a stultifying proof.[55]

According to the Naiyāyika the syllogism containing the three members only, (or the two members only as the Buddhists would urge)[56] will be a truncated and incomplete reasoning. If the syllogism contained the first three only, it is a fault of omission in that it makes no provision for equating the *probans* in the *pakṣa* with the *vyāpya*[57] and for obviating any possibility of a *counter-probans* or a stultifying proof. If the syllogism, on the other hand, contained the last three only, it does not adequately prepare the ground for inference. It starts abruptly leaving the listener puzzled and confused as to what the subje t-matter is

---

54. *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 293.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Buddhists urge that not more than two members are required, conveying the needed information about *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*, viz., *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*.

57. According to Praśastapāda, whereas the *hetu* states that S is M (*pakṣa-dharmatā*) the *upanaya* states that S ss M which is P, (*tṛtiyaliṅgaparā-marśa*). Śrīdhara holds that second member of the syllogism merely mentions the *hetu* or reason *in itself* and does not state that it is a property of the subject. *hetuvacanaṁ hetusvarūpamātraṁ kathayati, na tasya pakṣadharmatām.*

See Randle's *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 170.

Rāmakṛṣṇa in his *Śikhāmaṇi* does not agree with the stand taken in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* on similar grounds. In difference of opinion to be settled whether the hill is fiery or not, the most natural starting-point for one would be to give the *pratijñā* first[58] and the reason. This will naturally satisfy the curiosity or *ākāṅkṣā* of the hearers. If one could start with the example as the Advaitin believes, there is no reason why one should not start with *upanaya*, since abruptness without preparation is common to all such starting-points in the discussion. So Rāmakṛṣṇa concludes that only the first three members should be accepted and not the last three beginning with *udāharaṇa*. And, if, as according to the Bauddhas, only the *udāharaṇa* and the *upanaya* are admitted, all these defects will arise.

All these points go to show that a completely satisfying syllogism must have some procedure, however formal it is, where convincing demonstration will necessitate the statement of the thesis to be proved which is the conclusion when so proved. This does not mean that they are the same. However, for one who knows the implications of syllogistic reasoning, all the steps need not be expressed formally. That is how the syllogism of the Advaitins could be expanded into the more formal reasoning of the Naiyāyikas, and the syllogism of the Naiyāyikas could as well be expressed in the syllogisms of the Advaitin. One is inclined to say, therefore, that the other syllogisms are only the enthymemes of the Nyāya syllogism.

The distinction, which Vātsyāyana is said to have realised,[59] between the truly logical and the merely psychological, misses the point that in any logical process of reasoning, one thought must, as the ground of the subsequent thought, lead on without lapse or lacuna. Logic should take nothing for granted. The fact that three or even two *will* do for the enforcement of the conclusion does not mean that the full implications of the steps in reasoning have been brought to light. These implied steps in

58. pratbamaṁ sādhyanirdeśasyaiva kartumucitatvāt. p. 184.

59. Randle, *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 162.

the movement of reasoning cannot have anything less than the five members of the Nyāya syllogism. The Naiyāyikas would only urge that what is dismissed as merely psychological is not really so, but is so much logical link in reasoning.

8

A few remarks on Udāharaṇa

While all logicians are agreed that the two essential things in inference are the concomitance (*vyāpti*) or the major premise, and the *pakṣadharmatā*, the minor premise,[60] all the schools, *viz.*, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsaka, Bauddha, the Advaita, are agreed in regard to the importance and value of the example (*udāharaṇa*) as a member of the syllogistic expression. In the Nyāya syllogism, the *udāharaṇa*, *viz.*, "whichever has smoke, has fire, as the hearth", shows how the generalisation on which deduction rests is arrived at. *Udāharaṇa* is a typical instance which, expressing the invariable concomitance or connection between the *probans* and the *probandum*, enables one's mind to pass in the *pakṣa* from a similar case of the *probans* to a similar case of *probandum*.[61] Thus, through *udāharaṇa*, Indian Logic combines deductive inference and inductive discovery.

9

Inference of the illusoriness of the world

A syllogism establishing the illusoriness of the world is as follows[62]: 1. Everything other than Brahman is illusory. 2. Because

---

60. *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, II. p. 2.

61. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri: *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 297.

62. Madhusūdana in his *Advaitasiddhi* has given some twenty-six inferential arguments for illusoriness calling them specific reasonings. A few short syllogisms can be noted here: (a) World is unreal; because it is something other than Brahman, like shell-silver. (b) Unreality is invariably concomitant with all things except Brahman and the absolute non-entity, because it belongs to all unreal things, or because it is not the object of that absolute negation which is co-existent with unreality, like the character of perceptibility. (c) Perceptibility cannot belong to the absolutely real thing, because it resides only in the

of otherness from Brahman. 3. And what is thus (other than Brahman) is illusory, like nacre-silver. Here the opponent may say that there is no proper example of illusoriness. The Advaitin has quoted nacre-silver as the example of such illusoriness. The opponent may deny the illusoriness of silver described by the Advaitin as indeterminable. Either the nacre-silver is wholly real or wholly unreal. Hence it cannot serve as an example. To this, the Advaitin answers that the necre-silver is not real because it is sublated, and it is not unreal because it appears; its nature is indeterminable as either real or unreal. Secondly, it may be objected that even granting the indeterminability of the nacre-silver, "being other than Brahman" is not the determinant of illusoriness. The indeterminability follows from its being the nacre-silver. To this, the Advaitin replies that the indeterminability is presented in a variety of instances like nacre-silver, rope-snake, etc., which have nothing in common except that they are other than Brahman. So, "being other than Brahman" alone should be taken as the determinant of illusoriness for the reason of parsimony.[63]

And what is this illusoriness? It consists in being "the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence in the locus of the presentation itself"[64]. The following typical syllogism is offered as another

---

nameable things, like shell-silver. (d) Perceptibility is invariably concomitant with the character of differing from the absolutely real thing, because it is a character not residing in things other than perceptible, like the shell-silver. (e) The world is unreal, because while not being the object of that knowledge which leads to emancipation, it is yet different from non-entity, like shell-silver. (f) That absolute negation of the cloth characterised by the relationship of inherence resides in the yarn, because it is the absolute negation of the cloth, like that absolute negation of the cloth, which is characterised by another kind of relationship. *Advaitasiddhi*, Nirnayasagar Press, (1947), pp. 417–422. Eng. Tr. by Jha.

63. śuktirūpya-rajjusarpādīnāṁ mithyātve brahmabhinnatvasyaiva lāghavena prayojakatvāt - *V.P.*, 58. See S.S.S. Sastri's *Notes* on this on pp. 191–2.

64. *V.P.*, p. 58. svāśrayatvenābhimatayāvanniṣṭha–atyantābhāva-pratiyogitvam —V.P. p. 58.

proof for illusoriness. "This cloth is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in this thread; because of clothness, like another cloth". Citsukha has said: "Wholes are counter-correlates of absolute non-existence located in their own parts because of their wholeness, like other wholes."[65]

Dharmarāja thinks that the syllogism: "Every thing that is different from Brahman is illusory, because of difference from Brahman, like the shell-silver", is better in some respects than the syllogism: "The world is illusory, because it is perceptible like shell-silver". In *Śikhāmaṇi* the difficulties in this latter syllogism are enumerated through the mouth of the opponent. In this syllogism, in the minor term 'world' even Brahman is included and as such it is also subject to sublation (*bādha*). Just to avoid this, one cannot so construe the term 'world' as to mean 'all the modifications' (*sarve vikārāḥ*), thus thinking that Brahman, being unmodifiable, is excluded from the scope of the minor term. But in some philosophies other than Advaita, ether is said to be unmodifiable, and even in Advaita, the connection of *avidyā* etc., is stated to be unmodifiable. These also then will fall outside the minor term and will not be illusory. Again, shell-silver is given as example. But since shell-silver also is comprised within the minor term there is the fallacy of *siddhasādhana*. Moreover, illusoriness cannot be defined as the counter-correlateness of absolute non-existence located in the substratum of the object connected with it (i.e. illusoriness) (*svasaṁsṛjyamānādhikaraṇaniṣṭhātyantābhāva-pratiyogitvam*). This definition is applicable, not only to illusory things, but also to contact (*saṁyoga*) and absence of contact (*saṁyogābhāva*). Wherever there is *saṁyoga*, there is always a corresponding *saṁyogābhāva*. But this does not make *saṁyoga* illusory. Nor can illusoriness be said to be the *product* of *avidyā* because it will not apply to *avidyā* itself, thereby committing the fallacy of too narrow a definition. Nor is it removability by

---

Also *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 39, verse 7:

sarveṣāmapi bhāvānāmāśrayatvena saṁmate |
pratiyogitvam atyantābhāvaṁ pratimṛṣātmatā. ||

65. *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 40, verse 8. Also *V.P.* p. 59.

knowledge (*jñānanivartyatvam*) because it is accepted by others that in spite of its being real, the world is removed by the knowledge of Īśvara. Nor is illusoriness to be defined as inexplicability (*anirvacanīyatva*). Difference from existence cannot be the criterion of inexplicability, for, in that case, the non-existent things like the horns of the hare will become real. Nor can inexplicability be difference from non-existence because it will include Brahman also in its scope. Nor is it difference from both being and non-being, because there is no experience of such a thing. Nor is inexplicability the character of being the locus of non-being while not being the locus of being, since this will include Brahman who is free from the attributes of being and non-being. Moreover, what is this perceptibility (*dṛśyatva*) in the syllogism given as the *probans*? It cannot mean 'being pervaded by the fruit defined by knowledge' (*jñānalakṣaṇaphalavyāpyatvam*) because this definition will not be applicable to supersensuous things like merit and demerit. Merit and demerit are not objects of the *vṛtti-caitanya* born of sense-object contact. Nor the *dṛśyatva* be said to be objectness of *vṛtti* because Brahman, though self-luminous, is yet said to be an object of *vṛtti, i.e. akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti*. Thus, there could be no inference establishing illusoriness.

To avoid these defects, Dharmarāja in his syllogism has made some improvements. The phrase 'different from Brahman' is incorporated so as to exclude Brahman being part of the minor term. To avoid the defect of the example, shell-silver, being already established, the word 'everything' is incorporated. Shell-silver being illusory can thus constitute an example because though as part it is known to be illnsory, still the whole that is denoted by the term '*everything*' is not yet established. Thus the syllogism: 'Everything that is different from Brahman is illusory, like the shell-silver', is faultless. In any inference establishing non-difference as in: "Intelligence implied by the term 'Thou' is non-different from Brahman because of being of the definition 'Existence, Consciousness, Bliss like Brahman Itself', the minor term itself is the example (*abhedānumāne pakṣa eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ*). Thus, shell-silver coinciding with the minor term is not a fault. The same line of criticism is adopted in case of other categories also like

quality, action, generic character, inherence etc. For example, of the quality it may be said in the above manner: This colour (say, blue) of the cloth before me is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads; since it is colour, like any other colour. The same can be urged against inherence (*samavāya*) also as follows: *Samavāya* is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads, since it is *samavāya* like that between clay and pot. Thus, Brahman can be neither the locus of qualities nor an inherent cause. So it is not a substance. Substanceness is admitted to consist in being the locus of quality or in being the inherent cause.[66] If it is said that if things like pot etc., are illusory there will be the sublation of the perception as "pot exists", no; the reality of pot is not established. In all perception the content is the substrate Reality, *viz.*, Brahman.[67] And, if it is asked how the qualitiless, colourless Brahman could be the content of visual and other cognitions, which have as their contents things qualified by colour etc., is there not perceptibility even for that which is colourless, *viz.*, colour? Further, it has been already stated that Brahman, on the Advaitin's view, is not a substance. So, the question of the perception of the colourless substance does not at all arise. Even granting that Brahman is a substance for the sake of argument, there can be the contentness for it of visual and other cognitions just as there is contentness for time, which is colourless, of visual and other cognitions.[68]

Or, alternatively, the Advaitin recognises three grades of reality, viz., *pāramārthika* (absolute reality), *vyāvahārika* (empirical reality), and *prātibhāsika*, (phenomenal reality). The first is that of Brahman, the second is that of pot etc., and the third is that of nacre-silver. While the phenomenal nacre-silver is sublated by

---

66. guṇāśrayatvaṁ samavāyikāraṇatvaṁ vā dravyatvamiti te'bhimatam. na hi nirguṇasya brahmaṇaḥ guṇāśrayatā; nāpi samavāyikāraṇatā, samavāyāsidheḥ *V.P.* p. 60.

67. adhiṣṭānabrahmasattayā eva tatra viṣayatayā ghaṭādeḥ satyatvasidheḥ-*Ibid*, p. 59.

68. The Advaitin admits sense-cognisedness for time, which is colourless. nirūpasyāpi kālasya indriyavedyatvābhyupagamāt-*V.P.* p. 61.

the veridical cognition of the shell, the empirical reality of shell and other things like that, being due to nescience alone, are sublated by Brahman-intuition alone. While an absolute reality is denied for pot etc., they are granted an empirical reality. As such, therefore, pot etc., can be the content for pot-cognition etc. The negation of pot etc., is not in respect of their own existence but only in respect of their absolute reality.[69] Thus, there is no contradiction in the Advaitic view that the world is illusory; and for this illusoriness there is possession as counter-correlate of what is defined by absolute reality, as the qualification of absolute non-existence.

10

Ānandabodha's arguments for inferring the Illusoriness of the World

Ānandabodha gives the following syllogism in support of the illusoriness of the world. The world is illusory like the perception of silver and dream, because of inertness and objectness.[70] It may be said: the middle term 'objectness' for perception really renders the inference invalid, because, is the world that is the "object" of perception, real or unreal? If it is real, being an object of perception, illusoriness cannot be inferred. And, therefore, 'being an object of perception' cannot be the middle term. If the world were unreal, the *hetu* 'objectness for perception' will go without a basis or locus. The example also will be rendered baseless. The *hetu*, moreover, is inconstant in the case of the Self which is also known and which, in that case, will become illusory.

The first criticism referring to the middle term being refuted by the world of objects that is perceptible by valid means of

---

69. ghaṭāder brahmaṇi niṣedho na svarūpena, kiṁtu pāramārthikatvenaiva. *VP.* p. 61.

70. sati caivaṁ prapañco'pi
syād avidyāvijṛṁbhitaḥ |
jāḍyadṛśyatvahetubhyām
rajatasvapnadṛśyavat. ||
—*Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 128.

knowledge is groundless because it has been shown by Ānandabodha that differential perception, when analysed, will turn out to be a baseless notion and, thus illusory.[71] Thus, though there is the perception, the world given to perception is not real, just as the things given in the dream-perception are not real, though perceived or as it happens in meditation where the senses do not operate outward.[72]

With regard to the second criticism that if the world were unreal, the middle term and the example will have no locus at all, the Advaitin would say that he does not swear by the notion that in order to be an abode a thing should be real. It will suffice if there is the experience.[73] The essence of an illusion is that it is immediately given in experience, incapable of being maintained by any proof. So, absence of proof is no reason for saying that the world cannot be the basis or abode, and conversely, the world being an abode or locus is no reason why it should be real. For the example also, there is the testimony of experience.

With reference to the criticism that the *probans* is inconsistent with regard to the Self or Ātman, the Advaitin holds that the Self does not depend on anything else for its manifestation. It is self-manifesting and self-established. It is not an object of perception like any other inert object.

---

71. bhedaprapañcasya pratyakṣādigocaratāyāḥ prāk-parāstatvāt. *N.M.* p. 129. See for the criticism of differential perception, *Ibid.* pp. 1–56.
ittham nirasta-nikhila-pratikūlaśaṅkāt
vedāntavākyanikarānnikhilopi bhedaḥ |
śakyo niṣeddhumiti siddham anādyavidyā
tadvāsanāviracita bhūmamātrasiddhaḥ ‖ . *Ibid.* p. 56.

72. svapnadhyānayoriva tatsaṁbhavāt – *ibid* p. 56. The inference is as follows: The cognition of difference is not brought about by any valid means of cognition, for there is no satisfactory explanation of such a means of cognition or because it is a cognition like that obtainable in dreams. bhedasaṁvedanaṁ na pramāṇanibandhanam anirūpitapramāṇakatvāt bhedasaṁvedanatvād vā svapnabhedāvabhāsanavat. *Ibid.* p. 55.

73. na cāntarena prāmāṇikabhāvam-āśrayatānupapattirityapi kuladharmaḥ, prasiddhi-mātreṇa tad-upapatteḥ. *Ibid.* p. 129.

11

The Self-luminosity of Ātman

The Self cannot be the object of any mental perception for the reason that what is the subject can never be an object and be the cause of any psychosis having that as content. Indeed the finger cannot touch itself, nor is the sword cut by its own sharp edge. If it is said that though the Self be not an object of mental perception, still it cannot be independent of other objects for its luminosity, for it manifests itself in the cognitions of all objects that are dependent upon the sense-organs etc., it is not so, because the Self, though it experiences the fruit of the action of the psychosis having different objects for content, it itself is never the content of its own psychosis. For example, Caitra, who goes, is not the object of his going, for the object of his going is the city.[74] The subject Self is not an object, and an object is never a subject.

Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa* says that the self-revelatory nature of Self is absolute and independent. Citsukha formulates the definition of self-luminosity as that which is to be called immediate, at the same time not being an object of any cognition.[75] And the Self is nothing but this self-luminous consciousness. Some arrive at the idea of the permanent Self through the conscious reasoning and inference from knowledge, will and feeling which presuppose a unitary and permanent Self. But in that way it will be impossible to recognize one's own Self as different from others, one's own cognitions from those of others.

The Self manifests itself in all operations of knowing without being an object of cognition. Citsukha arrives at this definition after examining other *prima facie* views on the self-luminosity. Self-luminosity cannot merely mean existence and illumination for

---

74. parasamavetakriyāphalaśāli hi karmeti, is the principle, meaning that one's action has reference to something other than the agent only. *Ibid*, p. 132.

75. avedyatve saty aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvaṁ svayaṁ-prakāśa-lakṣaṇam. *Tattavapradīpikā*: Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, p. 9.

this would be so wide as to include the Nyāya definition of self-luminosity according to which knowledge is known in introspection, and illumination is not its intrinsic character. Hence, the existence and illumination must be the sovereign intrinsic character of consciousness. But in this case, the consciousness will be both the knower and the known at the same time. Since this is not sound, it is said that consciousness is self-luminous because it is not dependent on any extraneous source of its own kind, like the lamp which does not require the aid of another lamp. But then, this definition would apply both to consciousness and a lamp which is absurd. So a fresh definition is attempted. Consciousness or knowledge when it arises is *ipso facto* manifested. The rise of knowledge cannot but be self-manifest. Otherwise it will amount to saying that one knows but that only one does not know that he knows. Here again, the difficulty is that feelings and experiences like pain and pleasure are immediately manifested. Are we to call these experiences self-luminous? Obviously not. So the better formulated definition will introduce non-objectness (*jñānāviṣayatva*) as an essential feature of self-luminosity, which will exclude the experiences like pain and pleasure from the purview of the definition. A doubt still lingers. Do we not prove that knowledge is self-luminous by reasoning in the above way and make it an object of knowledge? The fact of empirical usage has to be admitted. The definition now will be having the qualification: "while being the subject of empirical usage, it is not an object of knowledge." This form of putting it, however, does not explain how Brahman-consciousness can be said to be subject to usages, being beyond all determinations. So the final solution is to define self-luminosity as: "though incapable of being an object of knowledge, yet possessing capacity to appear in immediate experience." Following the Nyāya definition of substance as "the seat of qualities" that implies the "non-location of the absolute negation of the seat of qualities" so as to cover the case of the substance which is without qualities at the time of its origination, Citsukha defines the expression 'fitness for immediate empirical usage', as 'being the non-locus of absolute or total negation of the fitness for immediate (perceptual) empirical usage.'

This takes Brahman out of the pale of empirical usage as Brahman is transcendent reality in which there could be no trace of the empirical. In the same way, non-objectness (*avedyatva*) in the definition is interpreted as *phalavyāpyatvābhāva*, or "absence of pervasion by fruit" or knowledge arising out of the mind transforming itself in the form of the object when it comes into contact with it through the senses. *Phala* is the revelation of the object when the percipient consciousness is united with the object-consciousness through a psychosis or *vṛtti* of the mind. Now Citsukha says that self-luminous Brahman is not the fruit of such a process of knowledge as described above while all the other objects like pot, etc., are.

Citsukha's syllogism for the establishment of the self-luminosity is as follows: Consciousness is self-luminous, because it is of the nature of experience (*anubhūtiḥ svayaṁprakāśā anubhūtitvāt yannaivam tannaivaṁ yathā ghaṭaḥ*). Just as any property like whiteness is denied absolutely in a pot which is black, knowability is totally denied in the Self with the result that the unknowable Self has to be self-luminous. The Naiyāyikas urge several objections to the syllogism proposed by Citsukha. Every attribute must have its locus in some substance. Self-luminosity is one such attribute and, even while it is conceived, it must be located in its locus, i.e. consciousness. Then why an elaborate inference of that which is already conceived to be located in consciousness? On the other hand, if there were no such preconception, since no idea of the predicate (the major in the syllogism) could be there, the major itself becomes inconceivable and unproved. Advaitin's reply is that self-luminosity is not inconceivable and though it is known, it is not so far known as related to its locus as its essence. Since knowability is denied in consciousness, self-luminosity is implied in it as its property. So it cannot be said that self-luminosity is unestablished. Nor is it quite pre-established. To make the partially known completely established, a syllogism is perfectly necessary.

Madhusūdana defines cognizability as that which has a definite formal content (*sva-prakāraka-vṛtti-viṣayatvam eva dṛśyatvam*).

The term *prakāraka* meaning 'form' excludes Brahman from the definition, since Brahman is self-luminous. All objects depend on an alien consciousness for their manifestation. They are other than self-revealing (*asvaprakāśatva-rūpatvam dṛśyatvam*).

12

The Self-luminosity of Cognition

The Prābhākaras who hold also, like the Advaitin, that cognitions are self-luminous differ yet from the Advaitic position in holding that cognitions are perceived not as objects but as cognitions (*saṁvittayaiva hi saṁvit saṁvedya na saṁvedyatayā*). Moreover, cognitions are inferred from the fact that there has been an apprehension of an object.

In every act of cognition, according to the Prābhākaras, the knower, known and the knowledge are given at once. This is known as *tripuṭisaṁvit*. All consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness as well as object-consciousness.[76] Moreover, the root "*jña*" (to know) is always transitive. It is invariably concomitant with an object.[77] Therefore, if the object is not present, it is also not present. But this position of the Prābhākaras is not sound. For, the manifestation of pot etc., is dependent upon the cognition, since pot is an object of knowledge. Its manifestation thus is invariably concomitant with the state of being an object of knowledge. But the cogniser does not depend upon the cognition for his manifestation, because of his immediacy. The Self is not an object at any time. And, as against the Prābākaras to whom the Self is inert, the Advaitins hold that Self is of nature of cognition and, therefore, what the Prābhākaras say of cognitions applies to the Advaitin's Self, viz., its self-revealedness.

The Naiyāyikas say that cognitions are not self-luminous. What does this mean? Does it mean that the cognition manifests others, itself being non-manifest? Or being manifest? Not the first;

76. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*: Vol. II, p. 395; arthasamvittirevātmānātmaprakāśanarūpā prakāśate. *N. M.* p. 134.

77. jānāteḥ sadā sakarmakatayā karmaṇā vyāptasya tannivṛttau nivṛtteḥ. *Ibid.*

otherwise, after seeing a pot, there will be always the doubt whether I saw the pot or no. So the cognition manifests itself at the time of the manifestation of the object because it is not apt to be doubted with respect to that object immediately after that like the object itself.[78]

If the cognition were dependent upon another cognition for its luminosity, then, that second cognition will have to depend on a third and so on. And we do not perceive a large number of cognitions simultaneously. Nor can it be said that one cognition has another cognition for content. For, is the cognition 'X' (for example), which has the cognition 'Y' for its object, born out of that contact with the mind wherefrom the cognition of the object 'Y' is produced? Or is it (X) born out of another contact with the mind? Not the first, because it is not admitted that the same cause *viz.*, mind-contact, could produce successive cognitions. Each cognition must have its own cause. Nor can it be the second; for, contemporaneous with the origination of the cognition of the pot there is action in the mind. Then, there is cessation of this action. Again, there is origination of a subsequent contact. Thus, there is much interval or delay due to a series of division of time. How, then, can the previous cognition comprehend that which is present now?

Thus, cognitions, one has to concede, are self-luminous and manifest themselves manifesting their contents. The Self is of the nature of cognition and is never an object while the world is of just the opposite character and therefore illusory. With this discussion, Ānandabodha establishes the illusoriness of the world by inference.

Five different definitions have been offered by the Advaitins for the concept or expression 'illusoriness' (*mithyātva*). (1) The absence of being as well as the absence of non-being (*sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati asattvātyantābhāvavattva-rūpaṁ viśiṣṭam*). Replying Vyāsatīrtha, Madhusūdana observes that exclusion of

78. vijñānamarthaprakāśasamaye prakāśate tadupādhavanantaraṁ sandehayogyatvā arthavat. *Ibid.* p.

being does not necessarily lead us to non-being. All that appears need not have being; but even appearances are appearances of something that has being. It is no argument against Advaita to say that it holds that what has no being cannot appear, for, Advaita says only that appearances have a substrate, *i.e.* Brahman. (2) Denial at all times even where it (the illusory) appears to exist (*pratipannopādhau-traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvam*). Being, because it is being, can at no time be denied. Non-being, because it is non-being, can at no time be denied. Only that which is indefinable as either being or non-being can at all times be denied. The denial of the indescribable illusion results or is the same as affirmation of Brahman. When the world-appearance is denied as 'there is no world-appearance *here*' (*neha nānāsti kiṁcana*), as there is no world-appearance *anywhere else*, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of world-appearance. This does not mean that the world is a *tuccha*; for, a *tuccha* can never appear for it to be denied. (3) Removability by knowledge (*jñāna-nivartyatvam*). World-illusion is removed by true knowledge with its causal aspect and effect-aspect. When a jar is destroyed with a heavy club, it is broken only in its effect-aspect. The cause-aspect, *i.e.* clay is there. (4) Appearance in the locus of its own absence (*svāśraya-niṣṭha atyantābhāva-pratiyogitvam*). (5) Difference from the real (*sad-viviktatvam*). Madhusūdana defines existence as that which appears as existent through proofs not invalidated by defect. This definition has the purpose of excluding non-entities and Brahman from its scope. Non-entities do not appear; Brahman is never an object to any mind.[79]

79. See *Advaita-siddhi* : *Paricchheda-I.*

Chapter III

COMPARISON

1

Comparison is defined as the "distinctive cause of the valid cognition of similarity".[1] A person, who knows a cow goes to a forest and sees a *gavaya*. Then the cognition "This figure is similar to a cow" results. This perception of similarity leads to the certitude "Similar to this is my cow". This perception of the similarity to the cow present in the *gavaya* is the distinctive cause of the *upamiti*. The perception of similarity to the *gavaya* present in the cow is the *upamiti*.

This knowledge by comparison is not perception because the cow of which the judgement is asserted is not experienced by the senses.[2] It is not inference, either; for, the similarity from which a comparative knowledge is secured is not a *probans*. It is not even a combination of perception and memory, i.e., perception of the *gavaya* and memory of the cow, in so far as they have similar features, because what we have in *upamāna* is a 'unitary act of knowledge', 'a single pulsation of intelligence.'[3] It cannot be argued that the comparative knowledge cannot be one of single perception on the ground that then there is no sense-contact with both the cow and the *gavaya* and that, if there were such a contact, then the knowledge by comparison of similarity will arise by direct perception itself and that, in that case, no separate *pramāṇa* called *upamāna* is necessary. It is true

1. sādṛśya pramākaranam upamānam. *V. P.* p. 62. upamitiśca sādṛśyajñānatvena sādṛśyajñānajanyā. *Sikhāmani* p. 198.
2. The Buddhists try to prove that *upmāna* can be brought under perception and verbal testimony. The factor in *upamāna* that can be brought under perception is the knowledge of similarity. The factor that can be brought under verbal testimony is the knowledge that certain things are denoted by a certain word. See S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 337.
3. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 38.

that only *gavaya* is directly seen. Only because of this, the knowledge of similarity in the aspect of *gavaya* is direct and in the aspect of the form of the cow, indirect. The first knowledge that this form (of *gavaya*) is similar to the cow arises on the perception of similarities in general like having horns, tail etc., while there is no complete identity with the cow. From the knowledge 'this form is similar to the cow' it follows that "my cow is similar to this". This is *anvaya*. When the first knowledge is absent, the second knowledge does not follow; this is *vyatireka*.

To the argument of the Sāṁkhyas who argue that *upamāna* can be classed under perception on the ground that the features from which a judgement of similarity between the *gavaya* and the cow is evolved are identical in the cow and the *gavaya*, the Advaitin replies that if the common features were identical, then, on perceiving the common features in a *gavaya*, one should remember, not only that he had perceived the similarity to a cow in a *gavaya* but also that he had perceived the similarity to a *gavaya* in a cow.[4] If it is asked what if this were so, the reply is that they cannot be so perceived by the same cognition. Where the similarity to the cow in the *gavaya* is brought out, there the cow is the qualifier and *gavaya* is the qualified; where the similarity to the *gavaya* in the cow is brought out, the *gavaya* is the qualifier and the cow qualified, *i.e.*, similarity of the *gavaya* to the cow and *vice versa*. Thus they cannot be object of the same cognition.

Among the Mīmāṁsakas, Prabhākara emphatically denies that analogy could be reduced to perception. Analogical cognition is not born out of mere sense-contact. The similarity of the *gavaya* to the cow which is known by analogical cognition is not perception for the reason that the cow is not before us. According to Kumārila, what constitutes the content of analogical cognition is the remembered cow as qualified by similarity to the seen animal. The analogical cognition, "cow-*cum*-similarity to the seen animal" is not the result of either perception or remembrance. So *upamāna* cannot be brought under perception.

4. *Atmabodhini*, p. 138. D. M. Datta. *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 144.

Sometimes the following syllogism is suggested by the opponents to show that *upamāna* is really a matter for inference. 'My cow is similar to this *gavaya*; since it is the counter-correlate of similarity present in this; when something is the counter-correlate of similarity present in another, the former is similar to the latter. For example, Caitra, the counter-correlate of similarity present in Maitra, is similar to Maitra.'[5] In short, cow is like *gavaya* because of the similar features that they possess. But this is almost a tautology. It is like saying that cow and *gavaya* are similar because they are similar. There cannot be an inference from being a counter-correlate to similarity unless similarity itself is already apprehended. Apart from this, the cognition "Similar to this is my cow" is not so much a matter for inference as for direct experience. Moreover, the cognition is not of the form "I infer", but "I compare".[6] So *upamāna* is a distinct source of knowledge.

According to the Naiyāyika, *upamiti* is the knowledge of the relation between the word '*saṁjñā*' and the thing denoted by it '*saṁjñi*'.[7] And knowledge of similarity is the instrument of such a cognition. The townsman goes to a forest without any knowledge as to the meaning of the word '*gavaya*'. He is told by the forester that *gavaya* resembles a cow. Then, subsequently, he sees a *gavaya* and remembers the forester's words, (*atideśavākya*). Then he understands that the word '*gavaya*' denotes the class of objects which resemble the cow. He has secured the *upamiti*

---

5. V. P., p. 63.

6. upaminomityanuvyavasāyacca, *V. P.* p. 64

7. Vātsyāyana's examples in this connection show that it is not merely the apprehension of the relation between designation and the designated. The knowledge of the name contained something more. "Knowing that the herb called the 'bean leaf' is like a bean, a person finds a herb like a bean realises that this is the thing to which the name bean-leaf applies and plucks it for medicinal purposes". (See Randle, *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 315). Thus it is not merely a knowledge of name, but an indirect identification of hitherto unseen objects or 'apperception' as Randle puts it.

now.[8] We find that the Naiyāyika deliberately restricts the scope of comparison to the determination of the denotative or significative power of a word, (*saktigraha*)[9] though Vātsyāyana, as we have seen, has tried to add a practical end or goal to the knowledge by comparison. The Naiyāyikas were only cautious in so restricting the usefulness of *upamāna* as a *pramāṇa*, that *upamāna* should not be reduced to inference. The Mīmāṁsakas, for instance, hold that the cognition "The animal called *gavaya* is similar to a cow" is the efficient instrument (*karaṇa*), and the cognition "My cow is similar to this animal called *gavaya*", is the resulting assimilative cognition, *upamiti*. That is to say, the *upamiti* is only the converse of the first cognition. Here the Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas will jump to show that the *upamiti* can really be inferred from the first cognition. In order to save themselves from this danger, the Naiyāyikas have taken the cautious position that the *upamiti* is in the form of knowledge of the primary significative power of the word '*gavaya*' (*gavayapadaśaktigraha*).[10]

---

8. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras* 1. 1. 39, while characterising the members of the syllogism, says that *upanaya* or application is analogy. *upamānam upanayaḥ tathety upasamhārāt.*

9. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 326.

10. To the Buddhist argument that *upamāna* can be brought under perception or verbal testimony, since there is perception of similarity and verbal testimony of the word, the Naiyāyika will say that the *application* of the concept to a particular class of things is neither perception nor verbal testimony, but a distinct *pramāna*. Against the Sāṁkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas who reduce *upamāna* to inference, the Naiyāyikas say that the knowledge of the denotation of the word is possible without the knowledge of *vyāpti* or universal relation between the two terms.

See S. C. Chatterjee. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 338. Diṅnāga, too, argues against *upamāna* in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: *na pratyakṣāt vākyād vā vytiricyate*. But both Uddyotakara and Vātsyāyana reply to Diṅnāga that his criticism is irrelevant because he has not understood the meaning of *upamāna*. Instead of taking *upamāna* to mean the process of applying a name to a thing through similarity to a known thing, he takes it to mean the process of getting to know the similarity of two things.

See Randle: *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 317. Vidyabhushan, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 287.

Against the position of the Naiyāyika, the Advaitin urges that the word '*gavaya*' denotes the class of objects similar to the cow can be known either through verbal testimony or through inference. As for verbal testimony, there is already the forester's word. As for inference, the word '*gavaya*' possesses a connotation (i.e., *gavayatva*), because it is a word like jar, cloth etc., which have connotations.[11] So it is only the knowledge of the similarity to the *gavaya* that is present in the cow through the instrumentality of the knowledge of the similarity to the cow which is present in the *gavaya* that constitutes the *upamiti-pramāṇa*.[12]

2

Upamāna in the Establishment of Brahman as Unattached and All-pervasive

The disciple who knows that ether is unattached and all-pervasive but who does not know that Brahman is unattached and all-prevasive, approaches the preceptor for instruction in Brahman-knowledge. He is told by the preceptor that Brahman is unattached and all-pervasive like ether. Then the disciple goes into solitude, meditates on this *sādṛśya* or comparison brought out by the preceptor and experiences the unattachedness and the all-pervasiveness of the self.[13] The Scripture declares: The *Ātman* is all-pervasive and eternal like ether. The *Bhagavad-gītā* puts it; Just as ether, though all-pervasive, is unattached to anything, due to its nature of unattachedness, even so the Self, though present in all the bodies, is not attached to them. Again, to the question, "What is the sense of the word '*Ātman*' or 'Self'?" the preceptor replies that the 'Self is of a nature *dissimilar* to that of body etc'. The nature of body etc., is perishability, painfulness, impurity etc. But *Ātman* is eternal, of the nature of bliss, and pure. The disciple returns into solitude with this answer and meditates on the dissimilarity of *Ātman* to body etc.,

---

11. D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 146.

12. gavaya-niṣṭha-go-sādṛśyajñānaṁ karaṇam, goniṣṭha-gavaya-sādṛśyajñānaṁ phalam. *V. P.* p. 63.

13. *Tattvānusaṁdhāna*, Tr. by Ka. Aranganatham Pillai, p. 139.

and gets the knowledge of *Ātman* through comparison.[14] If *upamiti* is accepted to arise only from similarity, then, that is not possible in the case of *Ātman*, since there is nothing like *Ātman* in the things that one sees. Thus by *upamiti* both the knowledge from similarity and dissimilarity should be accepted. It has been written in *Śikhāmaṇi* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* that where there is the form for the knowledge as "I compare", there is *upamāna* employed. In the comparison of dissimilarity, there is no such form of thinking as "I compare".[15] 'The cow is dissimilar to camel' (*goviśadṛśa uṣṭr*): in this knowledge of dissimilarity, there could be no analogical argument. It is formally known that people consciously institute comparisons like: "I compare the face with the moon", "I compare the eyes with lotus". But no one says: "I compare the cow with camel". Moreover, the comparison by dissimilarity can be said to be a case under, and can be known through, *anupalabdhi-pramāṇa* or non-cognition. The knowledge will arise as follows: "If in the cow there was resemblance to the camel, it should have been perceived; but it is not in fact perceived; so that resemblance is not there in the cow". This is not *upamiti* but *yogyānupalabdhi*.[16] Niścaladāsa asks: How, then, does the knowledge by comparison arise in such cases of dissimilarity as of the camel and rhinoceros? The case is similar to that of cow and *gavaya*. There the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* is perceptual. Here also the dissimilarity of the camel in the cow is perceived. This can be the *upamāna-pramāṇa*.

Niścaladāsa's point does not seem to be altogether unsound. If from similarity between two objects, *upamiti* is secured, from dissimilarity also that should be possible by parity of reasoning as was noticed by the Modern Naiyāyikas. In the knowledge generated by the perception of similarity, as in the case of cow and *gavaya*, certain elements are found common between them,

---

14. See *Vṛttiprabhākara* of Niścaladāsa, IV Prakāśa. Niścaladāsa agrees with the Naiyāyika here but differs from the Advaitic view as expressed in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

15. na hi kaścidanuvyavasyati karabhena gām upaminomīti, p. 199.

16. *Maṇiprabhā* p. 199.

while there are elements in them that are positively different. If the cow and the *gavaya* are totally identical, then, they will be one and the same, and the resulting knowledge will be one of recognition as in the case of "This is that Devadatta", and not one of comparison.

The author of *Śikhāmaṇi*[17] on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* has said that the common features inhering in the two different objects cannot be considered to be identical. They are different in some respects and that is why the form of judgement : My cow *resembles* this *gavaya*". In the same way, between the camel and rhinoceros, for example, there are so many things in common like "having four legs" and so on. But there are differences also to be compared. If they are totally different, then also, no comparison is possible, as in the case of total identity. *Mere difference* or *mere identity*, therefore, can never be the ground for *upamiti*. Identity in difference, or difference in identity is alone the ground. While the rhinoceros, for example, is different from everything else, not only the camel, it has something in common with it also. In the case of cow and *gavaya* identity in difference was noted because resemblances were greater than differences. In the case of the camel and the rhinoceros differences are greater than resemblances. As such, comparison is possible either on account of marked resemblance or marked difference. In either case, a new knowledge is certainly secured in the identification of the animal. In *Śikhāmaṇi* a view is recorded according to which knowledge of dissimilarity by comparison is admitted. Knowing that *gavaya* is like the cow, and that camel is different from cow, if a person subsequently at another place comes across a *gavaya* and understands that his cow is like the *gavaya*; and comes across a camel and understands that his cow is dissimilar to the camel, the knowledge that has arisen in this way is legitimately to be called comparison.[18] The doubt in this case

17. p. 232.

18. kecittu sapratiyogikapadārthajñānānantaraṁ parasmin sapratiyogikapadārthajñānam upamitiḥ. evaṁ ca vaidharmyapuraskāravṛttopamiti-saṁgrahaḥ. p. 199.

will be that if in the above illustration, the similarity of a *gavaya* to the cow, and dissimilarity of a camel to the cow is characterised as "*knowledge of the objects compared as correlates and counter - correlates respectively*" (*sapratiyogikapadārthajñāna*), this definition will be applicable even to other cases that are avowedly not analogies. The absolute non-existence of, say, a pot, its anterior non-existence, its posterior non-existence. its difference from cloth have each respectively its counter-correlate. Knowledge of these along with the respective counter-correlates first arises. Subsequently elsewhere the knowledge, 'this ground is qualified by the absolute non-existence of pot', 'The potsherd is qualified by the anterior non-existence of pot', 'This potsherd is qualified by the posterior non-existence of pot', 'Cloth is qualified by the difference from pot', arises. This is similar to the knowledge "any cow is dissimilar to camel" in form. So the aforesaid definition of analogy will apply to these also since the knowledge of these arises in the same manner. So it is too wide. To this objection, Rāmakṛṣṇa gives the answer that in the case of knowledge of such things as enumerated above where the ground etc., are qualified by absence of pot etc., albeit standing in the relation of counter-correlate and correlate, the determinant of such knowledge is the knowledge of qualification or *viśeṣaṇatā* as in "the ground is qualified by the absolute non-existence of pot", and not knowledge of the counter-correlates themselves. But in analogy, the aspect of being mutual counter-correlates, cow to *gavaya* and *vice verse*, is all-important. Thus there is not too much wideness in the defidition.[19]

19. sapratiyogikapadārthajñānatvena hetutvābhāvān na pūrvoktajñāne'tivyāptiḥ. *Maṇiprabhā*, p. 299.

Chapter IV

ŚABDA OR VERBAL TESTIMONY

1

The distinctive cause of *Śābdipramā* is *śabdapramāṇa*. "When for a statement its syntactical relation that is purportful is not sublated by other evidence, that statement is a *pramāṇa*".[1] The absurd statement 'Let it be made wet by fire' has the character of words deing connected in the form of a sentence. To exclude such statements from the purview of the definition the condition 'unsublated' is added. The knowledge arising from verbal cognition should be above contradiction. But then, in Advaita, all the statements except the ones in scripture declaring the existence of Brahman are liable to be contradicted in their contents by the texts: "There is no plurality whatsoever here" etc. Hence, to the word 'not sublated' the definition adds: 'by any other equal *pramāṇa*' like perception etc., excluding scripture whose sphere is the supersensuous Reality. In short, what a verbal statement asserts no other *empirical* means of knowledge should be capable of nullifying. But in the case of the explanatory passages like "*sa prajāpatiḥ ātmano vapām udakhidat*" (That Prajāpati plucked out his own omentum), the meaning is not clear because it is plainly impossible for one to take out one's own omentum. In this instance, then, there is the contrariety to experience. Hence, the *tātparya* also is considered essential in the validity of sentence as a *pramāṇa*. In the above specific case, the *tātparya* or purport is the greatness of the sacrifice of the omentum of the sacrificial animal.

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas refuse to accept verbal testimony as a separate *pramāṇa* on the ground that it can be brought under inference. The knowledge of the meaning of word or a sentence arises in the same way as the knowledge of fire is acquired by inference from smoke. We perceive by ears the

1. *V. P.* p. 65.

word and there follows the remembrance of the concomitance of this word with a certain meaning. But this is not very clear. In the case of an inferential argument, the smoke, for example, is perceived by itself; so also the mountain and inferentially the fire. But in the word "*gomān*" (one who has a cow), there is no separate cognition brought about by the word of the possessive suffix '*matup*'. Again, the mountain is cognised before its qualification 'fire' while in the case of a word '*gomān*', the word '*go*' meaning '*cow*' is first understood before the person who *possesses* the cow indicated by the suffix '*mān*'. Moreover, there is no affirmative or negative concomitance of the word with the meaning. One will not be able to say: Where there is a word, there is a meaning. Meaning is not recognised as being concomitant with the word either in time or place. If it is said that word is omnipresent and eternal, then every word in existence would bring about the notion of all things in the world. Nor can it be said that the cognition of the form of the word is concomitant with the cognition of meaning, for, in the case of illiterate people, there is a cognition of the *form* of the word without the cognition of the meaning. Even when the word is repeated a thousand times, the meaning is not comprehended by the illiterate man. If it be said that if the relation of the meaning to word is earlier ascertained, there could be concomitance, then, because there is such an ascertainment before the comprehension of concomitance, the concomitance is not the means of getting at the meaning of the word. Where is inference without the invariable concomitance being of some use?

It can be proved similarly that there is no negative concomitance between the word and its meaning not yet known. For example, it is not right to say "where there is no object, there is no word denoting it", because though Rāma himself does not exist now, the word 'Rāma' continues to be there. If the form be: "where there is no idea of the meaning there is no idea of the word", there, too, the argument fails in the case of illiterate persons. If it is said that the argument holds in the case of people who understand the relation between meaning and word, then the negative relation is asserted subsequent to the knowledge

of the relation of the meaning of the word. As such, it is no use in getting the meaning of the word. Thus even negative concomitance cannot be there. Hence both affirmatively and negatively, there could be no invariable concomitance, thus rendering inference impossible. For these reasons verbal testimony cannot be brought under inference. Rāmakṛṣṇa writes that even when there is no knowledge of the invariable concomitance and when there is the four-fold factors of expectancy, competency, proximity, and purport, the knowledge of the meaning follows. So verbal testimony cannot be inference. If the opponent persists in holding that *śabda* is not a separate *pramāṇa*, then even inference can be said not to be a *pramāṇa*. For even there, the knowledge of fire through concomitance on the hill can be said to be a *pratyakṣa-jñāna* through *manas* etc. If it is said that in inference one does not say "I perceive directly" but only says: 'I infer', even so in verbal knowledge one says: "I get this knowledge from words". *Śabda* then is a distinct *pramāṇa*.[2]

A sentence generates the cognition called *śābdī-pramā* by four causes, viz., (1) expectancy, (2) competency, (3) proximity, and (4) cognition of purport.[3]

I. Expectancy is defined as the capacity of the word-senses which are mutually the contents of the desire to know.[4] For example, the sentence "Fetch the pot", generates a cognition in the servant who is so ordered. The word "fetch" alone, or "pot", alone will not generate this cognition. Both of them must be there. When the word "fetch" is uttered, the 'that' which is to be fetched is left as a question. When 'pot' alone is mentioned, "what to do with the pot?" remains unsaid. Thus, in a sentence, there should be 'mutual affinity'[5] between the words. The word "fetch" expects the word 'pot', as it were, and *vice-versa*. One cannot convey the full sense of the one without the other. Similarly, on hearing the text, "one who is

2. *Śloka-vārtika* on *Words*; *Śikhāmaṇi*, p. 211.
3. ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsāttayastātparyajñānam ceti catvāri kāraṇāni. *V. P.*, p. 65.
4. padārthānāṁ parasparajijñāsāviṣayatvayogyatvam ākāṅkṣā. *ibid.*
5. D. M. Datta, *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 300.

desirous of heaven must perform by *Darśapūrṇamāsa*", as a means to get heaven, there is a desire to know its accessory sacrifice like *Prayājas* etc. The desire to know by itself cannot constitute expectancy because even for those who do not have a desire to know, the knowledge of the word-senses is seen to arise.

The capacity of the words to serve the requirements mutually is very important. Any two random words will not have this expectancy. 'Pot', in other words, is such that it can complete the sense of the word 'fetch' and *vice-versa*. What defines that capacity to fulfil mutual requirements is being an act, (*kriyātva*), or a causal-correlate (*kārakatva*). Thus statements like "cow, horse, man, elephant" etc., will not have the capacity and mutual expectancy and the sense, consequently, will not be complete. In the case of the scriptural texts like "That art thou" or ordinary statements like "Lily is blue" where there is neither *kriyātva* nor *kārakatva* and where, however, there is non-difference of syntactical relation, *abhedānvaya*, what determines the capacity is the identity or sameness of suffixes (*samānavibhakti*). So, neither the defect of over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*) of statements like "cow, horse, man, elephant", nor non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) of statements like "That thou art", occurs for the definition of expectancy as indicated above. Being an act, being a causal correlate, having the same suffix, etc., are only various kinds of determinant of *ākāṅkṣā*. In all this, it is the presence of *ākāṅkṣā* that is material. Fire, for instance, may be produced by burning the grass, by churning the *araṇi*-wood, or by powerful lense. But whatever be the causal instrument, fire is of one form only. So is the case with *ākāṅkṣā* too.

Only in consideration of the above definition of *ākāṅkṣā* there is the statement in the *Pūrva-mimāṁsā-sūtras* (*Balābalādhikaraṇa*), that in the text: "The cream belongs to the Viśvedevas; the whey is for the Vājins (*sa vaiśvadevyāmikṣā vājibhyo vājinam*)", there is expectancy of the relation to the whey, since the sacrifice is syntactically related to the cream. The doubt is whether the cream and the whey are to be offered to different

deities or both should be offered to the Viśvedevas either jointly or optionally. Though it is stated that the whey is for Vājins, it is possible to take this word to denote Viśvedevas on the etymology: "Those for whom there is *vāja* (food), i.e., cream, (*vājam annam ikṣā tadeṣām astīti vyutpattyā*)". But this is not correct. The cream is only for the Viśvedevas because the word "cream" is characterised by the *taddhita* form '*vaiśvadevī*' in *vaiśvadevyāmikṣā*. By express statement, called *śruti*, therefore, the expectancy of material for the rite is satisfied and there is no room for any other interpretation based on the presence of the word "whey" (*vājinam*) in the same sentence, though the whey, too, is fit to be a material offered. The suitability or otherwise of the material is not the criterion. The word 'cream' coming immediately after "*vaiśvadevī*", and in the absence of the mention of any other material, is connected with Viśvedevas. The whey however goes to the Vājins.[6]

Two aspects of *ākāṅkṣā* are distinguished. (1) *Utthita* or expectation actually roused, which is psychological, and (2) *Utthāpya*, or expectation that could possibly be aroused but has not been aroused actually, which is logical.[7] When any statement is uttered, there is no end to the questions that the maker of the statements has to answer before the sense could become perfectly complete. But, practically, a few doubts may convey a sense which is complete to all intents and purposes.

---

6. Kumārila says: śruṭyā'mikṣaiva śeṣo hi naiṣāṁ vākyena vājinam. tad durbalapramāṇatvāt tayā śrutyā nirākṛtam."

   The six criteria mentioned by the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā are; (1) *śruti* (express statement), (2) *liṅga* (significant capacity), (3) *vākya* (sentence). (4) *prakaraṇa* (context), (5) *sthāna* (sequence) and (6) *samākhyā* (name). with reference to which the expectancy could be determined. In the text "*aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhet*", it is indicated that the *upasthāna* for the *gārhapatya* fire is to be performed with *Indramantra*. The word '*aindryā*' by its significant capacity (*liṅga*) suggests that Indra must be offered obeisance; but the text expressly (*śruti*) states obeisance to *gārhapatya* fire. Thus by *liṅga*, the expectancy is weaker than *śruti*.

7. D. M. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

II. Competency or *yogyatva* consists in the non-sublation of a relation that is the content of a purport.[8] The statement "moisten with fire" is a case in point. There is no such property in the fire as is capable of being sprinkled on somethingelse and moistening it. Thus, there cannot be a connection between the fire and moistening. Where there is no fit and unsublated connection between words, there arises no verbal cognition. Or, in other words, where there is no *tātparya-jñāna*, knowledge of the purport, there is no verbal cognition. In the statement in Pūrva-mīmāṁsā "Prajāpati plucked out his own omentum", the meaning is, not that Prajāpati plucked out his omentum, but only the declaration of the greatness of the sacrifice of the omentum of the sacrificial animal. Only this *purport* will make the statement unsublated and the words will have competency or *yogyatā*. Only thus the *arthavādavākya* becomes authoritative. In the matter of texts like "That thou art", it is said that though there is sublation of the expressed non-difference, there is still competency for the sentence because the non-difference of the substrate, though secondarily implied, is not sublated.[9]

III. Proximity or *āsatti* is the cognition of the word-senses generated by words without any interval. The expression 'generated by words' (*pada-janya*) is intended to show that the syntactical relation is not cognised by any evidence other than *śabda*. The Prābhākaras hold that it is not the cognition of the word-senses *generated by words* that is the accessory of verbal knowledge, but only the mere cognition caused by perception (*upasthiti-mātram*) of the sense through expectancy etc., of words.

---

8. yogyatā ca tātparyaviṣayasaṁsargābādhaḥ. *V. P.* p. 68. Madhusūdana, however, defines it as: yogyatāpi tātparyaviṣayābādha eva. *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 689.

9. *V. P.* p. 68. Dharmarāja holds, in contrast with the traditional interpretation of the text "*tat tvam asi*" by secondary implication, that there is the signification of non-difference even by express sense of the terms 'that' and 'thou' and that, therefore, there need be no *bhāgatyāga lakṣaṇā* or exclusive-non-exclusive interpretation. Thus the expression "Though there is sublation of *expressed* non-difference" is only in accordance with the *saṁpradāyamata*. See *Śikhāmaṇi*, p, 226.

In the case of the word 'door', though there is the absence of the cognition of "close" as generated by the word 'close' along with the 'door', yet by the deliberate importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the sense of the form of the word 'close', the word 'door' becomes communicative of meaning. That is, we can make *arthādhyāhāra* (importation of the sense) and get the meaning even without the *padādhyāhāra* (importation of a word). In this event, Dharmarāja's definition will become defective by being too narrow. But Dharmarāja's answer is that if there could be syntactical relation without the sense being generated by appropriate words, then in the case of the statements like "On the Ganges, the hamlet (stands)" (*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*), there will be the syntactical relation among the words *as they are*, and as such, the secondary implication (*lakṣaṇā*) will be futile; and yet in primary sense the sentence will be unintelligible. We will have to take "the Ganges" as meaning 'bank', if the statement is to be intelligible. Here the word 'bank', alone can give rise to appropriate cognition. Again, if we do not admit that either by primary or secondary sense the cognition of the word-senses and their syntactical relation is generated by words in proximity, then as there is, for example, an inherent relation between pot and ether, we will have by the word 'pot' the cognition of ether also, and by the word 'ether' there will be the syntactical relation for the statement 'bring the pot' with 'ether'. All this is not sound. For these reasons it is not at all superfluous to postulate the word as qualified by a meaning of its own as the generator of the word-sense. The knowledge, "without the word 'close' there will be no verbal cognition of the door being closed", by *arthāpatti*, through the word qualified by that, is not at all prolix since it is quite originative of knowledge and is without defect. Moreover, in the case of 'door', it is not as though it has expectancy only with 'close'; it has expectancy even with 'open'. As such, unless the word 'close', is there, the sense of 'close the door' cannot be secured. Therefore just as inference is brought about by the subsumptive relation (*parāmarśa*), the verbal cognition is brought about by the knowledge of the word-sense generated by the word alone.

Just as in the case of secular statements like "close the door" there is not the verbal knowledge except through the words generating their senses, so is the case of the texts from the Veda also. To the words "Thee, *isā* (for food) (*iṣe tvā*)", the word 'I cut' (*chinadmi*) is supplied. For the same reason, in what are called rites there is the use of the words like "I make the offering propitious to Sūrya" (*sūryāya juṣṭaṁ nirvapāmi*). The offering unto Sūrya is modelled on the Āgneya rite where the words "*agnaye juṣṭaṁ nirvapāmi*" occur. The question is whether in the Sūrya rite, the word '*sūryāya*' is to be substituted or not for *agnaye*. According to Pūrva-mīmāṁsā (*IX, i*, 38, 39), it is to be substituted. Though it is a modelled rite, Sūrya is a different deity and as such, without reference to him, the *mantra* will make no sense. For all these reasons, it is clear that the cognition of the word-sense is generated only by words, and not by any other means.[10] And these words are to be in proximity without interval and that is what *āsatti* means. This *āsatti* is there, not merely for words together in a sentence, but also in cases where great texts like *tat-tvam-asi* (That thou art) are to be interpreted in alliance with minor texts (*avāntaravākyas*) teaching the senses of 'that' and 'thou', which are in syntactical relation to the great texts. Here the causality for *āsatti* is through the recall of sense.

10. avyavadhānena padajanyapadārthopasthitiḥ, *ibid.* The question is asked whether the *mantras* '*iṣe tvā*' and '*ūrje tvā*' are really one *mantra* or two different *mantras*. The *prima facie* view is that they are one, the reason being that their purport and usefulness are one. The *siddhānta* is that they are different as their meaning and wording are different and they do not stand in any mutual expectancy. "*iṣe tveti śākhāmācchinatti*" is one *brāhmaṇavākya* and *ūrjetvetyaṅumārṣṭi*, is another. The expression "thus" (*iti-śabda*) in these *brāhmaṇas* will be rendered meaningless if they are not of different purposes. If it is asked why one should supply the words indicating action (*kriyādhyāhāra*) like 'cut' etc., to the *mantras*, *iṣe tvā*, *ūrje tvā* etc., the answer is that by inference and presumption (*arthāpatti*) one has to supply the words denoting appropriate action because these *mantras* are called *karaṇamantras* (as distinguished from *anuvāda-mantras*) and as such without appropriate words denoting action, they will be unintelligible being sentences, associated with action and instrumen) by accepted definition.

The conjunction of the words should be appropriate to convey a sense. For example, the sentence "The hill was eaten has fire by Devadatta", is nonsensical. But if the words are in their right places in appropriate proximity as 'The hill has fire', "It (some fruit) was eaten by Devadatta", it makes sense. The interval that is mentioned is, in the case of spoken words, in respect of time. The utterance of the word "fetch" and the utterance of the word "pot" after a long interval of time do not originate any verbal cognition. Similarly in respect of written words, interval refers to space. It may, as we saw, refer to recall of sense also.

IV. Purport (*tātparya*) consists in the competency to generate that cognition.[11] Thus, the sentence "pot in the house" generates knowledge in relation to pot and not in relation to cloth; therefore, pot is its purport. And when a sentence or a word is uttered and if the word has two meanings, as in the case of "*saindhava*" which means both 'salt' and 'horse', difficulty may arise with reference to the purport. So, non-utterence of anything, preferring what is other than what is actually desired[12] at the time is also a qualification in respect of purport. A sentence, or word, being competent to generate a cognition of a particular nature, is not uttered with the desire for another cognition. But mere utterance with a desire to convey a sense, as the Naiyāyikas hold, is not the purport, for, purport is evident even from the utterance of one who has no knowledge of the sense and even though a teacher may desire to convey a sense, the desciple may know that the teacher has not understood the sense.

2

Classification of Word Sense

Word-sense is two-fold : (1) express (*śakya*) and (2) implied (*lakṣya*). The express-sense, (*śakti*), is the primary denotation of objects. 'Pot' means a particular thing qualified by a shape with

11. tatpratitijananayogyatvam tātparyam. *ibid.* p. 81.

12. taditarapratitiicchayānuccaritatvasyāpi tātparyamprati viśeṣaṇatvāt, *ibid*,. p. 81.

a large-bottomed cavity. This potency is an independent category because whatever exists in the cause so as to produce the effect is an independent category. Causality, to the Advaitin, is determined by potency. Fire has the property of burning because it is its potency. Therefore, the *definition* of causality is only potency.[13]

In the same way, the express and primary denotation is a potency of the word. This potency is inferred from the effect *viz.*, the cognition of the word-senses generated by the words. The express denotation that is the content of this potency has reference only to the perception of the universal and not to the particular. That the generic alone is the express sense and not the particular is asserted on the ground that (1) particulars are infinite in number and (2) when the generic is known, particulars are known. If the *jāti* or universal alone is the express content of the word, then how is one to interpret the statements and injunctions as "touch", "sprinkle", "May one get cattle wealth by the performance of *agniṣṭoma*", "One sprinkles rice", "bring", "The brāhmaṇa ought not to be killed", "Let not any creature be injured" etc., which have individuals as their sense? They do not have any sense of *jāti*. The answer is that without the generic cognition, the specific cognition cannot arise and that, therefore, the sense of particular postulate is in all the words quoted above by recourse to *arthāpatti* and *lakṣaṇā*. The cognition that brings about the knowledge of the universal brings about the knowledge of the particular also. There is no absolute difference between *jāti* and *vyakti*. That is why when one is told 'bring the cow', one brings some cow or another, not all the cows, nor only one specified cow. This is possible because the word 'cow' refers primarily to *jāti* and also to *vyakti* by the same cognition. If it is said that the memory of the particular

---

13. sarvatra kāraṇāyāḥ śakterevāvācchedakatvāt. *ibid.* p. 82.
The Naiyāyikas hold that *saṅketa* or convention is the *śakti* and that is not an independent category. This *saṅketa* is God's own. But the understanding of the primary sense of words is merely convention, for, even those who are unaware of the existence of God or deny him are able to get the meaning of words like 'pot'. The Mīmāṁsakas say that *abhidhā* is *śakti* and that it is an independent category.

is not the same as that of the universal and that they occur due to different sets of conditions, or that the set of conditions giving rise to knowledge of universal cannot give rise to that of particulars at the same time because of undue extension, then it may be stated that, in the particular like 'cow', it is admitted that the particular is the express sense, the potency of the word 'cow' is in respect of the cow, as it (potency) is existent, and not as it is cognised.[14] But in the case of the universal, it is the cause as cognised.

The whole discussion centres round the question whether the express sense is the generic, or the particular or both, much in the same way as the discussion in Western Logic was carried on as to the connotation and denotation of terms. The difficulty expressed with reference to the infinity of particulars only brings out the impossibility of using a word before knowing its significance while the significance itself is infinite.[15] In view of this difficulty the express sense of the word can be granted to be generic. With regard to the particulars, one can say that they are cognised when the generic is cognised by the same cognition.[16] Or, one can say following the Prābhākaras that the potency of the word extends to particulars also; in which case it has to be taken as functioning by its (potency) very existence, while in the case of the generic, the potency functions as itself known. In perception, for instance, the eye is not known but is taken to exist. But in the inference of fire from smoke, the smoke is perceived or known. This distinction of functioning by *existence* and as *known* mitigates the difficulty of the infinity of particulars. Or, one may say, as has been already noted, there is the cognition of the particular only by secondary implication.[17] just as in the case of the statement "The pot is blue", for the word "blue",

---

14. gavādipadānāṁ vyaktau śaktiḥ svarūpasatī, na tu jñātā. *ibid.* p. 71.
15. See S. S. S. Sastri. *ibid.* p. 195.
16. jātiśaktimatvajñāne sati vyaktiśaktijñānaṁ vinā vyaktidhī-vilambanābhāvāt. *ibid.* p. 71. jātibhānasāmagryā vyaktibhāsakatvaniyamāt. *Maṇiprabhā*, p. 236.
17. vyakter lakṣaṇayāvagamaḥ. *ibid.*

there is the secondary implication in respect of what is qualified by "blue". Thus, the particulars are signified in a secondary sense, and the generic by the primary sense.

It is a debated question in Indian philosophy whether a word recalls or indicates the generic or the particular. Different systems have given different answers. The Naiyāyikas maintain that a word signifies the generic, *jāti*, and the particular, *vyakti* and the general shape, *ākṛti*. One of these is predominant in any given context while the rest are subservient factors in the meaning of a word.[18] Some of the later Naiyāyikas, however, hold that a word both denotes an individual and connotes the class to which it belongs,[19] corresponding to the connotative terms of J. S. Mill. According to the Sāṅkhyas, a word signified only a particular.[20] "Popular usage supports the theory that words denote individuals."[21] When we say, for example, "That cow stands", "a herd of cows" and so on, we do not mean the generic character of cowness, since that character cannot be specified as this or that, but only the individuals which have individuated form, *mūrti*. When it is said that one gives his cows to the doctor, it is not the class-character that is meant since the class-character has no form. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. like the Advaitins, regard the universal alone as the significance of the word. The word 'cow', for example, stands for 'cowness' which is the essential attribute of the cow. Like the Advaitins, they also hold that although the word 'cow' means 'cowness' primarily, it may mean the individual by implication, as possessed of the generic character.[22] We can know the individual at the same time as we know the universal

---

18. See S. C. Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* : p. 361. Also *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, II-2-63.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 11-2-60.

21. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 107: *Nyāya-sūtras*, 11-2-60,

22. *Śāstradīpikā*, Ch. I.

because the universal and the individual are "inseparable in respect of knowledge and existence".[23]

With reference to the Advaitin's position, D. M. Datta observes, "We should not forget that the point at issue is not to what thing a word is actually applied in a particular sentence and in a particular context, but what is the primary meaning of an isolated word by itself, by virtue of which it can be applied to different particulars. This being the real issue the primary meaning of a word, by *knowing* which we are able to apply the word to different particulars, cannot be itself a particular, be it unique or universalised".[24]

The theory is not entirely free from difficulties, though it can be broadly taken as satisfactory. If the 'cow' *primarily* signifies, as it is taken to do, *cowness*, the origin of this concept '*cowness*' must have to be enquired into. Then, one finds that the derivation of the concept 'cowness' is from the observation of the common qualities found in certain typical cases of cow; only the application of this already derived concept presupposes its universal character. That is, before one could apply a concept to individual entities, the concept itself must contain that set of generic characteristics, derived and summed up in it through the observation of typical instances of cow. Thus, it may be possible for one to say that by derivation a word denotes the typical cases of cow and for application it connotes the universal or the generic. And, it is a matter for reflection whether a word could be isolated as a *word*, without detriment to the deposit of meaning in it, a meaning which is derivative and acquired. It is possible to say then that the predominance of the derivative or the applied aspects of a word depends upon the situation. In other words, when a term is applied, the Advaitin's view seems to be correct: When a word is taken by itself, its history seems to be very important,

---

23. S. C. Chatterjee, *op. cit.* p. 360. The Jainas believe that the word 'cow' refers to the shape (*ākṛti*). But any word has a reference to individuals also, for without such reference, the shape of the individual cannot be comprehended.

24. *op. cit.* p. 265.

relating to the typical instances with the class-character. The reference in it to particulars is implied in a term in a very significant sense. In the *Ślokavārtika*, we find a statement on *Ākṛti* (class) that no word can express an object (in the abstract). This means that the idea of the *class* as contained in the idea of the *individual* is what forms the object of verbal signification. This lends substance to what has been stated above, *viz.*, the derivative reference to particulars also constitutes an important part of the meaning of the word taken by itself, perhaps not merely as existent (*svarūpasati*) but even as known (*jnātā*). One cannot imagine a cow without a particular form of cow. The meaning of cow has developed along with the experience of cows. Since apart from a mind the word serves no purpose, the difficulty of infinity of particulars, for which reason the distinction of 'existence' and 'knowing' is sought to be drawn, largely vanishes; for the word 'cow' need not refer to infinity of particulars to the *mind* that understands its meaning, though the cows may be infinite in number. So the meaning of the word 'cow' does not always refer to cows as exist in themselves, but to cows as are known as well to some mind or another. After all the meaning is a matter of mind. Dharmarāja feels the difficulty in saying that the word primarily means the generic when he comes to such sentences as "bring the pot", or "pot is non-eternal" when he has to admit that the pot is a competent particular denoted by the word "pot".

3

The Implied Sense or Lakṣyārtha of words

The implied sense is the content of implication.[25] When the primary sense of the term does not fit in with the context, the secondary sense is to be preferred.[26] This secondary implication is related to that which is primarily indicated by that word. The implied meaning of word is classified in two ways. (1) Bare implication (*kevala-lakṣaṇā*) and (2) Implication by the Implied (*lakṣita-lakṣaṇā*). *Gauṇa* is brought under the latter variety. Bare

25. lakṣanāviṣayo lakṣyaḥ.

26. lakṣanā nāma śabdasya mukhyārthānupapattau vācyārtha-sambandhena arthāntare vṛttiḥ. *Tattvaśuddhi*. p. 11.

implication stands in direct relation to the express sense. For example, in the expression "the hamlet on the Ganges", for the word 'Ganges' there is bare implication of the bank which is in direct relation to the stream.[27] 'Ganges' only stands for the bank being directly related to it.

But in the second kind, implication by the implied, there is no such direct relation to the express sense. For example, in the word "*dvirephā*", there is denotation of the 'bee' by the indirect relation through the word '*bhramara*' which contains two 'r's. '*Dvirephā*' means 'bee' only by reference to the *bhramara* which contains two r's as '*dvirephā*' itself literally means 'two r's'. For another example, in the figurative (*gauṇa*) expression, "The pupil is a lion" (*simho māṇavakaḥ*), the pupil is related in ferocity which is related to the primary sense of the word '*lion*'.

Another classification of implication is into three kinds: (1) Exclusive implication (*jahallakṣaṇā*) (2) non-exclusive implication (*ajahallakṣaṇā*) and (3) exclusive-non-exclusive implication (*jahadajahallakṣaṇā*). (1) Exclusive implication is the implication of some sense which is other than the sense primarily indicated by the word, but which is related to the primary sense, while the primary sense is completely given up.[28] Or, in other words, where there is the cognition of another sense without including the express sense, there is exclusive implication.[29] For example, when it is said, "Eat poison", it may not be that the person is asked to eat poison. The implication may not have the express sense of the words at all. It may mean: "Avoid eating in an enemy's house", for eating in an enemy's house is like eating poison. For another example, in the expression "The village on the Ganges", the primary significance of "Ganges" is completely given up and the bank which is related to it is implied. (2) In non-exclusive implication, there is cognition of another sense even

---

27. *V. P.*, p. 72. Sometimes the classification is into *śuddha* and *gauṇa*. See *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī*.

28. T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, I Edn.; p. 48.

29. śakyārthamanantarbhāvya yatra arthāntarapratītiḥ tatra jahallakṣaṇā. *V. P.* p. 73.

while including the express sense.[30] For example, in the expression "The school works to-day", the "school" is not completely unreferred to. In "The pot is white", 'white' includes the quality of whiteness, but also denotes by implication the substance which that quality characterises. (3) In exclusive-non-exclusive implication, part of the express sense of a word is accepted and part of it is relinquished. For example, in "This is that Devadatta", the substrate alone in 'this' and 'that' is taken to be the purport. For there cannot be oneness for two qualified by difference of place and time. That is, part of the meaning of the word 'this' and 'that', which is Devadatta, alone is taken as the purport of the expression and the sense of place and time is relinquished. In other words, 'this' and 'that' are understood only in so far as they refer to Devadatta who is their substrate. It is thus that the expression conveys identity.

It is said that in construing the scriptural texts declaring supreme identity like "That thou art" and "I am Brahman" exclusive-non-exclusive implication is employed which is the generally accepted view. In the texts like "That thou art", which express identity of 'that' with 'thou' there cannot be that asserted identity because 'thou' denotes soul qualified by the internal organ, and, therefore, parviscience, while 'that' denotes Īśvara who is omniscient. So, if identity or oneness is to be established, it should be only in respect of the substrate '*svarūpa*'[31] in 'that'

---

30. yatra śakyārthamantarbhāvya arthāntarapratitiḥ tatra ajahallakṣanā. *V. P.* p. 75.

31. svarūpalakṣanā iti sāmpradāyikāḥ. *V. P.* p. 74. brahmātmaikatvaviṣayaḥ te tu jahadajahallakṣaṇayā vartante. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 74.

See *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* also, Ch. I, verse 160. Also there is the verse: tattvamasyādi vākyeṣu lakṣanā bhāgalakṣaṇā, so'yamityādivākyasthapadayoriva nāparā. See *Prakāśikā* of Pedda Dikṣita on *V. P.* p. 72.

Śikhāmaṇikāra thinks that there cannot be *jahadajahallakṣanā* at all, since Dharmarāja interprets even without *lakṣaṇā*, the sentence 'That thou art'. But this is only according to the view of the Nyāya thinkers adopted here by Dharmarāja. He gives us an example of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* the sentence: "Let the curd be protected from the

and 'thou'. And this is only by secondary implication, *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, because the qualifications are disregarded.

Dharmarāja, in his *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, differs from the followers of tradition in this interpretation. He does not believe that there is any secondary implication, though only a part of the denotation is taken as the purport. It is admitted that there cannot be oneness for things that are differently qualified, though these are, only as qualified, the express, or primary sense of the words, 'that' and 'thou'. But Dharmarāja believes that there is no contradiction in taking the reference to the substrates as the *express* sence of the words. Whenever a predication is made as in 'pot is non-eternal', where the predication holds good of the bare subject alone irrespective of the qualification, there need be no resort to the secondary implication. For, non-eternality does not belong to the pot-ness, but only to the pot. Here, the qualification 'pot-ness' is not essential to the interpretation of the sentence. As Dharmarāja puts it, "There is syntactical relation of non-eternality with what is competent, *i.e.*, the bare pot."[32]

Interpretation by secondary implication is, on the other hand, possible of such sentences as "pot is eternal". Here, it is the pot-ness that is eternal and is in relation to the predicate, and the primary meaning of 'pot' is actually given up. The statement "That thou art" resembles more 'pot is non-eternal', than 'pot is eternal'. If the predicate holds good only of the bare subject without the qualification that is irrelevant, then, 'that' and 'thou'

---

crows" where other birds and animals also should be understood. As such it does not seem to be correct on the part of *Śikhāmaṇikāra* to say that the threefold division of *lakṣaṇā* does not obtain in Advaita. *siddhānte ca jahadajahallakṣaṇayā evāsiddheḥ lakṣaṇātraividhyasya ca matāntarābhiprāyatvāt. Śikhāmaṇi*, p. 241, Mm. Anantakrishna Sastrin, as noted elsewhere, holds that according to the Mimāṁsaka position where only one *vyakti* is concerned as in *'so'yam devadattaḥ'*, the primary sense could be the *vyakti*. As such there is no contradiction in the view of Dharmarāja. See his commentary on *V. P.* p. 207.

32 yogyaghaṭavyaktyā saha anityatvānvayaḥ. *V. P.* p. 75.

are indicated only by the primary sense of the words and there is no need for any secondary implication. Otherwise, even such plain statements like "Bring the pot" must have to be interpreted by secondary implication, since 'potness', which cannot be brought, has to be discarded.[33] Here Dharmarāja can be charged with inconsistency. As an Advaitin, he should subscribe to the theory that a term primarily means the class, or the *jāti*.[34] So pot has 'potness' for its express sense. How can this be disregarded in "pot is non-eternal", without recourse to implication? Dharmarāja's position can possibly be defended on two counts leaving aside for the moment the contention that he takes this stand adopting the Naiyāyika's position on the matter. (1) It is thought that in the statement "pot is non-eternal", 'pot' is said to refer to a bare particular. Obviously one who denies implication in interpreting this statement in this way cannot be an Advaitin who holds that the primary sense of a term is its class-character. Hence 'pot' cannot be a particular. But Dharmarāja says that 'pot', and not its primary sense 'pot-ness', is the subject. Here 'pot' is not 'potness', but the bare particular. So either Dharmarāja surrenders the Advaitic position regarding the primary sense of terms or accepts implication here. That is the dilemma. If 'pot' in 'pot is non-eternal' means, as it should, 'potness', the statement 'pot is non-eternal' becomes false, for, it really states

33. ghaṭādipadānāṁ viśeṣamātraparatvaṁ lakṣaṇayaiva syāt. *V. P.* p. 76.

34. Śaṅkara states; It is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals.....the species are eternal. That is why the eternity of connection between such words as 'cow.' *ākṛtibhiśca śabdānāṁ saṁbandhaḥ.....vyaktiṣu utpādyamānāsvapi ākṛtināṁ nityatvāt. S. B.* I. 3, 28. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, in his notes on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, raises an objection to Dharmarāja's position on the ground of inconsistency, According to an Advaitin, a term, as we have seen elsewhere, always refers to a universal, or the class primarily. Thus, pot has 'potness' for its express primary sense. If this has to be discarded where non-eternality is predicated of pot as in "pot is non-eternal", does this not amount to the preference of implied sense to the primary sense? *V. P.*, p. 197. But this position, as we shall note later is not his own but taken by Dharmarāja in accordance with Naiyāyika's stand: ayaṁ tu granthaḥ paramatānusāryeva, na svamatānusārī, svamate ghaṭapadasya viśiṣṭaśaktatvā-bhāvāt, Anantakrishna Sastrin's comm. on *V. P.* p. 206.

'pot-ness is non-eternal'. And 'pot' cannot have anything other than 'potness' as its primary sense. Its primary meaning must be kept intact *i.e.*, pot-ness. And the statement also, at the same time, should be made intelligible. How is this possible?

This universal 'potness', can be taken to mean "having origination and parts". This is in perfect accordance with the Advaitic position[35] with regard to non-eternality. Being an effect, therefore, like a pot is invariably associated with non-eternality. Pot is one of the many things which are effects and which constitute the world. So, by 'pot', in the statement 'Pot is non-eternal', not only the pot (and it is not excluded) but also the nature of things like pot are meant. Even if 'pot' meant, therefore, the universal 'potness', the statement should only be read as 'pot-ness (which is not the individuality of pot but the class-nature of things *like* pot) is invariably associated with non-eternality'. The statement will strictly read: Pot is a thing which is non-eternal. Pot-ness can only mean thingness. Or if the entire predicate is taken as one, then pot-ness is thingness which is invariably concomitant with (as a *hetu*) non-eternality (for here the word 'non-eternal' too must be taken as generic and as 'non-eternality'). Or, in terms of identity, the character of being a pot is the same as the character of being non-eternal. Madhusūdana observes in *Advaita-siddhi* commenting on the words of Citsukha that the 'yarn' mentioned by Citsukha in one of his arguments is representative of the whole class of material causes. Similar construction here will not be far wrong. It will be seen now that it is not that *pot-ness* is non-eternal, but that only effect-ness which the pot stands for here is *concomitant with* non-eternality. Only thus, then, the statement "Pot is non-eternal" can be made without contradiction. Obviously, the copula 'is' must have to be taken to mean *invariable concomitance* or identity and not predication. And the reference to 'pot' the particular is of course by secondary sense. Secondly,

35. To wit: the Advaitic interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra* II, 3, 7. yāvad vikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat. Yato yāvat kiṁcid vikārajātaṁ dṛśyate, ghaṭaghaṭikodañcanādivā, kaṭakakeyūrakuṇḍalādivā, sūcinārācanistriṁśādivā tāvāneva vibhāgo loke lakṣayte. *S. B.* II, 3, 7.

Dharmarāja holds that the cause of secondary implication is only non-intelligibility of purport, *tātparyānupapatti*. His example of exclusive non-exclusive implication, *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, is: "Let the curds be protected from the crows", which has no unintelligibility of syntactical relation unlike "The hamlet on the Ganges" which has. The crow is not abandoned but is taken, but other dangers to the curd, (*kha, mārjārādi*) among which crow is one, are also referred to. The primary sense is not at all abandoned here. Even so, in "Pot is non-eternal", pot is not abandoned but other things, which are not eternal and among which pot is also one, also are indicated. When primary sense itself is thus intelligible, there need be no recourse to implication. And of course we do not say in the case of the example quoted above 'Let curd-ness be protected from crow-ness'.

Similarly in the case of "That thou art", the terms 'that' and 'thou' express their primary sense alone and no implication is necessary. The word 'thou' expresses the consciousness as associated with parviscience, and the word 'that' with omniscience. But nothing new that was not already expressed in the statement is brought in. Thus, the words 'thou' and 'that' express their primary senses, as in the example "Pot is non-eternal". And in fact what the exclusive-non-exclusive implication really does is only this exclusion of attributes. It is not at all an implication. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* goes on to say that the term 'implication' in exclusive-non-exclusive implication, is itself only used in the figurative sense, and not in the primary sense, as implications are brought in only to bring in fresh ideas which are not conveyed by the statement as such.[36]

All this discussion was done granting that Dharmarāja expresses his opinion fully sharing the Advaitic principle that a

36. *Advaita-siddhi* (Nir. Edn.) I. p. 374.
viśiṣṭaśaktijñānakāryaśabdadhījanakopasthititvarūpa lakṣaṇasādharmyātśakyopasthiterapi lakśaṇatvopacāraḥ. *Laghucandrikā*. *Ibid.*
Vācaspati is quoted by Madhusūdana Sarasvati. prastarādivākyam anyaśeṣatvāt amukhyārtham; advaitavākyaṁ tu ananyaśeṣatvāt mukhyārthameva. *Ibid.*

term must be taken in its primary sense only. But it is not so certain. Because it is held that Dharmarāja argues on the Naiyāyika principle that a term means both the class–nature and the individual, primarily.[87] If this were so, then, the difficulty expressed earlier in the statement, 'Pot is non-eternal', where if 'pot' meant 'pot-ness', as it should, according to Advaitins, the absurdity of 'potness', a universal, being non-eternal, will arise, does not at all arise.

4

Akhaṇḍārtha

or

the Impartite sense of the Empiric and Sacred Declarations

I. Regarding the Empiric :

We have already seen that the statements like "This is that Devadatta" express only identity.[88] Otherwise, these statements will become meaningless. For, it is to be made clear whether by the above statement (1) only one essential nature of Devadatta is conveyed, or (2) the identity of *this* with *that* Devadatta, or (3) the relation of *this* Devadatta cognised at the present moment to *that* Devadatta that was cognised at a different time, or (4) the identity of the Devadatta qualified by the present with the Devadatta qualified by the past. If the first, as that essential nature is conveyed by the single word, other words are profitless. Moreover, if it is the essential nature of Devadatta that is sought to be conveyed, that is secured even by direct perception of Devadatta here and now, and, thus, no verbal testimony is necessary. If the second, *viz.*, identity, that, too, is secured by direct perception, and no verbal testimony is necessary, nor

37. Panditaraja S. Subramanya Sastri, formerly of the Sanskrit Department, University of Madras holds that this is the fact. Cp. Mm. Anantakrishna Sastrin's commentary on *V. P.* p. 200. See *Sikhāmaṇi.* p. 241.

38. "Bring the cow with the stick" is a statement where there is *bhinna-vibhakti* between terms. This is *bheda-vākyārtha.* In the statement "The lily is blue", there is *samāna-vibhakti* or *saṁsarga* relation. But the Advaitin recognises a third way of import called *akhaṇḍārtha* which is not relational but the mere object. See *Candrikā* on *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi.*

the use of plurality of words, as one word is enough. If the third, *viz.*, the connection of Devadatta to the past and the present, then, there is no proof for saying that it is the *same* Devadatta that is connected with both the moments of time, past and present. There is, in other words, no proof that it is to the Devadatta related to the present alone that the past is related.[39]

If the fourth, *viz.*, the identity for the Devadatta, qualified by past and present times, this also is not intelligible, as there cannot be the mutual relation between that which is qualified by the past, and that by the present,[40] just as there cannot be mutual relation between the past and present times themselves. If it is objected that, though there is no mutual relation between the qualities like form and colour, for instance, there can be an entity which is *one* and which is related to both *i.e.*, form and colour, and that, similarly it is possible to conceive one person connected with both past and present, though past and present themselves may not have any mutual connection, it is replied that, between colour and form, there is no unintelligibility of existing together in time in one locus, as there is no rule with regard to them that one can exist only when the other does not

---

39. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 60. See also *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 705.
viśeṣaṇasya bhinnatvena viśeṣaṇa — viśeṣyatatsaṁbhandhātmakasya viśiṣṭasya bhinnatvāt, atiriktatve'pi viśeṣaṇabhedena viśeṣyabhedhena ca tadbhedaniyamāt.
Three relations mentioned in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (III, 3) are: (1) *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, the relation between words having the same substratum. (2) *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*, the relation of the qualified and the qualifier and (3) *lakṣya-lakṣaṇa-sambhandha*, the relation of the implied sense and the implying word, all of which imply the Self. Bhāratītīrtha asserts that impartite sense is to be preferred to *saṁsarga* or *viśiṣṭārtha*. samsargovā viśiṣṭovā, vākyārtho nātra sammataḥ; akhaṇḍaikarasatvena, vākyārtho viduṣāṁ mataḥ. *Pañcadaśi*, VII, 75. Madhusūdana writes that *sāmānādhikaraṇyam* is fourfold: caturdhā hi sāmānādhikaraṇyam; adhyāse idaṁrajatamityādau, bādhāyāṁ 'sthāṇuḥ pumā' nityevamādau, viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvena 'nīlam utpalam' ityādau, abhedena 'tattvamasi', tyevamādau. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 425.

40. vartamānāvartamāna-kālāyoriva tadviśiṣṭayorapi paraspara-saṁbandhānupapatteḥ. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 60. See also *Nyāya-makaranda* p. 268.

exist. They are not mutually incompatible. Not so two times, which cannot exist together. They are mutually incompatible,[41] as in the case of existence and non-existence. So, past and present cannot co-exist in Devadatta as his qualifications.

Thus, according to Jñānaghanapāda, the author of *Tattva-śuddhi*, in the statement "This is that Devadatta", when the direct sense is not possible, the implied sense must be taken.[42] The adjuncts of time *i.e.*, past and present and the designation as 'this' and 'that Devadatta' should be treated as inessential and illusory. Only the essential nature of Devadatta is to be understood by all these and this nature is always the same and one. This is what is known as '*bhāgatyāga lakṣaṇā*', or *jahada-jahallakṣaṇā* where a part of the meaning is given up.[43] Such a recourse to implication, says Jñānaghanapāda, is necessitated by the fact of the contrariety of the senses of the words, the contrariety being created by the fact of the perception of the coherence in a sentence of the words, this coherence, in turn, being brought about by the co-ordination or identity of the word-senses, and identity or co-ordination being not for one word but for two words.[44] The impartite sense is such that there should be a *prima facie* contrariety or differential notion in the words of a sentence which is dissolved by the impartite sense and not mere identity as in 'pot is pot', or 'A is A'. Thus, the essential nature of Devadatta is not conveyed by one word, but by two words. And when there are two words, secondary implication is the only course open to interpret the

---

41. *Ibid.* bādhāt, *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 705.

42. A view which Dharmarāja does not subscribe to. The *prakriyā* of finding the imort is as follows: prathamaṁ samānavibhakti-padayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyānvayaḥ, tatastadarthayor viśiṣṭābhedajñānam, tato viparītapratītiḥ, tato lakṣaṇayā śuddhayorupasthitiḥ, tatastayoraikyavyaktimātranirvikalpakam, tato' jñānanivṛttiḥ svarūpapratipattiśca. The impartite sense is defined as: padavṛttismāritātiriktāgocara pramājanakatvam.

43. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 61.

44. sāmānādhikaraṇyasya ca anekapadagāmitvāt. *Ibid.* bhinnapravṛttinimittayor ekārtha-bodhaparatvaṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam.

sentence as expressing the basic substrate identity of 'this' and 'that' Devadatta, the space-time-name adjuncts which are meant there primarily being treated as illusory and as not affecting the basic oneness of Devadatta.

The example of the "bright moon" clearly illustrates the case in point, When one says "the brightest object (in the skies) is the moon" he says it in answer to the question "In the skies, which is the moon?"[45] The answer does not refer to any quality of the moon, nor the relation of the moon to that quality. It merely identifies the moon, which shines with the excelling brightness in the skies. Shining is common to the other luminaries in the sky also. What distinguishes the moon is its excelling brightness. By both the references 'excelling' and 'brightness', only the moon is indicated and not the senses of those words themselves. Thus, the sentence has an impartite sense of the identity of the moon.[46] It cannot be objected that since the knowledge of the identity of Devadatta is not sense-generated it is not perception. For sense-generated-ness is not the determinant of perceptibility but non-difference of *pramāṇa*-defined consciousness from the content-defined consciousness. Here, the psychosis or the *vṛtti*-defined consciousness goes out and becomes one with Devadatta-defined consciousness. The statement "This is that Devadatta" is understood to mean only one person leaving out the inessential adjuncts. Thus it is a valid knowledge arising out of *śabda*.

---

45. "The judging activity being purposive, we should in determining its purport look to its end rather than its form; and the cognition of identity rather than characteristics is both an actual and intelligible end". S. S. S. Sastri, *Akhaṇḍārtha*, *T.O.R*, Vol. XII. Part IV., p. 290.

46. padadvayalakṣaṇāśrayaṇena candraprātipadikābhidheyamātre vākyaṁ paryavasyati iti siddham akhaṇḍārthaviṣayatvam – *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 63. nirvikalpakaṁ tu saṁsargānavagāhijñānam – *V.P.* p. 27; See also *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 109. The impartite sense is to have for import the sense of the stem *alone*. *Advaita-siddhi* puts it: prakṛṣṭa – prakāśaścandra iti vākye svarūpamātraviṣayatvaṁ pradarśitameva; svarūpamātraviṣayapraśnottararūpasya tasya svarūpamātra-viśayatvasyaiva āvaśyakatvāt.

Though Devadatta is the same person as before, the result that ensues from the above identity-statement is new. The past and present perceptions of Devadatta and the recognition of his identity, called *abhijñā* and *pratyabhijñā* respectively, alike give only identity. Not that in recognition we have a new identity established which was not already given in the direct perception of Devadatta. It is not even that the sameness of person related to past and present times is the result of recognition. Even by the two perceptions at a past time and a present one, that sameness is secured already. What recognition really accomplishes is that it removes the illusion of difference denoted by two times. This is the new result. And this recognition does not disclose identity (*aikyam*) as a quality but as essential nature. 'That-ness' and 'this-ness' in 'this is that Devadatta' are not the modes of that Devadatta. And oneness is not a numerical qualification, since in essential nature (*svarūpa*) there is no qualification by an attribute. That differential attribution of qualities is not the contradictory of diffential error is obvious. If that had been intended, the sentence will be "He is that and one" and not "He is that". In this latter expression, there is no word indicative of qualification. The author of *Kalpataru* accordingly says that differential denotations due to limiting adjuncts indicate one content only; that is the impartite sence; as impartite as the great ether contained in the pot.

5

II. Impartite sense of the Scriptural Texts of Identity

Scripture declares the nature of Brahman as "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss". Now the question arises: Does such a declaration as this have a differentiated meaning, or an integral, impartite significance? The Advaitin answers that it imparts the impartite sense only. The declaration "Brahman is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss", comes as an answer to the enquiry "What is the nature of Brahman?" In the text "One who knows Brahman attains the Supreme", it is naturally implied that Brahman of such and such nature ought to be known. Such nature is indicated by the succeeding text. So Brahman is what

is indicated, as in the case of the "bright moon".[47] The other words indicate Brahman by implication. It is not that one word alone conveys the expressed meaning *i.e.*, Brahman, because each of the words there removes one particular illusion. The word "Existence" removes the illusion of illusoriness or unreality in Brahman. The word "Consciousness" removes the illusion of inertness in Brahman. The term "Bliss" dispels any illusion of pain in Brahman. By *ananta* or infinity, any illusion of limitedness by space, time and substantiality is destroyed.[48] The usefulness in considering these words as separate is proper only to the extent of dispelling of these illusions.[49]

It cannot be said that the word "Brahman" expresses only the substance qualified by Existence, Consciousness, Bliss etc. For, the expression "Brahman" is self-evidently clear in meaning itself. If "Existence" etc., are taken as qualities qualifying Brahman,[50] then, there is the conflict with the declarations of infinity. The expressibility of Brahman in words is flatly refuted by the declaration "Wherefrom words return" etc.[51] The texts: "One alone without a second,"[52] "Plenum of consciousness

---

47. The inference is as follows: satyādivākyam akhaṇḍārthaniṣṭham, lakṣaṇa-vākyatvāt, tanmātrapraśnottaratvāt, prakṛṣṭaprakāśaścandra iti vākyavat. Sarvajñātmamuni establishes the process of finding the impartite sense as follows: The apposition of two words takes the first place: then the syntactical relation of substance and attribute. Then arises the knowledge of the conflict. When the knowledge of the conflict has arisen, we get the significance of homogenous, impartite entity by implication. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*: I, verse 196.

Sureśvara writes regarding *Tattvamasi*: tvamarthasya caitanyasya prasiddhatvāduddiśyamānasya vidhīyamānatadpadārthenādvayānandalakṣaṇena viśeṣaṇāt tadviruddhaduhkhitvaṁ nirasyate tadvat parokṣatvena pratīyamānasya tatpadārthasya viśeṣyavācinā tvaṁpadena sannidhestatpadapārokṣya vyāvṛttyā pratyaktā bhavati *Naiṣkarmya siddhi*, III, 10.

48. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 66.

49. tattadbhrāntivyāvṛttimātraprayojanatvāt. *ibid*,

50. As the Viśiṣṭādvaitins are wont to do.

51. *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, II. 4. 1.

52. *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, VI. 2. 1,

alone,"[53] speak of the homogenous nature of Brahman. And texts like: "There is no plurality here",[54] "He passes from death to death",[55] deny any inner differentiation of forms in Brahman. All these texts will be countered and contradicted if one supposes that Existence etc., are the various aspects of the substrate Brahman.

Again: If Brahman and his qualities (if qualities are accepted), are self-luminous, then, there is the detriment to the relation of substance-attribute because, then, qualities must be said to relate to the essential nature of Brahman, because of being self-luminous like Brahman itself.[56]

If Brahman is not self-luminous, then it is inert and known through some means of knowledge, as pot etc., are. Then, it will lose its character of being Brahman. It cannot be said that Brahman, being self-luminous, manifests the qualities also, for if Brahman's qualities are eternal, it is not proper to say that qualities are manifested by any extraneous means. If they are non-eternal, there will be the contingence of birth and death for Brahman. For these reasons the expressions "Existence" etc., must be interpreted by secondary implication only as conveying the impartite sense of 'Brahman'.

Now, it may be said that implication is unintelligible in the case of Brahman, since there is nothing other than Brahman, since Brahman has no distinctions, and since, therefore, there can be no relation of implied and the implication. But this argument also is not sound. For, while Brahman is ultimately real, the world, though unreal ultimately, can yet be the basis for empirical usages like *lakṣya*, the implied, and *lakṣaṇā*, implication. And though Brahman is suprarelational, all relations are intelligible till the time of the knowledge of the identity texts like "That

---

53. *Bṛahadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*, IV. 5. 13.

54. *Ibid*, IV. 4. 19.

55. *Ibid.*

56. svarūpaviśeṣāvadhāraṇāt. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 67.

thou art", and so, relations like the implied and the implication are, though formally illusory, intelligible in empirical usage.

Nor is there the unintelligibility of *lakṣaṇā* from the point of view of *anvitābhidhāna*. When the primary sense of a sentence is not intelligible, *lakṣaṇā* is the only course. Where, however, a direct interpretation is possible, *anvitābhidhāna* is to be accepted.[57] But where a sentence conveys a sense only through removing what is superimposed on it, its validity is by that removal alone, and, thus, *lakṣaṇā*, eliminating the superimposed adjuncts and bringing out the substrate, is alone proper. The expressions, "Existence" "Knowledge" etc., imply Brahman by negating the unreal, the inert, the painful etc. Similarly, in the great text "That thou art", the element of indirectness or mediacy contained in the expression 'That', and the element of transmigratoriness in the expression "Thou" are given up, and the secondless Brahman alone is implied.[58] Thus, the great texts only declare Brahman, and not His qualities. Otherwise, they are unintelligible. By both implication and inference, only the impartite sense of the great texts is proved. As Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi* puts it: "The convergence of the words in all texts speaking of Brahman without conflict is to be noted. When the words 'Bliss', 'Intelligence' etc., conveing primary Bliss etc., are used in co-ordination, then, their senses which stand in the relation of mutual determinants, without any contradiction being unable to pass into anything other than homogenous Brahman which is beyond the scope of all *pramāṇas*, imply the same Brahman".[59]

According to *Nyāyaratnadīpāvalī*, the impartite sense is only in the essential nature, *svarūpa* of the Self without any reference

---

57. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 69.
Also, tattvamasi-vākyepi tattvaṁ-padārthayor viruddhāṁśaparihārāya jahadajahallakṣaṇayā jīvaparamātmatādātmyaparyavasāyo nānupapannaḥ. *Nyāyamakaranda*: p. 269.

58. tvamarthagata – duḥkhitvasya tadarthagata – parokṣya ca vyāvṛtteḥ. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, III, 9.

59. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, pp. 31–32.

to the other qualifying aspects. Some others say that the impartite sense conveys the essential nature of the Self characterised *per accidens* by the absence of all difference. The author of *Tattvapradipikā* says that the impartite sense is the communication of one identical entity by words that are not synonymous and the origination of a non-relational knowledge. In the *Advaitasiddhi*, it is held that the sentence '*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*' yields an impartite sense each of the three words conveying Brahman alone, because of being a sentence seeking to give a definition of Brahman or because it is given in answer to a specific question as to its definition like the statement "The most luminous in the sky is the moon". The *Nyāyaratnāvali* has given the following inference with regard to impartite sentence: The statement has an impartite sense because the words standing in coordination purport only an identical substance as in the sentence "This is that Devadatta".

The impartite sense can be in any one of the following seven modes: (1) *niravayavārtha–paratvam*. (2) *acchedyārtha – paratvam*, (3) *nirviśeṣaṇa–paratvam*, (4) *viśeṣyamātra-paratvam*, (5) *nirbhedārtha-paratvam*, (6) *bhāvarūpaviśeṣaṇarahita–paratvam* or (7) *ekaviśeṣya–paratvam*. The first *niravayavārtha–paratvam* is based on the fact that in an impartite sentence, the separate parts of the sentence do not present themselves individually or separately as parts. Thus the impartite sentence is partless. There is neither the qualified, nor the qualities nor their relation in an impartite statement. Each word in the statement: *satyam, jñānam, anantam brahma*, denotes only one entity, though they may not be synonymous; and they are non-relational. So the nature of partlessness implies the non-divisibility also (*acchedyatva*), the second meaning of *akhaṇḍārtha*.

The third meaning is *nirviśeṣaṇatva*. The negating statements like "not this, not this" (*neti, neti*) deny all differences and what remains after this negation is only the Reality, just as when the specific determinations of bracelet and necklace are negated, what remains is only the generic gold. So *nirviśeṣaṇatva* means the negation of all specific determinations and existence in the

most general form. The sentence having such a meaning is *akhaṇḍa*. Fourthly, *viśeṣyamātraparatva* is only many words expressing each the same meaning or entity. Fifthly, *nirbhedārthaparatva*, too, must be similarly interpreted. In the final psychosis of the mind (*akhaṇḍākāravṛtti*), all difference and also absence of all difference are dispelled, for *absence* or *abhāva* is an empirical category or the product of nescience. Brahman alone with no tinge of the empirical in it is meant by *akhaṇḍārtha*, according to the author of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*.

The sixth definition is *bhāva-rūpa-viśeṣaṇarahitaparatva* which is adopted in the views of Maṇḍana who holds the theory of *bhāvādvaita*, and Vimuktātman and Ānandabodha who hold the fifth mode of the removal of nescience, *pañcamaprakāra-avidyānivṛtti*. Here the negation of the world is as real as Brahman, though not as a separate category. There is no positive entity other than Brahman.

Lastly, *ekaviśeṣyaparatva* also is only the expression of one meaning or entity, by each of a group of words, an entity without reference to any qualities. In all these seven modes, the purport (*tātparya*) is the most important and common element. When *tātparya* requires it, the apparently unfitting elements must have to be disregarded.

The question of the impartite sense arises only with regard to the statement where there is doubt whether the essential nature of an identical object is meant or no. Invariably, the *raison d'eter* is the need for a specific reply to an expectant query. The question of impartite sentence does not arise merely as a sentence like "Devadatta is black and young".

A sentence is as we have seen said to need four characteristics: (viz.) *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti*, and *tātparya*. All these obtain even in the case of 'That thou art'. *Ākāṅkṣā* and *āsatti* are the qualities of the words. *Yogyatā* is with regard to the meaning. *Tātparya* has reference to the speaker. All these requirements are certainly present in the *mahāvākya*, and as such the character of a sentence cannot be justly denied to that. And the *tātparya* in the case of the *mahāvākya* is only the essential nature of Reality as

one. This purport of identical oneness meant by all the words in a sentence is absent in sentences like "Devadatta is black and young" though they may also be sentences. That is why Madhusūdanasarasvatī argued that the impartite sentences arise in answer to specific query with regard to the identity of the object (*tanmātrapraśnottaratvāt*). In the statement defining the nature of Brahman (*lakṣaṇa-vākya*), "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*", in the three words there is difference of connotation (*pravṛttinimitta-bheda*). As such there is no synonymity in their meanings as in the case of '*ghaṭa*' and '*kalaśa*'. In the expression: 'brightest luminary' the two terms have different meanings but yet connote one entity. This they do by excluding whatever is not bright. This exclusion is the *upalakṣaṇa* or definition *per accidens*. In the case of *satyam jñānam anantam*, the exclusion of *anṛta*, *jaḍa* and *duḥkha* is the *upalakṣaṇa* which serves the purpose of removing all possible doubts or wrong notions. Even in statements like "The earth has smell" only the essential nature of earth through the exclusion of everything other than earth is indicated.

Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, argues: If it is said that impartite sense is not found in the terms that are not synonymous the reply is seen in the sentences like "the brightest luminary is the sun" etc. Indeed, here "brightest luminary" is not different from the sun. If they are different, the sun will be non-luminous; and there will be no sun, because the sun is nothing other than luminosity. True, heat also is the nature of the sun, but that is not the meaning of the word "brightest", because there is also the expression "The brightest luminary is the moon". Thus brightness and luminosity are not different from the sun; even then they are not synonymous because there is also the usage: "intense darkness" (*prakṛṣṭaṁ tamaḥ*). In all this, only the purport of the question and the intention of the questioner must be taken into consideration. The answer is commensurate with the question which wants to know the object in itself as "Which is the moon?", "What is Brahman"? etc.

It may be objected that the exclusion of anything that is not A is not possible without knowing that which characterises

A, like the odour in earth, and as such, it may be urged, the definitive sentences convey only that which is characterised by a quality, both in giving the definition and excluding the opposites. It is replied that it is not the case. According to the principle that whatever is the reason (*hetu*) for the exclusive knowledge of something, that generates only the knowledge of the nature of that something. Thus sentences which purport to be definitive, (*lakṣaṇavākyas*) will define only the essential nature of the defined object. The exclusion of the other things from the purview of the definition is only an accessory. The intention thus is not to indicate the thing as characterised. This is so even in the case of the example of the earth. When it is asked "what is earth", "the earth is that which has smell" is the answer. The intention is neither to exclude that which is not earth, nor to qualify, but only to identify the object. Even the exclusion is not *itself* the definition or the defined. It is only its result. The nature of earth alone is the defined. This is the opinion held by Vimuktātman.

If the text "*satyam jñānam anantam*" is taken to qualify Brahman variously on the ground that all sentences *qua* sentences are qualifying statements, then, it amounts to saying that the statements in the Upaniṣads that connote attributelessness are invalid. It cannot be said that the word "attributeless" (*nirguṇa*) means only the absence of base qualities (*heyaguṇa*). By the *apacchedanyāya*, the *nirguṇa-vākyas* are stronger than the qualifying statements. Moreover, in interpreting statements like '*tattavamasi*' etc.. expressing qualities of Brahman, there is not only unintelligibility of purport, but also unintelligibility of syntactical unity. It is a rule that, in a qualifying statement, the qualified and the qualification stand in mutual apposition. Applying this rule, we find in the statement '*tattvamasi*' the appositlon of omniscience (in *tat*) and parviscience (in *tvam*), which is absurd. To overcome this contrariety is exactly the function of an impartite interpretation. As Sarvajñātman has said: *utpanne ca virodhe ekarasike vastuny akhaṇḍārthadhiḥ*.

Even the mutual apposition of words here is rather figurative (*gauṇa*), as the impartite meaning is the implication of the entire

sentence, and not merely the connotation of the constituent words put in apposition since the latter is available even in qualificatory sentences.

Vācaspatimiśra considers that the impartite sense is found not merely in the case of propositions which are amenable to interpretation by implication but also in the case of ordinary sentences which need not be interpreted by a recourse to implication. This is the case in case of what are called "*bahuvrihi*" compounds.[60] For example, the phrase "the man whose is that beautiful cow", really speaks about the man who has the cow and identifies him. Everythingelse goes only to identify the man, and with that, their function ceases. For another example in "the man who has the stick", the function of the other words is only to identify the person who has the stick. Thus we find that the impartite sense of identity is possible even in cases where there is no room for implication".[61]

Even the Grammarians and others accept the possibility of the impartite sense in propositions. The Grammarian accepts

---

60. It is an adjective compound like '*bahu-vrihi*' (possessing much rice) where the last member loses its character of a substantive and together with the first member serves to qualify a noun. For example in "The man possessing much rice", the emphasis is on the man who possesses, and not on rice.

In interpreting the texts like *tattvamasi* and *aham brahmāsmi*, identity through sublation (bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyam) and identity in oneness (aikye-sāmānādhikaraṇyam) are referred to. In "*sthāṇuḥ puruṣaḥ*" the *sthāṇu* or post is sublated and the person is cognised, even as in texts like "*aham brahmāsmi*" the *aikyesāmānādhikaraṇyam* is most usually adopted; and identity through sublation is more appropriate in the case of texts like "*ātmaivedaṁ sarvam*". Bhāratītīrtha quoting Sureśvara adopts interpretation by *bādhāyāṁ-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*.

See *Pañcadaśī*, VIII, verse 43.

But the Vivaraṇakāra does not have recourse to *bādhāyāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya*, as, according to him, the reflection (i.e. *jiva*) and the prototype (Brahman) are identical.

61. See *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 264.

that the base and the nominative case have the same meaning.[62] The Buddhist concedes the possibility of the impartite sense for the words 'cognition' (*vijñāna*) and 'difference' (*bheda*), in the sentence "cognition is difference". Everything being a form of cognition for the Buddhist Vijñānavādins, there is no difference any where apart from cognition by which one could determine the meaning of the word 'difference' apart from cognition. The same difficulty of determining the meaning of 'difference' arises in the the theory of the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas. They hold the theory of the *svarūpa-bheda* i.e., difference is not different from the object, say, a pot. If this wer so, the difficulty that arose for the Bauddhas will arise again. That is, there is no means of determining the meaning of "difference" apart from the object from which it is not different, just as in the case of the Bauddhas, difference is not different from the sognition.[63] For those who accept difference as an attribute, the instance "Difference is different" should be offered. And here, the

---

62. For example, the word 'pot' in the "pot is black" signifies only the vessel, and the nominative case signifies the same pot. Thus, the base and the nominative case, which form a small sentence, convey the pot alone. The word '*ghaṭa*' and the case ending "s" do not convey any relationship between the two word-senses. See *Saṁ-Śār*, verse I. 274.

63. The Prābhākaras, for another example, accept the impartite sense in the sentence "The letter, *ga*, is a sound". Only mere '*ga*' is expressed by the two words "*ga*" and "sound". The word 'sound' does not denote the genus *viz.* soundness. It denotes the letters on the basis of being cognised by the sense of hearing (which is all that soundness means to the Prābhākaras). The sound "*ga*" also directly denotes '*ga*'. Thus only '*ga*' is conveyed by the impartite sense of the sentence: "The letter '*ga*' is a sound". The Vaiśeṣikas, too, accept the impartite sense in "Inherence is a relation". If the two words "Inherence" and "relation" are said to be two different words, related, then another relation for this relation must have to be accepted, in which case there will be infinite regress. Pāṇini, the grammarian, accepts impartite sense when he says "The stems (of words) have meaning not different from the suffix termed as the first (nominative) case: "prātipadikārtha-liṅga-parimāṇa-vacana-mātre prathamā". *Vyākaraṇa-sūtras.* II. iii. 46. See *Saṁ-Śār.* I. 270-275.

attribute 'difference' is not different from the substrate-difference, since otherwise this will lead to infinite regress.

Sarvajñātmamuni in his *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* interprets the impartite sense of the sacred text by *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā* and *jahallakṣaṇā*. According to the first *lakṣaṇā*, in "That thou art" only the non-dual aspect from the word 'That' and the aspect of being the innermost nature of all from the word 'thou' must be taken from the primary senses of the terms. Thus, the two words point to the same Reality. According to the second, the statement "That thou art" may be read as the statements like "This boat shouts", "Iron burns", "The rope before you is poisonous", are to be read. The word "Brahman" in the text "I am Brahman", primarily expresses the nescience with consciousness reflected therein, and the word 'I' expresses the ego with consciousness reflected therein, just as in "The rope is poisonous", only the serpent is meant, since the rope cannot be said to be poisonous. This is, then, interpretation by exclusive implication.[64]

6

Can Brahman be an object of Pramāṇa?

If Brahman were the object of a *pramāṇa* (and it is not an object of any *pramāṇa* other than scripture, if anything), then, either it is not the pure subject, the Self of all things, or it is not self-luminous, for, the fuuction of *pramāṇas* is only to make known what is hitherto unknown. To this Śaṅkara points out that Brahman is not a non-object in an absolute sense.[65] because it is the object of the notion of the ego and because it is immediately known.[66] The existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of everyone. No man thinks "I am not" which will be his thinking if the Self were not known to exist.[67] Thus both by the fact of its self-luminosity

64. *Saṁkṣepa-śāriraka*: 1. 69. See also *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*: II. 54.

65. na tāvadayam ekāntenāviṣayaḥ. *S. B.* I 1. 1.

66. asmatpratyayaviṣayatvāt aparokṣatvācca pratyagātma-prasiddheḥ. *ibid.*

67. sarvasya ātmatvācca brahmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ.....yadi hi nātmāstitva-prasiddhiḥ syāt, sarvo lokaḥ nāhamasmiti pratiyāt. *ibid.*

and by the fact of its being the self of everyone. Brahman is not unknown, Śaṅkara has thus put forward an effective rebuttal of the opponent's dilemma.

But something remains to be said. The question will then be: Is Brahman known or unknown? If it is known, there is no use in enquiring into that which is already known. If it is unknown, one cannot enter on such an enquiry. Śaṅkara's categorical reply is: Brahman is known. Then why an enquiry? Or what is the use of a *pramāṇa* in what is already known? Śaṅkara replies that an enquiry is necessary because, though Brahman is understood as the Self-manifesting Self of all things, yet its nature is not comprehended completely.[68] Once Brahman is *completely comprehended*, or one's Brahmanhood is realised, there is the total destruction of nescience. In the matter of completely comprehending Brahman's nature, there is use for a *pramāṇa*.[69] If the non-manifestation of Brahman were illusion, this illusion itself is based on nescience. It is due to this nescience that no distinction is felt between the inert and the Intelligence by the unwise. The Cārvāka materialists, therefore, say "there is no *Ātman*" "There is no *Dharma*". Thus, it is brought about that even the self-luminous should be illumined by a *pramāṇa*.[70] Here by illumination is meant only the removal of the obscuring nescience, just as digging a well is only the removal of the mass of matter, *viz.*, earth etc. The well-space was always there and it seems to be produced only now by the digging.[71] Similarly, in the case of the self-luminous Self, it was never non-manifest. But now that the obscuring nescience has been lifted, it appears to be illumined. This is the reason why the *pramāṇa* does not cognise Brahman like any inert object. It reveals Brahman, not as it would reveal an ordinary sensible object. but just as the disciple

68. *Ibid.* Vimuktātman puts it: "Brahman, too, though self-luminous, does not exist nor appear for the ignorant".

69. tathaiva brahmāpi svayaṁprakāśaṁ sacca nāsti na prakāśate ca ajñānām. ataḥ pramāṇaṁ tatrārthavat. *I. S.* p. 71.

70. *ibid.* p. 72.

71. *ibid.*

would reveal (or introduce) his preceptor. A disciple does not reveal or speak of his preceptor, as he would of his own disciple. Similarly, a servant does not introduce his master as he would his own servant.[72] So, here, the *pramāṇas* reveal Brahman's nature only by removing nescience.[73] This function of *pramāṇa* is not inconsistent even with the view held by the Bhāṭṭas that a *pramāṇa* only illumines that which is hitherto unillumined. But the Advaiṭin's position is that the *pramāṇa* illumines only in the sense that it removes the obscuring nescience. This is borne out by the declaration of Brahmanandin in his *Vākya*.[74] "Validity is established because of the capacity (for the *pramāṇa*) to remove *ajñāna*".[75] And thus, and thus only, Brahman can be said to be an object of *pramāṇa*.

7

The Establishment of Relation among words Denoting an Accomplished Fact

The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas argue that the authoritativeness of the Vedānta is not with reference to an established reality, but only with reference to what is to be accomplished, depending upon the actions of the elderly persons.[76] It happens like this:

---

72. *ibid.*

73. ajñānanivartakatvaṁ siddham. *ibid.*

74. A commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Dramiḍācārya on the *Chāndogya upaniṣad*.

75. *I. S.*, p. 72. See also *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka*, I. 245.

76. The Prābhākaras confine *Śabdapramāṇa* only to Śruti. *Laukika-śabda* is only a form of inference. Kumārila also refuses to recognize that *mokṣa* is through the means of *jñāna*. The Self does not need the scripture for its revelation, for it is internally perceived. Each *pramāṇa* has its own field (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) and so scripture is not necessary here. What scripture *does* accomplish is to restate the familiar fact of the existence of the Self for the sake of meditation and sacrifice. To justify the injunction, *svādhyāya-adhyetavyaḥ*, all scriptural statements must have a purpose. What purpose could there be in merely knowing the Self for its own sake? Knowledge of the Self could be purportful only when associated with sacrifice and meditation. Mere assertive statements serve no end, according to Kumārila.

On seeing a boy engaged in fetching fuel after hearing the words of the preceptor, "Boy, fetch the fuel", another compeer of his, sitting close-by and watching the action of his friend following the preceptor's words, gets to understand that it was the word of the preceptor that prompted his friend to action. The imperatives induce one to an appropriate action directly and the other associated words in a sentence subserve the ends of this inducement to activity and the knowledge of their meaning is produced only as they are construed in relation to what is to be accomplished. Therefore, either directly or indirectly, all the words denote only what is to be accomplished by activity. This inducement by words to activity is learnt by the conduct of elderly persons. And, an activity towards what is to be accomplished follows only from the words whose connection has been grasped. Therefore, with regard to an established entity like Brahman, there being no grasp of the connection of words, there cannot be authoritativeness for Vedānta.

It may be pointed out against this Mīmāṁsaka position that there can be the understanding of the words denoting established objects without any association with action. For example, in sentences like: "The *madhukara* drinks honey from the lotus that has just blossomed", for one who does not know the meaning of the word '*madhukara*', there is seen learning of the word-sense even in respect of the existent bee (*madhukara*) because of proximity to other known words. What is important in a sentence is the purport and this may be found in sentences that do not have anything to do with action. And the character of what is to be done need not always be the mark of purport. For example, in the text: "He is to offer oblation with *jartila* gruel or *gavīdhuka* gruel", there is no purport though there is indication of what is to be done. For, in the subsequent text: '*jartilas* and *gavīdhukas* are not oblations', there is negation of wild seasamum and *gavīdhuka* as fit objects for the oblation, goat's milk alone being permissible. For another example, the sentence "A son is born to you" generates pleasure in the hearer. This is obvious to a person near the hearer by the beaming of face, and other physical indications in the hearer. One knows also

from his own personal experience that the cause of such pleasure is the cognition of a pleasing thing. Out of curiosity to know what the specific reason for the pleasure in the hearer is, he decides, by means of positive and negative instances, (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) that the reason is the hearing of the sentence "A son is born to you". And it is already known also that the birth of a son alone is pleasing to this particular hearer. So, the words indicate only the birth of the son, and not anything else. And in this sentence "A son is born to you", the meaning of each individual word is arrived at in association with other words in the sentence, which all point to one event or thing, *viz.*, the birth of a son. It cannot be said that this knowledge too leads to action because of the purport of the sentence because that will land us in reciprocal dependence as between purport and valid knowledge of what is to be done. When there is valid knowledge having what is to be done for content, there is established purport characterised as the capacity to generate that valid knowledge; and when the latter is established, the valid knowledge gets established.

If this is so with regard to an event that has happened in the past, even with reference to sentences denoting an event taking place at the present moment, an understanding is possible without any reference to anything to be accomplished in the future. For example, the sentence: "Devadatta cooks rice in a vessel by means of fuel", the meaning of the words which are learnt previously, as well as the meaning of the base 'fire-wood' which is not so learnt, is known due to the proximity of words whose meanings are well-known. One comes to know that the word 'fuel' denotes the instrumental causality of the fuel for cooking. And by actual perception, it is learnt that fuel is the instrumental cause of cooking.

The Mīmāṁsaka's answer is that though the experience of pleasure could be inferred from the beaming face and other bodily expressions and that thereby the cause that produced the experience, *viz.*, the word stating the birth of a son, could be determined, still it is very difficult to say that the words "A son

is born to you" are the ground for denoting the cause of pleasure *viz.*, the birth of a son. These words being such a ground cannot be arrived at by the process of elimination, for, causes for pleasure are numerous belonging to the past, present and future, and far and near. But action is seen directly to follow the words, in so far as its sphere is the particular object. So, it is action that constitutes the first step in the knowledge of things. And, action is always with reference to what is to be accomplished. Thus, if there could be any word in usage which refers to an established entity, it must be taken as having only a secondary meaning. And, there could be no such word.

Similarly, in the case of the scriptural texts like "The self is to be known", only action is enjoined so that the fruit of release can be secured. And texts like "Brahman is Existence, Knowledge, Bliss", attain syntactical relation with injunctive texts, setting forth the nature of Brahman meditating on whom, or knowing whom, the fruit of release is secured.[77]

Or else, even granting that words have established entities for their import in the ordinary usage, that is not possible at any rate in case of the scriptural texts speaking of Brahman. The Vedantic texts cannot be the proof with regard to the nature of Brahman as non-dual and Bliss, since, then, they will come into conflict with other valid means of knowledge like perception etc., and remembrance. All these means of knowledge do not give us the proof of Brahman as non-dual and Bliss. They show Brahman as the self and the seat of egoism. Moreover, for the self-luminous Brahman. how can there be any obscuration at any time? There cannot be a time when Brahman is not known for the reason that it is self-luminous. So, the Vedantic texts are not authoritative in the matter of the knowledge of Brahman.

---

77. kosau ityākāṅkṣāyām ātmasvarūpasamarpaṇena satyaṁ jñānam ityādini vākyāni vidhinā ekavākyabhāvaṁ pratipadyante. Citsukha on *N. M.* p. 161.
vedāntānāmapi ātmā jñātavya ityapunaravṛttaye samāmnātena vidhinaikavākyabhāvamāśritya kāryaparataiva varṇaniyate iti siddham. *N. M.* p. 161.

The Advaitin answers that all the arguments of the Mimāṁsaka will be true only if the original cognition of the power of the word dealing with an established entity as its content is difficult to obtain. But it has already been seen in the example, "A son is born to you" (where through the beaming of the face etc., the generation of the state of happiness in the hearer immediately after the collection of words "A son is born to you", is heard and it is found that the cause of this happiness is the words "A son is born to you") that the cognition of the power of the word dealing with an established entity is possible to obtain. And that the birth of a son would bring, and would alone bring happiness being known earlier by so many evidences, it is conclusively established that the cause of happiness is the statement of fact that a son has been born. The person who brings the news of the birth of a son to Devadatta knows already that that would cause great delight in him. When such a known cause for Devadatta's happiness as this news exists, there is no need to search for an unknown cause in the past, present or future which may be innumerable. So, by a process of elimination and exclusion of the various probable causes for Devadatta's happiness, one arrives at the cause of Devadatta's happiness established by direct and indirect or circumstantial evidence. Vācaspati has said bitterly: "Persons doubting that there might be other reasons for the delight of Devadatta may doubt even their own Brahminhood suspecting an illicit connection in their own mother's case, and consequently they may suspect whether they are eligible for the performance of the rites customary to Brahmins. Then why take the trouble of studying Mīmāṁsā?"[78]

Nor can it be said here: It need not be the case that the statement: "A son has been born to you" should be the cause of Devadatta's delight. The cause might really have been the fact that Devadatta's wife has been delivered of the child without difficulty, a fact that is implied in the birth of a son. This criticism loses all strength when it is remembered that the sentence "A son has been born to you" should be construed

78. *N. M.* p. 163.

only on the basis of the relation of the words like 'son' etc., in the sentence to the objects like 'son' etc., and thus, the word 'son' as used not only here but elsewhere also means only the object 'son' and not the 'wife'. Secondly, in a sentence "A son is born to you", the words that occur in it should be construed in mutual relation and thereby only a meaning relating to the son becomes intelligible, and not when relating to wife. It is, therefore, possible to arrive at the reference only to the son by the process of elimination.[79] Moreover, *kārya* or what is to be accomplished is *only one* of the counter-correlates of words; it is not the sole counter-correlate. If it is said that at the time of understanding the relation between the word and its sense *kārya* or what is to be done is the only reference, in that case there will be the undesirable consequence for the Prābhākaras that in Veda also, at the time of knowing the meaning of words in Vedas, the root-meaning will be *kārya* and not *niyoga*, as the Prābhākaras claim. Again, substance, quality etc., also may be the meanings of counter-correlates of words, not necessarily *kārya*. Nor can it be said that substance, quality etc., do not *directly* have the nature of what is to be accomplished. For, even *niyoga* is not directly the product of action. After the effort sacrifices are performed; from sacrifices, *apūrva* or *niyoga* is produced. Moreover, in such usages as "performs sacrifice with curd", and "One should purchase soma with red (calf)", the curd and redness are in a sense contributory causes in the production of *apūrva* and procurement of *soma* respectively. So there is the nature of what is to be accomplished even for substance, quality etc., like *niyoga*. If to avoid the prolixity in respect of determinant competency of words, *bhāvārtha* is dispensed with and *kārya* alone is accepted, then one can as well dispense with *kārya* also and say that that which is associated with

---

79. It seems that in certain parts of India, a yellow cloth is presented to the father to inform him that a son has been born to him. In this case at least, it is clear that the meaning of the gesture exclusively refers to the birth of the son by eliminating all other possible causes of the person's pleasure.

paṭadarśanādinā liṅgena pariśeṣāvadhāraṇopapatteḥ. *N. M.* p. 164.

somethingelse is the determinant. There is no usage of *liṅ* without *kārya* and *bhāvārtha*.

Besides, there is not much substance in what the Mīmāṁsaka says *viz.*, "The ability to denote what is to be accomplished alone is described by the scriptural injunction and the Self should be known with due regard to the context of the cessation of the birth and death, which is the fruit and purport of Vedānta." In the declaration "*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*," there is no question of injunction. They are none the less purportful. The Prābhākaras say that there is the injunction: "This Ātman is to be heard, reflected, meditated on", for which the fruit of immortality has beed assured. True, the Prābhākara says, immortality is not declared along with the injunction "Ātman is to be heard" etc., and that is declared only later in the course of the *praśaṁsā* or expatiation of the merits of the injunction; nevertheless it is the fruit; in certain sacrifices, it may be that the fruit is not declared. In these cases, heaven should be taken as implicit and undeclared fruit This is according to what is known as *viśvajinnyāya*. But in the present case even this postulation is not necessary; as in the sacrifice called *rātrisatra*, the fruit is declared to be fame; but this declaration is not made along with the injunction to perform *rātrisatra*. It occurs in the course of the praise of merits of that sacrifice. In this case, all scholars are agreed that the fruit gets syntactical relation with the injunction though spatially divided from it by virtue of its being the declared fruit. Similarly, though the injunction to hear about Ātman is spatially remote from the declared fruit of immortality, yet in attains syntactical relation with that. Thus, '*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*' attains purport only in conjunction with the injunction.

But the points that have to be borne in mind are these. There are distinguishable three kinds of knowledge with regard to Brahman: (1) verbal, (2) that born of imagination (*bhāvanā*) and (3) direct intuition.[80] With regard to the first, these is no

80. prathamā śābdī, dvitīyā ca bhāvanātmikā, tṛtīyā ca sākṣātkārarūpā, *N. M.* p. 171.

possibility of injunction, for, verbal knowledge with regard to Brahman can come to a person who knows the meaning of words and their implications, even without injunction. Nor is there any injunction in the second type of knowledge, namely, *bhāvanā* or imagination or meditation, since it is established by co-presence and co-absence of the intensity of knowledge with the intensity of the practice of meditation. Consequently no injunction is necessary here also.[81] Nor is it the third kind *viz.*, direct intuition. This direct intuition is either the nature of Brahman itself, or a particular evolution of internal organ having Brahman as its object. With regard to the first alternative, there can be no injunction concerning the nature of Brahman, for Brahman is eternal and cannot be anything to be accomplished as an effect. Nor is it based on the evolution of the internal organ. For, the direct intuition as the evolution of the internal organ is a fruit and this fruit being of the nature of Bliss is desired naturally by everyone. So, no injunction is specially necessary for the attainment of this Bliss.

Therefore, the passages like "The Self should be known" are not injunctions. "Self should be known" must be interpreted as "Self deserves to be known".[82] That is why the nature of Brahman is first described so that there may be a desire to attain it.

And in the Vedantic passages conveying the nature of Brahman, there is no conflict with other means of valid knowledge. For it has been shown[83] that even perception does not give us difference. Even granting that there is conflict of scripture with other means of valid knowledge, scripture is more authoritative than other means of valid knowledge. It cannot also be said that Brahman is not comprehended by the other valid means of knowledge, because, though Brahman, *per se*, is not known as an object, that aspect distinguished by us in it which is the supreme

81. abhyāso abhyasyamānavastuni prakarṣādhāyaka ityanvayavyatireka-siddhatvāt na śabdam apekṣate. Citsukha on *N. M.* p. 171.

82. arhārthataiva vyākhyeyā. *N. M.* p. 172.

83. *Vide* chapter on *Dialectics of Difference* of this Thesis.

Bliss is known as in the capacity of the object of supreme love by ether valid means of knowledge. The cognitions "Let me not be extinct", "Let me be alive" arise because the Self is the object of ultimate desire. The state of being the object of desire cannot be proper unless the Self is of the nature of Bliss. This happiness is not the one that is derived from the fragrant sandal paste, or the charming damsel. Even the mundane sensory pleasure is not, in the ultimate analysis, desired for its own sake, but for the sake of the Self. How, otherwise, can the Self enjoy all other things for its own sake, if the Self were not the object of desire by itself? The Self being the object of ultimate desire, *parama-premāspada*, is not intelligible if it were not of the nature of Bliss.

It is the purport of the statement "Know the Self" that the Self which is of the nature of Bliss deserves to be known and hence it is not an injunction.

8

What is the Inducer to Activity?

The Mīmāṁsaka's contention is that the cognition of the individual who acts on hearing an injunctive statement is inferred as following that statement by those who stand nearby, from the observation of the results of that individual's activity; and from the inference of this cognition of the individual the object to be accomplished or towards which an action is directed is inferred. Here, those who make this inference go by their own personal experience wherein they were induced to act towards an object to be accomplished by the cognition of the import of an imperative statement. This is done by a process of exclusion and inclusion. For example, in orders such as "Bring the cow", "Tie the cow", the acts of 'bringing' and 'tying' are seen to follow the words "bring", and "tie". From this, the onlooker gets an idea as to what the words in a statement mean and how a thing is accomplished. And in a command, the verb is the principal part. The other parts of speech such as noun and adjective are only subsidiaries to this principal verb. The injunctive suffix *liṅ*, *loṭ* or *tavya*, is the principal factor. This

injunctive suffix, *niyoga*, denotes the activity or what is to be done.[84]

But there seems to be much difference of opinion as to what exactly it is in the injunctive statement that induces one to action. Some say that it is the cognition of the import of words that constitutes the inducer. The Bhāṭṭas say that the inducer is the activity or function of the injunctive suffixes like *liṅ*, *loṭ*, etc., and not of that which is directly signified by the word. Some among the Bhāṭṭas themselves hold a different opinion and say that it is that which is directly signified by the word that is the inducer. Some others say that the expressive potency of words, *abhidhā*, is the inducer. The Vedantins hold that it is the cognition of the means to achieve the fruit, *phala*, that constitutes the inducer,[85] *phalasādhanatāvabodham*.

Such being the conflict of opinions on this matter, how is one to determine the inducer to activity?

The Mīmāṁsakas refuse to accept any theory other than their own that what is to be accomplished is alone the inducer to activity.[86] The Advaitin agrees with the Mīmāṁsakas only in the refusal to accept the theories other than his own. But he differs from the Mīmāṁsaka in his own theory that the inducer to activity is the cognition of the capacity of the activity intended by words as means to achieve the results. That this cognition is the cause of activity is arrived at by the knowledge of the positive and negative instances where the actions seemed to follow and where they did not, respectively, with regard to the actions

84. See *Sambandhavārtika* : Translated with notes by T. M. P. Mahadevan, p. XVIII. kuryāt kriyeta kartavyaṁ bhavet syāditi pañcamam etat syāt sarva vedeṣu niyataṁ vidhilakṣaṇam. Quoted by Śaṅkara, *S.B.* III. 4.22.

85. *N. M.* p. 180.

86. In the rituals, since they are momentary something of an unseen character, *apūrva*, is postulated which brings about the fruits of the ritual observances. And this *apūrva* is not known by any empirical means of knowledge. It is known only by the Vedas. Therefore, the imperatives etc., in the Vedic statements indicate only what is to be accomplished in the form of an unseen power which is different from the ritual.

of one's own Self. No one, indeed, will engage himself in an activity which is not likely to result in his own prosperity. Even *praiṣā*, which is an order by an elderly person to be done by a younger person,[87] can be inducer to action only in so far as it is the means of the achievement of what is desired. And in case of *praiṣās* which are not seen to result in one's own good, no activity is, in fact, seen to follow.

Even the Mīmāṁsaka who thinks that what is to be accomplished alone is the inducer should accept that the cognition of the state of being the instrument of achieving the fruit is a contributory cause in the production of the cognition of what is to be done which becomes the inducer. It is only on account of the thought that it is a means to achieve one's desire that there is the state of what is to be accomplished in a thing which is full of pain. Śālikanātha, the disciple of Prabhākara, has said:

"In as much as an action though producing pain in itself becomes what is to be established, we must say that the state of being the instrument of achieving the fruit is the cause there, and, thereby, the state of being what is to be accomplished is the cause."

Bhavanātha has said: "An independent man acts on account of the cognition that a certain thing has to be done by him accompanied by the cognition that it is a means of fulfilling his desire." The state of what is to be accomplished for anything though it is full of pain is there only on account of the thought that it is a means to achieve one's desire. Vācaspati Miśra has said: "The injunction pertaining to the state of being the means of fulfilling one's desire is inherent in a particular object which is the state of what is to be done."[88]

Nor can attachment be the inducer to activity, and it is not possible to say that, before one could cognise the means of

87. When the person ordering and the person ordered are of equal status, it is called "*āmantraṇa*". When the person ordering is younger than the person ordered, it is "*adhyeṣaṇa*". *N. M.* p. 187.

88. kartavyataikārtha-samavāyini samīhitasādhanatā vidhiḥ.

fulfilling one's desire, one should have an attachment developed towards the object to be accomplished. For it should be known whether mere attachment towards the object of desire is enough to constitute an inducer to activity, or it is that the attachment should be associated with the cognition of the means of fulfilling one's desire. Not the first because there cannot be an activity even in the presence of the attachment towards the object to be accomplished when the means of accomplishing the object are not apprehended. If it be said that the attachment towards the fruit is the cause of the activity with reference to the means of accomplishment, then, it is strange that the attachment towards the object is the cause of the activity directed to something other than the object, *viz.*, means of accomplishing that desire. If it be argued that the attachment towards the object is the inducer to activity *only* when there is the apprehension of the means of accomplishing the object, it can as well be accepted that the cognition of the means of accomplishing the object alone is the inducer to activity, since it is now understood clearly that while the presence of the attachment to object is in no way an inducement to activity, the cognition of means readily brings about the activity.

The second alternative also is not reasonable. For, if attachment qualified by the cognition of the means of accomplishing the desire is the cause of activity, even then when that which is limited by the cognition of the means is said to be the cause, it is indisputable that that which so qualifies the attachment is also the cause of activity. But then the difficulty is even that which qualifies, *viz.*, the cognition of the means, cannot by itself alone bring about the activity, because even one who knows the means may not always begin acting when he has no attachment towards the object of his action.

To this difficulty, the Advaitin would say that an object cannot constitute the fruit of an action unless it is desired. If one does not start acting even though he knows how to achieve the object, then it only means that the person has not developed the desire towards the object. To be an object of action, a

thing must be an object of desire also. When there is no such desire, means of accomplishing that desire also cannot be present. It is impossible, therefore, that there is no *attachment* and there is the knowledge as to the means of achieving the object of desire and that the activity follows. Desire and means of accomplishing the desire must go together. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no activity in the absence of *attachment*, even when the means are known. Of course, sometimes, where there are attachment and the knowledge of the means of accomplishing the object as well, no activity may ensue if there are counteracting factors, neutralising the attachment. While the knowledge of the means of accomplishing the desire is alone the inducer, the volition and the capacity of the agent are associated accessories for bringing about the activity.

But can merely the knowledge of means of fulfilling one's desire bring about an activity or provoke the desire without there being a cognition of what is to be accomplished? Yes, is the answer of the Advaitin. For, there is no proof for the cognition of what is to be accomplished being the cause over and above the cognition of the means of accomplishing the object, which is also the cause of even the desire. What is to be accomplished is denoted by saying "This is to be done by me." But "This is to be done by me" is not a cognition, but only a desire or *cikīrṣā*. Here, the cause of the desire of doing is the same as the state of being the means of fulfilling one's desire.[89]

For these reasons, it is not acceptable that the cognition of what is to be accomplished through the imperative suffixes like '*liṅ*' etc., is the inducer to activity. Even accepting that *liṅ* etc., are the indicators of inducement to activity, in Vedas at least there cannot possibly be any place for *apūrva* or unseen power, (by means of which, the Mīmāṁsakas affirm, the actions in sacrifices etc., bear fruit, the sacrificial acts themselves being transitory and being, therefore, incapable of producing results). Of course, the Mīmāṁsakas might say this: "Sacrifices are

89. iṣṭasādhanatādhīyaścikīrṣākāraṇatopapattiḥ. *N. M.* p. 209.

prescribed in the Vedas for him who is desirous of heaven as in "Let him who is desirous of Heaven perform sacrifices". These sacrifices themselves, being perishable, cannot bring about the reward of Paradise. So *apūrva* or the unseen power must have to be presupposed even in the injunctions of the Vedas which come to tell the ignorant person as to what he should or should not do in order to obtain Paradise. Heaven is not something secured here and now but at a time much later than the time of the activity of sacrifice." But then, the Advaitin could ask, if even the sacrifices like Āgneya etc., could not bring about Heaven directly, but only through the unseen potency called '*apūrva*', does this not amount to the Advaitin's position that since *apūrva* is the intermediary means to what should be accomplished *viz.*, Heaven, it should be cognised as the means to Heaven? Does this not amount to accepting that the cognising the means of accomplishing an object is the inducer to activity and not what is to be accomplished?

Moreover, activity, according to the Mīmāṁsaka, is perishable and momentary. The injunction to activity like sacrifice with a view to obtain Paradise cannot be construed with the person, who is given the injunction, as qualified by Paradise, which is not achieved yet, but which is yet to be achieved. How can the imperatives in the injunctions whose relationship could not be comprehended, because of the unaccomplished nature of the result, indicate the unseen power? The unseen power (which is said to bring about the reward of Heaven) itself has been defined by the Mīmāṁsakas as that which is not comprehended by means of cognition other than the Vedas. If the injunctions are like any other empirical or secular injunctions, then the relationship of the words occurring in the injunction could be comprehended by means of cognition other than the verbal testimony, like perception, for instance. In that case, the statement that Vedic injunctions speak of *apūrva* which are not comprehended by *pramāṇas* other than the Veda itself would be rendered meaningless. So, '*apūrva*' stands on a different footing. If so, the injunction with regard to it cannot be construed because the relationship of the words cannot be comprehended,

d because of the activity of the agent, being momentary, will no more be there for it to be related to the fruit.

On the other hand, the relationship of words in these Vedic injunctions cannot be comprehended in anything that is not an object of any valid means of cognition. For, in order that the relationship may be comprehended, there should be the cognition of what is related. And this means that what is related in an injunction is known through some valid means of cognition. It cannot be held that what is related is understood through words alone and, that after this is done, one comprehends the relation. This will obviously involve a reciprocal dependence of the related and the relation. When that which is related is known through words, the relation is known ; and when the relation is known through words, then the cognition of that which is related arises.

To avoid the difficulty, if it is said, there is the cognition of that which is related by *presumption* or *arthāpatti*, as what is related in injunction is mentioned only in connection with the word "desirous of Heaven" (*svargakāmaḥ*), then it follows that what is related is known not merely by vedic testimony, but also by postulation or *arthāpatti-pramāṇa*. It cannot possibly be urged that the imperatives like *liṅ* etc., are so peculiarly powerful that they produce the cognition of what is related, *viz.*, the unseen power that is yet to take place ; how can one deny or overlook the dependence of that cognition on the relationship ordinarily existent only in the words ?

In short, then, if the so-called unseen power of the Mīmāṁsakas is an object of a means of valid cognition other than the Vedas, it loses its title to the name of unseen power. And there is the contingence of scripture merely repeating what the other valid means of cognition have revealed. If, on the other hand, it is not the object of any means of valid cognition other than the Vedas, then, there is no possibility of apprehending the relationship of words there. Thus, it cannot be established that *liṅ* etc., indicate an unseen power which is the

object of *śabda* alone, merely on account of its relationship with the words "Desirous of Heaven."

Therefore, it is clear to the Advaitin that the meaning of injunction in the Vedas is only with reference to an established object (and not something to be accomplished in the future) and, thus, has only the state of being the cause of desired object which deserves to be so desired.[90] Maṇḍana Miśra has declared "The injunction has been considered by scholars as the state of being the cause of the desired object."[91]

9

The Sphoṭa

The Grammarian maintains that, in the case of words, there is a supersensuous entity called '*sphoṭa*' manifested by the letters of the word. Or, when itself is apprehended by the mind, it reveals the sense of the word directly.[92] So, *sphoṭa* can be viewed either as the manifester or the manifested.

The Grammarian holds that the eternal word called '*sphoṭa*' is without parts, is the cause of the world, and is, verily, the Brahman. Bhartṛhari has said in his *Vākyapadīya*:

"Brahman without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,

Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation of the world."[93]

The proof of the existence of *sphoṭa* is perception itself. For example, there is one word 'cow' by which every one cognises the meaning of it and cognises the word distinct from

90. tadevaṁ vidhivākyānāmapi samihitasādhanārthatayā siddhārthaparyavasānān na kiñcidapi vaidikaṁ vacaḥ parābhimatekāryaparyavāyi. *N. M.* p. 256.

91. apekṣitopāyataiva vidhiriṣṭo manīṣibhiḥ.

92. śabdārthapratipatteḥ saṁpratipannatvāt, tasyāśca varṇavādipakṣénupapatteḥ, varṇātiriktasphoṭaparanāma śabdaḥ arthaprattyāyaka iti patañjaliḥ. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 81.

93. *Vākyapadīya*, I. 1.

the various letters composing it.[94] The cognition cannot arise from the various letters. For, are letters supposed to produce this cognition of their meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first; for, the letters exist only for a moment. The letters, being momentary, perish as soon as they are uttered,[95] such that when the word is uttered completely, the letters or syllables heard earlier do no longer linger. Only the last syllable is heard actually when it is uttered. But unless all the syllables are heard together, one cannot get the sense of the word. Separate syllables cannot supply a sense,[96] So the second alternative also is not sound.

If it is said that the last letter of the word together with the residual impression left by the earlier letters can produce the word-sense, it is answered that one does not actually apprehend the impressions themselves.[97] And any assumption of the effect of impressions themselves, from which the inference of impressions could be made, revealing the sense, will only lead to infinite regress. Therefore, says the Grammarian, the *sphoṭa*, the eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, must be accepted to cause the cognition of the meaning. *Sphoṭa* is so called because it is revealed by the letters, or it is so called because meaning is disclosed from it.[98] Patañjali asks: What is the word 'cow'? and answers: "It is that word by which when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns".[99]

To sum up, what happens is this: After the apprehending intellect has received the rudimentary impressions through the apprehension of the several letters, and after these accumulated

---

94. *S. D. S.* p. 299.

95. teṣāṁ utpannapradhvaṁsitvāt. *S. B.* I. 3. 28.

96. nahi ekaiko varṇórthaṁ pratyayet. *ibid.*

97. apratyakṣatvāt saṁskārāṇām. *ibid.*

98. sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇairiti sphoṭo varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ sphuṭati sphuṭibhavaty asmādartha iti sphoṭórthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārtham ubhayathā nirāhuḥ. *S. D. S.*, p. 300.

99. *Mahābhāṣya*: 1. 6.

impressions mature through the apprehension of the last letter, the *sphoṭa* presents itself *all at once*, as a single pulsation of thought and lighting up the entire sense of the word.[100] The first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible *sphoṭa*, and each successive letter makes this *sphoṭa* more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition."[101] "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter."[102]

10

Criticism of the Sphoṭa Theory

Now, is it supposed that the *sphoṭa* conveys the meaning when it itself is manifested or unmanifested? Not the latter; because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as *sphoṭa* is supposed to be eternal, and as, therefore, the cause is always present, the effect cannot possibly fail to appear. If in order to avoid this difficulty, we adopt the other alternative, *i.e.* that *sphoṭa* conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested, here do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Either way, there will be difficulty for the Grammarian, as he himself urged against the hypothesis of letters manifesting the meaning.[103]

Śaṅkara refutes the *sphoṭa* doctrine saying that the letters only are the word.[104] The argument that letters are momentary is profitless because they are persistent in as much as they are

100. pratyayini ekapratyayaviṣayatayā jhaṭiti pratyavabhāsate. *S. B.* I. 3. 28.

101. *S. D. S.* p. 303.

102. *Vākyapadīya*, I. 85.

103. Kumārila in his *Ślokavārtika* has put it: "The Grammarian who holds that *sphoṭa* is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a single difficulty."

104. Śaṅkara quotes Bhagavān Upavarṣa, one of earliest commentators on *Brahma-Sūtras*: varṇa eva tu śabdaḥ iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ. *S. B.* I. 3. 28.

recognised each time they are uttered. It is not that the letters are recognised only as belonging to a class, because they are recognised as such *i.e.*, as individual letters. For example, when the word 'cow' is pronounced twice, one does not think that two different words have been pronounced, but only that the same individual word has been pronounced repeatedly. The articulation of the word, however, may differ from individual to individual. But this does not affect the view that the letters themselves do not vary. Those who maintain that the individual letters differ offend against the Law of Parsimony. They have to account for the experienced fact of recognition by supposing the species of letters and say that when letters are pronounced, it is only the species to which the letters belong that are recognised and not the individual letters. And they have to assume the influence of external factors like the character of the person, his articulation etc., to account for the difference. Thus, there is the multiplication of concepts. It is much simpler to assume that the difference is due to external factors while recognition of letters are due to the intrinsic nature of letters.[105] The accents like *udātta*, *anudātta*, *svarita*, etc., relate only to the tone '*dhvani*' affecting the listeners with its own distinctions like high and low pitch. They are not the intrinsic difference of letters.[106]

Further, the very assumption of the *sphoṭa* is gratuitous, since letters themselves are enough to cause the apprehension of the word-sense. Perceptual or actual cognition cannot be given as the proof of the existence of *sphoṭa*, for, what are cognised are only the letters. What we have got at the end of the articulation of a word is the one entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, In the final cognition of the word, only that aggregate of letters that actually constitutes the word and not any other, is comprehended. If it were the *sphoṭa* that is given in the final comprehension, and not the *letters* that constitute the word, then,

---

105. tadvaraṁ varṇavyaktiṣu eva paropādhiko bhedapratyayaḥ; svarūpanimittaṁ ca pratyabhijñānam iti kalpanā lāghavam. *S. B.* I. 3. 28.

106. The character of length and pitch of the *dhvani* or tone are merely superimposed on the letters and create the illusion of intrinsic difference in the letters themselves.

these constitutive words will be excluded from the cognition just as much as any other unconnected letters. But this is not the case.[107]

To the argument that a plurality of letters cannot be the object of one mental act, it is replied that it is not an impossibility because one can show instances like army, forest, or numbers like ten, hundred and thousand, where several entities come to be known by a single mental act. And, the comprehension of a word as one whole means only the unitary sense that the letter convey.[108] To the argument that if the word were nothing else than letters which, in the aggregate, become the content of one mental act, such words as '*jārā*' and '*rājā*' '*pika*' and '*kapi*' cannot be cognised as different words, since, here, the same letters are presented to the mind, it is replied that there is sense in a word only where the letters come one after another in a certain order.[109] These letters coming in order are comprehended in totality. So, the theory that letters are words can be summarised as follows:

The letters of which a word consists, assisted by a certain order and number, have through traditional use entered into a connection with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed, they present themselves as such to the *buddhi* which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate and they thus unerringly intimate to the *buddhi*, their definite sense.[110]

Bhartṛhari has enunciated the theory that the world originates or appears from Śabda. Śaṅkara admits that the statement that the world is said to originate from Śabda is in the scripture but offers a different interpretation to these scriptual declarations. In

107. *S. B.* I. 3. 28. See also *Tattvaśuddhi*, gakārādi-varṇānāmeva asmin pratyaye anuvṛttidarśanāt. anyathā dakārādaya iva tépi vyāvartyeran. pp. 83–84.

108. ekārthapratyāyakatvopādhāveva ekaśabdhapratyayabhājo varṇāḥ bahviṣyanti. *ibid.* p. 84.

109. tattatkramaviśiṣṭānāmeva varṇānāṁ padaviśeṣaṇatvopapatteḥ. *ibid.*

110. *S. B.* I. 3. 28. See also *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayanta, *āhnika* 6.

the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* we read: "He with his mind united himself with speech" (1,2,4). Manu puts it in his *Smṛti*: "The several names, actions and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda." (I, 21). According to the *Taittiriyabrāhmaṇa* (II, 2, 4, 2), He created the earth uttering "*bhūr*" and so on. But Śaṅkara points out that the origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood to mean that Śabda is the material cause of creation as Brahman is. A person, when he sets out to do anything, first remembers the word denoting the thing and after that sets out to work. Similarly, the Creator first gets the Veda revealed to Him and He then proceeds to create things corresponding to those words. We have the *Smṛti* declaration to this effect: In the beginning, Mahes'vara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and procedure of all actions.

anādi nidhanā nityā vāg-utṣṛṣṭā svayaṁbhuvā
ādau vedamayā divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ

Maṇḍana's Defence of Sphoṭa and Śabdādvaita

Maṇḍana, in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* subscribes to the theory of *sphoṭa*, and to the theory of *Śabdādvaita* in his *Brahmasiddhi*, accommodating it into the Advaita doctrine by developing the implications of the term "*akṣaram*" occurring in the opening verses of *Brahmasiddhi*.[111] With regard to *sphoṭa*, Maṇḍana says that the letters cannot convey the entire sense of the word either individually or collectively. Individual letters cannot convey the meaning of the word, as otherwise other letters will become useless. Nor can they convey collectively since they come in succession and do not exist together at the same time. There is neither simultaneity in time nor togetherness in space for them.[112]

Maṇḍana believes, as against Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, that the Upaniṣadic texts "*Oṁ iti Brahma*", "*Oṁ iti idaṁ sarvam*", should

111. anandaṃ ekam amṛtam ajaṁ vijñānamakṣaram, asarvaṁ sarvamabhayaṁ namasyāmaḥ prajāpatim. *B. S.*, verse 1. See also *Gopālikā* of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara on *Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 263.

112. See *Gopālikā* on *Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 27.

be understood as establishing the identity of *praṇava* with Brahman and as supporting the *śabdādvaita* doctrine. The word '*akṣaram*' signifies that Brahman is of the nature of sound. It also signifies the negation of destruction for Brahman. No transformation is possible in Brahman who is of the nature of sound. That Brahman is of the nature of sound is borne out by such scriptural declarations as "The higher and lower Brahman, that is *Oṁkāra*". The word ending with the suffix "*kāra*" signifies that Brahman is not merely designated by the word "*Oṁ*", but that *Oṁ* is the very nature of Brahman.

Sometimes it is suggested that *Oṁ* is a symbol standing for Brahman to meditate on, since Brahman being beyond all specifications cannot be contemplated. This is similar to the practice of worshipping idols or images made of wood and stone as representing or symbolising the various deities when the deities themselves cannot be worshipped directly. Or else, one might say that Brahman is to be contemplated by the name '*Oṁ*', for *praṇava* is its name.

This suggestion is plausible only in cases where the subsidiariness to Yoga of '*Oṁ*' is declared as in "Meditate on the Self as *Oṁ*", "Concentrate on the Self as *Oṁ*" etc. But where identity is taught, without the mention of word like "concentrate (*yuñjīta*)", no symbolisation is meant. For, it is identity that is declared in such texts as "*Oṁ* is Brahman, *Oṁ* is all this." In these texts, it is shown that speech is present everywhere, it is all this world of names and forms. Even where it is declared in the scripture: "Thereby alone is the Supreme Person to be contemplated," conveying symbolisation, it is preceded by another declaration that *Oṁ* is the Self of all things. It cannot be suggested that the statement of *Oṁ* being the Self of all is only figurative and is intended as a praise. For, there is no conflict or contradiction in adopting the primary sense. Only when the primary sense is unintelligible, figurative sense is to be taken. That *Oṁ* is the Self of all is not given in sense-perception, or other *pramāṇas*. It is known only through the scripture. So its being the Self of all is not unintelligible in its primary sense.

That it is not known through sense-perception etc., does not prevent the scripture being the authority in the matter. And, in the words: "Therefore, he who knows," etc., meditation therewith is taught only for him who knows its being the Self of all. Only after the knowledge of *Oṁ* being the Self of all has arisen from the scripture, does that sentence lead up to the sense of meditation. In other words, there is the injunction of meditation only to him who has understood *Oṁ* to be the Self of all.

Speech or *Oṁ* is declared to be the Self of all in the text: "Speech itself was born as all the worlds; Speech itself enjoyed; spoke" etc. In the *Vāk-sūkta* it is set forth by speech itself that Speech is the Self of all, the controller of all. That speech is the cause of the world—manifestation is established by the rule that all modifications that come into effect partake of the form or nature of their material cause. The world of names and forms is accompanied by the form of speech. So the world is either the material transformation or an illusory manifestation of Speech.

How is this known? It is known by the cognition associated with and arising from speech. Apprehension by sound is not similar to the apprehension by sight etc. Sight etc., make objects known while they themselves are not known. In the case of sound, there is no apprehension of the object when it itself is not known. Nor is it the apprehension of what is in a locus other than the locus of sound, (as in the case of apprehension of fire through smoke where through smoke fire is inferred). Sound is not a means of inferring object as smoke is the *probans* by *means* of which fire is inferred. In the inference of fire through smoke, it is of the form "there is fire, because there is smoke," and not of the form "smoke is fire." But through *śabda* or sound, the apprehension is of form "This is pot," when there is identity or non-difference of the word from the object it denotes. In "There is fire because there is smoke" there is no co-ordination. Moreover, the substance-attribute relationship as expressed in "blue lotus" does not belong to, or arise from the relationship of, the word 'blue'. But it refers to that relationship that exists really in the objects, lotus and blue. The expression

"blue lotus," then, is non-different from the object 'blue lotus.' Here, the word or *śabda* is not a means, *upāya*, through which the object is apprehended. But the word is identical with the object.[113] Further, if the word is the cause or means of the apprehension of the object, as smoke is of fire, then the determination or ascertainment of the object would not be the form of that word or sound,[114] as in the case of smoke itself. The determination of fire from smoke or through some other means of knowledge does not take on the same form as smoke. But the determination of objects even through other *pramāṇas* is related to the form of sound as one has to speak in words. So, unlike the case of smoke, it is not because the sound or word is a means through which the object is known that the object is apprehended as of the form of sound, but it is because objects are in reality of the form of sound or word. It cannot be objected that it is an illusion that objects are of the nature of sound on the ground that as in the case of other *pramāṇas*, in *śabda*, too, the cognition comes after the word is uttered; for it is seen that even where the other *pramāṇas* like perception are instrumental in the cognition of the object, it is known that objects are of the nature of sound by the fact that one has to utter the cognition in words only, as in "This is pot," "This is fire" and so on. Simply because the cognition of the object follows the word, one need not condemn the knowledge as illusion.[115]

If it is objected here that though that sound is the nature of all objects may be proper in case of determinate knowledge where speech accompanies the cognition of the objects, it is not

---

113. sa ca śabdasya arthābhede ghaṭate; nopāyatve. *B. S. V.* p. 50.

114. as in "This pot" where the words and the object are identical. But smoke is not identicel with fire, either in inference, or in any other means of knowledge like perception. The identity of the object with the word is supported by any means of knowledge other than *śabda*.

115. pramāṇāntaropāye'rthe śabdarūpatvadarśanāt śabde'pi tathā śabdarūpa eva artha iti pratītau nopāya-bhūta-śabdānantaryāt śabdhātmakārtha-bhrāntiḥ. *B. S. V.* p. 50.

intelligible in case of indeterminate cognitions where no verbal expression is present, as in the example of child's suckling at its mother's breast, it is replied that even in the indeterminate cognition there is determination of objects, for unless there is some determination as 'this', no activity on the part of the child could ensue. And all such ascertainment is always associated with sound or speech. In case of children, too, there is the association of sound, though not now, at least due to the sound-impressions carried over from the past existence, i.e., previous birth.[116] Thus, Maṇḍana concludes that the world of names and forms is only the illusory manifestation of the sound, or *śabda*.[117] The objects of experience have only empirical reality, being the manifestations of the Reality of sound. The same character of empirical reality is applicable also to prescriptive and prohibitive injunctions like "perform," "do not perform," to sentence-sense, words denoting the collection of things like "forest," and non-entities like the circle made by the whirling fire-brand, the horns of hare etc. Prescriptions and prohibitions as in the imperative 'cook' (*pacet*) cannot refer to the past alone, or present alone, or to the future alone. In all the cases, the imperative will become one in sense with 'cooked,' or 'cooks,' or 'will cook' in which case the distinction between past, present and future activities will vanish. Nor is activity conceivable over and above all these three times. 'Activity' and 'desistance therefrom," imply that which induces to activity or that which restrains one from it, as the case may be. They get the name of prohibition or prescription only when they involve the agent's activity. So, prescriptive and prohibitive injunctions have no reality in themselves. They are mere notions with no real content, which are favourable to activity and desisting therefrom. Nor can the notion be baseless, since it is of the nature of knowledge; and it is not devoid of relation to the form of sound. Thus sound is the Reality which appears as prescriptions and prohibitions in such a manner as to favour activity and the desisting therefrom.

---

116. teṣāmapi pūrvajanmaśabdabhāvanābhājāṁ vāgrūpoparaktameva jñānaṁ niścīyate. *B. S.* p. 18.

117. tadrūpopagrāhyaṁ jagat tadvivarta. *ibid.*

The sentence-sense also partakes only of this empirical reality. The sentence-sense is either the relation or something qualified by it. It is not the relation, *saṁsarga*. For, the relation (of words) is not something other than the relata. If it were different, then, some other relation must have to be postulated for connection, *saṁsarga*, with the relata, which will obviously lead to infinite regress, Nor can it be said that it is both other than and not other than the relata at the same time. If the relation, on the other hand, were not different from the words, then, it is words themselves and not anything else. Nor are any relata other than what are not related. But at the same time the rise of sentence-cognition is not baseless or contentless. Nor is it devoid of association with the nature of speech. Hence it is concluded that speech is the Reality that manifests itself as sentence-sense etc.

Similar is the case with words meaning an assemblage or collection of things like "forest." There, too, it is only the reality of speech that is the basis of the word-cognition 'forest.' We have only individual trees. Still there is the usage and the cognition of the word 'forest.' So here, too, as there is cognition which yet has no content, we have to conclude that this illusory word-cognition is based upon the Reality of sound.[118]

And in all cognitions determinacy through word is certainly superior to mere indeterminate apprehension as that of a child. Thus there is superiority of cognition when it is associated with word. When there is no word, what is intelligised becomes non-intelligised as it were, by its absence. The very intelligising of intelligence comes about under the control of speech.[119] Or else, some say that intelligence is but speech-energy.[120] This energy exists in a subtle form after the speech which is its gross form has perished. In any case, all the objects of the

118. vanādau api asati vastuni vastubuddhir bhavanti vāktattvamevālaṁbate. *B. S. V.*, p. 52

119. *B. S.* p. 19

120. vākśaktireva vā citiḥ. *ibid.*

world are the illusory appearance of the word or *śabda*. And, the world cannot be a material transformation, but only an illusory manifestation of this Reality of *śabda* because the word *akṣaram* which is ascribed to this Reality means 'indestructible.' Any possibility of material transformation will render the Reality non-eternal like clay. Such is the defence of *śabdabrahman* put up by Maṇḍana in his *Brahmasiddhi*.

Vimuktātman's Criticism of Śabdādvaita or Non-dualism of Word

The Grammarian's declaration is that the word is Brahman from which all the worlds have appeared.[121] But for this declaration there does not seem to be any substantial proof. The word is inert and, as such, it is superimposed and unreal. And word is cognised by the senses since it is a sense-object like colour. There is no word which is not the object of the senses, as the term 'word' is used only in respect of what is apprehended by the ear. Even the internal sound is also an object of the ear, since, internal or external, it is being a sound that constitutes its objectness. The scripture, too, declares: "He closes the ears and hears." Even granting that the internal sound is not heard by the ear, still there is cognisedness for it.

Again, if the word is not an object of cognition for the intellect, is it self-luminous or non-self-luminous? If the first, it will verily be the Self. If the second, it can never be established.

The Self is not the word because it is not an object of any cognition and it is the cogniser. Since what is unapprehendable is not the word, and what is apprehendable is, like a pot, non-Brahman, Brahman is not of the nature of the word. And, one cannot find any support in the scripture for the theory that Brahman is of the nature of word. The declarations of scripture seeming to have this meaning that word is Brahman really have a different meaning. The text: *etad vai satyakāma paraṁ cāparaṁ ca brahma yad oṁkāra*, etc., according to

---

121. anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yad akṣaram, vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ. *Vākyapadīya*: I, i.

Vimuktātman, has the injunction of meditation.[122] The scriptural texts: "That which is not expressed by word, and by which speech is inspired (is Brahman)", "That which one does not hear by the sense of hearing," "Which is neither word nor touch," etc, make out that Brahman can never be word. Thus, there is no non-duality for word or *śabda.*

The objection can be raised here: If the non-duality of the word cannot be established, similarly the non-duality of the Self also cannot be established, because the Self is not Brahman. The Self appears as 'I' but Brahman is not an object of any cognition. And the Self appearing as 'ego' is the import of the word 'Ātman.' The import of the word 'Ātman' meaning the 'ego' is the secondary self while the primary Ātman is Brahman. Scripture declares that Ātman is Brahman. And, words like "Brahman," "Ātman" etc., convey Brahman only by implication and not in primary sense, because words are said to return powerless from Brahman unable to reach it. If it is said by the Advaitin that non-duality is only in respect of the supreme Ātman which is implied and not that which is primarily expressed, then, similar is the case with the *sphoṭabrahman* which is primarily Brahman, but not primarily expressed. Thus, non-duality for *sphoṭabrahman* is established.

To this, the Advaitin's reply is that there is no proof for the Brahmanhood for the word, but there is ample proof for its not being Brahman. While Brahman is unapprehendable, the word, by being a word, is apprehendable. This objection has been stated already. Brahmanhood for Ātman also is amply borne out in the scriptural texts; "Self is Brahman," "This Ātman is Brahman" etc. Nowhere a reference to the non-Brahmanhood for Ātman can be traced in the scripture. Moreover, unknowability is known of Ātman because Ātman is declared to be a knower. This knowership is not declared of the word or the *sphoṭa* anywhere. And the ego is not the Ātman, and experiences like pleasure, pain, etc., are not of

122. parāpara-brahma-dṛṣṭyā oṁkāropāsanā vidhiparā. *J. V., I. S.*, p. 519

Ātman, because Ātman is the experiencer or the knower while the experiences are things experienced or known. So they cannot belong to Ātman who is the unexperiencable or unknowable. When one says "I feel pain" or "I feel pleasure," what is brought out is the presence of the witness-Self who is Brahman, and not the ego. If it is said that even the Brahmanhood of the witness is declared only by words, it is replied that this Ātman, being devoid of class-character, attribute and action, is not expressed by words.[123] If it is further said that, in the above case, there cannot be the declaration "I am Brahman" because of the non-application of the word 'I' in the pure consciousness, it is replied that the declaration 'I am Brahman' must be interpreted by secondary implication so as to bring out the identity of the 'I' and 'Brahman'. The 'I' which is qualified by egoity and pure consciousness cannot be identical. The qualification must have to be abandoned, and the implied sense must be taken.

---

123. Brahman is indicated in such texts as '*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*' which, too, convey Brahman by their secondary sense and not primarily. If no word could convey Brahman directly, how can it be indicated even by secondary implication? For, secondary implication is obtained only where words used in implication have their primary sense known by other means of knowledge in other places.

To this, the Advaitin replies that there are cases where the secondary sense is obtained even when the words there have no primary application. For instance, in the description of the qualitative differences of sweetness of sugarcane, jaggery etc., one finds that a direct expression is impossible, and only secondary implication is available. There is the verse :

ikṣu-kṣira-guḍādināṁ mādhuryasyāntaraṁ mahat
tathāpi na tad-ākhyātuṁ sarasvatyāpi śakyate

It is not necessary that the implied content should be the object of some *pramāṇa*. In sleep, for example, there is the experience of the supernal bliss, *alaulika ānanda*. This bliss is expressed as : "I slept well," only by implication, since no primary designation by word is possible of this bliss as it is not an object of ordinary knowledge. Similarly, in the case of Brahman, implication by *jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā* is resorted to in interpreting *satyam jñānam* etc. Even in ordinary usages like "the most luminous is the moon," this kind of implication is obvious.

Moreover if Brahman be implied by the term 'word', word being always apprehended as external, Self-hood, which is pure subjectivity, could not have been stated. Only the non-Self-hood of the word would be stated as the word is external, as in the case of "Branches is the moon." Indeed, the ignorant is not competent to know the Selfhood for Brahman from the term "word" which has as its meaning something external, since it is not understood by any other means. Indeed, from the word "Branch" self-hood or subjectivity for the moon is not apprehended, though this subjectivity is unknown earlier, but only its non-self-hood, because there is no patency of knowledge of the moon's self-hood. Similarly, Self-hood for Brahman is not known before the knowledge could arise, and, before the knowledge, there is only the notion of non-Self-hood of Brahman due to illusion.

Therefore, when it is said that "word is Brahman", the ignorant individual thinks that the objective Brahman alone is stated, and not the Brahman as the Self of all, as there is no mention of the word 'Ātman' or the Self. The result is that there can then only be the apprehension "Not-self is Brahman", and not the apprehension "I am Brahman". This will necessarily come into conflict with the scriptural declaration "I am Brahman", and with the reasoning: "There will be non-Brahmanhood for Brahman, if it is not-self, like pot etc.," and there will be conflict with perception. We have shown already that there is no such conflict in Brahman, being implied by the word 'Self' and so on.

Therefore, non-duality of Self alone will be established and not non-duality of word or non-duality of pot, cloth and so on.

Vācaspati's Statement and Refutation of Sphoṭavāda

Is the complete sentence one unit possessing many parts like letters and words, or is it impartite and indivisible? Not the first; for, it is the accepted tenet of the Grammarians that the letters possess infinite magnitude[124] and there cannot be a whole

124. varṇātmakas'ca ye s'abdāḥ, nityassarvagatāstathā.

(i.e., sentence) greater than this magnitude. Even on the theory of the Logicians according to whom sound is a quality of ether, the letters cannot constitute the sentence since letters are *qualities* of ether and only substances can constitute a whole, as threads do the cloth.

Again, if parts (letters) are many, they must either coexist or come in succession. They cannot coexist for the obvious reason that letters are momentary; nor can they give rise to the knowledge of meaning by coming in succession for the same reason and will be devoid of contact without which the whole sentence cannot be constituted. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, the part is taken to be one, it cannot even then constitute the whole. Without combining with something other than itself, a part cannot produce any effect. Nor can the *cognitions* of the letters connected with one another produce the sentence-sense because of the momentariness of the letters themselves. So the sentence cannot be a whole having parts.

Then, the alternative is that sentence is devoid of parts.[125] The Sphoṭavādin believes that letters and words are more apparent than real. Sentence is manifested by the *dhvanis* which, due to different modes of articulation, generate the apparent cognition of the *śabda* or *sphoṭa* as consisting of letters and words. This auditory illusion has the counterpart in the optical illusion where one gets the reflection in a mirror of a varied shape.[126] The *dhvanis* in a sentence manifest the *sphoṭa* gradually. This is comparable to the decision of an expert in jewels with regard to the genuineness of a gem after repeated observations.[127] It is true that the *dhvanis* are inflexions of the unreal shortness or length of the letters. Thus the cognitions of these *dhvanis* are invalid. But even invalid cognitions sometimes lead to valid

125. nānekāvayavaṁ vākyaṁ padaṁ vā sphoṭavādinām. *Tattvabindu* p. 19. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri has drawn a comparison between *sphoṭa vāda* and the Gestalt school of psychology. See Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. 294.

126. mukhaṁ iva maṇikṛpāṇadarpaṇādayaḥ. *ibid.*

127. yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ. *ibid.*, p. 20

results. That is how the *dhvanis* manifest *sphoṭa.* The invalid cognition of a row of green grass as trees at a distance may lead one, when he goes over there, to the trees which do *exist* there.[128] Such is the perception in ordinary experience too. The mountain is called *naga;* the elephant is called *nāga; ajina* means the skin of an antelope or of a tiger used as a seat; *ajina,* with longer *i,* means the *absence of any loss. Śuna* means dogs. *Śūna* means growth or swelling. These differences in the apprehension of meaning are not illusions.

The Sphoṭavādin asks the Varṇavādin: do the letters produce the cognition of the partless *śabda* separately or collectively? Not the first because our experience is to the contrary and if one letter manifests the meaning completely, other letters in the sentence are redundant. Not even the second. The letters cannot operate collectively either by their existence or their being cognised together, because of all-pervasiveness and sequential presentation respectively.

If it is said that the last letter in a sentence together with the impressions registered by the hearing of the previous letters conveys the meaning, what is the nature of this impression? Is it such that produces memory or is it of that type that one finds mentioned in the text: "He sprinkles the rice" where the rice is given a ceremonial purification? Not the second type, because the letters uncombined cannot have one *saṁskāra.* To accept *saṁskāras* for each letter will lead to unnecessary multiplication of conceptions, particularly when by one single experience of whole sound, the entire meaning is comprehended. The case of religious rites like Darśapūrṇamāsa is different in that it has a distant fruit in view and thus many accessories which need not exist together, like the sprinkling etc., and *many* unseen potencies, *apūrva,* are intelligible.

The first alternative where the word *saṁskāra* is used in the sense of *vāsanā* and where the last letter together with the prior

128. ārād vanaspatau harita-pravābhasya vyaktataraṁ vanaspatitattvapratiti-hetutvadars'anāt. *ibid.,* p. 21

impressions of the previous letters gives rise to the cognition of meaning, involving nothing like *adṛṣṭa* or unseen potency, is untenable because the nature of impression is relevant only to that which was actually experienced, and here only the letters were experienced and *not* the memory. They do not possess an additional capacity to cause the understanding of the sentence also. That capacity can be placed only in the intelligent person and not in the *saṁskāras*.

Moreover, in words like *nadi* and *dina*, the recollection is only of the same letters and yet the meaning is not the same. In other words, if impressions can give rise to the knowledge of the meaning, there will be no distinction of any order from the absence of it. It is not as though the residual impressions of each of the letters in these words cited above as example cause one simultaneous memory of all the letters. Each residual impression is an independent cause of the memory of each of these letters according to the rule that a cause is always independent in the production of its effect as the seed of one plant causes the sprout independent of the seed of any other plant.

It may be pointed out against this that sometimes even independent causes combine to produce an effect. For example, the residual impressions are the cause of memory independent of eyes etc., and the eyes are the independent instrumental cause of perception; but in a case of recognition, eyes aided by residual impressions are the cause. Similarly in the case under discussion many independent impressions may generate together in combination a single cognition. Hence, one need not be apprehensive of the postulation of the unseen potency over and above the letters themselves. This is not proper because of the contingence of the apprehension of meaning, the order, or the lack of it becoming on this account immaterial. Indeed, for the letters that are all-pervasive and eternal there could possibly be no order. There will be communication of the meaning wholly and at once; in that case, there is no question of any successiveness of these cognitions of letters.

Thus *sphoṭa* or the unitary *śabda* (*ekapadavākyagocaratā*) is the generator of cognition of sentence or word-sense. The sounds (*dhvanis*) manifest this unitary *sphoṭa* gradually and increasingly, as each letter is uttered. In this, they cannot be equated with the letters. It is a sheer matter of experience that sounds as articulated manifest the meaning increasingly and thus all sounds, the first, the middle and the last, become important in this manifestation. In this there is certainly a difference between *sphoṭavāda* and the *varṇavāda*, the latter not believing in the unitary *śabda* or if it did believe in it, then the first letter will be communicative of the entire meaning and the rest of the letters will become unnecessary. And letters being all-pervasive and eternal cannot combine in any manner.

The Refutation

Vācaspati asks[129] : if there is a sound-element over and above the letters, what is the nature of this element? If it is soundness, the generic property of all sounds, that is declared to be responsible for the cognition of meaning, the result will be that sound as such being common to all the words, any sound will give any ideas or all the ideas. Since there are differences in ideas, there should be difference in the sounds. If it is suggested that in the word '*gauḥ*' for example, sounds *ga*, *au* and the *visarga* are the transfigurations, *vivartas*, of soundness, and that it is these transfigurations that produce the cognition, this explanation is very prolix because even without postulating a differenceless soundness, the apprehension of meaning from *ga*, *au* and the *visarga* as letters is quite evident. And since in the matter of being a generality there seems to be no difference, any generality can be preferred as the conveyor of sense through its transfigurations like letterness etc., and not necessarily soundness. Again, the undivided soundness, being eternal, exists in the letters, already cognized in a word or a sentence. So one need not wait till the last letter for the soundness or *sphoṭa* to be manifested. Even the very first letter would have done the job. 'Sound' cannot also be taken to mean 'that which can be experienced

129. See also *Bhāmati* on *V. S.* I. 3.28

by the ear', because even the cognitions of the letters by the ears convey only *difference* and not oneness of sound.

Now, the argument is crystallising into the specific theory of *sphoṭa* which is uniform in all letters. The letters are only the manifestations of this *sphoṭa*, and accounts for the difference in the cognition of *sphoṭa*. The Varṇavādin's argument is: when a sentence is spoken, do the cognitions of the letters earlier uttered combine with the last letter to produce the cognition of the meaning of the sentence? This cannot be because the previous cognitions, being momentary, do not exist at the time of the cognition of the last letter. It cannot be contended that the different letters manifest the *sphoṭa* without combining, for, the objects of the cognitions of letters are the *letters* and there can be no separate impartite *sphoṭa* apart from the letters.

But then is not a word like '*gauḥ*' which is one word and has one meaning, indicative of a unitariness? This unitariness cannot be explained on the basis of letters because the letters are many. Nor can it be said that the unitariness is through an adjunct just as many trees are together called a forest. This adjunct can be of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) being the content of one cognition or (2) being the cause of the designation and cognition as one. Neither of these two is appropriate here. It cannot be the first kind because at least for the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas knowledge is either inferred or known by a reflective cognition respectively. Hence at the time of cognition of a word, there is no cognition cognized, nor its unitariness.

It cannot be the second variety of adjunct since it involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. The word is one because of its capacity to convey a single idea and it has the capacity to convey a single idea because of being a word. Hence, the unitariness of *Śabda* is not by the *upādhis* but due to the unitary *sphoṭa*.

The Varṇavādin's argument is that the unitary expression need not mean one object; but it certainly supplies a name for

a group of objects.[180] The elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers are designated and understood together as army. It is not as though there is an entity called 'army' apart from the individual components. In words like '*gauḥ*', the three component *varṇas* in it, namely *ga*, *au* and the *visarga*, become objects of one recollection and cause one idea of "cow", just as three stones support one oven.[181] The question of the fallacy of interdependence does not arise because the word is, by its very derivation, an instrument of communication of an idea.[182] The knowledge of the word is dependent on the relation to activity of knowledge. Every word conveys its meaning with reference to what is to be known. There are pairs of words like *nadī* and *dīna*, *vṛṣa* and *vṛṣabha*, where it is not possible to get the meaning before they become the object of unitary idea and cognition. The unitary character of the word is determined by the unitary idea conveyed by it.

Moreover to say that one unitary *Śabda* is manifested increasingly clearly by the successive letters is not proper because *sphoṭa* cannot in the nature of the case have any degree in it. It cannot be said that the succeeding sounds being superimpositions, there is nothing detrimental to the unity of *sphoṭa*, for there could be superimposition only on something that is known. The *sphoṭa* cannot be said to be known earlier. If it is not at all known, there is no question of superimposition. If it were partly known, then the theory of the partlessness of *sphoṭa* would have been given up.

The fallacy of mutual dependence is inescapable only on the theory of *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is known, not directly, but only through a knowledge of it. But here exactly the fallacy creeps in. *Śabda* by itself cannot convey the idea but only through the

---

130. na vayam ekāvabhāsapratyayam ekavastu vyavasthitau pramāṇayāmaḥ, kintu vyapadeśamātram. *Tattvabindu*, p. 51

131. grāvṇāmiva ekapiṭharadhāraṇe. *ibid.*, p. 54

132. padyate anena. *ibid*, p. 55.
also: gatyarthas'ca jñānārthaḥ iti jñānakaraṇena abhidhīyate. *Tattvavibhāvanā*, *ibid.*, p. 55.

probans of the cognition of the idea derived from it. If this were not so, the utterance of words will yield the understanding equally to all. Thus, the knowledge of the word will depend upon the knowledge of the idea conveyed by the word, and *vice versa.*

When the communication of the meaning of the word is adequately explained by the letters in words characterised by succession and order, length and shortness etc., as in *nadī* and *dīna,* there is no need for postulating an extra-empirical entity called *sphoṭa.* The meaning of a word is clear when a single person speaks it and in a particular sequence. The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence arises, according to the Varṇa-vādin, from the cognition of the last letter in the sentence *along with* the impressions registered in the mind of the earlier letters taken together with *their* meanings.

11

Anvitābhidānavāda and Abhihitānvayavāda

Words constitute a sentence. Words have their senses. The sentence as a whole has a complete sense. Now, the question is: In a sentence, do the words present their individual meanings and the construed meaning of the sentence as well?

Between the two schools of Mīmāṁsaka thought, the followers of Prabhākara subscribe to the view that words convey both their individual meaning and the construed meaning of the sentence. That is to say: words convey their own senses, not in isolation, but as in a syntactical relation. This view is known as *anvitābhidhānavāda,* or the signification of the related. As different from this, the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa hold that the words signify their own senses only. The sentence-sense is the subsequent construction from the separate meanings of the words. This view is known as *abhihitānvayavāda,* or the relation of the signified.

But even the Bhāṭṭas hold that the word does not stop short of signifying its own sense, but leads up to the sentence-sense. But the signification of their own senses first is an essential

intermediary step. Dharmarāja in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* holds the same view as the Bhāṭṭa's, *viz.* the words *lead up to* the sentence-sense and what is related to the sentence-sense is the *lakṣyārtha* or secondary implication of the word-combination.[133] Vācaspati in his *Tattvabindu* says that the sentence-sense is known from words by their secondary significative potency in that it is generated by the *padārthas* or word-senses recollected by the means of words co-uttered or juxtaposed and associated with the accessories like expectancy or *ākāṅkṣā*.[134] Dharmarāja, in answer to the objection that, since there is no express capacity in the case of the words, there can be only secondary implication consisting in relation of the sentence-sense to the expressed sense of the words, says: "what is made known by the relation of express capacity of the word, the relation to this is secoadary implication."[135]

For example, the scripture contains explanatory eulogistic (*arthavāda*) statement like "Vayu is the swiftest deity" "He howled", etc. The first is an eulogy and the second is a condemnatory statement. The first is a praise of Vāyu and the rite in which he figures. The second is a condemnation of the giving of silver as sacrificial gift, since silver represents the tears of Rudra who howled. These interpretations are to be treated as secondary, lest the statement should become fruitless. The *lakṣaṇā* or secondary implication is not from a single word of the statements, but from the word-combination.[136] If "*Vāyu*"

133. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *V.P.*, p. 200.

134. ākāṅkṣādi-lakṣaṇasahakāripratyāsannais'ca-samabhivyāhṛtapadasmāritaiḥ padārtaiḥ pratyāsattyā gamyamānaḥ vākyārthaḥ lākṣaṅikaḥ śābdas'ceti ramaṇīyam. *Tattvabindu*: p. 161

Śabaraswāmin endorses the same view: padāni svaṁ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi atha idānīṁ padārthāḥ avagatāḥ santaḥ vākyārtham avagamayanti.

Śabara Bhāṣya, I, 1,25 according to the *Tippaṇi* on *Tattvabindu*.

135. *V. P.* p. 79.

136. Secondary implication, according to Logicians, consists in a relation to the express sense. It is understandable in the case of words which possess *śakti*, and a sense allied to the *śakya* can be conceived of.

could itself convey all this secondary implication, the other words would be purportless, which is not acceptable in the scripture where every utterance has a significance. So, it is from the word-combination as a whole that the meaning is derived, and not from a single word, though each single word has got its own meaning. The plain sentence-sense, even according to the Bhāṭṭas and Dharmarāja "thus, is led up to by the words".

As between the *abhihitānvayavāda* which is adopted by the Bhāṭṭas, and the Advaitins like Vācaspati, Citsukha and Dharmarāja, and *anvitābhidāna* adopted by the Prābhākaras,[187] the former seems to be the more satisfactory. In all sentences, there are the word-senses, and these lead up to the sentence-sense. The Prābhākaras' insistence on action and on the primacy of the verb is indefensible. For instance, the statement "This is a cow" does not involve any activity on the part of the person in relation to the cow, an activity by which the cow is affected in any way. It is not that the cow is known to be there only to be bound, or brought or unbound.[188]

Prabhākara was not able to distingulsh between statements of facts and injunctions. That is why he says that it is in virtue of the function of injunction that words really combine in a sentence to yield a meaning. As against the Prābhākaras, the Bhāṭṭas urge that in the statement "Bring the white cow," the adjective "white" is connected with the noun "cow" and not with the verb "bring".[189] And the meaning of the sentence is made clear by four conditions like expectancy, competency,

---

Where words combine to form a sentence-sense, the sentence-sense is not the *śakyārtha* or expressed primary sense of the words. See S. S. S. Sastri, *V. P.*, p. 199.

137. Prakāśātman and Bhāratitīrtha tend to hold that both the views are equally serviceable to the Advaitic thought. But the Vivaraṇakāra does not accept the Prābhākara view that all the words in a sentence have syntactical relation with the *Kārya* or the injunctive verb. See T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*, I Edn. p. 50.

138. gavādipadānāṁ gavādi-svarūpamātre sāmarthyaṁ pratipadyate. *Tattva-śuddhi*, p. 47.

139. *ibid.* p. 291.

proximity and purport.[140] In fact, the Law of Parsimony is in favour of the Bhāṭṭas. According to them, only one supposition *viz.*, the signification of the sense by the words needs be made. Regarding the combination of words and the sentence-sense, it is determined by expectancy etc. It is the Prābhākaras who go against Parsimony by saying that the words have the capacity to produce the nature of the content of the word and have again the capacity to signify the relation.[141] Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tattvabindu* forcibly argues for *Abhihitānvayavāda.* The sentence-sense (*vākyārthajñāna*) is, it is much simpler than what it would be on *Anvitābhidhāna* theory, the result of the recollection of the word-senses and not of the *words.* It may be laid down as a general rule that, unless the contrary is proved, what stands immediately prior to the effect is its cause. The word-senses alone stand in that relation to sentence-sense. Hence, they alone constitute the cause. The sentence-sense is caused to arise by the recollections of the word-senses on the basis of expectancy, congruity and proximity. The Bhāṭṭas point out against the Anvitābhidhānavādin that if the first word itself in a sentence conveys its idea and also its relation to the other ideas, then the other words in the sentence are superfluous. Their function has already been performed by the first word. On the contrary, if it is said that all the words in a sentence convey their own meanings and till that happens, the meaning of the sentence as a whole is not conveyed, this position suffers from the fallacy of interdependence, *anyonyāśraya.* For example, in the sentence, *ukhāyāṁ pacet,* unless the word, '*pacet*' conveys its own sense, the word '*ukhāyām*' is not to be understood; but till the word '*ukhāyām*' conveys its own meaning, the word '*pacet*' cannot be understood. If it is suggested that words *first* convey their meanings and *then* convey those meanings as related

---

140. tadamūṣāmeva (mānasīnāṁ) svārthasmṛtīnām ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsattisahakāriṇīnāṁ kāraṇatvam vākyārthapratyayaṁ pratyadhyavasyāmaḥ. *Tattvabindu*: p. 112;

141. padānāṁ tāvat padārthasvarūpasmṛtijanana-sāmarthyaṁ parikalpanīyam, punasteṣām anvitārthārthābhidhāna-sāmarthyam ca iti astyeva anekaśaktikalpanā. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 48.

to the meanings of other words in the sentence, the needless assumption of two capacities for words has to be made. This is against the Law of Parsimony. Again, the Bhāṭṭas urge that the cognition of an object can arise even without the cognition of the words expressing it. For example, a person perceives a white object and hears the neighing sound and the sound of galloping and concludes that a white horse gallops.

The Anvitābhidhānavādin agrees that in the absence of any strong exception (*bādhaka*), it is to be granted that whatever stands proximate to an effect is the cause for it. He is able to see the point made by the Bhāṭṭas that, according to the above rule, the recollection of the word-senses is more proximate to the sentence-sense than the words themselves, and hence, that only the recollection of word-senses, not the words themselves, is the generator of sentence-sense. However, this position of the Bhāṭṭas is invalidated if a strong exception to the rule mentioned above could be shown. A concrete example may be given here. The recollection of a palace without remembering its locality, *viz.* Pāṭaliputra and Māhiṣmati (a place which has no relation to the palace) cannot lead to an understanding of the word-senses of *palace* and *Māhiṣmatī* as related to each other. So, the recollections of word-senses do not bring up those senses in isolation, but only as related. Words have no inherent capacity to denote their meanings as unrelated to one another. This *sāmarthyābhāva* of words is a contradictory instance that nullifies the rule and the conclusion that word-senses are the originators of sentence-sense.

In answer to this, the Bhāṭṭas point out that though residual impressions of the mind are not capable of generating the memory of things already known and unknown earlier for obvious reasons, they do have the capacity to give rise to the memory of meaning of words that occur in a sentence in juxtaposition by virtue of expectancy etc. Thus they become the cause of the sentence-sense. If recollection in this way is not admitted, then the phenomenon of recognition, *pratyabhijñā*, will not be possible. In recognition, we have a model as to how the sentence-sense could arise inspite of different times and places at which words

are comprehended. One recognizes A as the same A as one saw at a different time and place. The same may be the power of the recollection of word-senses and latent impressions.[142]

From a juxtaposition of words in a group, the latent impressions are capable of producing the memory of word-senses.

The Abhihitānvayavādin has no difference of opinion in the matter of Law of Parsimony being applied to the potencies of words. But certainly he differs from his opponent in the matter of determining the kind of potency that words are said to have. The Anvitābhidhānavādin would say that the words have potency to refer to meanings of words as related. This is what is meant by the phrase '*anvitābhidhāna*'. The reference here thus is not to mere *anvaya* or relation. If it were so, relation being the same in all cases, all words will be synonymous. Words must rather be said to convey the meanings of words and their relation. Now, the Abhihitānvayavādins ask: Which of these satisfies the Law of Parsimony? To hold that the words have potency only to convey their own individual meanings (which produce the sentence-sense in their turn) or to hold that words not only convey their individual meanings but also their relation? Certainly the first satisfies that requirement. On the basis of juxtaposition and expectancy, words by their secondary significative power convey the relation of their meanings. Here words acquire their meaning in the context of the speaker with the intention of conveying the relation of words uttered by him. Words undoubtedly possess the capacity to convey their individual meanings. But even words that are not used in juxtaposition do not stop merely with conveying their own meanings. So, the particular order of words which have the sole object to convey the idea hitherto unknown, without which the co-utterance of words in a specific sequence in a sentence will be impossible helps to convey by the secondary significative potency the relation that subsists between one word-sense and another.[143]

142. vākyārthajñānapratyakṣa-pratyabhijñānajñānayoḥ tulyayogakṣematvāt iti bhāvaḥ. *Tattvavibhāvanā* of Ṛṣiputraparameśvara, p. 116.

143. *Tattvabindu*: p. 143

It is proper to speak about the intention of the speaker when the utterances have an author. But, in the case of the Vedas, there being no author for them, how is one to get their meaning? The secondary signification, *lakṣaṇā*, is generally adopted whenever there is unintelligibility of the primary sense of words that are in conflict with the speaker's intention. But the Vedas are self-revelatory and thus there is no question of conflict with the *intention of* the author. It cannot be said that Vedic utterances too are to be interpreted like the ordinary words, according to the *Lokavedādhikaraṇa* in the *Jaiminisūtra*. For, apart from the Vedic sentences, even among the ordinary sentences we adopt interpretation by *lakṣaṇā*. In the sentence "*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*" (on the Ganges, a hamlet), the word '*gaṅgāyām*' must have to be interpreted as 'bank' by *lakṣaṇā* since a hamlet cannot stand on the waters of Ganges. But in sentences like '*gaṅgāyāṁ payāṁsi*', '*gaṅgāyāṁ yādāmsi*' (waters in the Ganges, animals in the Ganges), the word '*gaṅgā*' means only waters, which is its primary sense. Such differences in interpretation do exist. In Vedas too, such an interpretation must be resorted to. But this is impossible because the Vedas have no personal author and interpretation by secondary signification must have reference to incompatibility of primary sense with the speaker's intention. So, argues the Anvitābhidhānavādin, the statement made by the Abhihitānvayavādin, that the word-senses, by secondary signification, generate sentence-sense is not quite reasonable.

The Abhihitānvayavādin answers that as in the case of ordinary words the Vedic words in a sentence produce by *lakṣaṇā* the cognition of the qualified word-senses (*viśiṣṭa-padārthas*). To quote Kumārila: words strictly convey their senses; yet they do not stop with them. The mere knowledge of word-senses is of no use to the hearer. Just as fire is essential for cooking with fire-wood, the conveyance of word-senses by words is essential for the generation of the sentence-sense. The sentence-sense is everywhere conveyed by secondary signification.

sākṣād yadyapi kurvanti padārthapratipādanam
varnāstathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale ||
vākyārthamitaye teṣāṁ pravṛttau nāntariyakam |
pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṁ padārtha pratipādanam ||

Again: *vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.*

This conveyance of *vākyārtha* by *padārthajñāna* by recollection with the aid of expectancy etc., can be illustrated by the example: *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, where the word '*gaṅgāyām*' is interpreted by *lakṣaṇā*, and not by direct *abhidhāna.* Therefore, it is simply not true that words suggest their meanings and *also* their mutual relation by virtue of twofold potencies. The pieces of wood, though they are used for the purpose of cooking, do not directly accomplish this; there should be fire also. Vācaspati says that when the relation of the word-senses is conveyed by words by *lakṣaṇā*, the primary word-senses are not completely excluded in the interpretation. That is, the implication is one of exclusive-non-exclusive type or *bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā*, unlike *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ* and like *daṇḍino gacchanti* (people with sticks go), where 'stick' is not abandoned in the description. In Vedic usage, the example will be: '*sṛṣṭirupadadhāti*', where *sṛṣṭi* by *lakṣaṇā* means '*bricks that are associated with a group of mantras*'.

12

Syntactical Harmony of Words and Sentences (Padaikavākyatā and Vākyaikavākyatā)

The syntactical unity as of a word, *padaikavākyatā*, is described as the mutual supplementation of words in a sentence. Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of *Śikhāmaṇi*, in his commentary on *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* uses the analogy of two warriors one of whom has lost his horses and the other has lost his chariot. The former can supply the chariot which is intact, and the latter can supply the horses. Thus they can help themselves, one supplying the othes's need.[144] Similarly, there is the reciprocal expectancy of words in a sentence. Where there is reciprocal expectancy with

144. It is known as *naṣṭāśva-dagdharatha-nyāya.* See Jacob: *A Handful of Popular Maxims*: p. 31

regard to a whole sentence in relation to another, there is syntactical unity of sentences. For instance, the sentence "There is a cloth", though it is complete, may arouse the question "of what colour is the cloth?". This is known as the 'contingent expectancy[145] between two sentences which in themselves convey a complete sense.

The topic of the syntactical unity of sentences is discussed, in the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, in relation to the question of eulogistic or condemnatory meanings, *arthavāda*, secondarily derived and becoming purposeful only in syntactical relation with an injunction.[146] The question is: what is the nature of this relation? Is it that of a word to a sentence of which it forms a part, or that of one sentence to another? Does the *arthavāda*, in other words, convey a complete sense, though it seeks syntactical relation with another, because of its own futility by itself? Or does it convey an incomplete sense like a word-sense, becoming articulate only as linked with an injunction, for example, the performance of a rite, offering a gift etc.? Dharmarāja holds that the eulogistic or condemnatory statements do not attain completeness in themselves and they, therefore, it should be considered to find such syntactical relation with the injunction, as that of a word in a sentence.

But syntactical harmony of sentences also is not totally rejected by Dharmarāja. In the case of texts declaring two rites, one of them being the principal and the other subsidiary (for example, the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rite which has for its fruit the attainment of Heaven, and the *samit* and other sacrifices constituting the *prayājas* which have no declared fruit), the latter, though complete as sentences, are not complete as injunctions. So they must be syntactically united with the texts enjoining *Darśapūrṇamāsa* rite.[147] Thus, there is *vākyaikavākyatā* here. In the words of Dharmarāja, "where, in the case of two sentences, each declaring separately a different relation (of word-senses,) there is,

145. See S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's notes on *V. P.* p. 202
146. See S. S. S. Sastri's notes on *V. P.* 201
147. *V. P.*, p. 79

because of expectancy, the making known of the sense of a major sentence, the syntactical unity is as of a sentence."[148]

Again the cognition of the sense of the major text depends upon the cognition of the sense of the subsidiary text standing in syntactical relation to it. This is true of the great texts of identity as much as of injunctive texts. The understanding of the text "That thou art" depends upon the cognition of the texts teaching the sense of the words "That" and 'Thou'. This is also called technically "*Āsatti*", which is *not* here the proximity of words, but immediate recall of sense,[149] which is the cause of verbal knowledge of sentence-sense.[150]

13

The Eternality of the Vedas

To the Advaitins, as against the Mimāṁsakas, the Veda is not eternal,[151] since it has an origin, and whatever has an origin must have an end. The letters, words and sentences are as much the products of creation as ether etc., are, and the Veda is composed of these words and sentences only. It comes into being at the time of creation and comes to an end at the time of dissolution. But this origination and destruction, however, are not for letters in the middle because there is always such recognition as "This is that *ga*," which shows that the letter does not perish and come into being in the middle. Once it has been created, it lasts until dissolution. Otherwise one has to postulate an infinite number of '*ga*'-s.

What is not eternal is the audible sound, *dhvani*, that manifests the letters. They are short or long. They come into

148. *Ibid.* Kumārila says: "For sentences which have terminated in the cognition of their own sense there arises again in combination a syntactical unity, because of the need of principal, subsidiary etc." *Tantravārtika*, pp. 329-333

149. tadupasthitiśca āsattih. *V.P.*, p. 80

150. sa ca śābdabodhe hetuḥ.

151. asmākaṁ tu mate vedo na nityaḥ, *V.P.*, p. 85

being and perish.[152] The non-eternal *dhvani* is superimposed on the letters which are eternal (in the sense that once created they do not perish till the time of world-dissolution), and the letters are, due to superimposition, mistaken to be non-eternal. Thus, though the Vedas are not eternal in the sense that they are uncreated and endless, yet they are not momentary. Once created, they last till the time of dissolution. They do not perish in the middle, having been composed of letters that do not perish in the middle.[153] This, to sum up, is for two reasons: (a) if the Veda is momentary, there will be no recognition as in the statement "The same Veda that was studied by Devadatta is studied by me too". (b) the apparent non-eternality of letters is due to the superimposition of the non-eternality of audible sounds on the letters which, though not eternal in the Mīmāṁsaka sense, are not yet momentary.

With reference of the origin of the Vedas, it can be called personal, if by 'personal' is meant 'dependence', and not *de novo* creation.[154] As against the Mīmāṁsakas, the Advaitins hold that the Veda depends on Īśvara for its production.[155] But even Īśvara does not produce it *de novo*.[156] Even He has no power to manifest the Veda in any form other than the form in which

---

152. varṇābhivyañjakadhvanigatotpatti - nirūpita - paraṁparā - sambandha - viṣayatvena pramāṇaṁ vā - *V.P.*, p. 86

153. varṇānāṁ sarvagatatvāt nityatvācca. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 96
na tu madhye varṇānām utpattināśau. *V. P.* p. 85

154. *Tattvaśuddhi*: p. 87

155. *Br. Up.* declares: asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛgvedaḥ. II.4.10 "If Vedas were not dependent upon Brahman, then the Scriptural texts declaring oneness of Brahman will be purportless since the Vedas will be as eternal as Brahman and independent. Moreover, there are texts which say that when the Self is known, all will be known. (*Br. Up.* IV. 5.6)
This shows that the Vedas must bede pendent on Brahman. *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 96

156. Īśvarasya nityajñānavatvépi kāryakāraṇavaidhuryeṇa vedapraṇayanāsaṁbhavāt. *ibid.* p. 89

it existed in the previous aeon.[157] There was no time at which the Veda did not exist. Since the world does not have an absolute beginning at a point of time it is difficult to trace when the Veda was non-existent.[158]

14

Scriptural Testimony only Source of the Knowledge of Brahman

Śaṅkara clearly establishes in his commentary on the fourth *Brahmasūtra*; '*tattu samanvayāt*', that Brahman is to be known only from Scripture. Brahman is not the object of perception and other means of knowledge, for, everything is rooted in Brahman. That which is the basis of all things cannot be grasped by anything that is based on it. It is not explained by anything, as everything is explained by it. Sureśvara points out in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, (III, 47–51), that since Self is devoid of sensible qualities it is not an object of perception and since it does not have any distinguishing marks, it is not an object of inference. Moreover, inferential knowledge is mediate. So, perception, inference etc., which have only the sensible world for their object, cannot in the very nature of things grasp the nature of Brahman which is transcendental and supersensible. Scripture alone can give us that knowledge.[159] The purport of the *Śāstra* is not to show Brahman as this or that object, but is to establish that Brahman is eternal subject, distinctionlessly one. Thus, the distinctions of knower, known and knowledge, are regarded as belonging to the realm of nescience. Perception, inference etc., are valid only in this realm of nescience. While perception and the other empirical means of knowledge teach about objects, scripture has, as its special topic, Brahman. Even the passages on creation in scripture are subordinate to passages that treat

157. parameśvaraḥ pūrvasargasiddhavedānupūrvisamānānupūrvikaṁ vedaṁ viracitavān, na tu tadvijātiyaṁ vedam. *V. P.* p. 88

158. See *Tattvaśuddhi*, p. 97. Vyāsa has said: yugānte' ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharṣayaḥ lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujñātāḥ svayaṁbhuvā. Quoted by Śaṅkara See *S. B.* I. 3.29

159. śrutiśca naḥ pramāṇam atīndriyārtha-vijñānotpattau. *S. B.* II. 3, 1. See also II. 1.1.

of Brahman. Texts on creation culminate in teaching Brahman only. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* says: "As food, too, is an offshoot, seek after its root *viz.*, fire. And as fire is an offshoot, seek after its root. viz., the true".[160] Ultimately the texts, of course, teach the non-difference of the effect from the cause, the world from Brahman. Gauḍapāda has said: "If creation is represented by means (of the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things, that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever."[161]

Sarvajñātmamuni in his *Saṁkṣepaśāriraka*[162] has established that *śruti* alone can teach us about the Self. All the other *pramāṇas* like perception have the external world as their content. The Self-born forced the senses outwards. That is why the senses perceive the external world and not the inner Self.[163] The difference between *śruti* and other *pramāṇas* can be stated as follows:

When the *pramāṇa* has for its object something *not divested of its objectivity*, it is empirical. But when it manifests its object, the Self, *divested of its objectivity*, it is *śruti* texts like "That thou art"[164]. Again: all *pramāṇas*, except *śruti*, apply to that which is empirical, and not to Reality, because they are incapable of generating the cognition of the uncognised and the uncognisable.[165] That is, before the rise of *pramāṇa* in respect of various contents, there is non-cognisedness for the object. But there is no means of cognising this non-cognisedness of this object. The external object cannot reveal itself because it does not have self-luminosity. Now, unless one knows that before a thing was

---

160. VI. 8.4. Quoted by Śaṅkara. *S. B.* I. 4.14

161. *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*: III. 15, Quoted by Śaṅkara, *ibid*,

162. Ch. II.

163. *ibid.* verse 13. Sarvajñātman quotes the verse from *Kaṭhopaniṣad*: parāñcikhāni vyatṛṇatsvayambhūs tasmāt parāṅ paśyati nāntarātman / kaściddhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikṣat āvṛttacakṣur amṛtatvam icchan //

164. *ibid.* verse 14 and 15. parāgarthaprameyeṣu yā phalatvena saṁmatā / saṁvit saiveha meyo'rtho vedāntokti pramāṇataḥ // Sureśvara.

165. *ibid.* 43 & 44

cognised by a *pramāṇa*, there was its non-cognisedness which could not be known by any *pramāṇa*, and that it was by a *pramāṇa* that the uncognised object was cognised, one cannot know whether an object was known by any *pramāṇa* at all, or it manifested itself by self-luminosity. For example, one who has not seen a cloth soiled previously cannot know whether it has become white by cleansing or it is the very nature of the cloth to be white. Similarly one cannot say, in the case mentioned above, whether its manifestation was its own nature or was by a *pramāṇa*. In this sense, all *pramāṇas* fail to make unknown things known; what they generate is the empirical usage only[166]. But this empirical world is indeterminable. And so all the distinctions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Perception etc., therefore, cannot put us at any time in touch with the real. It is the scripture that can teach us the nature of Reality by dispelling the ignorance which is the cause of world-illusion.[167] Just as Arjuna kills the Kauravas who have been already killed by Vāsudeva,[168] so also, the knowledge generated only nominally by the scriptural texts destroys the world-illusion because consciousness or knowledge is eternal, Again, means of knowledge other than *śruti* have external objects which, being the products of nescience, are characterised by difference and mutual non-existence. But the scripture speaks of an impartite non-dual Self. While non-difference is the truth, difference is illusory. Hence perception etc., cannot claim any capacity to reach Reality.

15

Śruti vis-a-vis other Pramāṇas

The means of knowledge other than *śruti* have difference for their ground and fruit. But *śruti* teaches non-difference. Now, is there not a conflict of other *pramāṇas* like perception with *śruti*? Does *śruti* sublate perception or does perception

166. *ibid* 21: Nṛsiṁha comments in his *Tikā*: tasya ajñāta-vastu-avabodhak-atvābhāvena tattvāvedana-prāmāṇyābhāvèpi vyavahārayogya-vāstupadarś-arena vyāvahārikaprāmāṇyam asti.

167. *ibid*. II. 34.

168. vāsudevanihataṁ dhanañjayaḥ hanti kauravakulaṁ yathā punaḥ. *ibid*. 38. See algo *Bhagavadgitā*, XI, 34.

sublate the testimony of the scripture? Or is there no conflict at all for sublation to be spoken of? If there be no conflict, how is the apparent conflict resolved?

One possible answer to the question of conflict is that there is no conflict at all since the two *pramāṇas*, *śruti* and perception, have different realms to operate in[169]. Perception operates in the realm of emplrical duality which is brought about by nescience that is indeterminable. But *śruti* teaches the reality which is non-dual. Thus, there need not be a *real* conflict between what is truly a *pramāṇa* and teaches Reality, and what deals with the indeterminable and itself belongs, therefore, to the realm of indefinable nescience. Another way of answer is to say that perception itself gives us only the bare reality, and not difference.[178] The apparent notion that perception presents us only with difference will not stand a rational scrutiny.

Sarvajñātman argues against the notion of difference as follows: If it is difference that is seen when, for example, a thing like cloth is perceived, then, cloth itself will cease to exist as an entity, since it will be like a house divided against itself. A thing which has difference in it can never be an identical object with a unitary existence. Thus, there can be no perception of cloth as cloth at all. If the difference for cloth depends upon the counter-entity, say, a pot, (from which the cloth is said to differ), then one cannot still speak of difference as real because that which is real is real is never seen to be relative and dependent on another.[171] Again, dependence on a counter-correlate, too, is not sound. For, first the locus, *i.e.*, cloth and the counter-correlate *i.e.*, pot, are to be perceived independently *per se* as *pot* and *cloth*, and then only as correlate and counter-correlate. So, there will be only infinite regress. Without the knowledge of mutual non-existence, there is no knowledge of

169. *ibid.* II. 10. Nṛsiṁha writes: pratyakṣādeḥ tattvāvedana-lakṣaṇaprāmāṇyāsaṁbhavāt na tena vedāntavirodhaḥ

170. See the Chapter on Difference in this thesis. See also *Tattvaśuddhi*, Ch. I. and *I.S.*, Ch. I.

171. Sarvajñātman demonstrates this point in the III chapter when dealing with the categories.

difference and there cannot be the knowledge of mutual non-existence without the knowledge of difference. Thus difference is only assumptive and not real.[172] So, the very basis of the ordinary notion of perception is taken away. And perception is shown to give us a bare reality, indeterminate and undistinguished. Scripture, too, teaches that Reality is non-dual and distinctionless. Thus, there is no conflict between perception and scripture.

Now, assuming that the conflict is real, Sarvajñātmamuni shows that perception can never sublate scripture. Perception can neither originate nor remove that which is real or that which is unreal or that which is real-*cum*-non-real. Its field of operation is the inert objects and they are neither real like Brahman, nor unreal like 'the hare's horn', nor real-*cum*-unreal, since this will involve contradiction in terms. They are the products of nescience which is indeterminable. Perception cannot remove this nescience since it itself is the product of nescience. Nor does it originate them because it itself is originated by nescience which originates them.[173] But scripture by teaching non-dual Reality and causing intuition of Reality sublates all nescience. So, perception cannot sublate and, therefore, is not stronger than scripture. Non-difference is the truth. Truth sublates difference which is error.[174] Vedānta sublates the world-illusion because it is the final truth and comes later than the perception of the world.[175]

---

172. *Saṁ. Sār*: Ch. I. 107

173. *ibid.* Ch. II. 108

174. *ibid*: 116–125

175. This is according to the *nyāya* laid down by the Mīmāṁsakas:
pauvrvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam āha śāstre' 'dhyāye' vasthito jaiminiryat.
Vimuktātman writes: Since *pramāṇas* only dispel the ignorance and since ignorance or knowledge can be spoken of only with reference to Self and not not-self, the ignorance of the true nature of the Self can be dispelled by the *śruti* alone. Pratyakṣa etc., therefore, deal with world of difference and ignorance. Scripture declares the truth. Thus there is no conflict between perception and other *pramāṇas* on the one hand and scripture on the other. *ataḥ na tadvirodhāśaṅkā śrutyarthe, tadviruddhārthatvābhāvātteṣām. Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 217

CHAPTER V

ARTHAPATTI OR PRESUMPTION

1

Where the perception of a thing cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing, this assumption is called 'implication' or *arthāpatti*. When an element of doubt enters into the facts observed, and this doubt can be removed only by an assumption of something that can explain the desideratum, the facts remain unintelligible till the assumption is made. It is this fact that distinguishes implication from inference which contains no doubt to be resolved. This is the view which Prabhākara among the Mīmāṁsakas takes. On Prabhākara's view, the process of implication is as follows: (1) the perception of the fact that the man is not in the house; (2) till it is known that the man is outside, it is a matter of doubt whether he lives or not; (3) it is then a question of the man living outside. So what is to be determined and what is unintelligible is the man's existence outside. This is explained by his existence outside. This is the function of *arthāpatti*.

Kumārila differs a little from Prabhākara and holds that *arthāpatti* helps us to reconcile the apparently inconsistent facts. Two observed facts look conflicting making the situation mysterious and perplexing. Here the facts observed are not doubtful, but only mutually incompatible apparently. For example, when it is known that a particular person is alive and when he is not to be found in his house, one has to assume, in order that the facts of his being alive and his not being seen at home may be reconciled, that he must be somewhere outside the house.[1]

1. Śabaraswāmin's definition of *arthāpatti* runs thus: Presumption is the supposition of a thing on the ground that a thing, heard or seen, is otherwise not possible; for instance, through finding that Devadatta, though alive, is not at home (there arises) the supposition of his being out, a thing which we do not know by actual experience. The Naiyāyikas bring *arthāpatti* under inference. Praśastapāda makes the distinction between *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti* and defines *arthāpatti* as;

Kumārila does not agree with the Prābhākara account. If the man's existence were in doubt, it cannot serve as a basis for presumption. Only when it is known that a man exists, the presumption of his being out is legitimate. The question of existence is settled by the observed fact of existence, not by existence outside or inside. In *Ślokavārtika*, Kumārila mentions different varieties of presumption answering to the six *pramāṇas*. (1) Presumption based on *perception*. e.g. burning capacity in fire based on the perceived fact that it burns; (2) based on *inference* e.g. moving capacity in the sun based on the inference that the sun moves; (3) based on *analogy* e.g. cognisability of the cow by the cognition born of the similarity between the cow and the *gavaya*; (4) based on *presumption* e.g. denotative potency of words based on the fact that words denote things. By this we presume the eternality of the word; (5) based on *negation* e.g. non-apprehension of Devadatta leading to the presumption of his being outside; (6) based on *verbal testimony* e.g, from hearing the assertion "So and so is fat and he does not eat during the day", we are led to the presumption that "the man eats at night." Here the the verbal *assertion* "He eats at night" is presumed from the inconsistency and unintelligibility involved in the assertion that "Being fat, he eats not during the day." As soon as the assertion "He eats at night" is made, the unintelligibility disappears. Apart from the *words* expressing it there is no basis for a presumption of fact since no inconsistency to be explained is left after the assertion "He eats at night."

Implication from an object of experience is no more than inference by opposition; Implication from what is heard is inference from the inferred. For example, absence from the house, when contradicted by knowledge that the man is alive, is inseparably connected with, and therefore, is the mark (*liṅga*) of, being outside the house. See Randle: *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 324. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* says: *arthāpatti* is accomplished through the recognition of a negative relationship between the middle and the major term (*vyatirekavyāpti*). This may be expressed in two different stages: (a) He who does not eat at all is not fat. This man is fat. Therefore, he is one who eats. (b) He who eats must do so either by day or by night. He does not eat by day. Therefore, he eats by night. See S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, vol, II. p. 112

Vedāntaparibhāṣā defines *arthāpatti* as follows: "It consists in the postulation by a cognition which has to be made intelligible of what will make it intelligible.[2] The fatness of one, for example, who does not eat by day is unintelligible in the absence of eating at night. Eating at night is what makes the whole thing *i.e.*, fatness, intelligible. The cognition of eating at night is the fruit of *arthāpatti pramāṇa*, and the cognition of what is to be made intelligible, *viz.*, fatness, is the distinctive cause. The word '*arthāpatti*' applies, it is said, both to the fruit and the distinctive cause. The word '*āpatti*' applies as possessive compound in the form "postulation (*āpatti*) of something (*artha*)," to the fruit of the *pramāṇa*. To the distinctive cause, it applies, in the form of a *bahuvrīhi* compound, "that because of which there is postulation (*āpatti*) of something (*artha.*)"

2

Two Kinds of Arthāpatti

Arthāpatti is of two kinds: (a) postulation from the perceived (*dṛṣṭārthāpatti*) and (b) postulation from the verbally cognised (*śrutārthāpatti*).

The first kind can be illustrated from the instance of the illusory silver. One sees the shell as silver. The cognition now is "This is silver". The illusion is sublated by the subsequent cognition of the locus, the shell. The sublation is of the form "This is not silver", contradicting the earlier cognition "This is silver". Now, the sublating cognition "This is not silver" will be quite unintelligible, if the silver in "this is silver" were real. So, one has to presume that the silver is not real but illusory.

The second variety of postulation occurs as follows: A sentence is heard. Now, the own sense of this sentence itself is unintelligible. Therefore, there has to be postulated some other sense to make the sentence intelligible. For example, there is the statement in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: "He who knows the Self, crosses sorrow".[3] This declaration is unintelligible in its

2. p. 89
3. VII. I. 3

own sense. For, Self is known, and this knowledge cannot remove the entire host of bonds or fetters signified by the word "sorrow". Knowledge can remove only error. To make the sense of the declaration intelligible, bondage, which is sorrow, is taken to be illusory. Thus, the postulation here is with reference to illusoriness. Even in empirical statements like "Devadatta who will live to be a hundred is not at home", his existence somewhere outside his home is postulated.

This postulation from the verbally cognised, *śrutārthāpatti*, is again of two kinds: (a) the non-intelligibility of expression and (b) the non-intelligibility of the expressed. The unintelligibility may belong to the expression (*abhidhānupattiḥ*). When a part of a sentence is expressed, there may be the unintelligibility of expressing syntactical relatinn. In that case, we have to postulate a word which will complete the syntactical relation. For example, the word 'door' as a part of a sentence may not have intelligible syntactical relation. It must then be supposed that the word 'door' stands in a syntactical relation to the word 'close', and the sentence will be 'close door'.[4] For another example, in scripture, rites are prescribed to one who desires heaven, as "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with *Jyotiṣṭoma*". Sometimes the fruit is not explicitly stated. In those cases, a fruit has to be postulated.[5]

With regard to the non-intelligibility of the expressed, when a sense of a sentence is unintelligible, another sense has to be postulated. For example: "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*". Here as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, being momentary, cannot be instrumental to the attainment of heaven, there is postulated an unseen potency, called *apūrva*, as intermediary.

Dharmarāja establishes that *arthāpatti* cannot be included in inference. The Advaitins hold that in inference, our knowledge

4. Expression here means only purport, not mere statement. It is hence said that without reference to the act of closing, the word 'door' by itself is unintelligible.

5. *V.P.* p. 92

is based on pervasion of co-presence alone, *anvaya*, *i.e.*, universal concomitance between the middle and the major term. When *arthāpatti* is reduced to an inferential form, the major premise of such an inference will express only the universal relation between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle term. The relation will be *vyatirekavyāpti*, and not *anvayavyāpti*. And Advaitins do not accept *vyatireki* or merely negative inference. For example, in the syllogism "Earth is different from the other elements, because it possesses odour", the *vyāpti* or pervasion is negative in the form "Whatever is not different from the other elements has no odour". But it cannot be said positively that "whatever has odour is different from the other elements", since odour exists only in earth. And with regard to that earth, since it is the subject or minor term, there is doubt or uncertainty whether the major or the *probandum i.e.*, difference from the other elements, exists in it or not. So the inferential character of *kevalavyatireki* is not accepted by the Advaitins.[6] Here, in the case mentioned, the major premise will be "The absence of eating at night while fasting by day is a case of the absence of stoutness".[7] For reasons stated above, this *vyatireki* type of inference is not admissible to the Advaitin. According to him, *vyatireki* type of inference can only indicate an unintelligibility thus calling for a postulation. In the example of the earth, it is thus: earth could not intelligibly possess a quality not present in other elements, *without being* different from those elements. In the case of Devadatta, Devadatta cannot intelligibly be stout while not eating at daytime *without eating* at night.[8]

---

6. *V.P.*, p. 56. Advaitins hold that no inference can take place through the absence of the *probans* where the *probandum* to be proved is non-existent. They insist on positive experience.

7. See D.M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*. p.233

8. D. M. Datta has argued at length why *arthāpatti* cannot be reduced to *anumāna*. *Ibid*, pp. 232–237. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja in a paper before the 16th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress argues: *arthāpatti* is not really a process of beginning from the exhaustiveness or exclusiveness of already specified particulars *viz.*, eating at night and fasting

Thus, *arthāpatti* is a distinct *pramāṇa*, standing in its own right and supplying a specific need in knowledge.

---

by day); the process is more like this. It is known that Devadatta is alive. Being alive is a general notion which must be realised in some specific way. The initial presumption is that he is alive and at home. When that is negatived, a tension is created by the generality having to find out at once some other specific support; relief is given to this tension by providing a specific alternative, *viz.*, Devadatta being out. The basic thought-procedure thus is different from that of inference. See S. S. S. Sastri. *V.P.*, pp. 205–206.

Chapter VI

ANUPALABDHI OR NON-COGNITION

1

The Advaitins, along with the Bhāṭṭas whom they follow in matters empirical hold that non-existence of a thing is known through a distinct *pramāṇa* called *'Anupalabdhi'* or non-cognition, as the existence of the object is known through valid means of knowledge like perception etc.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā puts it: "Non-cognition is the distinctive cause of that experience of non-existence which is not generated by an instrument of cognition".[1] The word "experience" in this definition excludes memory which is recollection of non-existence and emphasises the presentative or direct perceptual character of non-cognition as a *pramāṇa* in cognising non-existence. The words 'which is not generated' etc., are included to exclude from the purview of the definition such means of cognition as inference of non-existence, etc.[2] Non-existence is not the object of any of the other positive means of knowing. Moreover, the non-existence of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are supposed to be known only through inference, and not through non-cognition since they are supersensuous. To exclude merit and demerit, therefore, the words "which is not generated" are included in the definition.

Non-cognition is useful as a *pramāṇa* only in the case of those objects which are ordinarily capable of being known by positive means of cognition, had they existed in the locus in

1. jñānakaraṇājanyābhāvāsādhāraṇa-kāraṇamanupalabdhi-rūpaṁ pramāṇam. *V.P.*, p. 96

2. Inference requires the knowledge of some *hetu* or *probans* that is invariably related with the thing to be inferred. But when the nature of the knowledge of the thing itself is not yet ascertained, as in the knowledge of non-existence the relation of any *hetu* to it cannot be determined. So, there can be no inference, See D. M. Datta: *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 161. See also *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila on *Abhāva*.

which they are not perceived now. That is why the non-existence of pot in a place which is enveloped by darkness cannot be said to be known through non-cognition. That is why the merit and demerit, which are supersensuous, are not known by non-cognition. The pot in a dark place is not capable of being known by perception even if it existed. Merit and demerit are not sensible objects at all. The principle is expressed in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* as follows: "The competency of the non-cognition consists in the possession of a counter-correlate (cognition) contingent on the existence of the posited counter-correlate (content)."[3]

The meaning of the dictum is explained as follows: If on a brightly lit ground there existed a pot, then it should be known. Now, it is not so known. Therefore, there is non-existence of the pot on the ground. That is to say, when some non-existence is cognised, then, the deduction of the non-existence of the object must be capable of being secured through *reductio ad absurdum*. This kind of deduction is not possible in the case of an object enshrouded by darkness, and in the case of *dharma* and *adharma* which are supersensuous. So non-cognition as a *pramāṇa* is only appropriate or competent non-cognition *(yogyānupalabdhi)*.[4]

---

3. anupalabdheḥ yogyatā ca tarkitapratiyogisattvaprasañjita – pratiyogikatvam. *V.P.*, p. 98

4. Yogyānupalabdhereva abhāvagrāhakatvam. *V P.* p. 97. *Śabaraswāmin* in his *Bhāṣya* defines *anupalabdhi* as: Non-existence being an absence of any instrument of knowledge is also the thought of something not persent to sense in the form "it is *not* – (*abhāvopi pramāṇābhāvo nāstity asyārthasya saṁnikṛṣṭasya*). Kumārila says that non-existence of a means of knowledge is only the non-existence of *other* means of knowledge. Otherwise, the difficulty raised in the *Nyāyasūtra* how the absence of a means of knowledge could result in knowledge will arise. (See Randle: *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 329.) So Kumārila, in his *Ślokavārtika* in section on *Abhāva*, gives the definition of non-cognition as foilows: "If a thing be such that while it exists, its existence is revealed through any of the five means of knowledge and if still there is no knowledge of the thing, this non-cognition of the thing is evidence for the non-existence of the thing."

The Prābhākaras do not recognise non-cognition as a *pramāṇa* in cognising the non-existence of an object. To them, non-existence has no reality apart from the existence of a thing. An object is known to be existent with reference to itself, and non-existent with reference to other objects.[5] The non-existence of a thing is the existence of another. The non-existence of pot on the ground, then, is really the existence of the bare ground. The cognition of the substratum, in which the non-existence of something else is said to be apprehended by non-cognition by the Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭas, is alone that which is apprehended in the so-called non-apprehension. In fact, the cognition of non-existenee is inferred from the non-perception of something that would have been perceived had it been present.[6] A means of cognition must bring about the positive cognition of its object. When there is no such positive cognition, people say: "This is not found here." This is enough to account for the idea of non-existence. Śabara's statement must be construed only as a supplement to the definition of other means of knowledge, and not as the definition of a distinct *pramāṇa*, in addition to the five. But Kumārila begs to differ and claims that there is no rule that a *pramāṇa* must always be positive. Means of knowledge dealing with positive entities cannot tell us anything about negative entities. What brings about the cognition of non-existence of things is not the mere non-perception of the object,

---

5. See T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*: p. 40 I Edn.

6. Praśastapāda in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* says: "Non-existence also is neither more nor less than an instrument of inference. Just as the occurrence of an effect is the inferential mark in the apprehension of the presence of the cause, so the non-occurrence of the effect is the inferential mark in the apprehension of the absence of the cause." II. 14—15.

Śridhara in his *Nyāyakaṇḍali* argues that even those who assert that *abhāva* is a distinct instrument of cognition have to qualify the assertion by adding that the thing thus cognised as absent must be such a thing as is capable of being perceived, if present and that the conditions of perceiving it must be present. But this at once introduces an inferential element into the apprehension of non-existence; the middle term being the fact that the thing is not perceived.

but the non-perception of the object which, had it existed, would have been perceived. It is non-cognition as a distinct *pramāṇa* that shows up the fact of one thing not being another. Again, only by this *pramāṇa*, the details pertaining to one ritual are known to be *not* the same as the details of some other ritual. Also, that a certain detail does not belong to a particular ritual can be known only by non-cognition. The Sāṅkhyas, too, argue that the non-existence of the pot on the ground is but the existence of the bare ground. Negation or *abhāva* is brought under perception and is interpreted in terms of the positive. Non-perception itself cannot be the sole proof of non-existence. It may be due to several other causes like long distance, too much nearness, extreme subtlety, disturbance of the sense-organs, inattention, concealment of the object, or confusion with other objects.[7]

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, do not say that the non-existence of the pot is the same as the existence of the bare ground. They hold that non-existence is an attribute of the locus *i.e.*, ground. The bare ground is *qualified* by the non-existence of the pot. The quality is perceived along with the substrate in the same cognition. "The non-existent thing is of the same order of reality as its locus",[8] which is cognised. Otherwise, the perception of the non-existence of the object cannot be implied by the perception of the substrate. The Naiyāyikas thus bring the perception of the non-existenee of the pot under the sixth kind of sense-contact called *viśeṣaṇa* or the relation of the qualification and the qualified, (the other sense-contacts being conjunction, inherence in that which is in conjunction, inherence in that which inheres in that which is in ccnjunction, inherence, inherence in that which inheres). Non-existence is perceived, therefore, by sense-contact. The contact may be expressed in two forms: "The ground is qualified by the absence of the jar (*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam*)" or "There is the absence of a jar on the ground" *(bhūtale ghaṭābhāvo'sti)*.

7. *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*: VII. 7

8. S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 113

In the first case, non-existence qualifies that which is in sense-contact *(samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā)*, *viz.*, the ground with the eye. In the second case, it is non-existence that is qualified by that which is in contact (*samyukta-viśeṣyatā*).[9] To the argument that the non-cognition of the jar on the ground is only the perception of the bare ground without the jar, the Naiyāyikas ask: Is this being without the jar identical with the ground or different from it? If the first, it is not possible, since there will be no meaning in saying that the ground as perceived without the pot is identical with the ground perceived with it. If the second, then, one is apprehended by perception as much as the other.[10]

The Advaitins show grounds why the Prābhākara and the Sāṅkhya view of non-cognition cannot be accepted. If the perception of the bare locus could give us the cognition of non-existence of, say, pot, then, even when there *is* pot on the ground (and not merely when the pot is not there) there can be the cognition of its non-existence since the perception of the locus or ground is there even when the pot is present. Or else there will not be the cognition of the non-existence of the pot when there is a piece of cloth on the ground. It cannot hence be said that, since the pot is there, there cannot be the cognition of its non-existence, even though there is the cognition of the locus. Moreover, if the cognition of the bare locus is instrumental in the cognition of the non-existence of pot, then, there is no reason why this should be restricted to pot alone. There are numberless things that are non-existent on this locus, ie., ground. Thus there should be the cognition of the non-existence of numberless things in the cognition of the locus. But this never happens.[11]

The view of the Naiyāyikas, too, is unsatisfactory to the Advaitin for several reasons. There can be no sense-contact with

9. Keith: *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 77

10. *Nyāyabindu*, p. 11. See S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 55. According to the Buddhists, the perception of negation means only the existence of something that is the basis of negation.

11. See T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*: I Edn. p. 41

non-existence. What sense-perception gives us is only the locus.[12] If it is said by the Naiyāyikas that the sense-contact with the locus also, and not merely with non-existence, is an instrumental factor in bringing about the cognition of non-existence, there is the contingence for him of the non-perception of the non-existence of sound, for, according to the Naiyāyika, in the cognition of the non-existence of sound, there is no sense-contact with the locus which is the sense of hearing, the ear-defined ether.[13]

It may be argued that perceptual character of the judgment "There is no pot on the ground" is to be admitted even on the Advaitin's view,[14] that, in that case a psychosis should be assumed to go out and take the form of the ground and also the non-existence of the pot on it and that there is, thus, the perceptibility for non-existence of pot. But the Advaitin will merely point out that though the cognition of non-existence has a perceptual character,[15] the *instrument* of such a cognition is not perception, but a distinctly separate *pramāṇa*, *i.e.*, non-cognition. There is no necessity that the *pramāṇa* should be sense-perception when the resultant cognition is perceptual in character. For example, in the statement, "Thou art the tenth", we see that the resultant knowledge is perceptual. But the knowledge is secured through verbal testimony when it is pointed out to the person that he has forgotten to count himself as the tenth in the company.

How can there be a difference in *pramāṇa* when the result is the same, *viz.*, perceptual? The difference in the *pramāṇas* is accountable by the difference in the nature of the psychosis. In the case of the pot, the psychosis whose form is the non-

---

12. indriyasya cābhāvena samaṁ sannikarṣābhāvena abhāvagrahahetutvaṁ *V. P.* p. 100
adhikaraṇajñānādyupakṣiṇatvena. *ibid.*
13. See T. M. P. Mahadevan: *op. cit.* p. 42
14. With reference to the ground-aspect.
15. abhāvapratīteḥ pratyakṣatvepi. *V.P.* p. 101

existence of pot is not produced by the sense-contact, because there can be no such contact. So, it is produced by the distinct *pramāṇa*, non-cognition.

This may raise a further difficulty. If the cognition of the non-existence of the pot is perceptual. (whatever may be the *pramāṇa*), then, is there not the contingence of perceptibility even for the illusion of the non-existence of pot when there is a pot on the ground? In other words, when the non-existence of the pot in valid cognition is known immediately, the illusion of the non-existence of the pot also should be known directly. Now, the Advaitins hold that in illusion, the material cause of the illusory object *viz.*, *Māyā* is of a positive character, *bhāvarūpa*, and is not merely a negation of knowledge, and is indeterminable. Then, the non-existence of pot in the illusion will be indeterminable and positive and will not be a negation. If it were not a negation, then, sense-contact is not impossible. If, to avoid this difficulty, it is said that the non-existence of pot in illusion does not have *Māyā* as its material cause, then, the basic position of the Advaitins is endangered.

Dharmarāja's answer to this difficulty is as follows: The illusion of the non-existence of the pot is not indeterminable product of *Māyā*. It is a case of cognition - otherwise, *anyathākhyāti*. and not the cognition of the indeterminable, *anirvacaniyakhyāti*. In the present case of the pot, the non-existence of the pot as cognised in the colour etc., of the ground is supposed to be cognised on the ground. The pot is non-existent in the colour etc., of the ground. When it is wrongly thought that it is non-existent in the ground, (and not in the colour of the ground, for example), there is cognition otherwise. Thus arises the illusion.

If it is wondered how the Advaitin can subscribe to the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti*, it is pointed out that the Advaitins do accept *anyathākhyāti* in the case of the crystal and the china-rose, for example. Wherever there is sense-contact or immediate

cognition for what is super-imposed together with its locus, there is only cognition-otherwise.[16]

Alternatively, even granting that the illusory cognition of the pot is indeterminable being a product of *Māyā*, there is no necessity that *Māyā* and its product should be totally the same in all respects, for example, in being positive. Cause and effect need not be totally similar. The thread and the cloth, though related as cause and effect, are not absolutely similar. To be sure, *Māyā* and its products have something in common, *viz.* the attribute of illusoriness. If it be said that if what are different could be related as cause and effect, then, Brahman could be without difficulty accepted as the material cause of the world, it is pointed out that Brahman is accepted as the material cause of the world in the sense that it is the basis of world-illusion.[17] World is not, of course, the material transformation of Brahman, since Brahman is impartite. That material cause that undergoes transformation is *Māyā*, and not Brahman.[18]

Kinds of Non-Existence

The object of non-cognition is non-existence. Now, this non-existence is of four kinds. They are: Prior non-existence, Posterior non-existence, Absolute non-existence, and Reciprocal non-existence.[19]

Prior non-existence is the non-existence of the object prior to origination. The corresponding cognition to this non-existence is "will come into being." The thing is not manifest.

---

16. āropyasannikarṣasthale sarvatra anyathākhyātereva vyavasthāpanāt. *ibid.*

17. prapañcavibhramādhiṣṭhānatvarūpasya tasyeṣṭatvāt. *ibid* p: 103

18. *ibid.* p. 104

19. *ibid.* The Advaitin is not committed to all the four varieties of non-existence, but only *viz.*, Absolute and Mutual non-existences.

Nṛsiṁhaswāmin in his *Bheda-dhikkāra* accepts only Absolute non-existence. All the other three can be reduced to this. For instance, the cognition "The ground is not pot" is not different from "There is no pot on the ground", in the sense of negation. Pot-ness is the determinant of counter-correlateness in both the cases; and in both,

When the pot is destroyed into potsherds with the pestle, the destroyed condition of the pot is its posterior non-existence. While the Naiyāyikas hold that the posterior non-existence is not further destructible and has no end, though a beginning (unlike prior non-existence which has an end but no beginning), Dharmarāja writes that annihilation of the potsherds destroys the posterior non-existence of the pot, *i.e.*, potsherds. It cannot be doubted that by the destruction of posterior non-existence of pot, there will be the resurrection of the object. Annihilation of annihilation need not mean resurrection of the dead to life. When the potsherds are destroyed, the pot also is destroyed. Otherwise, with the annihilation of the pot, (pot, which is brought into being by the annihilation of its prior non-existence), its prior non-existence should come into being.

Nor can it be assumed that if the locus is eternal (for example, the potsherds are the locus of the pot, one may say), there cannot be the destruction of the posterior non-existence. Now, this assumption is gratuitous. There is no such locus which is indestructibly endless and eternal, except, of course, Brahman. If the locus be Brahman, then, the destruction of the world, which is superimposed on Brahman, is indeed eternal. That is, by Brahman-intuition, the world is rendered non-existent, and there can never be a resurrection of the world-delusion. But this is Advaitic position which may not be quite welcome to the Naiyāyika, but all the same relentless logic drives one to the Advaitic conclusion only.

But it is quite relevant to ask: If the destruction of world-delusion were eternal in Brahman, do we not have two eternal things to be spoken of, *viz.*, Brahman and the destruction of the world-delusion? But the Advaitin will say that the destruction of the world-delusion, which is superimposed on Brahman, results in or is the same as Brahman itself. This is according to the principle that the destruction of posited (or superimposed) things

---

the ground is cognised as not having potness. See T. M. P. Mahadevan: *Philosophy of Advaita*, I Edn. p. 44

leave as residue the substrate.[20] The negation of nescience is itself Brahman.

With reference to the absolute non-existence, it is non-existence in all the three times, for example, the absolute non-existence of the colour in air.

Reciprocal non-existence is expressed as "This is not that." Reciprocal non-existence is also called difference and separatedness. Reciprocal non-existence has a beginning where the locus has a beginning, *e.g.*, the difference from cloth in pot; where, however, the locus is beginningless, that too is beginningless. For example, the difference of the individual soul from Brahman, or of Brahman from the individual soul implies the beginningless reciprocal non-existence, since both the individual soul and Brahman are according to the Advaitin beginningless. But neither of these differences is eternal, since on the annihilation of nescience these differences will be annihilated also.

Difference, again, is of two kinds: (a) adjunct-conditioned (*sopādhika*) and (b) non-adjunct-conditioned (*nirupādhika*). For example, ether is differenceless, but it appears as different due to the adjuncts like pot, well, hall etc. Or the sun, though one, appears reflected as many in the receptacles of water. Similarly, Brahman, though one, appears as many individual souls due to the adjunct of the internal organ. Difference that is not conditioned by any adjunct, on the other hand, is that of pot, for example, from cloth.

The differences perceived in Brahman are not real, but are produced by nescience. This nescience is positive, and not merely the prior non-existence of knowledge. That is why it is capable of producing the illusion of difference. The *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* formulates the following inference: "The knowledge generated by some valid means of cognition is preceded by some entity which is present in the same locus (as the knowledge), which

20. adhiṣṭhānāvaśeṣo hi nāśaḥ kalpitavastunaḥ. *V.P.*, p. 206
See *Iṣṭa siddhi*: Chap. VIII

veils its content and which is other than the prior non-existence of that knowledge; for, it (knowledge) reveals what was unrevealed before; like the light of a lamp that has just been lit in a dark place."[21]

Thus, the Advaitins agree with the Bhāṭṭas that non-cognition is a distinctive *pramāṇa*, giving us knowledge of the non-existence of things.[22]

---

21. See S. S. Sastri: *V.P.*, p. 207

Tattvapradīpikā defines nescience thus: "That which is beginningless, positive and removed by knowledge is nescience."

22. While non-existence of objects is known by non-cognition, non-existence of knowledge in general is known only by the witness-Self. Kumārila mentions *Saṁbhava* or probability whereby we cognise the presence of 'a hundred' in 'a thousand' (he includes it in Inference), and *Aitihya* or tradition (he includes it in Śabda). Some people have postulated *Pratibhā* or intuition as a *Pramāṇa*. Pārthasārathy Miśra is not inclined to accept premonitional intuitions as *pramāṇa* because they are not always true.

PART II

Chapter I

VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Once the *pramāṇas* have been stated, the question that immediately follows is whether the knowledge that comes through the *pramāṇas* is intrinsically valid, or only extrinsically. Different views are expressed by the divergent schools of thought in India as to whether a cognition guarantees the validity to itself or it acquires its validity by conditions extraneous to it. The Sāṅkhya thinkers hold that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic to cognitions that come to us through the *pramāṇas*, while the Naiyāvikas think that both are extrinsic. If every cognition were self-evident, argues the Naiyāyika, there will be no possibility of doubt.[1] All our cognitions are not valid. We see the sun as moving from east to west, while it is not at all moving. If our perception can go wrong in this way, it only shows that the validity of our knowledge can be assured to us only by an inferential or mediate process of reflection. The cognition, it is urged, is apprehended by inner sense-perception, while its validity is apprehended by means of inference.[2] All our knowledge is tested by its practical efficiency in bringing about successful action (*pravṛttisāmarthyam*). When our knowledge induces an activity which fails in bringing about the desired results, it is invalid. When the activity succeeds in bringing about the desired results, then the knowledge that started the activity is valid.[3]

Now if the cognition itself is proved to be valid or invalid by inference, how is it that one *pramāṇa i.e.* perception is the object of another *pramāṇa*? To this objection the Naiyāyikas

---

1. Prāmāṇyaṁ na svatogrāhyeṁ saṁśayānupapattitaḥ *Bhāṣā-paricccheda*: V. 76
2. punar anumānena. *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 94
3. pūrvotpannaṁ jalajñānaṁ pramā, saphalapravṛtrijanakatvat. Nilakaṇṭha's *Dipikā*, p. 63

answer that just as a balance is an instrument when it helps weighing and is an object weighed when it itself is weighed; or, just as the lamp-light is *pramāṇa* with regard to the object, while it itself is established by another perception by means of its contact with the eye,[4] similarly a *pramāṇa*, too, can be both the establisher and the established. If *pramāṇas* could be self-established, even the objects could be so. When the doubt of infinite regress is raised, the Naiyāyikas appeal to practical wisdom and say that at one time or another some cognition must be taken as sufficiently valid. Here theoretical consistency is no use. There is thus no fear of an endless series of cognitions. So, the Naiyāyikas.

The Advaitins hold that the validity of a cognition is determined by the entire causal complex and that the complex of conditions that give rise to the cognition determine its validity also.[5] No extrinsic factor is necessary to make the cognition valid once it has already arisen. The cognition and its validity are not produced successively by separate sets of conditions.[6] The reason for this is that it is not possible to determine a uniform and single condition or standard of validity common to all cognitions.[7]

The standard cannot be that the cognition should present an object in all its aspects. For, one may cognise an object in all its parts, but yet be mistaken. One may cognise only a few aspects of a thing and yet be correct. The illusion "The conch is yellow" arises even when the conch is cognised in all its parts. Moreover, sense-contact with a multitude of parts of the object cannot be the determinant of validity, for, this is not possible in the case of colour and the Self, for example, which have no parts. Again, one may by mistaken even after seeing an object repeatedly; and another may be right even after seeing

4. *Nyāyavārtika*: II 1. 19

5. vijñānasāmagrījanyatve saty ajanyatā tadanyatah prāmāyās-tat-svatastvam: *Citsukhī*; p. 122

6. na tu adhikaguṇam apekṣate. *V.P.* p. 109

7. pramāmātre anugataguṇābhāvāt. *ibid.*

the object once. In the same way, it is possible that one gets the correct conclusion from incorrect premises. Even though the *probans* or the reason for the conclusion may not be sound, the conclusion itself may prove to be right. Thus, it is found that it is not possible to point to a single uniform condition that accounts for validity in all cognitions. The distinction between the valid and invalid cognitions is that the former arises without any defect while the latter has a defect. Absence of defect is a condition for the validity of a cognition. This does not make the validity extrinsic for the reason that the validity can be said to be extrinsic only when there is dependence on some *positive* extraneous factor. Here the absence of a defect is not a positive, but only a *negative*, condition. Because invalid knowledge is caused by defects, it need not be held that valid knowledge is caused by absence of defects. The positive conditions that give rise to knowledge are enough to ensure its validity: *Doṣābhāva* need not be postulated as an additional cause. Further, the very absence of defects means the validity of knowledge manifesting itself. Again, if mere absence of defect is the cause of valid knowledge, this will lead to infinite regress. The absence of defect, being considered here an operative cause, must have another absence of defect as its causal condition and so on.

To be intrinsically apprehended is to be apprehended without any intruding presence of defect and with all the causal complex that makes for the apprehension of the 'locus' of that validity, *viz.*, the cognition itself or as the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* puts it, the cognitive psychosis. The perceiver of this psychosis is the witness-cognition, (*sākṣijñānam*). In other words, the witness-apprehender apprehends both the cognitive psychosis and its validity. To the argument that even invalidity could be apprehended in the same way as validity by the apprehending witness, Dharmarāja answers that it is not possible because the extraneous defect that determines the invalidity, not being brought in by the cognitive psychosis, is not apprehended by the witness.

Invalidity of cognition, therefore, is extrinsic, is determined by defect, and is inferred from the failure of the cognition to

lead to successful action. Thus, while the Naiyāyika says that the validity and invalidity of a cognition are inferred from the results, the Advaitin holds that invalidity alone is inferred extrinsically from the results.[8]

With reference to the objection that if all cognitions are intrinsically valid, there is unintelligibility of the rise of doubt, the Advaitin says that doubt arises where there is a defect present and the cognitive psychosis and its validity are not apprehended.[9] Here, then, intrinsic nature of the cognition consists in competency to be apprehended wherever there is the apprehender of its own locus.[10] Or an alternative explanation will be that validity is not apprehended at all in respect of a cognition whose locus as linked up with the *absence* of defect is not apprehended because of the *presence* of a defect.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas[11] adopt the self-validity of knowledge. Validity which does not belong to the cognition can never be brought about by anything external to the cognition. Only the invalidity is proved extrinsically by causes other than the causes of the cognition like discrepancy or defect.[12] Doubt arises only when we recognise the defects in the causes of knowledge, like the defect in the visual organ. The doubt with regard to any particular cognition can be corrected by a specified number of repeated cognitions or observations. This need not involve an unending series of cognitions. For, three or four observations carried out repeatedly will be certainly true.[13] The

---

8. visaṁvādipravṛttyādi-liṅgakānumityādiviṣaya iti parataḥ eva apramāṇyam utpadyate jñāyate ca. *V.P.* p. 112
9. doṣavaśenāgrahāt na saṁśayānupapattiḥ. *ibid.* p. 111
10. yāvat svāśrayagrāhaka-grāhyatvayogyatvam svatastvam. *ibid.*
11. The Prābhākaras, too, hold that the conditions of knowledge produce also the consciousness of its validity. But, to the Prābhākaras, all knowledge is valid.
12. *Ślokavārtika*: II. 85 and 87
13. *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārtika*, II. 58 and 60-61
See also S. Radhakrishnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 404-405. According to Kumārila, a cognition is not directly perceived, but is

Advaitins then, as in other matters empirical, are one with the Bhāṭṭas in adopting the intrinsic validity of knowledge.[14]

Inferred from the cognisedness (*jñātatā, prākaṭya*) of the object produced by the cognition (*jñātatānumeyaṁ jñānam*). Thus, though Advaitins are one with the Bhāṭṭas in respect of self-validity of knowledge, they cannot agree to the theory of inferred character of knowledge. The difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas in this case is that though the Bhāṭṭas hold that validity is inferred from the cognisedness of the object, they also hold that knowledge is made known by this cognisedness. That is to say, the same causal conditions that make knowledge known make the validity of that knowledge also known and this is the meaning of self-validity. The Naiyāyika, on the contrary, holds that knowledge is made known by reflection, *anuvyavasāya* and validity by practical success. The Prābhākaras and the followers of Murāri Miśra hold that validity is apprehended by the same elements that generate knowledge. *Utpatti* and *jñapti* arise from the same set of conditions. The syllogistic expression of this will be: vimatā pramā vijñānasāmagrījanyatve sati tadatiriktajanyā na bhavati, apramātvānadhikaraṇatvāt ghaṭādipramāvat. S. D. S: *Jaiminiya Darśana.*

14. The Bauddhas hold that invalidity is intrinsic while validity is extrinsic. The verse from *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* sums up the views of the different schools on this matter of the chapter: pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṁkhyāḥ samāśritkāḥ; naiyāyikas tu parataḥ; saugatās caramaṁ svataḥ; prathamaṁ parataḥ prāhuḥ prāmāṇyam; vedavādinaḥ pramāṇatvaṁ svataḥ prāhuḥ, parataścāpramānatām. Ch. *Jaiminiya Darśana.*

CHAPTER II

TRUTH AND REALITY IN THE ADVAITA OF ŚAṄKARA

Reality Not A Nothing

Ultimate Reality, Brahman in Advaita, knows no distinction of 'existence' and 'character' 'reality and ideal' (to borrow the phrases of Bradley), subject and predicate. "Secondless one" (*ekamevādvitīyam*)[1] is the central text of Advaita metaphysics. As for Parmenides, so for Advaita, "All that is, is one, and this one is that is." It alone is.[2]

It has no internal or external relation,[3] since there is nothing outside it, similar or dissimilar to it, *sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bhedarahitam.*[4] The tree, for example, has internal differentiations like foliage, fruits and flowers. It is different from other trees. It is different from things which are not trees. It has, therefore, *svagata, sajātīya* and *vijātīya* differences. But Brahman is undifferenced pure consciousness, *nirviṣayacinmātram*, mass of intelligence, *prajñānaghana.*[5] An absolutely pure, utterly differenceless Being is

1. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI. 2. 1.
2. Cp. Schelling: "Being expresses the absolute; Determinate being a conditional positing; Actuality [one conditioned in a definite sort by a definite condition ..... but the absolutely posited, the Ego is. *I am* is all the Ego can say of itself." *Werks*, I. 209.
3. evaṁ hi śrutivākyaśataiḥ sabāhyāntaram ajam ātmatattvam advayaṁ na tato'nyad astīti niścitam etat. Śaṁkara on Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā*: III. 27
4. See *Pañcadaśī*, II. 20 and 21
5. With differentiations the *sat* cannot be; without them a plurality of reals cannot exist. Hence, there is nothing akin to the *sat*. *Pañcadaśī*, II. 24. Cf. In the beginning, there is yet no other (*sadeva somya idam agra āsit*). There is nothing more than name and form in the manifested world. Before being projected forth, it was one with *sat*. Again: The indeterminate is the blank we begin with, not a featurelesness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first

very difficult to conceive in our imagination that is, due to biological reasons, pictorial and practical. To be sure, an undifferentiated indeterminacy does not appear to be very much different from the merest nothingness to the conceptual ways of our thinking which is habituated to tear and twist, divide and distinguish. An integral existence without seams and slits defies our thought's essayings. Hegel was certain that "to be completely free from any determination is just what we mean by nothing".[6] That of which we can say nothing save that it merely is means much the same as nothing. 'A night in which all cows are black", a contentless blank is no fit food for thought that demands details. Speaking on the Vedāntist's Absolute, J. S. Mackenzie observes: "The pure Self-consciousness of which they speak is rather like the pure Being of Hegel, which cannot be distinguished from non-entity".[7] To Ludwig Fischer, "absolute truth is of the same fictitious nature as plenary reality".[8] Writers like Von Hartmann hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory of Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing.[9]

Wallace observes: "The nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything is the same abstraction. Only in, and by virtue of, this inert generality is it Nothing, sometime inexpressible, whereof the distinction from Nothing is a mere intention or *meaning*".[10]

Reality in Advaita looks, thus, so perilously a contentless abstraction that it can very easily be mistaken for the *śūnya* or the void of the Buddhists. Śaṅkara was aware of this danger

---

of all ..... it is only and merely thought." Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 159

6. *Greater Logic*: 1. 78
7. *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*: p. 458. Hegel thought that any determination of the Pure Being would make it have some particular nature; would make it 'X' rather than 'non-X'.
8. *The Structure of Thought*: E. T. by W. H. Johnston. B.A.
9. See *Logic of Hegel*, p 412, Notes and illustrations.
10. *Logic of Hegel*, pp. 161-62

when he said: Brahman, free from space, attributes, motion, fruition and difference, being in the highest sense and without second, seems to the slow of mind no more than non-being".[11] The author of *Pañcadaśī* writes: People are afraid of hearing of the one without a second like the persons who, having fallen into the sea, are bereft of their senses and are full of fear. Gauḍapāda in his *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* observes that people who worship a personal God are unreasonably afraid of meditation in which the difference between subject and object disappears.[12] The *asparśayoga* or the yoga of *nirguṇabrahman* seems to be a lonely wilderness to those who are accustomed to the crowd of concretes. But reality is so immense that all determinations in it are negation. What discussive thought condemns in stupefied amazement as the emptiness of a zero, integral experience, *anubhava*, shows up to be immediately real, ineffably rich. Reality is inaccessible to our ordinary modes of thought and speech. It is eternal, pure, free, intelligence.[13] When Reality is intuited in integral experience, all dualisms vanish, and thought and speech vanish with them. Śaṅkara observes: "Knowledge does not wait even for the moment immediately next the annihilation of duality, for, if it did, there would be an infinite regress, and duality will never be annihilated. The two are simultaneous".[14]

It is the nature of thought to dissociate and associate the abstracted constituents of reality. Otherwise it cannot function. To Bradley, the real is known in feeling rather than in thought. "The only reality", writes Stout, "which can belong to feeling as such is actual existence, such as belongs to a tooth-ache in

---

11, Commentary on *Chānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1. dig-deśa-guṇa-gati-phala-bheda-śūnyaṁ hi paramārtha-sad-advayaṁ brahma mandabuddhīnām asadiva pratibhāti.

Also: vāṅmanasātītatvam api brahmaṇo nābhāvābhiprāyeṇa abhidhīyate. *S.B.* III. 2.22

12. III. 39

13. vāṅmanasātītam aviṣayāntaḥpāti pratyagātmabhūtaṁ nitya-śuddha-buddha-muktasvabāvaṁ brahmeti. *S.B. ibid.*

14. *Com.* on *Māṇḍūkya Up.* I. 7
Gauḍapāda says: jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate. *Kārikā*, I. 18

actually being felt. But the mutilation of feeling which yields the object of thought as such deprives that object of all claim to this sort of reality".[15] This inadequacy inherent in thought is responsible for our mutilated views of Reality and inconceivability of the ineffable fulness of reality. That is why Śaṅkara, in the line of the Upaniṣads, repeatedly denies that Reality is an object of knowledge. There is no knowing of reality but only being it.[16] We cannot form an idea of Reality because there is nothing like it in the world we know in thought. Human understanding grasps only that which is circumscribed by space-time-cause limits. An object of thought or sense, *because* it is an object of sense, has neither infinity of extension, nor eternal endurance or independence of being. Within the space-time frame, it is a link in the immemorial and endless causal nexus. It begins and terminates in time. It has an objectivity, and this objectivity is the reason why it is unreal. To be objectified and to be confronted by a subject in a transitive act of knowledge is a lapse and a corruption from oneness. A lapse from "to be" is "to become".[17]

The test of reality is endurance. What at one time is and at another time is not, is not real. Śaṅkara lays down the principle thus: "That is real whose nature by which it is cognised, remains constant, and that is unreal, whose nature by which it is

---

15. *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology.* p. 347

16. anubhavāvasānatvāt - *S.B.* I. 1.2 brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti. *Muṇḍ. up.* Again: brahma-veda brahmaiva bhavati. See *S.B.* I. 1.4. There is nothing to be done between *brahma-darśana* and the attainment of *sarvātmabhāva*. brahmadarśana-sarvātmabhāvayor madhye kartavyāntara-vāraṇāya udāhāryam. As in the case of the statement "standing there he sings" where there is no activity between the man's standing and singing.

17. Cf. "In Becoming the Being which is one with Nothing, and the Nothing which is one with Being, are only vanishing factors; they are and they are not. Thus by the inherent contradiction, Becoming collapses into the unity in which the two elements are absorbed. This result is accordingly Being determinate." Wallace[: *Logic of Hegel*, p. 89

determined, varies".[18] As, tested by this criterion, no obje is real. Thought, which deals with objects, revels in the relative and the unreal. Thought with the objects commits suicide at the touch of the One. No wonder, then, an integral experience appears so strange and outlandish to the sensuous ways of thinking and Reality itself seems a non-entity, a nothing.

2

Reality—Relationless

The relations, internal or external, belong to the world of objects, subject to change and variation. The phenomenal entities are forced by their finitude and insufficiency consistently to point beyond themselves. Whitehead spoke of things as having rugged edges which is proof that they must have been torn from a total existence. Any separation is privation. Perpetually passing into and out of relations, in mutual penetration and dispersion, things temporal are so insupportably uncertain and momentary that one is at a loss to judge whether they are or no. To Heraclitus and the "stricter Muses of Ionia",[19] reality is becoming and the interplay of opposites, Heraclitus said that men did not know how what was at variance agreed with itself and gave the example of the bow and the lyre where there was an attunement of opposite tensions but yet sweet harmony. To the Pythagorians as to Heraclitus, reality is motion countered by quiescence, light by darkness, infinity by finitude. To Gautama, the Buddha, momentariness is a striking fact of nature and the subject-self.

---

18. satyam iti yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṁ tadrūpaṁ na vyabhicarati, tat satyam. yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṁ tadrūpaṁ vyabhicarati tad anṛtam. Śaṅkara on *Taitt. up.* Mem. Ed. Vol, p. 62

19. Plato in his *Sophist*:

"There are Ionian and in more recent time Sicilian, Muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles (of the One and the Many), is safer and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them." Quoted in Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 74

Hegel observes: "When we look more closely, we find that the limitations of the finite do not merely come from without, that its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and that by its own act it passes into its counterpart.[20] To Henri Bergson, time seems so formidably real as to inspire him to say that change is the stuff of reality.[21] Things are constantly devoured by time and constantly shot forth only to be devoured again. Bertrand Russell however said: "A true image of the world, I think, is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is. Both in thought and in feeling, to realise the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom."[22]

In this complex movement, everything owes its being to everythingelse, and it is hard to find anything which stays in itself, much less sustains others. To trace the descent of any objective entity to its parental forces, and again to follow up the ancestry of these parental forces to their elements and so on leads to an infinite regress. To discover the first cause in the series is a hopeless enterprise. The phenomenal thing never *is*; it is always manifested in its curve of birth and death, growth and decay. It occupies a continuum of space and time and has its history and biography in the continuum. It is a process and change in the continuum, an aberration in the whole. A selected thing, or rather point-event, involves a multitude of relations. Everything is relative to everythingelse. But if relativity is the universal law, there would be nothing for anything to be relative to, as Bertrand Russell is careful to point out.[23] Relations could never be

---

20. Wallace: *Logic of Hegel*, p. 100

21. Bergson believed that the whole universe is the clash and conflict of two opposite motions, life and matter.

22. *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 167
Bhagavad-Gitā puts it:
avyaktādini bhūtāni vyaktamadhyāni bhārata, avyaktanidhanānyeva tatra kā paridevanā.

23. *A B C of Relativity*, p. 14

ultimate unless they are rooted in something that itself stands unabsorbed in the relations. Finite entities cannot constitute a sovereign universe. Zeros can never make one. It appeared to Kant that only that which persists can be regarded as changing. Change, without persistence, could only mean the substitution of one thing for another.

Śaṅkara distinguished between two kinds of permanences, the *pariṇāma*, the evolving, and the *kūṭastha*,[24] the changeless. The first is that which persists in and through the changes and modifications and has an identity. The examples are, the gold is beaten on the goldsmith's anvil and made into various ornaments which are only physical modifications of gold. The milk turns into curd. The seed becomes the sapling and the sapling grows into the tree. In all these phenomena, there is a continuity of growth from one state to another, from the unmanifest to the increasingly or variously manifest. When the seminal energy contained in the cause flowers forth and the germinal potentialities assume distinct contours and features, and when what is hidden is revealed, we say that the effect has been produced.[25] In all such causal operations, cause becomes effect and, in the process, kills itself.

There is another causal relation—if causal relation be the name for it—where the substrate—(substrate, *adhiṣṭhāna*, is a better appellation than cause here) stays unaffected and yet appears differently from what it is.[26] The moon in fact does not change when it is seen as two by one with a faulty vision.

---

24. tatra kiṁcit pariṇāminityaṁ yasmin vikriyamāṇe'pi tadeva idamiti buddhir na vihanyate. *S.B.* I. 1.4 The Sāṁkhyas think that the *guṇas viz.*, sattva, rajas and tamas are real in spite of their change.

25. kāraṇasyaiva saṁsthānamātraṁ kāryam. *S.B.* II. 2. 17. anabhivyaktaṁ kāraṇam, abhivyaktaṁ kāryam ucyate. ato na bhedaḥ. bhede tu tayoraśvameṣavan na kāryakāraṇate syātām. *I.S.* p. 188

Again: anabhivyaktasyaivabhivyakteḥ. *ibid.* p. 188

26. na hi avidyākalpitena rūpabhedena sāvayavaṁ vastu saṁpadyate. na hi timiropahatanayanena aneka iva candramā dṛśyamāno aneka iva bhavati - *S.B.* II. 1. 27

A change should affect the locus of its occurrence. But when the multiple forms, as which the locus appears, have no relation to the locus at all but are an aberrant delusion, the phenomenon is unique and is called "*vivarta*". While what is called *pariṇāma*, transformation, is the resulting in an effect having equal reality with the material cause, what is called transfiguration, or *vivarta*, is the resulting in an effect whose reality is not equal to that of the material cause".[27] The snake in the illusion leaves the rope untouched. Similarly the ultimate Reality is not persistence or perpetuity amidst the clouds of change but is eternal purity. The experience of duality is a product of ignorance, *avidyā*. *Avidyā* or nescience is the material cause of this illusion. The silver in illusion, for instance, is the transformation, *pariṇāma*, of the material cause *i.e.*, nescience, and is the transfiguration, *vivarta*, with reference to Reality.[28] While the world, the product of *avidyā* or nescience, evolves, Reality does not evolve.[29]

The infinite will have none of the finite. Finites are partite or partible entities. Infinite is impartite. As a rule, change and evolution, growth and decay are incidental to entities which are possessed of divisible parts. That which is divisible is perishable.[30] Thus, finite entities, not only stand and are sustained by

---

27. pariṇāmo nāma upādāna samasattākakāryāpattiḥ. vivarto nāma upādāna-viṣamasattākakāryāpattiḥ. – *V P.*, p. 37. According to the *Pañcadaśī*, *anyathābhāva* is *pariṇāma* and *anyathā-bhāna* is *vivarta*. The *Vedānta-siddhānta-sūktimañjarī* puts it: Brahman is said to be the material cause when it is the basis of the world which is a transfiguration (vivarta), and *vivarta* is the object that has a reality that is nondifferent from the reality of its basis and that is dimunitive and unequal. tatra upādānatā viśva vivarta āspadatā citaḥ, svābhinna nyūna-sattārtho *vivarta* iti kathyate. *SLS* puts it: vastunaḥ tat-sama-sattāko anyathā-bhāvo pariṇāmaḥ, tat asamasattāko vivarta iti.

28. prātibhāsikaṁ rajataṁ ca avidyāpekṣayā pariṇāmaḥ, caitanyāpekṣayā vivartaḥ. *ibid.*

29. apariṇataṁ avatiṣṭate. *S B.* II. 1. 27. tasmāt asti avikṛtaṁ brahma. *ibid.*

30. sāvayavatve ca anityatvaprasaṅgaḥ - *S B.* II. 1. 26. Reality is described thus: pāramārthikam, kūṭasthanityam, vyomavat sarvavyāpi, sarvavikri-yārahitam, nityatṛptam, niravayavam, svayaṁjyotiā – svabhāvam, yatra dharmādharmau sahakāryeṇa kālatrayaṁ ca no pravartate - *S.B.* I 1. 4

relations with each other, but stand with parts balanced in internal relations.

Now, the world of mutually dependent relations and change, involving an infinite regress and perpetually pointing to something beyond themselves, with no inherent essence, (*niḥsāra*), is seen by Advaita to have no existence from the perspective of transcendent oneness. The doctrine of *samavāya* leads to infinite regress.[31] If things are related by *samavāya*, a category of internal relation or inherence as distinguished from external conjunction admitted by the Naiyāyika thinkers, Śaṅkara argued that this relation itself will require another relation for it to be related to the thing which it is said to relate. This will be a *regressus ad infinitum*.

F. H. Bradley brings out the self-contrariness of the relations thus: "If A is related by R to B, A must be related by a relation R_1 to R, and R must be related by a relation R_1 to B. On the same grounds, A must be related by a relation R_{11} to R_1, R_1 must be related by a relation R_{12} to R, R must be related by a relation R_{21} to R_2, and R_2 must be related by a relation R_{22} to B". Bradley's contention is that this series could not have a first term, unless it had a last term which it plainly does not have, a criticism to which Śaṅkara would have willingly subscribed.

If this be so with the relations admitting them to be real, Śaṅkara declares them to be non-real when he sums up the considered opinion of all the Vedāntins thus "The gospel of all Vedāntas is that the empirical determinations of space-time stand sublated and contradicted in reality. There is neither the empiric world nor the thought and activities born of that world."[32]

Relations die of inanition. if one may say so, because there are no dependent relata to be related. The absolute has no

31. samavāyakalpanāmapi, samavāyasya samavāyibhiḥ saṁbandhe-bhyupagam yamāne tasya tasya anyonyaḥ saṁbandhaḥ kalpayitavya iti anavasthā-prasaṅgaḥ. *S.B.* II. 1. 18.

32. paramārtha - avasthāyāṁ vyavahāra - abhāvaṁ vadanti vedāntāḥ sarve. *S.B.* II. 1. 4

room for the relative. Their unreality is borne out by the fact of their sublation in the unitive Being or Experience, *anubhūti*.

3

The Non-Difference of the Finite and the Infinite

The central mystery of existence seems to be, then, the fact of the appearance of the many: the so-called relation of the one to the many. The Advaitin's position is that the problem of relating the one and the many does not simply exist. Many a philosophical load has been wrecked on this adamantine rock of the finite-infinite relation. One can as well try to combine light and darkness.[33] It is paradoxical to speak of the infinite and the finite at the same breath. The real cannot possibly be related with the unreal.[34] It is impossible to associate that which does not exist with that which alone exists or to associate two things neither of which exists.[35]

Advaita system postulates the principle of non-difference, *ananyatva*, as a substitute for the indefensible finite-infinite relation, thereby denying the duality of the relata. All the Upaniṣadic utterances point to the non-difference of the effect from the cause, (if again, to speak in terms of cause is legitimate).[36]

---

33. viṣayaviṣayiṇos tamaḥprakāśavat viruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretarabhāvānupapattau. *S.B.* Introduction. na yuktastamasā sūryo, nāpi cāsau tamomayaḥ. *Pañcadaśī* II, 33

34. nahi sadasator saṁbandhaḥ – *S.B.* on *Bṛh. Up.* II. 7.

In *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (London, 1952) G. E. Moore said writing on false judgments: "In order that a relation may hold between two things, both the two things must certainly be...". p. 263

Sorley criticises monism in terms of the monistic doctrine of the Absolute and its beginnings. "This absolute is indeterminate: The monist never succeeds in showing *how* the Absolute comes to appear or express itself in phenomenal modes or any particular modes at all". W. R. Sorley, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, 1925, p. 254.

35. katham alabdhātmakaṁ sambadhyeyeti vaktavyam. satorhi dvayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ sambhavati; na sadasatorasatorvā. *S. B* II. 1. 18.

36. śrutibhiḥ aviśeṣeṇa triṣvapi kāleṣu kāryasya kāraṇa ananyatvaṁ śrāvyate. *S.B.* II. 1. 9. (See also *S.B.* II, 1. 1. 4 & 16).

For any relation, there should be two terms at least. But here it is found that there is only one term, Reality *or* the appearance. When the realisation of reality is secured, the finite loses its being.[37] Or conversely, if truth is to be secured, error should be cancelled. "All affirmation is the negation of negation", wrote Ritchie in his *Philosophical Studies*.[38] If the finite is the negation of the infinite, the negation of the finite is the affirmation of the infinite. Negation and affirmation cannot co-exist. When there is no coexistence of two, there is much less a causal relation between the two.[39]

4

Reality as the Great Universal

Plato suggests in his *Sophist* that non-being is only otherness. There is no non-being as such that comes within sensible experience. A sheer nothing could never appear.[40] Even the most odd of appearances has a basis in reality. The world, however unreal it might be, is not mere nothing but is based on Brahman. Brahman is the ground of all things, including errors.[41] One cannot dismiss the world as nothing and be done with it. The empirical world is not so much disowned and repelled as it is sublated by Reality. To exclude is to make the world have a sovereign existence, as it were.

In this sense only, one can speak of the Absolute as the great universal *including* every particular. Śaṅkara puts it thus:

---

37. evamasya bhogyabhoktṛādi prapañcajātasya brahmavyatirekeṇābhāva iti. *S B*. II. 1. 4

38. p. 205 Footnotes.

39. Gauḍapāda writes: nāsti asadhetukaṁ asat, sadasat hetukaṁ tathā, sacca sadhetukaṁ nāsti, sadhetukam asat kutaḥ. *Kārikā*, IV. 40.

paramārthatastu na kasyacit kenacidapi prakāreṇa kārsya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ upapadyate. Śaṅkara's commentary thereon.

40. asataḥ khyātyasaṁbhavāt. *I.S*, p. 39

41. sarvakalpanāmūlatvāt. (*S B*, III, 2, 22). Vidyāraṇya puts it: niradhiṣṭhāno na bhramaḥ kvacidikṣyate. *Pāncadaśi*; II, 35. This is what distinguishes Advaita from Buddhism. There is no illusion which is *niradhiṣṭhāna* (substrateless) and *niravadhi* (with limitless sublation).

"All these universals falling into a graduated series are included and comprehended in one Great Sāmānya, *i.e.*, in Brahman's nature as a Mass of Intelligence".[42] If the appearances are alien to reality, and are excluded by it, they possess immediately a sort of emigre reality and need an explanation for their fugitiveness. It is evident that this is a fruitless job. Applying Ockham's Razor, the entities could be cut down for consideration of the economy of concepts. If the appearances, in other words, constitute a reality viable in itself, why should an attempt be made to connect it with or disconnect it from another reality, rather presumed than proved to exist over and above the presented world? If both the Real and the appearances are accorded true existence, there is, and need be, no knowledge that sublates the error.

If, on the other hand, the presence of a higher Reality that is said to be the basis of the world-manifestation is emphasised on the strength of the facts of change and self-contrary unreality that seem to govern the world, the difficulty of relating the world of change with an uncreate reality is at once realised. If one endeavours to accommodate the unreal and the changing in what is changeless and real, the real becomes divided against itself and seethes with internal disturbances. If change could be placed right at the heart of reality, its integrity is compromised.

Bradley, Bosanquet, Joachim, Royce and others, true to Hegelian tradition, are unwilling to surrender the "appearances", but somehow try to 'transmute' them into the one. This is to carry the reminiscences of the empirical into the transcendental. An appearance can never be transmuted; it can only be transcended. One cannot eat the cake and have it. If the actual is a falsification of the ideal and the real, if it veils rather than reveals the truth, and if it is in the realm of relational thought that distinctions are conjured up and contended with, and not in the unrelational or the supra-relational, then, to reconcile the

42. anekā hi vilakṣaṇascetanācetanarūpaḥ sāmānya viśeṣāḥ. teṣāṁ pararṅparyagatyā ekasmin mahāsāmānye antarbhāvaḥ prajñānaghane. *Com. on Bṛh. Up.* II, 4, 9.

real and the unreal is to oscillate between two antagonistic allegiances and to fall in between. Bradley says: "The real is the individual. It is one in the sense that its positive character embraces all differences in an inclusive harmony".[43] But the real can never be a nice adjustment of rivalling claims. Error and truth, as Śaṅkara puts it, are mutually exclusive. Truth is one; and it is not made of *truths* in plural and *half-truths*. Partial diversities and discords can never make unity and harmony.

As outside the real (Śaṅkara uses the term '*brahmavyatirekeṇa*'), the world does not exist. As inside the real, it is non-different from its substrate (*kāraṇāt-kāryasya ananyatvam*).[44] The world of many, therefore, can never be spoken of in terms of exclusion or inclusion. Yet it *appears*. A nothing cannot appear. The world is not unreal in the sense of non-existence. It is sublated in the Reality that is one.[45] It is not real in the sense of existent-Reality, Brahman. It is really inexplicable as this or that and is of the nature of *māyā*. The many and the one are

---

43. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 140. Again: "Absolute is one system. It will hence be a single and all-inclusive experience which embraces every partial diversity and discord". *ibid.* 146

According to Joachim, truth is an organic unity of significant whole, the constituents of which "reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning". *Nature of Truth*, p. 66

Bertrand Russell makes the following criticisms of Joachim: (1) If no partial truth is quite true, this must apply to the partial truths which embody the monistic philosophy. If they are not quite true, any deductions we may make from them may depend upon their false aspect, rather than their true one, and may, therefore, be erroneous. (2) The theory does not explain in what sense one partial judgment is said to be true and another false, though both are equally partial. (3) In order to prove that there can be only one coherent whole, the theory is compelled to appeal to "Experience", which must consist in knowing particular truths, and this requires a notion that the monistic theory cannot admit. *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 159-160

44. *S.B.* II. 1. 19. Brh. Up.: II, 4, 9

45. tasmād antyena pramāṇena pratipādita ātmaikatve samastasya prācīnasya bhedavyavahārasya bādhitatvāt na anekātmaka – brahmakalpanāvakāśaḥ - *S.B.* II. 1. 4

related as the Reality and its appearance due to *māyā*.[46] Reality is, in Advaita, not *anekātmaka*, a system comprehending the particulars, but *advitīya* and *akhaṇḍa*, secondless and impartite.[47]

5

The Saprapañcavāda and Its Refutation

The *bhedābhedavādins* maintain that the relation of Reality to the world of many things, subjects and souls, is one of identity-in-difference, *bhinnābhinnatva*. As all the world has originated from Brahman, Brahman exists interpenetrating and informing the things of the world. The analogy of the clay and the pot is drawn to show this interpenetration. It is the aspect of consciousness in all sentient and thinking beings. All that one sees are only various aspects of Brahman. This is the declared import of the *Vedānta-sūtra "aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt"*.[48] In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the Lord says, "*mamaivāṁśo jivaloke*" etc. The clear implication of these authentic pronouncements is that Brahman and the world stand in the relation of whole and part, or body and consciousness, *aṁśāṁśibhāva*. And between part and whole, the relation is one of identity-in-difference. Otherwise, that relation is unintelligible. The scriptural declarations of oneness and infinity of Brahman relate to the differenceless Brahman. And the declaration of its being the soul of all relates to the things and persons of the world informed by the spirit and yet standing mutually different and different from Brahman. Total difference or total non-difference will not make these divergent declarations intelligible. Hence, the world is not so much denied in Brahman as sustained by it or in Hegel's

46. Śaṅkara declares that *nānātva* or maniness is born out of ignorance. mithyājñānavijṛmbitaṁ ca nānātvam. *S. B.* II. 1. 4

Again: paramakāraṇasyaiva ekasya satyatvāvadhāraṇāt sa ātmā tattvamasi śvetaketoiti. *S.B.* II. 1. 4.

47. Professor P. T. Raju writes that the Absolute is the only concrete universal which is all-comprehensive, *ghana*, rich, *pūrṇa*, full with a subjective intensity that transcends thought. The word 'ghana' signifies only the exclusion of any internal difference. See also Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛh. Up.* passage: II, 4, 11 and II. 4. 12.

48. *V.S.* II. iii. 43.

language, sublimated. We have a position here akin to the position of Bradley and Joachim outlined earlier in these pages.

But neither our experience acquired through the senses nor the authoritative scripture is in support of the position of identity-in-difference. To assert identity-in-difference between the soul and Reality needs the perception of both. But one perceives neither. Scripture, (which is verbal testimony), too, is unavailing; for, when difference is not first established, there cannot be an understanding of the connection of the words expressing the sense of 'the world', and "Reality" and the senses themselves, and there can be thus no understanding of the direct import of the words (*vākyārthajñāna*) so as to enable us to say "This is different from that".[49] And this difference is not established by any other source of knowledge. If it were, then, it will not be the purport of the scripture. Scripture has purport only in what is not established by the other *pramāṇas*.[50] And it is not established by the senses, as was already pointed out. Thus the scripture, too, teaches only the oneness of the soul and Brahman, and not their identity and difference. In fact, it denies difference and establishes oneness.

If this is the case with the individual soul, the same is the case with reference to the world also. Sense-perception is no use in establishing any difference between the world and Brahman, as Brahman is not an object of knowledge. Granting that difference is presented between the world and Brahman, it can no more be the purport of the scripture, on the principle that the scripture is useful in subjects not established by other sources of knowledge. Hence non-difference or identity can alone constitute the purport of the scripture. The scripture does not declare differencelessness taking cognisance of difference earlier established. It is not as though the knowledge of taste arises without any conflict with the earlier knowledge of colour

49. asiddhe tu tadbhede - nyatas - tadvācakapadayos tābhyāṁ sambandhāgrahāt ayam asmād bhinno-bhinnaśceti vākyārthajñānānupapatteḥ - *I.S.*, p. 242

50. aprāpte hi śāstram arthavat - *I. S.*, p. 242.

or form. It denies difference altogether.[51] So, difference and non-difference cannot be the two aspects in Brahman, as taste and colour are in an object of sense.

A little dialectic[52] will show that, leaving Brahman alone, even the perceptible entities do not show up difference among themselves. Perception is no proof for plurality. Difference demands a correlate and a counter-correlate. Now, when difference is not first established, the counter-correlate is not established. But unless the counter-correlate is established difference cannot be established. Thus, there is mutual dependence.[53] Even when difference among the things is established, the difference between the knower and the sources of knowledge, *jñātṛmānādibheda*, is not established by perception. So, the difference of objects is not perceptible, and the clay is not different from the pot. The example of the clay and the pot, quoted by the *bhedābhedavādin*, therefore, is not for *bhedābheda*, but can only illustrate *abheda*. The *vācārambhaṇaśruti*[54] declares the same.

Moreover, those who assert identity-in-difference between Brahman and the individual soul must be able to tell us what, according to them, the essential nature, *svarūpa*, of the soul and of Brahman is. Is it consciousness, or inertness, or both, or is only one of them of the nature of consciousness? If the first, whence the difference between Brahman and the soul? Their nature is identical. If the second, the cognisership, being of the nature of Self, having desire for release etc., will have to be denied of the soul. Omniscience and all-creatorship will have to be denied of Brahman. If the third, there cannot be in the

---

51. sakalabhedaniṣedhenaiva abhedaṁ bhodhayati - *J.V., I.S*, p. 558
The scripture, too, declares: *nehanānāsti kiṁcana.*

52. *Vide* Chapter on "*Dialectic of Difference*".

53. asiddhe bhede pratiyogyasiddheḥ taṁ vinā bhedānavagateḥ - *I.S.*, p. 244
This is the pithiest summary of the elaborate dialectic of defference found in Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* in the *Tarkakāṇḍa*. Advaitins like Ānandabodha, (who was a disciple of Vimuktātman), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, and Citsukha have revelled in this dialectics.

54. *Chānd. Up.* VI. 1.4

nature of consciousness the aspect of inertness and *vice versa*. For example, in the pot there is no aspect of seership. Nor is there the aspect of pot in the seer. If the fourth, then, as one of them only is consciousness, there cannot be the relation of whole and aspects.

Again, the *saprapañcavādin* must tell us whether the world of things and souls is known by Brahman or not. If the first, then, since there is difference between the knower and known, the world can no more be said to be the aspect of Brahman. When a person knows a pot, the pot cannot be an aspect of the person. If the souls are known by Brahman, they become the objects of knowledge like pot etc. And release and desire for release become impossible. Then one should say that bondage and release are only for Brahman.[55] If the second alternative, then, the world of things and souls can never be established. There is detriment to the omniscience of Brahman also.

Or, it can be asked: is Brahman known by the souls or not? If the first, omniscience for Brahman is surrendered. The soul, too, becomes different from Brahman. If both the soul and Brahman are known, one cannot be said to know the other and there can be no self-luminosity and self-knowledge. Thus, a being other than themselves (*i.e.*, the souls), knowing them and remaining itself unknown, must be recognised. That alone will be the Self and Reality. That it is not a matter for knowledge is borne out by the scripture: "Who knows it not, knows it"[56] Since it is the knower of all, no one knows Brahman. Or, there is nothing other than Brahman; it is all; it knows all.[57] This omniscience of Brahman will never be established on the view of the *saprapañcavādin*, who desires to establish it. If Brahman and the world are one, if the world of many is taken into Brahman, as it were, the omniscience of Brahman is difficult to maintain. For when the world and Brahman are identical, the distinction of the knower and the known cannot be maintained.

---

55. brahmaṇa eva bandhamokṣau na vā kasyacit - *I.S.* p. 245
56. yasyāmataṁ tasya matam. *Kenopaniṣad*, I. 2.3
57. sarvajñascāsau jñaśca iti vā sarvajñaḥ, tadanya = vastvabhāvāt - *I.S* p. 246

Again: if all this world is Brahman, is Brahman a knowable only? Or only the knower? Or is it both the knower and the known? Or is it something including both and yet neither of them exclusively?[58] Not the first; if Brahman is knowable, then no knowership is there. Not the second; if Brahman is the knower, it is not known. Not the third; if Brahman were both, then really there will be two Brahmans, one knowing the other. Not even the fourth; if Brahman is both and yet one standing above the pair, it is neither the known nor the knower.[59]

Such are the difficulties and inconsistencies in supposing that the world and Brahman could be somehow accommodated into each other or reduced to each other.

6

The Empirical Reality

The world, according to Advaita, is the projection of *māyā* which is the root of all diversified existence. That is to say, *māyā* is the primordial cause, *mūlaprakṛti* of the world-process. It is also called *avidyā*.[60] It is this that brings about a super-imposition of the many on the one. It is not that Brahman and *māyā* are independently the material causes. Bharatītīrtha Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* analyses three possibilities. (1) Just as two strands conjoined together make a rope, Brahman and *māyā* are the material cause of the world. The elements of

---

58. *I. S.* II., 80 and 81.

59. brahmaikam ubhayaṁ taccet na tadvedyaṁ na veditṛ - *I.S.*, II. 81

60. māyeti sadasattvābhyāṁ anirvacanīyā avidyā ucyate - *I.S.*, p. 35

Māyā does not stand for the sense of *prajñā* because its removal is declared by the scripture. Even admitting that it has *prajñārtha*, it cannot be the *prajñā* or consciousness as of the nature of Brahman - consciousness. It can be only the empirical *buddhi*. Where it is used in connection with *buddhi*, *manas* etc., it is not used in the sense of Brahman - consciousness. Scripture declares significantly:

"*māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram*" separately. His *māyā* is the *śakti* which is the direct material cause. The verse states:

mano mahān matir brahmā pūrbhuddhiḥ khyātiriśvaraḥ.
māyā prajñā tathā dhiśca smṛtiśca paripaṭyate - *J.V.*, *I.S.* p. 499

reality and consciousness in the world are caused by reality. The elements of inertness and change are caused by *māyā*. (2) *Māyā*, as the potency of Brahman, is the material cause. (3) Brahman is the substrate of *māyā*. So, material causality, though it directly belongs to *māyā* alone, cannot be avoided for Brahman.[61] In all these three views, Brahman is only the substrate and is never directly the cause of the world, in any ordinary sense of the word 'cause' that science is used to. Advaita is wedded to the

---

61. *Philosophy of Advaita*, T. M. P. Mahadevan, p. 213. layabhūmitvāt upādānameva na nimitta...ātmavidyayorubhayórapi upādānatvād advitiyatvabhaṅga ity āha *śaktiriti*. ātmādhiṣṭhānatvāt na tasyāḥ pṛthaksattā - *J.V.*, *I.S.*, 409

The author of the *Saṁkṣepaśāriraka* holds that pure Brahman is the material cause. The Vivaraṇakāra thinks that Iśvara is the material cause. sarvajñatvādi viśiṣṭam māyāśabalam iśvararūpameva brahma upādānam. Cp *S.B.* I. 1.20, and I. 2.1. When material causality is denied in *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, only material causality of *māyā* associated with Iśvara is denied; and not of Iśvara Himself. sabalopādānatva - nirākaraṇatvamapi māyā - viśiṣṭopādānatva - nirākaraṇatvābhiprāyam. *S.L.S.* p. 62. Sarvajñātman holds that Māyā is subsidiary, though not the cause, and is yet present in the effect, just as the softness of the clay is present in the pot as the clay itself: māyādvārā brahmaṇatvaṁ kāraṇatvaṁ vaktavyam iti na vyarthā māyā, *S L S.* p. 76. The text: *māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt*, is intelligible even when taken as to signify *māyā* as *nirvāhaka* of the *prakṛtitva* of Brahman.

māyāyāḥ prakṛtitva - nirvāhaka - mātram; na svataḥ prakṛtitvamasti. Vācaspati Miśra observes that the world is the transfiguration of Brahman that is the content of *māyā* which is superimposed on Brahman. cidadhyasta - māyā - viṣayīkṛtabrahmavivartatva - mātra - aṅgīkāropapatteḥ prapañcasya.

When one says: 'pot exists', the material causality of Brahman is meant. When one says: 'pot is inert', material causality of *māyā* is meant. *san ghaṭaḥ*, *jaḍo ghaṭaḥ* ity sāmānādhikaraṇyānubhavāt. The scriptural authority for this are the statements like: "sadeva somya idam agrāsīt"; "tad etat jaḍaṁ mohātmakam" etc. The author of *Padārthatattva - nirṇaya* holds that both Brahman and *māyā* are material causes. So both the texts are intelligible; both the attributes, reality and inertness, are intelligible. As in the case of "Rāhu's head", where the distinction of head is made, in Brahman reality can be spoken of as an attribute. In the case of Brahman, the world is illusory manifestation. In the case of *māyā*, it is material transformation.

theory of *Vivarta* or appearance of the world in a substrate. Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi* brings out the causality of Brahman for the world by a striking illustration of the picture on the canvas. The picture is the variegated world.[62] It is based on the One. This is like saying that darkness is based on light, cold on fire. It is to this perplexing difficulty that the image of the world as based on Brahman points.[63] The world is a picture because, like the picture, it does not exist apart from its substrate. The world is not merely a *citra* or picture, but a *māyā-citra*, because unlike the case of the picture where, though the picture is inseparable from the canvas, the material cause, *viz.*, the colour, of the picture is separate from the canvas, here the material cause of the world-picture is not separate from the substrate of the world, *viz.*, Brahman. *Māyā* is neither separate nor one with Brahman. That is why it is said to be inexplicable.[64]

The canvas is not directly the material cause of the picture; nor is the picture natural to it; nor is it a state, *avasthā*, of the canvas, as the pot is of the clay; nor is it an attribute, as red colour is of the mango. The coming into being of the picture is not the coming into being of the canvas, since the canvas exists even prior to the picture. Without the canvas, there can be no picture on it. But without the picture, there can still be the canvas.[65] Thus, Brahman is the substrate of the world and the world cannot be said to be either a modification or an attribute of Brahman. While the world depends upon Brahman for its existence Brahman exists in its own right. This unique relation of the world to Brahman is described as caused by *māyā*, which is itself as *indeterminable*, *anirvacanīyā*, as real or unreal, as the world that is the product. The effect partakes of the nature of the cause.[66]

---

62. citraṁ vicitraṁ nānārūpam. *I S.*, p. 35

63. dṛśyam anubhūtyāśryam iti tasya dausthyaṁ prakaṭayati - *ibid.*

64. māyā hy anubhūteḥ pṛthaktvāpṛthaktvābhyām anirvacaniyā - *I.S.*, p. 36

65. *I. S.*, p. 37

66. kāryānurūpatvāt kāraṇasya - *I. S.*, p. 185

The 'how' and 'why' of the world is a mystery and yet it is there. The many are perceived while Reality is one. The experience of plurality is a superimposition on the one. This superimposition is the work of *māyā* that is beginningless and natural. *Avidyā*, *māyā* and *ajñāna* are synonymous and are[67] the material cause of the world. The Reality is one. Yet it is wonderful and mysterious that there is the presentation of many in it. This is the sense of *māyā*.[68] The superimposition of the notself on the Self is removable by right knowledge. Hence it is called *avidyā* or nescience.[69]

The inexplicability of *māyā* and its product, the world, is declared repeatedly by the scripture by such statements as "*neha nānāsti kiṁcana*," "*mṛtyossa mṛtyum āpnoti, ya iha nāneva paśyati*". These statements declare the absolute negation of plurality and difference, not in the way in which, for example, the pot, which exists elsewhere, is denied on a particular spot on the ground. It is not as though difference real elsewhere is denied in Brahman. Difference is denied in the very place and time at which it is observed, as silver is denied in the shell in the very place of its appearance.[70] The world that is the effect is denied in its cause, Brahman. The effect does not exist apart from the cause, and is manifested by the luminosity and reality of the cause. The world-effect, *kāryaprapañca*, is not existent in Brahman. If the world of many is a *kārya*, an effect of Brahman, it is not real apart from Brahman. If it is not a *kārya*, it can

---

67. māyāvidyādiśabdairyā
śrutiṣu smṛtisūditā
sā jagatprakṛtirmāyā
yato māyāmayā bhramāḥ. *I.S.*, I. 34

68. ekarūpe vastuni nānāvidha vicitrābhāsana caturatām āha māyeti - *J. V., I. S*, p. 498

69. ātmanā saha sthitatvepi abhivyaktātmanā nivṛttiyogyatām āha avidyeti-*ibid.*
Avidyā is described as laya, śākti, supti, mahāsupti nidrā, akṣara and ākāśa. See *J.V., I.S.*, p. 499

70. tatraiva avidyopasthāpitaṁ nedaṁ rajatam itivat - *I. S.*, p. 145
Cp : pratipannopādhau traikālika - niṣedha - pratiyogitvaṁ mithyātvam.

never be denied because it will be Brahman Itself which is the only non-effect.[71]

The world-effect is neither different, nor identical, nor different-*cum*-non-different from Brahman. If the world-effect is different from the cause *i.e.*, Brahman, then, Brahman itself will be an effect according to the principle "*yāvadvikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat*"[72] (wherever there are effects, there is division as in ordinary life). Nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided and *vice versa*. For instance, one apprehends ether as divided from earth. Hence ether is an effect.[73] By the same principle, if Brahman is different from the world it will become an effect and a perishable. For another reason also, Brahman cannot be different from the world. In case of difference, there will be no more the cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world, as between any two effects. Nor can the world be non-different from Brahman. Otherwise, the difference that characterises the world will characterise Brahman also. Nor is there difference-*cum*-non-difference between Brahman and the world. Because in the aspect of oneness, *abhinnatva*, there is the contingence of Brahman losing his Brahmanhood, as has been already stated. Or, there will be no difference even in the world-effect as in Brahman. If there were no difference in it is will be Brahman itself.[74] Again, if the world is non-different from Brahman, it will not have birth and death like Brahman itself; or else, Brahman, too, will be having birth and death. If the world were not non-different from Brahman, there will be unintelligibility of the scriptural texts like "*brahmaivedam*

---

71. brahmaiveti tannaiva niṣedhyam. *I.S.*, p. 146

72. Brahma-sūtra, II. iii. 7

73. Śaṅkara's *Com. ibid.*

74. Madhusūdana in his *Advaitasiddhi* answering those who aver that the reality of the world is the same as that of Brahman remarks to them: "You have heard of the bridegroom who, when at the time of marriage, being questioned by his father-in-law as to his *gotra* replied that his *gotra* was the same as that of his father-in-law. You are the true brother of that bridegroom." If the bridegroom and the father-in-law had the same *gotra*, there could be no marriage at all.

amṛam", "All this is Brahman, immortal", "*ātmaivedam*", "All this is the self".

7

Degrees of Truth and Reality

The Advaitins distinguish three degrees of Reality: (1) the illusory (2) the empirical and (3) the truly real. To this position, there may be objection as follows: If the distinction of the degrees of reality is ultimately valid, there will be the abandonment of the fundamental doctrine of *advaita*; if, on the contrary, it is more imaginary than real, then the distinction itself loses all significance.

But to those who accept nothing except Brahman as real, this dilemma does not pose a serious problem. Nor is the distinction of degrees of reality endangered thereby. For, the Advaitin states only the empirical reality (*vyāvahārikatva*) and not absolute truth (*tāttvikatva*) for these degrees. Absolute Reality is determined by non-sublatedness, which is not possessed by the distinction into degrees. And to be sure, sublatedness itself is not an independently real category as nothing apart from Brahman could be real. Accepting the distinction of degrees of truth will not militate against the theory that Brahman alone is real for the reason that distinction is only empirical.

Again, it has to be made clear whether by this distinction of degrees it is meant that (1) the absolutely real alone is real in the strict sense of the term, and the other two distinctions, *viz*, the empirical and the apparent, are really distinct from real and appear in knowledge as though they are real, the distinction between the latter two being made on the basis of comparative endurance, or (2) these two are the distinctions within Reality itself.

Not the first; for in Advaita, there could be no knowledge of silver when there is no silver; and similarly, when those experiences, *viz*., empirical and the apparent, have no reality, they could not be known as real. If these two kinds of

experience do not have any reality whatsoever, then there will be no question of their being spoken about. If the empirical is of the same order as the apparent, then, considerations like practical efficiency and the utterance of the scripture with regard to distinctions between the two will become unreasonable. The empirical life and the scriptural utterances alike will become delusive like a dream.

Not the second; for there will then be no distinction between them as that which is superimposed and that which is not. If, on the other hand, the empirical has a nature that is not illusory like that of a dream-object, that is surely acceptable to the Dualist, but not to the Non-dualist.

This difficulty is not a serious one because only the second alternative is accepted by the Advaitin. The quality of non-sublatability is common both to that which is superimposed and that which is not superimposed, *at the time in which they respectively take place*. They cause suitable activity towards them at the time of their presentation, though the superimposed presentation *is sublated* at a later time. The silver that is merely apparent, *prātibhāsika*, is manifested by the Witness-Intelligence and not known through any source of knowledge. The empirical silver is known through a *pramāṇa* and fulfils certain expectations. Though in both the cases the word 'silver' is used, the apparent silver is merely manifested by the Witness and not known through a *pramāṇa*, since it it solely a product of nescience pertaining to shell. The empirical silver also is called 'silver' but with a different status, *viz.*, it is known, having remained unknown, through a *pramāṇa*. The 'silverness' common to an illusory manifestation and real object of knowledge is the meaning of the word 'silver'. In cases like ether also, similarly, there are both the reality as in its illusory manifestation and its non-superimposed real existence in consciousness *qua* consciousness and another common to both these which is empirical. The term 'reality' here has thus three meanings.

Though the empirical world is real, yet there is no distinction for it as non-superimposed. That is, its reality is derivative

from the Real. Since there is so much as this derivative reality, it is possible to speak of its origination etc. For the utterly unreal, no such origination could be thought of.

It may be asked: The Advaitin holds that both the empirical and the apparent are sublatable. Then how is a distinction between them maintained? Is it on the basis of the distinction of *māyā* and *avidyā?* Can't be, for *māyā* and *avidya* are synonymous. Either of the empirical and the apparent will partake of both *māyā* and *avidyā*. Practical efficiency cannot be the basis for the distinction, for even water in dream has the practical efficiency of quenching the thirst. Nor can the distinction be maintained on the ground that the empirical is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman while the merely apparent is sublated by empirical knowledge, for, even according to Advaitin's own contention, the apparent silver is sublated by the Brahman-knowledge conditioned by shell; and the distinction will be too wide as it will extend to the sublation of the notion that Brahman is momentary by the knowledge that it is not so. Nor can the distinction be made on the basis of sublatability by true Brahman-knowledge and another true knowledge different from it, for in Advaita Brahman-knowledge alone is true. Nor can the distinction be made on the basis of something being true sublated by the true knowledge and another being illusory sublated by empirical knowledge, as such an illusory knowledge may be present even in case of Brahman as "Brahman is unreal". Nor can the distinction be that the empirical is sublated by the knowledge of the truly real while the apparent is sublated by the knowledge of the empirical, because of mutual dependence as the knowledge of the one can be determined only by the knowledge of the other. That is, the truly real can be so determined only with reference to the empirical and *vice versa*. Nor again can the distinction be made on the ground that the empirical has a content different from that of the apparent and *vice versa*; this distinction is precisely the thing that is sought to be determined in vain. On all these counts, the thesis of degrees of reality cannot be maintained, says the critic.

The defence of the Advaitin is as follows: the distinction is tenable on the grounds: (1) The empirical is sublatable by the unitive knowledge while the apparent is sublatable by the discursive empirical knowledge. (2) If it is protested that in recognitions like "This is that Devadatta" there is unitive knowledge but that it is empirical knowledge, then it can be formulated thus: the empirical is sublatable by the knowledge of Pure Brahman while the apparent is sublatable by other kinds of knowledge. (3) If it is objected that Pure Brahman cannot be a content of any knowledge, since it is knowledge itself, the distinction can be formulated in a third way. The empirical is sublatable by the knowledge born out of the understanding of the *mahāvākyas* and the apparent is sublatable by other kinds of knowledge. (4) If it is further objected that the verbal statement like a *mahāvākya* cannot give rise to immediate intuition but only through the intensity of mental meditation (and this according to the *Bhāmati* school), the distinction can be formulated in a fourth way. The empirical differs from the apparent because it is sublatable by a final mental intuition which then annihilates itself, having nothing to know while the apparent is sublatable by mere mental knowledge. The *sattā traividhya* is thus reasonable.

Thus, the world is only indeterminable and no positive relation could be spoken of between Brahman and the world. There are scriptural texts also declaring the illusory character of the world divided by differences. The texts like "*yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati taditara itaraṁ paśyati*", teach that difference is perceived only in the realm of nescience.[75] The texts like "*yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tatkena kaṁ paśyet*", speak of the negation of difference on the arrival of right knowledge.

8

All changes are phenomenal

The changes that one perceives in the world are only phenomenal and not real. There is in reality no change or

75. The term '*iva*' in "*ya iha nāneva paśyati*" denotes only that the manyness of the world, *nānātva*, is illusory like the silver in illusion. It does not

modification or destruction. For an object that continues to be what it is, change is impossible. It is impossible even for the object which has already become otherwise, or that which already is otherwise, for this involves infinite regress.[76] Nor can there be any change for that which is no more. Only for the existent, any change can be intelligibly spoken of, not for the non-existent. And the existent cannot change because it is existent.

9

What is illusoriness?

Five definitions are offered by the Advaitin for illusoriness:

1. That which is declared illusory is different from both the real and the unreal. That which is not contradicted is real and that which does not at all appear in any experience is unreal. The illusory something is different from both. Those who hold that either a thing is real or unreal will obviously take exception to this definition. They will base themselves strictly on the Law of Excluded Middle. A is either B or not-B. There is no third possibility here. Besides, Brahman in Advaita is attributeless. In other words, neither reality nor unreality can be attributed to it. But yet Brahman is said to be real. Reality is its very *nature*. Similarly, though the world may be neither real nor unreal, it may yet possess the nature of reality.

The reply to the first criticism is based on the theory that reality and unreality are not negations of each other. By definition, reality is *not sublatable in all times*. But unreality is *'not cognisable as real'*. The negation of unreality will be cognisability as real. Cognisability as real is identity with reality. The first definition of illusoriness therefore is reduced to "difference from what is unsublatable in all times together with identity with reality (i.e. cognisability as real).

---

denote a world existing there and being alluded to in comparative or exemplifying terms. *I.S*, p. 149

76. nāpyanyathābhūtasya anyathābhavato vā anyathābhāvaḥ, anavasthāprāpteḥ. *Ibid.*, p. 149

The second criticism is answered by saying that there can be no parity between Brahman and the world in having reality as one's own nature. The world can be said to be 'real' even in the sense of superimposed identity with the real Brahman of which it is the transfiguration. To be designated as real in usage, reality in the true sense of the term is not necessary.

2. To be declared illusory, the object must be the counter-correlate of negation in all the three times in the place where it appears. (*pratipanno-pādhau traikālika-niṣedha-pratiyogitvam*). We do admit the negation of things where they appear. For example, the pot, though it appears in clay, does not exist in the clay. The cloth, though it appears in the threads, does not exist there. That they cannot exist anywhere else than in their own material causes is plain. Thus, they cannot be said to exist anywhere, and so are illusory like the shell-silver.

The difficulties in this position arise with reference to the nature of negation. Is this negation of the things of the world 1. real in the true sense of the term or 2. phenomenal or 3. empirical (*vyāvahārika*)? If the first, negation will be a reality additional to Brahman, much to the detriment to the concept of Advaita. If the second, as such a negation is quite consistent with the reality of the world, it need not be reckoned with. Nor the third, for empirically existence and negation cannot coincide. If they do, the opposition between positive elements and their negation will disappear and where is the question of negation at all?

Of these, the first alternative seems to be acceptable to the Advaitin, though the acceptance does not mean the acceptance of dual realities, for the reason that negation does not stand separate from Brahman. Otherwise, it will cease to be negation. The Advaitin holds that negation is not an independent category but is identical with its substrate. Thus, after negation Brahman alone exists.

Negation is also taken to be empirical. But it is the negation of the world as it is the result of investigation (*anumāna*) and *śruti* which is superior to perception in authority.

The negation of the world can be expressed in two ways here, It can be said that the universe is negated in Brahman as universe, that is, in its own nature. Or it can be said that the universe does not exist in Brahman *in reality*, from the *pāramārthika* point of view. And the negation of the world does not make it the same as *tuccha* or *asat* because *tuccha* cannot even be denied since it does not appear in experience. The denial of the world presupposes its presentation.

3. Illusoriness is equivalent to being destructible by knowledge (*jñāna-nivartyatvam*). The shell-silver is cancelled by the knowledge of the shell which is its substrate. Similarly, the world-illusion is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman which is its substrate.

The objection to this is that a knowledge that is cancelled by another knowledge need not be unreal. For instance, the latent impressions (*saṁskāras*) are destroyed by the respective recollections and yet the impressions are real. Similarly, it cannot be said that the world is an illusion since it is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman.

In answer to this it is to be said that by destruction is meant here not the non-existence or the last condition of an object, for, even a pot when it is destroyed cannot be said to become non-existent. It is there reduced to a different form. But the same cannot be said about the destruction of the illusory silver. When the shell is known for what it is, the illusory silver *is* destroyed totally and irretrievably. The shell remains but it is not a different form of the silver. The silver is once and for all gone. Similarly when knowledge of Brahman dawns, the world-illusion disappears and cannot be brought about again in any manner. This is what is meant by 'destruction' in the definition. The illusory object is that which is removed by knowledge in all its possible conditions and states. An object

can be gross or latent. By other means of destruction, only the gross form of the object can be destroyed. The gross form of the pot is destroyed with a pestle. But the latent form may remain. Similarly, in knowledge, by the second superseding cognition only the gross form of the first cognition is lost but not its latent state. Hence the definition of illusoriness will not apply to real things. By Brahman-knowledge, however, the objects of the world are removed in entirety, both in the gross and subtle states.

4. The fourth definition of illusoriness offered by the Advaitin is practically the same as the first one.

5. The fifth one is "difference from the real" (*sad-viviktatvam*). The "real" is that which is the object of valid knowledge. Brahman alone is the object of valid knowledge; the other things are objects only of errors. The implication of the *Muṇḍaka* text, the knower of Brahman is freed from name and form (i.e. the world), is that the right knowledge is that of Brahman alone and all the other cognitions are, like that of illusory silver, erroneous because of having as their objects the projections of *avidyā*. This is the meaning of the statement that what is different from the object of valid knowledge is illusory.

To avoid overpervasion in respect of Brahman on one hand and the non-existent on the other, we have to add in the definition: "being the object of the knowledge as *sat*." Being attributeless, Brahman cannot be known as *sat*, let alone the *asaṭ*. This definition is according to the view of Vācaspati.

Similarly, destruction, too, cannot be for the existent or the non-existent. It is seen, therefore, that all changes are illusory.[77]

77. This point of the discussion *viz.*, impossibility of change, is discussed in the chapter, *Refutation of Anyathākhyāti*, in this thesis.

10

The Empirical has an Order

The creation is an articulation of *māyā*. The world-process contains the seeds of change in it, origination and destruction, the pulsation of light and darkness. But the changes are not capricious or arbitrary. There is an inherent order or harmony, a method and a meaning in the temporal sequences of events. The world has its first principles. If gold or clay is understood truly, if the 'flower in the crannied wall" could be understood "all in all", one can understand God, man and the universe. If the first principle is understood, everything else following from it is understood.[78] The world is of the nature of the unreal not because it is a chaos. Confusion is the last thing to be said about the structure of the world. The wonderfully harmonious structure of the world and the laws that it obeys must be traced to the single cause from which it takes its birth. The world is an integrated whole because all that happens therein is the offshoot of the same cause. "Things not only are together, but belong together". Nothing that happens here has an independent existence; it is a unit bound to other units in inseparable inter-relation. One speaks of the world-events as

78. ekavijñānena sarva-vijñānāpekṣaṇam. *S B.* I. 2.21

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says: "kasminnu bhagavo vijñāte sarvam idaṁ vijñataṁ bhavati. I. 1 3. Vimuktātman interprets the declaration, "when Ātman is known, everything is known" as follows: The meaning is that the unknownness of the phenomenal plurality of things relates only to indeterminable nescience, and is consumed without vestige by the knowledge of Ātman. In the case of pot being known, for example, there are things other than pot which remain to be known. But when Ātman is known, there is nothing else to be known, nescience being destroyed as a whole. Just as a person advised to know the hundred elephants running about in a small enclosure says: "I have known", so is the case here. Or alternatively "When Ātman is known everything is known" may be taken to mean that with the knowledge of Ātman, everything becomes Ātman". Just as people say: "All that water in the lotus-pond and that army has become that place itself when that place is seen" even so when nescience and its products are destroyed by knowledge, Ātman alone remains like the place in the saying. See *I.S.* pp. 370-1.

causally intertwined. By this, it is commonly meant that every event has its own cause. This is not perfectly true. Really, there is only one cause and all else is its effect. Between events A and B or C and D, neither is the cause of the other because A, B, C and D, all of them, lock, stock and barrel, are the effects of the same cause, *viz.*, the primordial *māyā* or the *mūlaprakṛti*.[79]

World Based on Intelligence

Again, if the *mūlaprakṛti* itself could develop in automatic evolution uninspired by the motivating force of an Intelligence, the Sāṅkhya account of the world-development would be much more satisfactory than that of Advaita. But Śaṅkara has adduced reasons for the conclusion that a mere insentient cannot evolve of itself[80] and cannot be the highest goal of a human aspiration-*viz.*, Eternal Bliss.

The state of oneness with reality is release.[81] The Śāstras declare with regard to this release, which is of the nature of Bliss, that where there lingers the consciousness of difference there is fear, and that where there is no such consciousness, there is no fear, (which is release). Such fearlessness as the goal is intelligible only when one supposes that Reality is of the nature of Bliss and not when Prakṛti is the Reality. The same is declared by the *Taittiriyopaniṣad* as follows: "All this, indeed, are born from Bliss; they are sustained in Bliss. They dissolve in Bliss."[82] The *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, commencing with the description of the Lord as omniscient, goes on to say: He is the lord of the Jiva; He is not produced by anything else. He has

---

79. ekasyaiva nityasya kāraṇasya anekāni kāryāni kramabāvini. *I.S.*, p. 54 This point is more elaborately discussed in the chapter on "*Ajñāna*" in this thesis.

80. *S.B.* I. 1.3. As *māyā* is the *śakti* of Brahman, Brahman is ultimately the cause.

81. asminnasya ca tadyogaṁśāsti. *V.S.* I. 1.19. tadātmanā yogas tadyogaḥ, tadbhāvāpattiḥ muktir ityarthaḥ. *S.B.* I 1.19.

82. *Taitt. up.* III. 6.

no overlord".[83] The omniscient God is the cause of the world. Again: the scripture denotes only the Self by the words like "*sat*". The act of *ikṣaṇa* or seeing is attributed to that *sat* or the Real in the scripture.[84] It begins by saying: O! Somya! At the beginning all this was only the secondless and single Reality", and goes on to say: "That contemplated "I will become many" and created the energy, *tejas*".[85] The *Aitareyopaniṣad* says: "This (world) was one Self only at the beginning. There was nothing else. That Self contemplated: "Let me create the world". That Self created all these worlds".[86] *Muṇḍaka upaniṣad* proclaims: "That which is the knower of everything, the austerity of which is of the nature of knowledge, from that Brahman, name, form and objects of enjoyment come forth".[87] Thus, all the scriptures declare that it is the omniscient Brahman that is the origin of the world and not the *pradhāna* or matter of the Sāṅkhyas. The *Svetāśvatara* puts it: Know this māyā to be Prakṛti and the Maheśvara the wielder of *māyā*.[88]

Nor can it be said that the world came into being on its own accord by natural causes. For, it is common experience that whatever is an effect must have been produced by a cause. The world must have a cause since it is accepted that it must have had a beginning. If the world developed or evolved on its own accord, it means only that it is its own cause or it does not depend upon a cause at all. Consequently, the world is both the cause and the effect. This is *prima facie* absurd. The world is observed to consist of events and effects which are produced by widely varied causes depending upon the place, time and the instrumental cause. So it is clear that there must be a cause for the world which is other than itself.[89]

---

83. sa karaṇādhipādhipo na cāsya kaścijjanitā na cādhipaḥ. *Śveta. up.* VI. 9.
84. ikṣaternāśabdam. *V.S.* I. 1.5
85. sadeva somya idam agra āsit ekamevādvitīyam. *Chān. up.* VI. 2.1.
tadaikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeyeti tattejo' sṛjata. *Ibid.* VI. 2.3.
86. *Ait. up.* I. 1.1.
87. I. 1.9
88. māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt, māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram.
89. *S.B.* I. 1.2.

Śaṅkara also seems to think that since there is the presence of *cetana*, conscious beings, in the world, only a *cetana* could be the cause of the world, even admitting that the inert *prakṛti* or primordial matter is the cause of the things that are inert in the world. But, mainly his argument is that, even taking instances from the world,[90] that which is inert and does not have an intelligent being as substrate is not seen to have capacity to produce the variety of experiences like pleasure and pain for a living being. The home, the bed, the seat, the playground and things like these that are created for pleasure according to the changes in climate etc., are only seen to have been produced by intelligent and imaginative architects. How much more ingenious and imaginative this world is with all its wonders and mysteries, colossal designs and perfect orderliness!

The inert *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas cannot be the cause of the world without being based on the Intelligence, that is Brahman.[91] The orderliness or *racana* of the world is unintelligible without the presence of Intelligence in it.[92] This Intelligence is Brahman which is omniscient, omnipotent and has *mahāmāyā* as its *śakti*.[93] There are scriptural declarations which make this aspect of the matter clear. The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* says: Everything is his function; everything is his desire; everything is his fragrance; everything is his quintessence. He has all this. He has no need for senses. He has no attachments."[94] The

90. Śaṅkara holds that ultimately scripture alone is the guide to Reality and not the logical reasoning based on empirical data.

yadyapi idaṁ vedāntavākyānāmaidamparyaṁ nirūpayituṁ śāstraṁ pravṛttaṁ na tarkaśāstravat kevalābhir yuktibhiḥ kaṁcit siddhantaṁ sādhayituṁ dūṣayituṁ vā pravṛttam. *S.B.* II. 2.1

But to meet the opponents on their own ground, he weilds the weapon of logic.

91. pradhānasyāpi cetanāntarādhiṣṭhitātatvaprasaṅgaḥ – *S.B.* II. 2 1. The ultimate atoms of the Tārkikas, too, share the same criticism of not being fit to be the cause of the world, while the scripture declares Iśvara to be the cause. *S.B* II. 2. 11 to 17.

92. racanāupapatteśca nānumānam. *V S.* II. 2 1

93. sarvajñaṁ sarvaśakti mahāmāyāṁ ca brahma.

94. IJJ. 14.4.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka puts it: "O! Gārgi! On the behest of this *akṣara* (Brahman) the sun and the moon are established (in their courses)."[95]

The omniscience for Brahman is declared because Brahman makes manifest the potentialities of the seed of name and form that are of the nature of nescience.[96] This capacity of Brahman is called *māyāśakti* or *prakṛti* by the scripture and the traditional codes. *māyāśaktiḥ prakṛtiriti ca śrutismṛtyorabhilapyete.*[97] "He who makes one seed into many"[98] says the *Upaniṣad.* The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declares: "He is the Lord of all; He is the Lord of all the Elements; He is the wall preventing chaos of the worlds".[99] The *Bhagavadgītā* puts it: "The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings. He rules by his *māyā* all the creatures who are held on a machine, as it were".[100]

Brahman with the condition of nescience at his call is the controller and organiser of the world, the *niyantā*. The great world of *prakṛti*, the product of his *māyā*, is his charge. He is the indwelling order and harmony of the world.[101] There is not only physical order, but an irrevocable moral order, where the Lord, too, cannot interfere in the natural results of good and bad deeds.[102] The Lord creates in dependence on the merit and demerit of the creatures.[103]

---

95. etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane gārgi sūryācandramasau vidhṛtau tiṣṭataḥ III. 8.9
sarvobhedā ca taddarśanāt – *V.S.* II. 1.30

96. avidyātmaka – nāmarūpa-bijavyākaraṇāpekṣatvāt sarvajñatvasya. *S.B.* II. 1.14

97. *S B.* II. 1.14

98. *Śveta. up.* VI. 12

99. eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatireṣa bhūtapāla eṣa seturvidharaṇa eṣāṁ lokānām asaṁbhedāya. IV. 4.22.

100. XVIII, 61

101. avidyākṛta-nāmarūpopādhyanurodhiśvaro bhavati. *S.B.* II. 1. 14

102. deva – manuṣyādivaiṣamye tu tattajjīvagatānyeva asādhāraṇāni karmāṇi bhavanti. *S B* II: 1.34
Bṛhadāraṇyaka states: puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpena. (II, 2. 13)

103. dharmādharmau apekṣata – *S.B.* II. 1.3

11

Truth is Reality

The world of *māyā* is the world of science, the world of apparent plurality. While the empirical world of the māyic construction has its own laws and principles of operation, the apparently various laws governing the variety of things are traceable, as has been said, to single primordial cause, *viz.*, *māyā* or *avidyā*, the locus of which is Brahman Itself. Both the changes and consistencies, uniformities amidst diversities are caused materially by *māyā* which again is informed by Intelligence that is Brahman. Thus while it is understandable that there is law, order and harmony in the world, the entire arrangement of the world of events in time and things in diversity and mutual relations conceals the Truth that is one and changeless. While Reality is differenceless, the world is constituted of many; characterised by change. To get the truth that is one, one has to transcend the many and the direct cause of the many *i.e.*, *māyā*.

The world of many, being the world that science studies, yields us *many truths*. But these are really errors in the sense that they relate to many. Characterised by change, not being capable of being proved to be either real or unreal or both,[104] our so-called truths of a world of such a nature are only make-believe and point to the truth that is one. As truth is that which has reference to that which exists and is real and as Brahman alone is real, Truth is the Real. Truth, in Advaita, therefore, is Reality. Śaṅkara says that Brahman's truth is affirmed by speaking of its existence; for it is asserted that the existing is the true.[105]

One Infinity, Truth and Reality appears to be many as the one sun is seen to be many in the reflection in the myriad particles of water, or as the same space appears divided because

---

104. Iśvarasya ātmabhūte iva avidyākalpite nāmarūpe tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīye. *S.B.* II. 1.14.

105. Com. on *Taitt. up*: II, 6, 1; also on *Chān. up*: IV, 2, 1.

of the vessel in which it is contained. And as the effect, it is not different from its cause, Brahman.'[106] It does not have a reality of its own, though in itself it has practical efficiency. Thus to stay in the many is to stay in the error. To get the truth, the empiric must be sublated by the transcendental, which is mere existence.

106. kāraṇādananyatvaṁ kāryasya. II. 1. 15 *Ibid.* See also *Bṛh. up*: I, 6, 1. Sureśvara holds that the Self associated with nescience, attaining identity with it and undifferentiated from its own reflection in the intellect is called the *antaryāmin*, the witness and the cause of the world. ajñānopahita ātmā ajñānatādātmyāpannaḥ sva–cidābhāsa–avivekād antaryāmi sākṣī jagat–kāraṇam iti'ca kathyate. *S. Bindu*, p. 26. 27.

Chapter III

KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

1

The Test of Truth

The illusion of silver in the shell is contradicted by the right perception of the shell. Similarly, the empirical world of men and things is sublated by Brahman-intuition. Silver is unreal because it is contradicted or sublated by the perception of the shell. The world of objects is unreal because it is annulled by the integral experience or Brahman-intuition. Brahman is the reality, and is the only reality, because it is never sublated by any higher experience.[1] As M. N. Sircar puts it: "The truth or falsity must be determined by a possibility or impossibility of an enduring affirmation or existence".[2] Thus the Advaitins adopt the theory of non-contradiction as the test of truth and validity. Unsublatability or uncontradictedness is declared to be the test of the truth of the various *pramāṇas* and the reality of the existent objects, *artha*.

Non-contradiction is not merely coherence, though it implies coherence also in the case of empirical perceptions and objects. As even an imperfect system of knowledge may cohere, non-contradiction allows only a tentative truth to all systems of knowledge. It points to the finitude of our knowledge and makes our conclusions provisional hypotheses, subject to correction. In Advaita, it is not merely an empirical criterion but also definition of metaphysical reality. Even the most coherent of human knowledge is, according to Advaita, subject to sublation. Ultimate

1. bādhakajñānāntarābhāvācca – *S.B.* II. 1. 14. cf. Bradley, F.H.: "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion". *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.
2. *Comparative studies in Vedantism*: p. 69. tacca samyagjñānam eka-rūpam; vastutantratvāt ekarūpena hi avasthito yo'rthaḥ sa paramārthaḥ. This is the principle of truth.

Reality is not coherent, but non-dual. When there is no second, there can be no coherence.

Non-contradiction is a negative test, for the reasons that (1) our judgements concerning the empirical objects and the illusory ones are tentative, and (2) that the ultimate Reality is not an object of any positive test at all. Śaṅkara says, commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, I, 20): The essential meaning of all the Upaniṣads is to remove all finite conceptions about Brahman. When we wish to describe the true nature of Reality, we must realise that it is an utter impossibility. Only by stating "Not this, Not this," eliminating all specifications delimiting Reality, and negating all differences in it, can one hope to indicate it. Hence it is said that Reality is such that there is no, and cannot be, another to it. To *know* the truth, in Advaita, is *to be* it. Epistemology merges into metaphysics. Truth is not an attribute of Reality to be known as such, but truth *is* Reality.[3] It is the deepest experience.

2

Sublatability of Dreams and the Waking World

Within the empirical realm of experience, a distinction is made between dream and waking experiences. The striking fact about dream (or any illusion for that matter) is the certainty, immediacy and vividness of the presentation of visions. If the criterion of non-contradiction is to be applied here, dream experiences are real so long as they are not sublated by waking experience.[4]

Dream is a dream only when contrasted with waking life.[5] As between the dream and the waking experiences, the latter is

3. Cp. Plotinus: The vision baffles the telling.....it is not to be told, not to be revealed to any that has not himself had the happiness to see it. *Enneads*: VI, XI, II.

4. jāgratviṣayāpekṣaṁ tadanṛtatvam, na svataḥ. Śaṅkara on *Chānd. up.* VIII. 5. 4.

5. "If one's dream-experience in any one dream were to be perfectly coherent with itself, and if the events of one dream were always to

taken to be more real than the former, because it is more stable and has an uncontradicted continuity. While waking life endures, dreams are rudely cut short. One may retort that it may as well be said that it is the waking life that seems to be cut short by the dream life. But it is obvious that, though interrupted by the interval of dream, waking life on resumption continues from the last thread of the experiences of the previous day while dreams have no such continuity or cogent connection among themselves, not to say anything about their private character. The waking life has a greater objective self-consistency and subjective continuity of memory.

Śaṅkara observes that the dream-state is different from the waking life for the following reasons: (1) The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. But the experiences of the waking state are never negated at any time. (2) The visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the perceptions of waking state are acts of immediate consciousness. And the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by everyone as being founded on the absence or presence of the object.[6] (3) The dream world does not have any continuity with the waking world. That is to say, it does not fulfil the conditions of place, time and cause, and the condition of non-sublation.[7] For example, one sees things like chariot and dreams that he is travelling by them. He traverses a long distance and returns in a moment. But this is impossible because a person cannot cross great distances in such a short time. Besides, there is no space in the person's body for such large distances and the roads on which the chariots move.

---

follow in an intelligible sequence on the event of the preceding dream, undoubtedly our dream life would be as real as our waking life. But these are two pretty big 'ifs'." Ritchie: *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 78. Descartes asks us not to accept anything unless it were self-evidently so. If this vividness of perception is any test of reality, then dreams are real.

6. *S.B.* II. 2. 29. Tr. by Thibaut.

7. *ibid.* III. 2. 3.

Sometimes, a person recounts his dream in which he went to some place without returning from it. He says, "Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country of the Pāñcālas, and being there I awoke". Indeed the person could not have gone to the country of Pāñcālas, for, had he done so, he would find himself in the country of the Pāñcālas on waking. But he wakes up in the country of the Kurus where he was sleeping.

Again, while a person dreams that he goes to another place, the bystanders see the body of the dreaming person lying still on the couch. Further, a dreaming person does not usually see the places, which he dreams, he visits, as they really are in their geographical contours. The scripture declares that dream takes place within the body. "He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body."[8] Again, there is conflict in time also. One person lying asleep at night dreams that it is day. A person lives during a dream, which lasts for a few minutes, through many years.

There is the unintelligibility of causation also. There are no causes for thought or action in the dream. In sleep, the sense-organs are drawn inwards; the person dreaming sees the chariot etc., though the eyes are not functioning. And, how can one produce things like chariots etc., in no time without instruments and the like?

Finally, there is the unintelligibility of endurance or persistence. Horses etc., that are seen in the chariot, are negated in the waking state. The dream itself negates what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning. What was at first considered to be a chariot turns out to be a man, the man turns out to be a tree. And, as the final arbiter, the scripture declares: "There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads" etc. So Śaṅkara concludes, dreams are delusive.[9]

---

8. *Bṛh. Up.* II. 1. 18.
9. *ibid.* Śaṅkara shows that what the dream indicates may be real, it may bring good luck and ill-luck, though the dream itself is illusion. *ibid.* III. 2. 4.

But comparison between the dreaming and the waking states is difficult to institute. Each is true in its own frame of reference.[10] Sinclair observes: "If what we at first call the illusion seems on fuller acquaintance to be so large in proportion to what we at first call real that we have difficulty in deciding which is the recalcitrant part and which is the larger whole, then we are in doubt about which is real and which is illusion.[11] Professor Clifford says: "For physical purposes, a dream is just as good as real life; the only difference is in vividness and coherence".[12] Śaṅkara expresses this fact when he says that dream and waking experiences are respectively real in their own spheres.[13] "The contrast is not between two entities, one a real thing and one an illusion but between two total situations, within each of which is a subsituation, one of these being relatively stable and is called an illusion. If the so-called illusion is found to be more stable than a so-called real thing we come to call the former

10. "The assertion that what is dreamt is less vivid and distinct than what we actually perceive is not to the point, because no one has ever been able to make a fair comparison of the two; for we can only compare the recollection of a dream with the present reality". Schopenhauer: *The World as Will and Idea*: Tr. by Haldane & Kemp: Bk. I. Sec. 5

"The unaccountable things are the conditions of the dream itself, the dream-space, the dream-time, the dream-unity of consciousness, the dream itself. No amount of unconscious cerebration can explain the facts that at one and the same time I am seen to be several other persons besides myself, while preserving my own identity in theirs; that I can penetrate into walled spaces without opening doors; that I can arrive at positions in space without occupying intermediate positions in space; that I can go through a continuous series of performances, involving an expenditure of time that may be anything between five hours and five days, or with suitable breaks, even five years; all in what proves to have been three seconds by the watch at my bedside". May Sinclair: *A Defence of Idealism*, p. 295. All this reads like a paraphrase of Śaṅkara's statements.

11. *Conditions of Knowing*: p. 211.

12. *Fortnightly Review*, 1875. p. 780. Quoted by Maxmuller in his *Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 86.

13. sarvaviṣayēpi..... satyameva svapnadṛśyaiva..... iti na kaścid virodhaḥ —*Com.* on *Chānd. up.* VIII. 5. 4.

real and the latter illusory. Real things are those illusions that are more than usually stable."[14]

Advaita Vedanta puts dream and waking experiences in the same order of relative unreality with this difference that the waking experiences are less often subject to contradiction because of having a larger public reference,[15] as has been pointed out already. As Schopenhauer observes: "To institute an enquiry according to this criterion as to whether something was dreamt or seen, would always be difficult and often impossible. For we are by no means in a position to trace link by link the causal connection, between any experienced event and the present moment, but we do not on that account explain it as dreamt..... The only sure criterion is in fact the entirely empirical one of waking, through which at any rate the causal connection between dreamed events and those of waking life, is distinctly and sensibly broken off."[16]

3

The Basis of World-Illusion

In all illusions, which are by their nature sublatable, there remains the substrate when the illusion itself has been sublated. Illusions do not occur *in vacuo*. In silver-illusion, the shell is the substrate. Similarly, the substrate of the world-appearance is Reality or Brahman. Śaṅkara declares that Brahman is the basis of all illusions, the locus of all nescience.[17] In all aberrations of visions, something is mistaken for something else. The world

14. Sinclair: *Conditions of Knowing*: p. 209.

15. kiṁ punaḥ vaidharmyaṁ, bādhābhādāv iti brūmaḥ — *S. B.* II. 2. 29.

16. *The World as Will and Idea*: Tr. by R. B. Haldane and Kemp. Bk. I. Sec. 5. "One might say that a person properly adapted to his environment is one whose dreams never end in the sort of surprise that would wake him up". Bertrand Russell: *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 65-66.

17. sarvakalpanāmūlatvāt. *S. B.* III. 2. 22. In Plato's *Theaetus*, the stranger says: "One cannot legitimately utter the words or speak or think of that which just simply is not; it is unthinkable, not to be spoken of, or uttered, or expressed". E. T. by Connford.

has a sort of reality, indeed. A mere nothing could never appear as anything. One never commits a mistake in the judgements about the son of a barren woman for the simple reason that there could be no judgement on a thing that never exists at any time.[18] The illusory snake, the illusory silver and the illusory man appear in the real rope, the real shell, and the real tree.[19] There is nowhere just emptiness of being. As Hegel could never conceive of Being without thinking of a non-being, Śaṅkara could never conceive a mere non-being without a tinge of being in it.[20] Kumārila, the Mīmāṁsaka realist, declares that even illusions and dreams have real basis. Only there things are wrongly related in time and place.

Isaac Pennington says: "All truth is a shadow except the last. But every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but a shadow in another place. And the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is the true substance."[21] All the judgements in the ultimate analysis are assertions about Reality. But assertions belong to knowledge of multiplicity. "In order to contemplate the first Being one must be raised above knowledge".[22] One should see the truth that underlies all error. All our judgements are true because Brahman is the basis of those

---

18. na hi vandhyāputro rājā babhūva prāk pūrṇavarmaṇo' bhiṣekād ityevaṁjātīyakena maryādākaraṇena nirupākhyo vandhyāputro rājā babhūva bhavati, bhaviṣyatīti vā viśeṣyate. *S. B.* II. 1. 18. See also his *Com. on Māṇḍ. Up.* VII.

19. *Com. on Māṇḍ. Up.* VII

20. G. E. Stout writes: 'Cleopolis. the capital of fairyland, was burnt down last night'. If I am told this, I reply that Cleopolis and fairyland never had any actual existence. Here I condemn both subject and predicate as illusory". *Study in Philosophy and Psychology*: p. 289. This corresponds to the 'barren woman's son 'of Śaṅkara. Bertrand Russell at one time by distinguishing 'being' from 'existence' endowed non-existent things like chimeras with a sort of 'being' for if they were non-entities, we could make no propositions about them.

21. Quoted by W. R. Inge. *Philosophy of Plotinus*: *p. x.*

22. Plotinus: *Enneads*: VI. 9. 4.

judgements. All our judgements are false because Brahman is not an object of judgement.[23]

4

Śaṅkara's Realism

The distinction that Śaṅkara makes between illusions and dreams, on the one hand, and the world of men and things given in right knowledge and waking experience on the other, underlines the epistemological realism of Śaṅkara. The world taken in itself consists of divisions of knower, known and knowledge. There is no need to doubt the testimony of the senses and the other valid means of knowledge. That there is a world of objects lying outside the knower, and capable of being known, and that objects are not created but revealed in knowledge is a doctrine that Saṅkara urges with a great deal of force and conviction. Śaṅkara observes commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, 1, 20): "you cannot prove that fire is cold or that the sun does not give heat, even by citing a hundred examples, for the facts would already be known to be otherwise through another source of knowledge." The metaphysical idealism which affirms the reality of Brahman does not have anything to do with epistemological idealism which reduces matter to mind. Both mind and matter are appearances of Brahman. But taken in themselves, they confront each other as separate independent entities.

Śaṅkara has no patience with those who say that objects are the forms of our cognitions.[24] To Śaṅkara, as to Professor John Dewey, facts of the objective world are "prior to, synchronous

---

23. John Scotus following Neo-platonic thought held that there were two ways for the finite minds to approach God. One the positive way, and the other a negative one. The affirmations like "God is good" are not wholly true, though not wholly false; not wholly true because God is more than good; not wholly false because He is good too. Everything is He though He transcends everything.

24. aviruddhaṁ tu lokaprasiddhaṁ svātmavyatirekeṇa vijñānena bāhyārthoanubhūyata iti na icchasi. aho pāṇḍityaṁ mahaddardinām. *S. B.* II. 2.28.

with and subsequent to ideas".[25] Ideas have their basis in things.[26] Knowledge is never an originating or creative process. As Perry puts it: "Idealism's claims can be substantiated only provided it is true that *to know* is to generate the *reality known*. It must be proved that the being and nature of things are conditioned by their being known".[27] Knowledge always makes known what is not hitherto known. Kant's Copernican Revolution in theory of knowledge shifted the centre of cognitive experience from the objects to the ego. It is the mode of cognition that is primary. It is not the cognition that conforms to objects. But to Śaṅkara, knowledge follows the nature of the object. It is the nature of the object that determines the knowledge of that object. It is not something to be made, or unmade, or made otherwise. It is not like the human actions which depend upon the human will. Knowledge is independent of human will.[28] One cannot change the nature of the object by the fact that he knows it in a particular way.[29]

Śaṅkara inveighs powerfully against the subjective idealists in defence of realism. Objects are always perceived as having an objective reality as "This is a post", "This is a wall", etc. A thing could not be given in cognition if it were a mere non-entity[30] Will anyone say that he does not eat and he does not have the

---

25. Dewey: *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays*, p. 154.

26. vinārthopalabdhyā vāsanānupapatteḥ - *S. B.* II. 2.30.

27. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 119.

28. na vastu yāthātmyajñānaṁ puruṣabuddhyapekṣaṁ. kiṁ tarhi. vastutantrameva tat - *S. B.* I. 1.4. H.A. Prichard writes "Knowledge is essentially discovery or finding of what already is." *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 118.

29. na tu vastvevaṁ naivaṁ asti nāstitivā vikalpyate. vikalpanāstu puruṣabuddhyapekṣaḥ-*ibid.*

30. *S. B.* II. 2.28. na ca upalabhyamānasyaivābhāvo bhavitum arhati.

satisfaction while, in fact, he has taken his food and he feels the satisfaction? Will any one go against experience? If the subjective idealist objects that he does not say that one does not know any object, but only maintains that an object as different from the cognition is not known, it is replied by Śaṅkara that objects of knowledge should be accepted as having an extramental existence independent of consciousness because of the very reason that they appear so in cognitive experience. Indeed, the cognition itself is not known as pillar or wall. The pillar and the wall are usually stated to be *objects* of cognition. Even those who contend that an ideational content of consciousness looks *like* an external object, employ the idea of *likeness* of the ideational content to the external object. Intent upon denying the externality of sensible objects, they unwittingly use the phrase "as though it were," and the imagery of "looking like". If there were no external objects at all, how could one get the idea of similitude and comparison which the expression "as though it were external" in connection with cognitions warrants? Does any one say that the man, Viṣṇumitra, looks like the son of a barren woman? Since there is the experience, the lovers of truth should grant the objectivity of objects. The objects *are* outside. They do not merely look so.[31]

If it is objected that the similitude in the expression "look like" is mentioned because there is no certainty that the external things exist, it is replied that the sure existence or non-existence of objects is determined by the functioning or non-functioning of the criteria and sources of knowledge, *pramāṇas*. But existence or non-existence of objects does not determine the functioning or non-functioning of *pramāṇas*. That which is known by anyone of the *pramāṇas* like direct perception should be considered as real. That which no *pramāṇa* presents should be deemed non-existent. But here, all the *pramāṇas* agree in indicating the extra-mental reality of objects.

---

31. bahirevavabhāsate iti yuktam abhyupagantuṁ, na tu bahirvad avabhāsate iti-*S. B.* II. 2.28.

Because knowledge of an object has the form of that object, it cannot be said that objects do not exist outside. If there were no object outside, how can knowledge get the form of that object?[32a] Therefore, the invariable co-presence of the object and the knowledge of it does not suggest the non-difference of the knowledge from the object, but only suggests the relation of *upāya* and *upeya* between them. In the knowledge of the pot and the piece of cloth, for example, the difference of the pot from the cloth resides in the pot and the cloth themselves, and not in the knowledge of them. The difference between the white cow and the black cow lies in the particular attributes of whiteness and blackness. but not in the cowness which is common to both the cows, white and black. It is because of the differing attributes that things are said to differ.[33] The same argument applies to the perception of a jar and its memory. Here the difference obtains between perception and memory and it does not lie in the jar itself. The jar has neither perception nor memory in its construction.

Again, two cognitions which have a before and an after in time, that is, which, being momentary, perish as soon as they know themselves, cannot be said to know each other. If one cognition could know another cognition, the principle that the Vijñānavādin presupposes, *viz.*, cognitions differ from one another and are momentary, will be damaged.

Moreover, once one accepts what is known as cognition or *vijñāna*, why should he not accept external objects like pillar and

---

32. dvābhyāṁ ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati, ekasmācca dvayoḥ. *S. B.* II. 2.29.

33. Śabara says, in his criticism of the Idealist, that cognition does not have and form, that only the object has a form and that, therefore, cognition is different from object. Kumārila, in his *Ślokavārtika*, points out that the cognition cannot be both the apprehender and the apprehended. Whatever object is presented to us in whatever form by the cognition has to be accepted to be of that form.

wall? If the reason is that the cognition is known to be such, then, for the same reason, the external objects, too, must be accepted, for, they too are known to be such.

If it is pointed out that the cognitions are self-luminous like a lamp and, therefore, know themselves, and that such self-luminosity external objects do not possess, it is replied that no activity can ensue in the intrinsic nature of anything, in what it is intrinsically itself. A knowledge, on the other hand, which is different from the objects, cannot know itself. One can as well say that fire burns itself. The act of knowledge cannot take place in the *vijñāna* because it cannot be both the knower and the known. The *Vijñānavādin*, strangely, prefers this self-contradiction to the well-known fact that the external objects are known as such by intelligence.

Nor can it be said that distinctions arise in our knowledge, not because of the distinctions in the objects, but because of the distinctions in the *vāsanās* or the mental impressions. The very basis of the '*vāsanās*' has to be analysed. They can never arise unless the externality of objects is true. If, on the other hand, the *vāsanās* are supposed to be originless, then, it will lead to infinite regress because one *vāsanā* depends upon its predecessor, and so on. But it takes us nowhere. *Vāsanās* are not self-explanatory because they originate in experience. If the idealist does not admit the difference that exists between consciousness and objects, the two will be synonymous. Likewise, means and ends will be synonymous. Buddhist scriptures inculcating the difference between the two will be rendered false. Kumārila argues that the mere usage of the word '*vāsanā*' cannot blind us to the reality of things.

Thus, the theory that there is no extramental objective world is refuted by Śaṅkara in the manner of a thoroughgoing realist. While his metaphysical idealism reduces all the world to the manifestation of a single Reality which is neither mind nor

matter, in the usual sense of these terms, his epistemology defends a realistic approach.[34]

34. Writes Deussen: "Just as Kant, along with transcendental idealism, maintained the empirical reality of the external world, and defended it against Berkeley, so the Vedāntins are not prevented by their doctrine of Ignorance as the foundation of all Being expanded in name and form from maintaining the reality of the outer world against the Buddhists of idealistic tendencies. *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 241.

Certain post-Śaṅkarites like Prakāśānanda adopt the *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda* or the doctrine that objects do not exist when they are not perceived. This view reduces everything to merest illusion. There is no possibility of proving that the seen objects are different from the cognition. (a) It need not be supposed that the object produces the consciousness of it because consciousness is ever present. And even if we suppose that it is so produced, the process of cognition itself can be regarded as the cause of its production. Knowledge, for instance, of the internal kind arises even without the presence of the object. (b) The object is not the locus or support of knowledge. So, the persistence of knowledge also does not require the presence of an object. (c) Cognition and its object do not exist in the same place or at the same time. So, Prakāśānanda concludes that the cognition and the cognised are not different. See *Indian Idealism*: Das Gupta, p. 172. Also *S. L. S.* Tr. by S. S. Sastri, pp. 298-299.

Part III

Chapter I

THE DIALECTICS OF DIFFERENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MĀYĀ

1

Introduction

Vimuktātman, in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi* establishes, through the dialectical criticism of the notion of difference and of the other theories of error like the *Akhyāti*, *Anyathākhyāti*, *Ātmakhyāti* and *Asatkhyāti*, that the world, just like the cognitive errors, is a product of inexplicable nescience, *avidyā* or *māyā*.[1] Like the silver in the illusion, the nature of the world and its cause, *viz.*, *māyā*, is not determinable either as real or as unreal.[2]

The world is the construction of *māyā*. It is *māyācitra*. This portrait of the world is only portrait *as it were*, *citramiva citram*. The Experience, *anubhūti* or Brahman, is the canvas, as it were, *bhittiriva bhittiḥ*. The canvas, even ordinarily, is not the material cause of the picture; nor is the picture natural to the canvas; nor even is the picture a different state or form of the canvas, as the pot is that of clay; nor is it an attribute or aspect of the canvas, as redness is of mango. The canvas, again, does not come into being along with the picture; it is there even earlier. While the canvas can be there without a picture on it, the picture cannot exist except on the canvas.[3]

---

1. māyeti sadasattvābhyām anirvacanīyā avidyā ucyate.
2. prapañcasya māyānirmitatvābhyupagamāt. māyāyās sakāryayā apī vastutvāvastutvābhyām anirvacanīyatvāt - *I. S.* p. 32. Vimuktātman says in the second half of his invocatory verse :-- mahadādijaganmāyā citrabhittiṁ namāmi tām - *I. S.*, p. 1, verse 1.
3. *I. S.* p. 37. Though the picture is not separable from the canvas, yet the material *i. e.*, colour etc., is separable and has as much reality as the canvas. But the material cause of the world - picture is not like that. That is why it is called *māyācitram*. See *I. S.* p. 36.

In these respects, then, the analogy of the canvas and the picture to Brahman or *Anubhūti* and the world is appropriate.

The relation of the world to Brahman is one of inexplicability. The world picture painted on Brahman-canvas is *māyācitram.*[4] It is as much explicable or inexplicable as the silver seen in the shell.[5] Just as the picture, though painted on an even canvas, produces the impression of height and depth and the third dimension, in Reality which is one, the world of many is seen. The world can be said to be neither separable nor inseparable from Brahman.[6] This is precisely the reason why it is described as *māyā.*

There are scriptural declarations like, "*indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate,*" "*māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt*", "*māyā hyeṣā mayā sṛṣṭā*" etc., to show that Brahman projects the world out of its own *māyā.* And Brahman is declared to be one and of the nature of consciousness and bliss and of the nature of the Self. So the creatorship, *sraṣṭṛtva,* for Brahman is only through *māyā.*[7]

Vimuktātman then undertakes a logical enquiry into the relation of the world to Brahman. Discussing the three possible relations, difference, non-difference, difference-*cum*-non-difference, he rejects them all and shows that the relation is really inexplicable by any known categories of relation. The world is the product of *māyā,* the relation of it to Brahman also is *anirvacanīya.* As this stand is consistent with the Advaitin's theory of error, *viz., anirvacanīyakhyāti,* and as, in fact, it constitutes the metaphysical basis for the Advaitin's theory of

---

yatha citrasya bhittyā tulyasatyam
dravyāntaram upādānaṁ naivam anubhūtyā
tulyasatyaṁ dravyāntaraṁ jagaccitrasya
upādānam ityarthaḥ - *J. V., I. S.* p. 414.

4. tacca māyācitraṁ mahadādijaganmāyācitram - *I. S.* p. 35.
5. *ibid.* p. 35.
6. māyā hy anubhūteḥ pṛthaktvāprthaktvābhyām anirvacanīyā - *ibid.* p. 36.
7. māyāvyapāśrayameva - *ibid.* p. 36.

error, it is considered pertinent to include Vimuktātman's dialectics of difference as a chapter in this work.

Vimuktātman in the second chapter of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* argues in a short passage that difference among the objects themselves is not perceived. This argument is reminiscent of Maṇḍana's argument against differential cognition in the *Tarkakāṇḍa* of his *Brahma-siddhi*. The brunt of the argument is that for the perception of difference of one object, A, from another, B, both the correlate and the counter-correlate, A and B, must be known. But unless first A and B are known as A and B in themselves as correlates[8] there cannot be the cognition of mutual negation without which difference is impossible. Thus, the cognition of negation requires the knowledge of difference and the knowledge of difference requires the knowledge of negation. Hence there is mutual dependence.

Vimuktātman argues in a similar way. When difference is not established already, the *pratiyogi* or the counter-correlate is not established. But if the counter-correlate is not established, difference is not established.[9] Therefore, difference is not perceived by the senses. Now even granting that difference among objects is perceived, difference between the perceiving Self, Ātman, and the means of perceiving is not cognised by the senses because the perceiving Self is never an object of perception. But unlike Maṇḍana's, Vimuktātman's main interest is to show the untenability of any difference, and non-difference for that matter, between the Self and objects, Brahman and the world and to demonstrate that the nature of the world is inexplicable.

Vimuktātman launches upon an enquiry into the common notion that the difference between the inert object of knowledge, *dṛśya* and the Intelligent Seer, *dṛk*, is patently established by the *pramāṇas* like perception, inference, etc. The inert appears

---

8. vidhānamantarena na niṣedhasya saṁbhavaḥ. *Brahmasiddhi, Tarkakāṇḍa*, verse 2.

9. asiddhe bhede pratiyogyasiddheḥ; tam vinā bhedānavagateḥ *I.S.*, p. 244.

as 'this'. The Advaitin himself holds that the inert is *not* of the nature of intelligence. If the inert things are non-different from the Intelligence, *dṛk*, which is one only, even the mutual differences among the inert will not be perceived. But the fact is that they are perceived. Again, the statement of the inference of being the effect from division will not be there in the Advaitin's view,[10] because, according to the *Brahma-sūtra*, the world is an effect because it is divided. How, then, can it be that there is no division or difference?

To this argument Vimuktātman replies as follows: No doubt there is the perception of difference in experience. But even the serpent is perceived in the rope illusorily. So mere perception is not a sufficient reason for the reality of difference. Thus, an elaborate analysis of this notion of difference, which is so patent, must have to be undertaken.

2

Critique of Difference

Difference between two inert objects may be perceived but not between *dṛk*, the cognising Self and *dṛśya* the object, for the simple reason that *dṛk* is not perceptible. If it were perceptible, it becomes an object, and thus, another subject-seer must have to be presupposed and this will land us in infinite regress.[11] But the necessity of perceiver himself who is imperceptible can never be overcome.

Moreover, the cognition of difference requires the knowledge of the substrate and the counter-correlate.[12] The imperceptible *dṛk* can neither be the substrate, nor the counter-correlate. Otherwise, the necessity for the cognition of both the correlate and the counter-correlate for the perception of difference being done away with, difference of everything from everything else

10. yāvadvikāraṁ tu vibhāgo lokavat. *Brahma-sūtra* - II. 3.7

11. tasyāpi māna-meyatve mātrādyanavasthā - *I. S.* p. 244.

12. dharmipratiyogyapekṣatvāt bhedadṛṣṭeḥ - *ibid.* p. 2.

will be instantly and simultaneously perceived without any restriction, which is unreasonable.

So, one cannot see the difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, one of which is imperceptible.

If it be argued that though the Self is imperceptible, yet it is, according to the Advaitin, not unknown, since it is self-manifest, and that, therefore, difference between the Self and the world could be seen, it can be asked: What is this difference? Is it the essence of the entities that differ, or their attribute? (1) If the essence, then, for the perception of difference there will be no need for a counter-correlate. Each object and its difference from others will be known if the object is known. Also even if a counter-correlate is admitted, to know the counter-correlate whose nature itself is difference, another counter-correlate will be needed and so on endlessly and nothing will be known. (2) If difference, on the other hand, were the attribute of the entities that differ, the attribute, too, is not different from the substrate, *i.e.*, the differing entity. So, difference must be accepted as *somehow* different from the substrate and cognised by a separate cognition, like colour, taste, etc.[13] Colour, taste, etc., though they do not belong to the essence of the object, yet are the attributes of the object and are known by separate sense-organs. So, they are *somehow* different from the object. This will obviously result in infinite regress. Difference as an attribute must somehow differ from the substrate on the one hand and the difference itself on the other, and so on.

If this is unpalatable to the opponent, it is asked: does he reject difference everywhere or only that between difference and the differing substrate? If the former, the Advaitin's purpose of non-duality is secured. If the latter, then, the same question whether difference is the essence or the attribute of the entities that differ will arise with the same attendant difficulties mentioned earlier. So, if difference is desired, it should be

13. tasmat kathamcid bhinno jnanantaragamyo rūparasadivat - *ibid.* p. 9.

desired as different from the substrate, and cognised by a separate cognition.

Mutual Non-Existence

Dṛk is self-effulgent. Its revelation is not dependent on a counter-correlate. Nor is there a non-cognition of it at any time. For these reasons, as in the case of difference, so in the case of mutual non-existence, which is the *ratio essendi* of difference, there is no basis in reasoning for the acceptance of it between the Self and the world.

If difference and mutual non-existence are accepted as perceptible, they are not the attributes of *dṛk*. If they are imperceptible, then they are not established at all. If they are said to be self-luminous, they will be the same as *dṛk* and as such, not being dependent on a counter-correlate, will lose their character of mutual non-existence and difference. And for the same reason they cannot be the essence, *svarūpa* of *dṛk*. Nor can they be said to be the two forms of *dṛk* which is one. Even accepting that they are, are they different or non-different from each other and from *dṛk*? Either, they cannot be different from each other since they are non-different from *dṛk* or *dṛk* cannot be one because it is non-different from these two. So either *dṛk* will be split up into two, or all differences among things will vanish.

Again, if difference and mutual non-existence are non-different from *dṛk*, then, mutual non-existence and difference become non-different. Now, does mutual non-existence alone or difference alone remain?

If difference alone, and if there is non-difference between this difference and *dṛk*, is there *dṛk* alone now or difference alone? If difference alone, there being no *dṛk* the Seer, nothing will appear and there will be no knowledge. If *dṛk* alone remains, then there is no difference for *dṛk*. The same reasoning can be applied in the case of *dṛśya* also. Thus, there is no difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*.

As to the second alternative, if mutual non-existence is supposed to remain and if this mutual non-existence and *dṛk* are non-different, does mutual non-existence alone remain or *dṛk* alone? If mutual non-existence alone, there will be no *dṛk* but only void. That, too, will not appear for want of a *sākṣin*. If *dṛk* alone remains, there is no mutual non-existence and there will be no mutual non-existence between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*.

Moreover, if difference is non-different from mutual non-existence, and if there is mutual non-existence alone, then, there being no difference and only one entity, mutual non-existence cannot be established. If difference alone remains, there is no mutual non-existence and as there is no conflict for accepting mutual non-existence in a non-different entity, there will be only one reality. Then where is difference and from what? So, difference and mutual non-existence must be accepted as different from each other and from the differing entity. Therefore, they are neither the essence of *dṛk*, nor its attributes.

There is no substrate-attribute relationship between *dṛk* and *dṛśya* since they are not cognised as such by a single cognition like the pot and its colour.[14] Whatever things are related as substrate and attribute must be capable of being known by a single cognition. Therefore, difference and mutual non-existence cannot be there in *dṛk* having *dṛśya* as the counter-correlate. For the same reason, they cannot be in *dṛśya* also having *dṛk* as the counter-correlate. If they are not in *dṛk*, they cannot be in *dṛśya* also. Otherwise, there is the contingence of their not requiring a counter-correlate and existing in one and the same object, which is unreasonable. Again, the knowledge of mutual negation arises when all the causes of the knowledge of the counter-correlate are not observed.[15] But there being no cognition of *dṛk* there can be no cognition of the absence of *dṛk* also. It cannot be said that the non-cognition is not the cause of the knowledge of non-existence, because of the contingence of the knowledge of non-existence even when there

14. na ca ekajñānagamyatve 'pi dharma-dharmitvam, atiprasaṅgāt. *ibid.* p. 7.

15. abhāvajñānaṁ ca upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhav iṣyate. *ibid.*

is the cognition of counter-correlate. If as a special case, there could be the knowledge of non-existence of *dṛk* even without non-cognition, there is the contingence of the cognition of the non-existence of *dṛk* even when it is manifest. The same conditions can produce the knowledge of the non-existence of *dṛśya* also.

It may be argued: "Knowledge of *dṛk* is *dṛk* itself, and, therefore, the knowledge of the absence of *dṛk* must be due to the non-existence of *dṛk*. But the case with objects is different." As against this, it is only to be asked: Is the very non-existence of *dṛk* the knowledge of its non-existence? Or, is there a different, positive knowledge having the negation of *dṛk* for its content? To take the second first, there must be some cause for the rise of this positive knowledge. And here, the cause cannot be the usual non-cognition of what is obtained etc., as the existence of *dṛk* itself is knowledge, and as *dṛk* is always there, there can never be a non-cognition of it. Further if the non-existence or negation of *dṛk* is the non-cognition of it, *anupalabdhi* being a *pramāṇa*, it cannot be its object also. Its object must be other negation and not itself.

The first alternative is unsound because negation cannot be identified with knowledge. If it is said further that knowledge of the substrate where *dṛk* is non-existent is the cause of the cognition of the non-existence of *dṛk*, then, how can there be anything called substrate when the counter-correlate is not known? Moreover, as *dṛk* is eternally self-manifest, and, for these reasons, the negation of *dṛk* is not the object of any proof, and consequently, mutual non-existence being impossible, the difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya* can never be established.

3

Critique of Non-difference

Having shown that the difference of the visible world of objects from *dṛk* is a common uncritical notion for which there is no basis in reasoning, Vimuktātman proceeds to show that if the world of objects is not different from the Self, it is not

non-different from it also. Denial of difference does not imply affirmation of non-difference.

If there were complete identity of the world with the Self, difference which is the basis of empirical life and is patent will have to be denied. The Advaitin does not deny the potency of difference but only its being based on a proof. In the same way, non-difference of *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, too, has no proof. What difference can claim as its strength *viz.*, the basis in all empirical usage. *sarvavyavahārāśrayam*, is not open for non-difference. It is not even patent. With reference to duality and difference, even when they are sublated, their patency will not perish like that of the double-moon. Moreover, the Self is self-evident while the objects are established by extraneous means of knowledge. Thus, they cannot be the content of one and the same knowledge, which is necessary for any assertion of identity. If *dṛśya* is one with the Self, there will be the Self alone, and no *dṛśya* and therefore there is no question of identity between them. If *dṛk*, the Self, is the same as *dṛśya*, there will be *dṛśya* alone and no *dṛk* and since there is no Self-Intelligence, nothing will be known.

Further, do the identity of *dṛk* and *dṛśya* and its knowledge pertain to the two things which are existent and which appear? Or, in respect of one only which exists and appears? Or, both being existent, does one alone appear? Or, is one only existent but both appear? Not the first alternative. There cannot be any identity here, because the existence of difference and the knowledge of it even as *two* entities are spoken of. If it is said that the other two, identity and the knowledge of it, exist, notwithstanding the existence of difference and its knowledge, it is asked: is the knowledge of identity in reference to the objects of knowledge of difference, or something else? If the first, that, too, is only knowledge of difference because of having a common content. If the second, even then, the knowledge of identity is not of two, but of only one since it is different by supposition from the knowledge of difference and its contents which should be two. With regard to the second alternative in the main

argument, since one only exists and appears, there is no question of identity or its knowledge in respect of two. On the third alternative, though the second is there, it does not appear. There cannot be the knowledge of identity between the two, one of which *i.e.*, the world, appears and the other *viz.*, the Self does not.

If it be argued that the Intelligence-Self and the world of objects appear together invariably, and thus, an identity between them can be asserted, then, what is meant by this invariability of appearance? It cannot be that the Self and the world are *cognised* together in a single perception, because, of the two, *i.e.*, the Self and the world, the Self is not an object of perception. Again the world cannot invariably be copresent with the Self since the Self is eternal and the world is not. Moreover, appearance together is intelligible only in the case of two entities.[16] Otherwise, the expression "together" becomes meaningless. While without the *dṛk* the *dṛśya* will not appear, the *dṛk* will appear even without *dṛśya*. Even in this way, there is no appearance together for them.

The eternality and non-objectness of Intelligence Self, which is of the nature of knowledge, and the transience and objectness of the material world cannot be said to appear together. If it is said, as the Buddhist of the *Vijñānavāda* persuasion does, that cognitions are non-eternal on the ground that there are differences in cognition, *i.e.*, knowledge as is evidenced in the empirical usage of pot-cognition, cloth-cognition etc., which arise successively, the answer is that since (1) cognitions are self-revealed and, thus, not objects of any knowledge and (2) if cognitions are momentary, the earlier cognitions cannot be said to be the contents of the later, (for, they would have perished after their moments)[17] there is no difference in cognition, and thus cognitions do not arise and perish. Again, if for one cognition other cognitions are said to be contents, then the alleged difference between them will not stand because of their

16. dvayorhi sahabhānam, naikasyaiva - *I. S.* p. 13.

17. kṣaṇikatvācca anyonyāviṣayatvāt - *ibid.*, p. 15.

relationship as subject and object as in the case of pot and the cognition of it.[18] The difference of pot from the cognition of it is not accepted since the locus of everything known about the pot like colour etc., is one and the same.[19] Further, if cognitions are themselves the objects of cognition, there is the contingence of non-self-luminosity and non-intelligence like pot etc., for the cognitions. And, even granting that *dṛk* and *dṛśya* appear together, there is no non-difference between them. But appearance together, too, is not there. In this way, therefore, the third alternative *viz.*, there are two existents but one alone appears, is rejected, as there cannot be non-difference between them.

In the fourth alternative, since there is only one existence, there cannot be anything like non-difference and the cognition of it for two. Even assuming that two entities appear when really there is only one, there cannot be non-difference between those that appear as different. But, how is it that two appear when one exists? What is the one that exists? If it is the object, it cannot be known because there is no suject-Intelligence to know. If it is the Intelligence-Self, there is no possibility of difference since this Self is impartite. Again, how is it said that the world of objects which appears does not exist? Thus, non-difference cannot be affirmed between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*.

4

Critique of Difference-cum-Non-difference

A third course open now is to say that the world of objects, *dṛśya*, is neither different nor non-different completely, but different-*cum*-non-different from the Self or *dṛk*. Even though there is difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya* as *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, there is identity between them and Brahman in the Reality-aspect, since Reality is one.

---

18. grāhyagrāhakasaṁvidāṁ viṣayaviṣayibhāvāt ananyatvaṁ yuktam - *J.V., I.S.* p. 399.

19. ghaṭanīlādiviśeṣasya viṣayaikāspadatvāD na saṁvidbhedaḥ sidhyet. *I.S.*, p. 15.

But it is not readily intelligible how, if they are in Reality-aspect identical and if Reality is one, mutual difference could still be maintained, since the oneness of Reality will be compromised thereby. If there is difference, there is no non-difference, and *vice versa*. If in spite of the non-difference of Reality, there is yet said to be difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, then, there cannot be identity for them with it (Reality), as in the case of a pot and a cloth which are mutually different and are not identical with a pillar.

If it is said that the identity with Self is in an aspect different from the one in which there is difference for them, then, if *these* aspects[20] are identical with them, *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, there cannot be difference from Brahman as before. Nor can there be difference of these aspects from one another. If they are different, there can be no identity between those aspects and hence no identity between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*. Nor is there a dual aspect for *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, *i.e.*, *dṛk* has no form of *dṛśya* and *vice versa*. Thus, there should be either difference or non-difference between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, and not difference-*cum*-non-difference. Again, it is self-contradictory to say that one has two aspects of *bhedābheda*. If these two aspects, *bheda* and *abheda*, are different from the one, they cannot be its aspects. So, if *dṛk* is one, it cannot have two aspects, *dṛktva* and *dṛśyatva*. Thus it is not reasonable to say that *dṛk* and *dṛśya* are non-different in the aspect of *dṛk* or Brahman.

It may be argued that the statement that one cannot have many forms goes against the testimony of experience. Gold, for example, is one, but its forms as various ornaments are many. There is no contradiction in one having many forms since there is perceptual experience. But if what is given in experience is taken to be the truth because it is so given in experience without rational criticism, then, all that does not come under the gross physical perception will have to be denied, as the materialists deny the soul for the reason that the soul is not seen. Hence perception must be supplemented by reasoning. Thus an enquiry is necessary.

20. *i.e.*, the aspect in which they are identical and the aspect in which they are different.

If one and the same thing like gold has many forms, are these forms seen to be different or non-different or different-*cum*-non-different from the substrate, *rūpin?* First, if they are seen to be different, then there are not many forms for the substrate because, by reason of this difference, there is no coordination or *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of all these forms in the substrate. Moreover, if the forms are totally different from the substrate, how can they be called the forms of *that* substrate? Secondly, if they are seen to be non-different, then to speak of *different* forms of the substrate is wrong since only one non-different entity is seen. Thirdly, if the aspects themselves are said to be different-*cum*-non-different from the object, are they different in one aspect, and non-different in another, or different-*cum*-non-different in the same aspect?

If the first, there being two aspects, *i.e.*, aspect of difference and of non-difference in each of the aspects, there is the contingence of its (the aspect) having two aspects in its turn. And, if there be difference-*cum*-non-difference for those two aspects from the first aspect, each of them in turn will have two aspects. Thus, there is infinite regress of aspects of aspects. In the same manner, in the second alternative, if there be difference-*cum*-non-difference directly for the substance with the aspects, then for each aspect, yet other two aspects are to be accepted. And if there be difference-*cum*-non-difference with them and yet other two aspects, there is infinite regress for the aspects.

Again between the substance and aspects difference-*cum*-non-difference can be established only indirectly through the aspects[21] (even if numerous aspects are accepted).[22] And so, among the two aspects for which there is difference, there is no non-difference, and for that for which there is non-difference there is no difference. Thus, difference and non-difference are not attributes of any one substrate.

It cannot be said that since difference and non-difference cannot directly be between the substrate and its first form, they

21. na rūparūpiṇorapi sākṣān mitho bhedābhedau iṣṭau, kiṁ tu rūpābhyām- *I S.*, p. 20.

22. And they are not accepted, because of infinite regress.

are *figuratively* expressed as the attributes, *dharmau*, of the first attribute of the substrate object[23] though really they are appropriate only in regard to the aspects of the first attribute of the object for the reason that the aspects are *identical*, being the aspects of the one and the same attribute. For in the case of real non-difference of the aspects, why a figurative usage at all?[24] Indeed, they, *i.e.*, difference and non-difference are not figuratively used of the aspects at all. If the figurative usage is said to be accepted because of the existence of difference also between the aspects, then, difference-*cum*-non-difference between the substrate and its aspects is also figurative, and it cannot be real or primary.

If it be said that *bheda* and *abheda*, which are the attributes of aspects being figuratively attributed to the thing (here the first attribute of the object of which aspects are being spoken), form the primary sense of the term '*bhedābheda*', because of the absence of another *bhedābheda* in its primary sense; or else, if it be said that the *bheda* and *abheda* are not figuratively used at all, as the attribute of a totally different object alone will have to be attributed to another figuratively,[25] and that, therefore, here between the first attribute and the aspects there is difference-*cum*-non-difference, then it should be made clear how this *bhedābheda* between the attribute and the aspects established at all? How is it that *bheda* and *abheda* which are existent in the aspects are used figuratively in the attribute? Not directly, because of the contingence of *bhedābheda* directly elsewhere also.[26] The *bhedābheda* elsewhere, *viz.*, in the aspects cannot be figuratively attributed to the first attribute, since it involves the defect of mutual dependence in the following way. The establishment of *bheda* and *abheda* is dependent on that figurative usage, and the figurative usage is dependent on the establishment of *bheda* and *abheda*.[27]

---

23. asmin prakaraṇe tadvacchabdena rūpiṇaḥ prathamarūpam ucyate. *J. V.*, *I. S.*, p. 403. The term used in the text is "*tadvataḥ*" which is said to mean the first form of the object as against the aspects of this first form of the object.
24. abhede kiṁ ity upacāraḥ - *I. S.*, p. 20.
25. anyadharmo hi anyatra upacāryas syāt - *ibid.*, p. 20.
26. mukhyarūparūpiṇorapi sākṣātbhedābhedaprasaṇgāt - *J. V.*, *I. S.*, p. 404.
27. tadupacārad bhedābhedasiddhiḥ, tad siddhau tadupacāraḥ - *I. S.*, p. 21.

Therefore, there is no proof for *bhedābheda* between aspects on one side and the object on the other. But, even if it were to be established, it will not be by aspects that are *essential* to the object but by external aspects. Thus, in the view that between the object and the aspect, there is difference in one aspect and non-difference in another aspect, *bhedābheda* can never be established. Therefore, to say that there is identity between *dṛk* and *dṛśya* in the Reality-aspect is also not sound.

If the world of perceptible objects is neither different, nor non-different, nor different-*cum*-non-different from Brahman, then what is its character? It is the product of inexplicable *māyā*[28] which cannot be brought under any of the above categories of relation, *bheda*, *abheda* and *bhedābheda*. Still it is given in appearance. The argument of the Advaitin is that even illusions and errors in epistemology partake of the inexplicability of their material cause, *viz.*, *ajñāna*, as it has been shown *supra*. The establishment of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* by the Advaitin is more by the refutation of the alternative theories that try to explain error by some positive means of proof and thus cancel out one another than by any positive assertion on his own part. His position is precisely that the phenomenon of illusion is inexplicable. So he does not undertake an explanation himself while showing that any attempt at explanation will fail. We find that Vimuktātman, in subjecting *anyathākhyāti* to a critical analysis, sets forth the same arguments against the categories of difference etc., as above to show that one cannot become otherwise than what it is;[29] and that without the postulation of *māyā*, otherwiseness is not conceivable by ordinary categories of thought.

This chapter on the dialectics of the category of difference, therefore, is a prelude to the establishment of *māyā* by Vimuktātman as the cause of not only the metaphysical illusion of the world-phenomenon but also of the perceptual errors and the theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* that is unique to Advaita epistemology.

---

28. prapañcasya māyānirmitatvābhyupagamāt - *ibid.*, p. 32.
29. See Chapter II of *I. S.*

CHAPTER II

ADHYĀSA OR SUPERIMPOSITION

1

All error is, according to the Advaitin, due to superimposition of the unreal on the real.[1] Or it is seeing a thing in a substrate where it is not.[2] This is what is named *avidyā* or nescience by the discerning.[3] Whatever one's theory of error, one thing is common to all, *viz.*, *adhyāsa* consists in perceiving the attributes of one thing in another substrate.[4] It is lack of discrimination and false knowledge.[5] This *adhyāsa* is patent in the illusion of the silver in the shell, of the double moon, of the not-self as the Self. Śaṅkara offers the full definition of superimposition as follows: "The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed in some other thing."[6]

The Anyathākhyātivādins maintain that error is the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing. The Akhyātivādins hold that error is founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed. The Mādhyamikas or the Śūnyakhyātivādins argue that error is the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is

---

1. satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya. Śaṅkara's *Introduction* to his commentary on the *V. S.*
2. atasmiṁstadbuddhi *and* paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ - *ibid.*
3. adhyāsaṁ paṇḍitā avidyeti manyante - *ibid.*
4. anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatāṁ na vyabhicarati - *ibid.*
5. itaretarāviveka mithyājñānanimittaḥ – *ibid.*
6. smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ - *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya.* When one says that he views the mother-of-pearl as silver, 'mother-of-pearl' denotes mother-of-pearl pure and simple while the word 'silver' denotes, by implication, the idea of silver.

superimposed.[7] But all agree that in error one thing is mistaken for another. Similarly, when the not-self is mistaken for the Self, there arises all the human cognitional activity. The distinctions of agent and enjoyer arise only due to this superimposition. "Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping; attributes of the sense organs, if he thinks, "I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind"; attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination and so on."[8]

In perceptual error, when the shell is seen as silver, the silver-nature is superimposed on the shell. In both the metaphysical and cognitional errors, the material cause that brings about the error is nescience. In Advaita Vedānta the principle of explanation, if explanation it is, (because the why of the creation is inexplicable), is single, *viz.*, nescience.

2

Superimposition is possible under the following conditions. (1) The residual impression brought about by the cognition of a real object, (2) defect in the objects of knowledge, (3) defect in the cogniser, (4) defect in the instrument of valid knowledge and (5) a knowledge of the general nature alone of the substrate without a knowledge of its particularities.[9]

---

7. *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya.* The secular rule is: the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when the king's charioteer is mistaken for the king. See *S. B.* IV. I. 5, Śaṅkara, however, speaks of mutual superimposition, *itaretarādhyāsa.* But, what appears in the delusion is only the superimposed, as the substrate is not cognised. The mutual superimposition is patent because both 'this' and 'silver' appear (See *Saṁkṣepa śārīraka,* I, 3-36). To the fear expressed that if there be mutual superimposition the world will have no substratum and thus be void, Sarvajñātman answers that there is a distinction between *adhiṣṭhāna* which is Brahman and *ādhāra,* the apparent support of superimpositions. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Siddhāntabindu* remarks that if there be no mutual superimposition, there will be non-manifestation of that on which superimposition is made: ekatarasyādhyāsāṅgīkāre anyatarasya abhānaprasaṅgāt. Gaekwad's Oriental Series - Vol. *LXIV*. p. 25.

8. *S. B.* Tr. by Thibaut, Vol. I. p. 9.

9. Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita,* Second Edn., (1958), p. 226.

Even illusions must have a basis in reality. Unless one has seen silver earlier, he cannot superimpose it on nacre for the simple reason that there will be no idea to be so superimposed. In addition to the presence of defects, the substrate of the illusion is there and is known as "this" in its general feature but not in its distinguishing aspects. Now, the questions can be raised: For silver to be superimposed, it must have been experienced in reality somewhere and at sometime. This is right in so far as silver-illusion is concerned. But not regarding the superimposition of the not-self or egoity etc., on the Self; for egoity etc., there cannot be any residual impression for the reason that egoity etc., are not real like real silver. So they cannot be superimposed on the Self.

Superimposition means either that the not-self is superimposed on the Self or *vice versa*. Now, it cannot be the second. That which is unreal cannot be the substratum of the superimposition for the fear of the contingence of accepting the void. If, on the other hand, the not-self is believed to be real, there will be no possibility of release which is unacceptable to the Siddhāntin. And, it cannot be the first because the Self is always manifest and is without general or specific qualities and similarity, etc., without which no superimposition is possible.

Moreover, the existence of the not-self is established only when the Self is superimposed and there must be the superimposition of the Self; and owing to the possibility of similarity of faults etc., in the Self on account of its superimposition on the not-self, there must be superimposition of the not-self on Self. Thus, is there not mutual dependence?

Again, nescience is not the cause of superimposition. For, it, too, is either imposed on the Self or not. If the former, the very same defect of self-dependence etc., will arise here also. If the latter, since ignorance then becomes real, it cannot be removed and release will be impossible.

Besides, if everything has its root in superimposition the distinctions such as mistaken knowledge, right knowledge etc., cannot be established.

Finally, there would be a contradiction in one and the same Self appearing as the means of knowledge, the thing to be known, the act of knowledge and the knower. If there were no contradiction, there would be established the view of the Buddhists,[10] according to which Self is momentary and the consciousness is both the knower and the known.

To the first objection, the answer of Bhāratītīrtha in his *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha* is as follows: What is necessary for superimposition is not the reality of the thing superimposed but only the residual impressions of the *cognition* of the thing. As such, even the cognition of the illusory object e.g., the snake in magic, may serve as a cause of superimposition. There is no rule that the residual impression generated by a *pramāṇa* is an adjunct, but not one generated by delusion.[11] So egoity etc., may be superimposed. It is not their *reality* that is the cause of the superimposition but their *cognition*.

To the other objections mentioned above, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī offers the following answers in his *Siddhānta-bindu*: The consciousness "I am a man", "I am a doer", etc., is a delusion, apparent to all. This consciousness is not recollection because it is not an external object perceived and remembered, but is manifested subjectively and directly.[12] Also, it is preceded by a non-cognition of difference between the Self and the non-self. In all superimposition, it is the identity of the real and the unreal that is superimposed.[13]

Nor is this patent consciousness a right knowledge. The scripture declares that Brahman is devoid of distinction, that it is "truth (being or existence), knowledge and infinity"[14] etc., and is devoid of attachment to anything.[15] The appearance of

10. *S. Bindu*, Gaekwad Oriental Series. pp. 16-17.
11. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha*, p. 10. See Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, p. 227.
12. aparokṣavabhāsatvāt bhedāgrahapūrvakatvācca. *S. Bindu*, p. 13.
13. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* – p. 14.
14. *Tait up.* II. 1.1.
15. *Bṛh. up.* IV. 3.15.

Self as the doer, enjoyer etc., cannot be right knowledge. This can be proved by reasoning also. Body, senses etc., are limited by time and place and are liable to changes. Thus, they are incapable of knowing themselves. If they could know themselves, they become both the subject and the object themselves[16] which is a contradiction, and there can be no relation as between the *dṛk* or the Seer and *dṛśya* or the seen, unless it be by superimposition.[17] If the Self and the seen are related at all, either the relation should be one of identity, or intimate relation. If the former, then with the destruction of the objects, the Self also will be destroyed. If the latter, either the relatum itself is that relation or no. Not the first; because a relatum is not seen anywhere to be connected by itself as a relation. Nor the second; for, if another relation is assumed for the relation of the Self with the objects, it will land us in infinite regress. Nor can there be the substrate-attribute relationship between the Self and the objects, either in case of total difference, or non-difference between them. If they are as different from each other as Himalayas and the Vindhya mountains are, then, there can be no substrate-attribute relationship between them. If they are totally non-different, then also it is impossible and, besides, the Self will not remain unaffected by the changes in the objects.

Again, granting for the moment that the Self is not of the nature of knowledge, not unchanging and unchangeable, and that it is momentary, (as Yogācāras maintain) it is here to be asked: is the knowledge of each moment separate or is it the same but only the objects are different?

If the first, each momentary knowledge will have separate individual differences, separate destructions, previous non-existences, separate intimate connections and so on, and this is to prove more than what is necessary for the purpose in hand. If the

16. In the *Pāṇini Sūtras* it is said: ā kādarād eka saṁjñā – I. 4.1. Puruṣottama writes in his commentary on *S. Bindu* that *kartṛsaṁjñā* and *karmasaṁjñā* cannot belong to the same entity.

17. Puruṣottama on *S. Bindu*, p. 21.

second, then, too little will be proved,[18] because where the Self is accepted to be capable of being of the nature of knowledge, there is no need to keep up the distinction between the knower and knowledge. The perception of difference in knowledge as "knowledge of pot", "knowledge of cloth", etc., is due, not to the intrinsic difference in knowledge itself, but due to the adjuncts like "pot" etc.[19] The apparent rise and destruction of knowledge is due to the connection of knowledge with the objects through the psychosis. When the pot is broken, for example, the pot-space is said to be destroyed. But space itself is neither produced nor destroyed, but is said to be produced or destroyed because of the connection with pot etc.[20]

If, again, a pot is said to be distinguished from another pot even without reference to the limiting conditions like space, time, etc., then their counterparts will not be comprehendsd with the result that space, time etc., instead of being essentially the same, will have to be taken to be diverse, which is not true. So it is concluded that knowledge is one and permanent, and not momentary, as the Yogācāras believe. Self is of the nature of knowledge. There cannot be the distinctions of doer, enjoyer etc., in it. Otherwise, there will be no possibility of release at all, since there will never be a time when the Self ceases to be a doer, enjoyer etc. The Self is not the doer. That it seems to be so is a delusion, arising out of *adhyāsa*. The inert objects cannot know themselves. Everything is illumined by the self-luminous Self.[21] All distinctions of knower, known and knowledge are due to nescience[22] that is indeterminable and beginningless and, therefore, the superimposition is also beginningless.

---

18. jñānānityatvapakṣe tattadvyaktibhedadhvaṁsa-prāgabhāva-samavāyajñānatva-jātyādyabhyupagame gauravaḥ, ekatvābhyupagame ca atilāghavaḥ – *S. Bindu*, p. 19.
19. ghaṭajñānaṁ paṭajñānamiti upādhibheda-puraskārenaiva jñānabhedapratiteḥ – *ibid.*
20. tadubhayayoḥ sambandhaviṣayakatvam. Puruṣottama's commentary, p. 21.
21. svaprakāśānabhyupagame ca jagadandhyaprasaṅgāt – *S. Bindu*, p. 19.
22. anirvacyam ajñānameva tat – *ibid.*

The fact that Śaṅkara has defined *adhyāsa* as of the nature of recollection, *smṛtirūpa*, is construed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as intended to apply to a superimposition of effects,[23] and, according to him, the definition of superimposition is contained only in the statement "*paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*, which is common to both the kinds of superimposition, *viz.*, superimposition of effects and the cause or *ajñāna*. Śaṅkara himself speaks of the mixing of the real with the unreal–*satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya*. So, superimposition can be defined as the "appearance of a co-mingling of the true and the false entities".[24]

The empirical egohood is analysable into two parts: one, the pure consciousness, and two, the subjectivity, illumined or manifested by the pure Intelligence. This gives rise to the judgement "I am a man", etc. This illusion or superimposition is due to the power of nescience which subsists in the pure Intelligence, according to Padmapāda.[25] In the words of Sarvajñātmamuni: "The Self manifests all knowable objects as well as itself by virtue of possession of the power to manifest. Similarly, the Self's nescience may possess the ability to impose itself and others (on the Self.)[26]

3

Evidence for Superimposition

Perception, inference, presumption and scripture are the evidences for superimposition. The very empirical usage as "I am a man", etc., shows that there has been this superimposition. This is clearly and patently given in perception and experience. Inference also supports it. In sleep, there is no superimposition and there is no distinction and empirical usage of knower and

23. The ego etc., which are the effects of nescience, and not the nescience itself which is the cause.

24. satyamithyāvastusaṁbhedāvabhāso adhyāsaḥ – *S. Bindu*, p. 26. see *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, I. 33.

25. asmatpratyaye yo' nidam-aṁśaś-cidekarasaḥ tasmiṁs-tadbala-nirbhāsitatayā lakṣaṇato yuṣmad-arthasya manuṣyābhimānasya saṁbhedaivāvabhāsaḥ sa eva adhyāsaḥ – *Pañcapādikā*, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, p. 3.

26. *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka* – I. 54.

known at that time. Presumption, or *arthāpatti* too, strengthens the point. In the absence of superimposition as an explanatory fact, cognisership for the unattached Self cannot be made intelligible. There are scriptural declarations testifying to the fact of superimposition like "A Brahmin is to sacrifice".[27] Thus, the fact of superimposition stands proved.

The Mīmāṁsakas of Bhāṭṭa persuasion argue: Non-existence is merely another existence.[28] An existent considered as of the nature of another existent becomes non-existence. In its own nature it is existence. So, mirage, etc., which may be real in their own nature, may well be in the sphere of experience, and in its (mirage) appearance as water may be explained as another mode of existence. Even so, if the world is absolutely unreal and devoid of all practical capacity and is essenceless, how can it be given in experience at all? Similarly, if the world were absolutely unreal, how can it be superimposed on the Intelligent Self at all? One cannot say that nescience makes the unreal appear through the cognitions.

For, it can be asked here: what is the capacity of the cognitions to make the unreal appear? If it is the unreal, is it effected by it or only made known by it? Not the first; the unreal cannot at any time be effected. Nor the second; for, there is no other cognition than the one which makes it manifest.[29] Also there is the risk of infinite regress of a cognition requiring another to make its capacity known.

If it be held that the very essence of cognition is to manifest the unreal, what is this relation between the real cognition and the unreal? Is one to say that the cognition, that is real, is made determinate by the unreal? It is not a sound suggestion

27. *V.P.S.*, p. 96. See also *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*: I–22 to 38. The Self is Bliss as is evident during a dreamless sleep when there is no objective cognition. This is a matter of experience. Of such a Self, the body etc., which are finite, painful and perishable, are only superimpositions.

28. bhāvāntaram abhāvo hi kayācittu vyapekṣayā – See *Bhāmatī* – T.P.H., p. 20.

29. jñānnāntarānupalabdeh – *ibid.*

that the real is determined by the unreal. Cognition cannot do anything to the unreal because cognition can never be the support of the unreal. Nor can it be said that it is of the very nature of cognition to appear always with the unreal, for, it is not reasonable that the cognition which is not of the nature of the unreal and does not originate from the unreal has yet to depend upon the unreal for its very being. Hence the body, organs, etc., which are totally essenceless and unreal cannot be the objects of experience. And since there are experiences of all these, they cannot be totally essenceless. So the Mīmāṁsakas.

The Siddhāntin would reply: in the case of the mirage, is the cognition of water in the rays in the sphere of the true? If that were so, it will never be sublated.[30] The opponent may say that it will never be sublated so long as the cognition is of the rays as *not* of the nature of water. The delusion is, however, there when the rays are cognised as of the nature of water. The reply is that the nature of rays is non-waterness, and waterness of the rays is not real. Nor can it be unreal; for, it is said by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas that "non-existence is existence in another form, not anything else; since no such thing is proved"[31] *i.e.*, that the unreality of one thing is the reality of another.

Now, the imposed form *i.e.*, waterness, is not another thing. If it were, the cognition would be either of the rays, or the water in the Ganges. If the first, it cannot be the perception of water. If the second, the cognition will not have a reference to 'here' but to water in the Ganges. If it were a mere recollection, this will be merely of 'water', not of 'water here'. Nor can it be something that is totally non-existent devoid of any character, because such a non-entity can never appear.

---

30. *ibid.*, p. 21 and the following.

31. bhāvāntaram abhāvo' nyo na kaścit anirūpaṇāt – *Ślokavārttika*, p. 245. The position of Kumārila's should be distinguished from that of Prābhākaras who have denied any kind of reality to non-existence.

So the water superimposed on the rays has to be recognised to be indeterminable, being neither totally real, nor totally unreal, nor yet real and unreal, this being self-contradictory.[32]

Similarly, the indeterminability of superimposition must have to be accepted by all the theories of error. The Ātmakhyātivādins say : though there is no external reality, yet there is an external falsehood created by the impression of beginningless nescience, and on this, there is the imposition of what is of the form of cognition.[33] The Akhyātivādins, however, say that when there is the superimposition of one on another, it is a delusion conditioned by the non-apprehension of their distinctness; that the illusory silver of the form of cognition is proved neither by experience nor by inference. Experience must be either the cognition of silver or the cognition that sublates it. Not the first because the experience of silver makes known the silver as having for its substrate the "this", and not one's own consciousness, as the Vijñānavādin believes. Otherwise the cogniser will be non-different from the cognition and the resultant cognition should be "I am silver" which is not the case.

It cannot be the second. It cannot be said that the sublating cognition makes known the silver as of the form of cognition by denying the silver that is supposed to lie outside. The sublating cognition can never have the function of making known the prior experience to have the form of cognition. If it is said that it is known that silver is of the form of cognition only and is not external, by the fact of the denial of its externality by the sublating cognition, then, by such denial, only the utter difference of silver from cognition will be established and not identity.[34] The sublating cognition denies only the

---

32. tasmānna sat nāsat, nāpi sadasat parasparavirodhāt ity anirvācyamevāropaṇiyaṁ marīciṣu toyam āstheyam – *Bhāmatī* p. 52.

33. yadyapi na bāhyaṁ vastu sat tathāpi anādi avidyāvāsanāropitam alīkaṁ bāhyam; tatra jñānākārasyāropaḥ. *ibid.* p. 24.

34. asaṁnidhānāgrahaniṣedhād asaṁnihito bhavati. pratipatturatyantasaṁnidhānaṁ tvasya pratipatrātmakaṁ kūṭasthtyam. *ibid.*, p. 25.

empirical usage following the wrong cognition "This is silver", and denies neither the "thisness" nor the "silver".

And the Akhyātivādin will urge that all cognitions are valid for the following reasons: (1) Silver itself is not occasioned by the cognition of it in nacre. For, nacre is not the basis of the appearance of silver; since it is contrary to experience. If it is said that the nacre as a mere existent or 'that', and not as known, is the basis of the silver-experience, then all things that exist must be the basis, existentiality being common to all things. (2) One cannot say that nacre is the cause of silver-experience, since senses also are causes. So, the word 'basis' can mean only manifestation or appearance. But in silver-cognition, nacre is not manifest. (3) If so, then, since nacre is not manifest in the silver-cognition, how can it be the basis even in the sense of manifestation? (4) Senses are capable of generating valid knowledge. How can an illusory cognition be generated by them? If the generation of illusion is by conjunction with defects, defects do not generate but only counter-act the generation. (5) So, all cognition is valid.[35] In error, two cognitions - "silver" and "this" - are of two kinds, *i.e.*, memory and experience. By the non-discrimination of the two, the silverness in memory is superimposed on the 'this' which is given in experience; but the superimposed is not created. The superimposed and the substrate are real, though the superimposition itself is precisely the mischief.

4

Answer to the Akhyātivādin by the Anyathākhyātivādin

The Anyathākhyātivādins find the conclusions of the Akhyātivādins unsatisfactory. The superimposition cannot be due to lack of discrimination for the simple reason that apprehension cannot result from non-apprehension.[36] Moreover, the Akhyātivādin is to be asked: Is the similarity of silver in illusion to the valid cognition of real silver said to be the cause of empirical usage

35. tasmāt sarvaṁ jñānaṁ samicinam āstheyam–*ibid.*, p. 26

36. *ibid.*, p. 28.

by being apprehended? Or by its bare existence, without being apprehended? If the former, the apprehension must be of the form, "of the cognition 'this' and 'silver', there is resemblance to valid cognition," or, of the form, "between those very two no difference is apprehended in respect of their nature or contents." The first cannot lead to any empirical usage. Mere perception of resemblance does not produce any activity in the knower. The second is self-contradictory since the expression 'between' contradicts "non-apprehension of difference". For, when difference is not perceived, how can anyone say that 'between the two' no difference is perceived?

So, it should be admitted by the Akhyātivādin that it is the non-apprehension of difference, and not memory and apprehension (the difference between which is not apprehended), that is the cause of empirical usage, not itself being apprehended.

The Anyathākhyātivādin then argues that there is the empirical usage through the creation of an imposed cognition. It is not the memory of the bare root-meaning of the word 'silver' that causes activity; for, the activity of one who seeks is directed to the substrate of "this-ness". So, he should desire "thisness" only. And one should know that it is silver before one could desire it. It cannot be said that desire is due to the non-apprehension of the true nature of the substrate. One could as well be indifferent to it. No activity need follow. Thus it is the non-apprehension of difference that induces activity of an intelligent being through superimposition.[37]

By such criticisms of each other, the various schools of thought accept implicitly or explicitly the fact of superimposition.[38] And all error, as we shall see in the sequence, is the result of superimposition, the material cause of which is nescience.

---

37. *ibid.*, p. 30.

38. anirvacanīyatā sarvatantra-siddhānta ityarthaḥ, *ibid.*, p. 32

Chapter III

NESCIENCE

1

Cause of Illusions

The material cause of all error, of superimposition, either of the not-self on the Self, or of the silver on the shell is *ajñāna* which is positive, beginningless and inexplicable.

In the shell-silver illusion, the shell-silver and the knowledge of it are determinable neither as real nor as unreal. The shell-silver or the knowledge of it is not unreal because there is an experience of them. The silver cannot be real because it is sublated by the knowledge of the shell. It is so even with regard to its knowledge. When the known object is indeterminable, its knowledge cannot be determinable and *vice-versa.* It is because the silver is presented occasionally that its cause requires to be found out. It is not in every shell, nor every time for the same man, nor for every man that the silver-illusion occurs. It is a departure from the normal vision of shell. This eccentricity and exception must have to be accounted for. And, no account with regard to the production of anything will be complete and satisfactory unless the material cause is given.

The cause of the unreal cannot be found in the real. Otherwise, the illusory silver will acquire a reality since it is, on this supposition, produced by a real cause. Consistent with the indeterminable character of illusory silver, its material cause also should be indeterminable. This cause can, therefore, be none other than *ajñāna* whose character is typically inexplicable.

Again, the material cause of illusion should be beginningless. That which has a beginning in time will have an end and, therefore, can hardly constitute the persistent cause of illusions which recur. *Ajñāna* is itself the cause of time and it must be

beyond time. Its end is the end of the world-perception of difference and duality. In other words, so long as nescience persists, there will be bondage. And this is ended only by knowledge. That is why Śaṅkara calls it as beginningless and endless. The *ajñāna* has an end; otherwise there cannot be liberation. What is meant is that it is the persistent cause of the world. Just as a single principle continues to manifest itself both in the seed and the sprout, the earth and the pot, one beginningless persistent cause produces all the empirical existence.[1]

It cannot be maintained that illusions cause other illusions and this process of chain-causation is there without beginning and that, therefore, illusions themselves are nescience. Illusions and their residua are both of them effects of nescience. Since they are effects alike, one cannot persist in the other, and whatever cannot so persist can hardly be said to constitute a cause.[2] For example, the lump of clay is not the cause of the pot. It is the earth that is the cause of both the clay and the pot. The one characteristic of cause is that when it is present the effect is present and when it is absent the effect, too, is absent.[3] When nescience is present, illusions and their residua occur and when it is absent, they, too, do not occur. Hence nescience alone is the cause of illusions.

2

Enquiry into the persistent cause

The effect comes into existence only when the cause is there, and not that it necessarily comes into existence when the cause is there.[4] Otherwise, when the cause is eternal, effect also will have to be eternal because of the rule that it should exist

---

1. bījāṅkureṣvapi yadekam anvitaṁ mṛd iva ghaṭādiṣu tadeva kāraṇaṁ bījānām aṅkurāṇāṁ ca mṛdiva piṇḍādīnām - *I.S.*, p. 54.
2. ananvitaṁ ca nopādānaṁ piṇḍa iva ghaṭasya - *ibid.*, p. 48.
3. tasya bhāve teṣāṁ bhāvāt abhāve ca abhāvāt - *ibid.* yat kāraṇaṁ bhāva eva kāraṇasya kāryam upalabhyate, nābhāve - *S.B.* II. 1.15.
4. bhāva eva bhavati nābhāva iti niyamaḥ, na tu bhāve bhavatyeva iti - *I.S.*, p. 49.

when there is the cause; and conversely, the cause will be non-eternal because of its existence only at the time of the existence of the effect. Again, if cause is only coeval with effect, then there cannot be any cause-effect relationship between them, as in the case of the two horns of a cow which are not causally related. Thus when there is the cause present, the effect need not necessarily be there. Therefore, it cannot be argued that since nescience is present always, the illusions also will always be present.

3

Refutation of the Buddhist view that the cause is momentary

Buddhists argue that the cause and effect are not coeval but that the causal moment precedes the effect-moment. Then does the cause exist only in the previous moment? Or in the moment of the effect also? If the second, there will not be the effect in spite of its existence because of the non-existence of the effect in the earlier moment when cause was present. Then, how can this effect be that of this cause, the presence or absence of which does not seem to affect it?

If the first, *i.e.*, if the cause exists only in the prior moment, there will be no effect when it exists, but only when it is non-existent. The sprout, for example, comes into being only when the seed is destroyed. That which is existent when the cause is non-existent and is non-existent when the cause is existent is not the effect of that cause.[5]

If it is said that the posterior non-existence of the cause itself is the cause, it will cease to be the cause because of the fact that its posterior non-existence is not removed even when the effect is existent. The cause and the effect, then, must be said to co-exist which the Buddhist has denied already. And, as the posterior non-existence of the cause is not removed even when there is the existence of the effect, the non-existence of effect will have to be accepted at the time of the existence of the cause. Therefore, even

5. The criterion of causal connection is: yasmin sati yad bhavati, asati ca na bhavati, te kāryakāraṇe iti prasiddhiḥ - *ibid.*, p. 50.

if negation[6] is the cause, there is no rule like "the effect will necessarily be born when there is the cause". But negation can never be a cause. Similarly even if the existent cause and not the negation of it exists both at the time of the effect and earlier, then, there is the rule that "the effect comes into being only when there is the cause", but not the rule that "the effect necessarily comes into being when there is the cause", because of the absence of the effect when there is the existence of the cause in the prior moment. If, on the other hand, the cause exists only at the prior moment and not at the time of the effect, even then there is no necessity that the effect must come into existence when there is the cause because of the absence of the effect at the time of the cause. And because at the time of the effect there is no cause, the effect must come into existence only when there is no cause. Thus, an assertion with regard to their relationship as cause and effect will be meaningless.

Now, if, as the *siddhāntin* believes, the cause is permanent, will there be any distinction of prior and posterior moments for that cause? Will there be anything like sequence? If there is no sequence, does it not mean that all the effects of this permanent cause are produced at one single moment? And, for the rest of the moments to come there will be no effects to be produced by the cause, and thus the practical efficiency of the cause will be nullified. To avoid all these snags can we not hold that by the cause-effect relationship is meant only the existence of cause and effect in prior and posterior moments and that, by saying that effect exists at the causal moment, only this sequence is meant, and not simultaneity?

To this it is replied that this argument goes against what is commonly observed. That which follows when another exists, and that which does not follow when that another does not exist is related to that another as an effect. To say, therefore, that cause and effect exist at different times goes sorely against this commonly accepted rule. One cannot say, without the risk of flying against the face of experience, and accepted sense of

6. Posterior non-existence of the cause.

the words, that non-existence at the moment of the existence of the other is itself existence at the time of the existence of the other. If cause is momentary, there being no distinction for it in the prior and posterior moments, either the effect should be produced always or never at all. It cannot be said that there is a peculiarity in the cause at the moment of its own existence and not at the prior and posterior moments; for, in that case the effect also should originate only at the time of the existence of the peculiarity. And there will be no effect which comes at the next moment. If the next moment also is the effect of the previous moment it will come into existence at that time. If not, no cause-effect relationship can be asserted between the moments.

It may be argued: cause and effect relationship is not merely due to the priority and posteriority but existence in prior and posterior moments. For the moments themselves there cannot be existence in prior and posterior moments because there cannot be a time for time and this accounts for the impossibility of asserting a cause-effect relationship between them.

If this be the argument, since then there is no before and after for a time in respect of another time, since time itself does not have priority and posteriority, there is no prior and posterior relationship for the objects connected with time; cause-effect relationship does not need prior—posterior existence. And so the result will be: What once originates exists; that which does not originate, never. And thus there will be nothing like change and causation at all. This can be said to be the defect even in the Advaitin's position—*viz.*, time does not have another time and change is uureal. But then the Advaitin does not close his eyes to experience which displays causation and change. He takes experience as it is given, while the opponent flies against it and tries to explain it away by adopting the position of momentariness which will lead to no solution of the problem of cause. To deny causation is not to explain the experience of it. A permanent cause whose nature is inexplicable must be postulated to explain causation and change which are unreal but

which appear in experience. Of course this defect is there when simultaniety of cause and effect is asserted. In the event of the effect coming into being at a moment subsequent to the moment of cause, *i.e.*, if the effect originates when there is no cause, there is the contingence of its production at all moments since absence of cause is common to all moments with reference to the moment of the effect. There is no reason, in other words, why one moment alone should be singled out for special treatment as the causal moment preceding the effect-moment. This preceding moment is as good as any other moment prior or posterior to it, since the effect is not produced at that moment and when the effect is actually produced, it is not present. It cannot be said that the causal moment can be distinguished by this—*viz.*, moments earlier to it constitute its prior non-existence and moments subsequent to it constitute its posterior non-existence. For, there cannot be a distinction between two non-existences. Otherwise, non-existences will become positive.[7] If the distinction itself is of the nature of non-existence, again, among non-existences there can be no distinction. If it is of the nature of existence, how can this positive distinction be an attribute of non-existence?

Now, even granting that non-existences could be distinguished, there being no distinction in cause in the prior and posterior moments, its effect should be produced always. And, since there will be no time when there will not be this effect, there will be no more practical efficiency for it and consequently no further effect will ever be produced. It will be the final effect, and never again a cause for anythingelse. In the same manner, if its cause also were an effect of some other cause, it will be, like its own effect, only an effect and never a cause. Thus, cause can never be an effect. Therefore it is that one eternal cause and its many effects arising successively must be accepted. As an alternative to this, as many eternal causes (which are not effects,) as there are effects must be accepted. Anyway, there can be no rule that the effect necessarily comes into being

7. na ca prāgabhāva-pradhvaṁsābhāvayoḥ viśeṣaḥ abhāvatvāt. vis'eṣavattve ca bhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ - *I.S.*, p. 51.

when there is the cause. The dogma that only that which is practically efficient is real is to be abandoned since, as we have seen above, the effect produced will be final and will produce no further effect itself and thus, according to the definition of the 'real' given above is not real. Then there is the contingence of its cause being unreal, since its effect is unreal.

Thus, the cause of the various phenomena of the world is one and permanent, and not momentary. If the causal relationship between two momentary things is asserted, then, since the cause does not continue (in the effect) and since the effect is entirely non-existent before its birth and there being no distinction in the prior and posterior moments, why does the effect originate only then, and not at some other time, or even always? It makes no difference to the effect whether the cause is present or no since at the moment of cause the effect is totally non-existent. And there cannot be the association of the cause with what is non-existent. Certainly, causality cannot be asserted for two things which are not associated in a way. If the relation with the cause is for the non-existent, then, it is not for the effect which is existent, and, thus this effect will be causeless. For the effect, what is required is the relation with the cause; and not the antecedent non-existence. If, on the other hand, the relation with the cause is for that which has come into existence, then, if the effect had come into existence before it is related to the cause, what is the cause for? If it is said that a moment becomes the cause of the effect by being related to the effect, then, before the birth of the effect, there was no cause. And, thus, there can be no association of the effect with that. If the association exists even beforehand, then, there is the effect also, and in that case it shall not be momentary. So is the cause, too, not momentary. Besides, there is the contingence of a mutual dependence, since one is the cause due to its relation with the effect and the other is the effect due to its relation with the cause.

If it be said that the effect is produced by the cause when the cause is connected with those things, by the connection with

which it becomes the cause, then, either everything should constitute the cause or nothing, since there is no distinction for the moments which are non-persistent and entirely dissimilar. There is no such peculiarity for any moment or moments to enter into a causal connection to the exclusion of others.

If cause-effect relationship is restricted to mere existence in the prior and posterior moments of what one called the 'cause' and the 'effect', everything that exists in the prior moment will be the cause of everything that exists in the subsequent moment. Mere sequence will be treated as consequence. If that which is patent as the cause is said to be the cause, irrespective of priority, then, patency in experience is reckoned as an important factor and the conceit of reasoning is abandoned. If patency itself is said to be reason, then, cause, effect, etc., should be accepted as they are patent. And cause and effect relationship is not patent as momentary. It is well known that even in the case of seed-and-sprout-relationship which is beginningless, both of them are effects of a persistent cause and neither of the two is a cause. Night and day, though beginninglessly alternating, are yet the effects of the same cause. So a beginningless series of moments constituting causes and effects cannot be upheld. All the things of the world are the effects of the same cause that persists in them all; and none of them is a cause by itself. An effect can never be a cause.[8] And it has been shown earlier that because nescience, the cause, is permanent and persistent, all its effects will not be there at once. It has been shown that when the cause is present, the effect does not necessarily follow.[9] Though the cause, *viz.*, nescience, is persistent and permanent, the diversified effects come into being at diverse times. An example will explain the nature of the cause. In the trees which stand for a long time, flowers, fruits and foliage are observed to come into being only at distinct and appropriate times.[10]

---

8. kāryasya kāraṇānupapatteḥ - *I.S.*, p. 54.

9. kāraṇabhāve kāryaṁ bhavatyeva iti niyamo nāsti - *ibid.*

10. sthāyināmapi vṛkṣādināṁ kālaviśeṣād eva puṣpaphalādi - kāryaviśeṣāḥ dṛśyate - *ibid.*, p. 55.

Though the times of these effects like flowers etc., are diverse, *time* itself is not different. There cannot be a time for time itself.[11] Similarly, though the cause-*viz.*, nescience, is persistent, the effects unfold themselves successively at the appropriate times. Thus, the shell-nescience, *i.e.*, ignorance of shell which is beginningless is the material cause in respect of the shell-silver and the knowledge of it.[12]

4

The Beginninglessness of Nescience

Nescience or the shell, *śuktyajñāna*, is said to be beginningless. But the shell *has* a beginning. How can, then, the nescience of shell be beginningless? The answer is that nescience, though it is of shell, is not located in the shell which has a beginning, but in the Intelligence-Self which is beginningless.[13] Though located in the Self, it is nevertheless called shell-nescience; just in the same way as the knowledge of the shell is treated as that of the shell while it is the knowledge located in the Intelligence. As the shell-knowledge has shell for its content, the ignorance of it, too, has it for content.

A doubt can be raised here: If nescience has the Self for its locus, how is it that the experience is only "This is silver", and not "I am silver" just as one says "I am ignorant?" How is there the coordination, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in shell for the silver born of that nescience located in Self? The silver, the product of ignorance, cannot have two loci. And if silver had shell for its locus, (shell that has a beginning) nescience cannot be said to be its material cause. If it be contended that that which is persistent in the shell and the cause of it is itself the cause of silver, then, the silver, too, like the shell, would be real.[14] If it

---

11. kālasya tu kālāntarābhāvāt na kālaniyamacodyam asti - *ibid.*
12. anādikasyaiva śuktyajñānasya śuktirūpya - tajjñānopādānatā nyāyyā - *ibid.*, p. 56
13. jñāśrayaṁ hi tat; jñaśca anādiḥ - *ibid.*
14. śuktyanugataṁ śuktikāraṇameva rūpyakāraṇam iti cet, śuktivat rūpyamapi satyaṁ syāt - *ibid.*

is said that the cause of shell, too, is nescience, one cannot be sure; that is yet to be proved. A bold assertion without proof is not sustainable. So every line of thought seems to point to the fact that nescience is located in the shell, and not in the Self.

The *siddhāntin* meets the above argument in the following ways: Knowledge and nescience do not exist in shell-silver for anybody because of the undesirable consequence of reality as in the case of real silver. And silver is not real, because it is subject to sublation by true knowledge of shell. Hence it stands to reason that the shell-silver is produced out of shell-nescience. For the coordination of silver with the shell, though it is born of nescience that is located in the Self-Knower, one has only to be asked to see what happens when the sun is reflected in the water in a well, though the sun is actually in the sky. How does one see the sun in the well and delude himself that there is a sun in the well? Similarly, the silver as seen in coordination with the shell is only an illusion. Silver that appears in illusion is really not there. Still it appears and that is precisely the illusion. If the non-existent silver could be illusorily presented to perception, how is it impossible that there is the experience of its coordination with shell, a coordination which is as unreal as the silver? Really, the ignorance of the knower is expressed as "my ignorance is in respect of this". Unless the knower is accepted to be the locus of nescience, the perception of silver, and perception implies the knower, can never be accounted for.

Again, a doubt is raised from the Bhāṭṭa point of view. It was stated that knowledge and nescience of silver do not exist. Now it is said that such a knowledge and nescience exist. How are we to resolve the contradiction? Moreover, if silver is not known immediately, how can it be said to be silver, or how can there be a sublation of that? Unless it be given immediately, there will be no desire or effort on the part of the (deluded) people to get it. It cannot be said that silver-perception is not valid but born of nescience. For there cannot be a perception of silver without a valid means of perception.

Again, knowledge is mediate because of its being inferred.[15] Much more so is nescience which is only an absence of knowledge. Therefore, if shell-silver is produced out of nescience, it must be only a mediate presentation. But silver appears not mediately but immediately to perception. Otherwise people will not act upon this perception. And it is not self-luminous. Only cognition can throw it up immediately. This immediacy will not be secured even if nescience is negation of intelligence[16] which is immediate. For, nescience which is thus a negation cannot be a positive material cause of a silver that appears immediately to perception, precisely because it is a negation.

The Bhāṭṭas hold that *abhāva* or negation is only another positive entity, and thus, the absence of knowledge which nescience is, as indicated by the prefix 'a' in '*a-jñāna*', is something positive and not a negation, nor an indeterminable, nor beginningless because silver-illusion is an effect which has a beginning.

Nescience is either the prior non-existence or posterior non-existence of knowledge. That, too, is another positive knowledge or positive something else. And it is some positive particular effect inherent in its cause.[17] Indeed, the antecedent non-existence of the effect is not the cause itself. For when effect comes into being, its antecedent non-existence ceases to be and thus there is the contingence of the absence of the cause. Nor is the posterior non-existence of the effect the cause. Otherwise,

15. Bhāṭṭa Mimāṁsakas believe that knowledge is not self-luminous, but only inferred from the results of cognition; jñātatānumeyaṁ jñānam. See also Śabara's commentary on *Jaimini-Sūtra*, I. 1.1. In other words, the existence of cognition is inferred from the specific relation involved in knowledge between the subject and the object. Though cognition is inferred, the Bhāṭṭas believe that the objects are manifested immediately. In *kriyātvapakṣa*, knowledge is inferred. See *J.V., I.S.*, p. 429.

16. This is a reply to the argument: Intelligence may be said to be of the nature of fruit, different from the act that produced it. This knowledge, that is the fruit, is immediate. Therefore, its absence also is immediate - *ibid.*

17. kāraṇasamavetaḥ bhāvarūpa eva - *I.S.*, p. 57.

there is the contingence of the absence of the cause prior to the effect, because of the absence of posterior non-existence previously. Therefore, the antecedent and posterior non-existences of knowledge are *effects* and *positive* entities, like the lump of clay and the potsherds of the pot. Thus nescience is neither beginningless nor indeterminable. And it is not the cause of shell-silver.

Here the Naiyāyikas might say: the posterior non-existence is not a positive entity because of its eternal character, inspite of the fact that it is an effect. Though it has a beginning, it has no end. If *pradhvaṁsa* were a positive entity, it will be as non-eternal as pot, cloth etc., which are positive entities. And *pradhvaṁsa* cannot be non-eternal because, otherwise, even if a thing is destroyed, it will come into being again.

With regard to the *prāgabhāva*, though it has an end, it has no beginning. Thus, while it is denied that *pradhvaṁsa*, is a positive entity, it is denied that *prāgabhāva* is an effect. If *prāgabhāva* is an effect, another *prāgabhāva* will have to be accepted for the first one; and in this way, there will be infinite regress. Not even one of the antecedent non-existences will be established.

If prior existence itself were prior non-existence, apart from the contradiction in terms, all that exists at the prior moments will constitute the prior non-existence of all the things that come later.[18] If it be said that the positive entity which existed earlier and which is separated only by the interval of posterior non-existence is alone the antecedent non-existence, even then this positive entity is not direct *prior* non-existence since the interval of posterior non-existence, *ex hypothesi*, divides it from the effect. Moreover, a positive entity is not a non-existence. If, in order to attribute effectness to prior non-existence, it is suggested that posterior non-existence itself is prior non-existence,

18. And it cannot be said that that which is the posterior non-existence of something is the prior non-existence of that thing, for posterior non-existence has been shown to be not an existence.

because of its direct priority and the character of non-existence, even if this is admitted, positiveness of prior non-existence is not established. If posterior non-existence, say of clay, itself is prior non-existence, say of a pot, then because of the consequent non-removal of the antecedent non-existence, the effect will not come into being. Again, if the prior non-existence of knowledge is an effect, then, it should follow that before the origin of this effect, *i.e.*, prior non-existence of knowledge, knowledge should be accepted to be there always. In that case, it can have no prior non-existence. This is so not only before the origin of the effect *i.e.*, prior non-existence of knowledge, but also even after its origin, because of the persistence of posterior non-existence which is eternal. And a beginningless positive entity cannot have a destruction. Therefore, the positive entity *viz.*, knowledge, will be beginningless and will have no end which is not an acceptable position to the Bhāṭṭa. Thus prior non-existence is neither positive, nor is it an effect. And posterior non-existence, even if it is an effect, is not a positive entity.

To this position of the Naiyāyikas, according to whom *abhāva* can be perceived, the Bhāṭṭas, to whom *abhāva* or negation is only a *bhāvāntara*, offer a reply: How can posterior non-existence be an effect if it is not a positive entity? If it is an effect, how is it not non-eternal? It may be said that only a positive entity, and not *abhāva*, is non-eternal because it alone is an effect. Then, only a positive entity is an effect and not an *abhāva*. If being an effect is common both to positive and negative entities, it follows that non-eternality also is common to both. Indeed, no negation is observed as an effect and as eternal. If posterior non-existence is an effect in spite of its being a negative entity, then, antecedent non-existence also should be an effect, which is not acceptable to the Naiyāyika. If antecedent non-existence is not an effect because of its beginninglessness, it can be said that it is an effect because it has an end. Whatever has an end has a beginning.[19] Thus, negation, too, is a positive entity because of its having a

19. antavattaśca ādimattvāt, ghaṭavat - *ibid.* p. 59.

beginning[20] and an end, like any other object like jar. This is not strange since mutual negation, *itaretarābhāva*, is characterised by positivity of two entities mutually.

Again, the Naiyāyika is to be asked: is the destruction of the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, knowledge itself or somethingelse? If the first, then, as knowledge is positive, positivity would have been accepted for the posterior non-existence—*i.e.*, destruction of the prior non-existence of knowledge. If the second, is this something other than knowledge a positive or a negative entity? If the second, then, by contrast, antecedent non-existence becomes a positive entity, the destruction of which has resulted in the negative something else. In other words, negation cannot be the remover of negation.[21] If it could be, the previous negation cannot be the antecedent non-existence of knowledge because of its being separated from knowledge by this destruction.[22] This is so even in the case of the posteriority of the remover.[23]

If destruction, *nivṛtti*, is a positive entity, an antecedent non-existence and its destruction should be accepted for *nivṛtti*, because it did not exist earlier. This will lead to infinite regress as the same difficulty will be felt with that second *nivṛtti* and so on. Therefore, the removal of the antecedent non-existence of knowledge is not anything other than knowledge.

---

20. ādyantavattvācca bhāva eva abhāvo'pi, itarabhāvavat - *ibid.*

21. na hi abhāvasyaiva abhāvaḥ nivṛttissyāt - *ibid.* p. 58.

22. nivṛttivyavadhānāt - *ibid.* p. 59. tena nivṛttilakṣaṇābhāvena vyavadhānāt tasya nivṛttimataḥ na jñāna-prāgabhāvatvaṁ sidhyati ity arthaḥ - *J.V.*, 430.

23. nivṛtteḥ bhāvatvèpi tena bhāvena vyavadhānāt nivṛttimato na jñānaprāgabhāvatvam ity arthaḥ - *J,V.*, 430-431. Even if the removal of negation *i.e.*, antecedent non-existence of knowledge, be something positive, something other than knowledge, what is removed, *i.e.*, the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not really antecedent to knowledge because intervening between this antecedent non-existence of knowledge and knowledge itself, there is something positive other than knowledge which is said to remove the antecedent non-existence of knowledge.

Then, if knowledge itself is the *nivṛtti* or destruction of its antecedent non-existence, positivity will have to be accepted for destruction. It may be said here that negativity was accepted only with regard to the destruction of a positive entity and not of a negative entity. Only positivity is to be accepted for the destruction of negative entity. But even here, since there is a destruction of this positive entity, the destruction of a posterior non-existence has to be accepted. Thus, in view of all these difficulties, either the indestructibility or regeneration of antecedent non-existence of knowledge should be accepted, and, therefore, beginninglessness for it cannot be established. And it cannot be indeterminable. It is positive effect.

Nescience, if it is something other than knowledge, is not indeterminable. All that is known is known as either "is" or "is not", determinably. An indeterminable inert, which nescience is asserted to be, which is not cognised by any valid means of knowledge cannot be said to appear without the risk of self-contradiction. So, the *pūrvapakṣin* concludes that the inert, which is cognisable by valid means of knowledge as 'is' or 'is not',[24] appears and that it is not nescience that is indeterminable.

The Advaitin offers the following reply:

5

Nescience—Known by the Witness—Sākṣin

Nescience and its effects are established by experience, *anubhava*, which is eternal. Indeed the entire world of inert objects is rooted in and established by that *anubhava*.[25] Otherwise, nescience and its product, the world of objects, will not be established, since they are not established by valid means of knowledge.[26] *Pramāṇa* or valid means of knowledge itself does not have a *pramāṇa*, — what is there to say about nescience?[27]

---

24. asti nāstīti vā pramāṇa-gamyameva jaḍaṁ bhāti - *I.S.* p. 60. Becoming, according to Hegel, is both an 'is' and an 'is-not'.

25. tatprasādādeva sarvasya jaḍasya siddhiḥ - *I. S.*, p. 60.

26. teṣāṁ pramāṇāgamyatvāt - *ibid.* p. 61.

27. na hi pramāṇamapi pramāṇagamyam, kiṁ punarajñānādi - *ibid.* p. 61.

To this nescience therefore the eternal experience alone is the basis. The experience itself does not undergo any change, but is the basis of all appearance of change. If it is said that, since experience is eternal, there should be cognition always of all things, it is replied that perceptions like that of colour etc., arise occasionally because all empirical perceptions require the activity of the psychosis of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The *vṛtti* or the psychosis goes out, reaches the object, takes its form, and perception arises because there is the oneness of all three — *pramātṛ - caitanya*, *pramāṇa - caitanya* and *viṣaya - caitanya*.[28] For this perception, therefore, the internal organ, the *vṛtti* and the sense-organ are all necessary. That is why, though the *anubhava* is eternally present, knowledge does not arise always.[29]

Now assuming that nescience is the object of *pramāṇa*, two alternatives can be posed: (1) Is it the object of inferential or indirect knowledge or (2) is it the object of perceptual or direct knowledge?

Not the first; *pramāṇa* and its absence cannot be inferred by the effects and their absence.[30] If this is the case with valid *pramāṇa*, it is all the more so in the case of remembrance, illusion and doubt which do not have any effects from which *pramāṇa*, its absence or presence, could be inferred. If, on the other hand, they had an effect, they will be no more invalid, but valid knowledge.

It cannot be the second; one knowledge cannot be the object of another knowledge.[31] Knowledge should indeed be either a transformation of the knower or his quality. Both these alternatives are not helpful. Transformation of a person will not cognise either him or his another transformation. The

---

28. See Chapter on Perception.

29. rūpādinām anubhavasaṁsargasya cakṣurādijanita antaḥkaraṇavṛtti - sāpekṣatvāt na cakṣurādyānarthakyaṁ vṛtteḥ kādācitkatvāt na sadāsiddhi - prasaṅgaḥ - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 432.

30. phalaṁ nāma arthāvacchinnaṁ prākaṭyam bhāṭṭasya - *ibid.*

31. na ca jñānaṁ jñānāntarapratyakṣam - *I.S.*, p. 61

quality of a man, similarly, will not cognise either him or his another quality. The luminosity of fire does not cognise the fire. Nor even does it cognise itself. In the same way, knowledge cannot be the object of itself. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, etc., too, like *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge, remembrance, illusion and doubt (and their absence) are immediate, not to knowledge, but to the witness - *sākṣin*. [Everything] is present directly to the witness - Self; otherwise they will not be established at all. Thus, it cannot be said that because nescience is not known either by positive means or negative means there is the contingence of its determinability. Nescience is not unestablished since it is established by experience. Thus, it stands to reason that nescience, which is indeterminable, is the cause of silver-illusion.

It was said that nescience is not comprehended by positive and negative means of proof and, is, therefore, indeterminable. But this indeterminability is contingent for knowledge, pleasure, pain etc., since they, too, are not apprehended by positive and negative means of proof. If this contingence is not considered to be unacceptable, then there would be the more serious contingence of invalidity for the knowledge of Brahman. This contingence is, however, averted by the fact that Brahman-knowledge, having a real for content, is valid and not indeterminable. Validity and invalidity of knowledge are determined by the reality or unreality of the content. Knowledge is not valid or invalid in itself.[32] Hence, even illusions of waking and dreaming states, which indicate really auspicious and inauspicious things, are valid because their content is real, though they themselves are unreal.[33] Again, perceptions like that of long or short, though these longness and shortness themselves are unreal,[34] are valid because there is the real content. Similarly, the image, though unreal, indicates the prototype and it is invariably

32. yataḥ satyaviṣayatvaṁ tadabhāvaśca prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyaṁ ca, na svarūpa-satyatvam asatyatvaṁ ca - *I.S.*, p. 62.

33. jāgratsvapnabhrāntīnām asatyānāmapi satyaśubhāśubha - sūcakānāṁ satyaviṣayatayā prāmāṇyāt - *ibid.*, p. 62.

34. The *dhvani* is superposed on the letters which are alone, of course, in a relative sense, real.

concomitant with it, *i.e.*, the prototype. But things like pot, for example, do not indicate fire, etc., because though they are real, there is no invariable concomitance between the two, pot and fire.[35] This is so even in the case of illusory smoke. A dense mist may appear as smoke. But this is not to deny that there can be a real content for what is unreal. What happens in the case of unreal smoke is : the unreal smoke, *mithyādhūma*, not being invariably concomitant with fire, like the real smoke, there is for this unreal smoke non-indicativeness—*abodhakatvam*, because of not being the *probans* of real fire.[36] Therefore, knowledge, though indeterminable, is valid because the content is real.

Thus, it is not at all a defect that indeterminability is not apprehended by means of positive and negative proofs. But it must be noted that the Advaitin does not attribute this indeterminability to nescience for this reason. That is to say, its non-apprehensibility by positive and negative proofs is not the determinant of its indeterminability, but its destructibility by knowledge.[37] A real entity can never be cancelled by knowledge; nor can the totally non-existent things like the hare's horn. And nescience is indeterminable also because it is impossible to decide whether it is one or many, real or unreal, different or non-different, partless or impartite. Really, the non-apprehensibility of nescience by positive and negative proofs is declared only to remove whatever doubt there may be with regard to its reality or unreality. But, indeterminability does not follow from this non-apprehensibility because this non-apprehensibility is shared by knowledge, pleasure, etc., also, which are determinable.[38]

6

Maniness of Shell-Nescience

The nescience relating to the shell are as many as the shell-cognitions.[39] The silver-illusion arises in shell only when there

35. ghaṭādessatyasyāpi avyāptasya agnyabodhakatā dṛṣṭā - *I.S.*, p. 62.
36. mithyādhūmasya avyāptatvāt satyāgnyaliṅgatvātadabodhakatvam - *I. S.*, p. 62.
37. jñānamātra apanodyatvāt - *ibid.*, p. 63.
38. tasya nirvacanīyeṣvapi bhāvāt jñāna-sukhādiṣu - *ibid.* p. 63.
39. anantānyeva, yadyanantāni śuktijñānāni - *ibid.*

is nescience ralating to the shell. If shell-nescience is only one, it will be destroyed by the very first shell-cognition, and, thus, all the subsequent shell-cognitions will be futile. In other words, there cannot be more than one instance of illusion or shell-ignorance for an individual. If the subsequent shell-cognitions are not futile, but fruitful even if they do not destroy nescience, then, the first shell-cognition, which *did* destroy shell-nescience, is also such that the shell will always remain unknown. If the first one destroys nescience, the later ones also will. Thus, all cognitions must be accepted as destroyers of nesciences and all cognitions must have to be said to have the hitherto unknown for content.[40] A cognition revealing an object at one time need not be taken to have revealed the object for all time. If, then, different cognitions are desired even with regard to the same object at different times, different nesciences with regard to the same object, to be removed by different cognitions, must also be admitted.

Now, if many nesciences are accepted with regard to the same shell, then, by a single cognition of the shell, only one nescience will be destroyed, and other nesciences will remain and will conceal the object. If the shell could be known even in the presence of these later nesciences by the first cognition, and if it is not known when there is not this cognition, it follows that it is not the nesciences that cause the non-appearance of the shell; and when there is cognition the shell is known, and is not known when there is not this cognition,[41] whether there are nesciences or no. Thus, it is not at all necessary to postulate a nescience covering the shell. So runs the objection.

Here it has to be said that in the case of the alleged non-existence of nescience, there will be nothing that is unknown. And consequently, there will be nothing that can legitimately be called knowledge, because knowledge is legitimately so only when it makes known something hitherto unknown. Even granting that knowledge reveals the shell which does not reveal itself, and

40. ajñāyamānārthaviṣayatvāviśeṣāt - *ibid.*, p. 64.

41. And the shell does not manifest itself by its own capacity.

which, therefore, was not known earlier, it can still be said that the earlier absence of knowledge is removed by knowledge. Thus, to say that there is only the revelation of the object and that there is nothing to be removed is not true. And, there cannot be the knowledge of the shell unless the absence of the knowledge of it has been removed. If knowledge is said to exist even when there is the non-existence of knowledge, then (brooking even this self-contradiction in terms), there will be the manifestation of the shell always. Consequently it will not be possible to say whether the manifestation of the shell always is due to the knowledge of it or no and its knowledge will never be established. To avoid this self-contradiction, if it is agreed that knowledge arises only when its absence is removed; that the appearance of the shell, therefore, is occasional consistent with the occasionality of knowledge; but that the shell appears, even when the other negations of cognitions than the one which is at the moment removed by the knowledge, are not removed in as much as they are not instrumental for the non-manifestation of the shell, if all this is admitted, then, there is no reason why the same argument should not be accepted even in the case of nesciences other than the one that is at the moment removed by knowledge.

7

Positivity of Nescience

Nescience is not absence of knowledge. It is not something negative because, as has been already declared, it is not an object of any negative proof.[42] The Naiyāyikas will say that negation is perceived. The Bhāṭṭas accept *abhāvapramāṇa*[43]. And nescience is not cognised by either of these *pramāṇas*. It has an immediacy which shows that it is not an object of *anupalabdhi*[44]. Even taking the Nyāya view, the negation, *abhāva*, which is an attribute of the thing perceived, is an object of

---

42. abhāvapramāṇāprameyatvāt - *I.S.*, p. 65.

43. abhāvasya pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇamiti tārkikāḥ, abhāva iti bhāṭṭāḥ - *J. V.*, *I. S.* p. 436-7.

44. Cf. Bhāṭṭa view that knowledge and its absence are mediate.

perceptual knowledge.[45] But the Self, which is of the nature of Intelligence, is not an object of knowledge. Therefore, its nescience also is not cognised by any *abhāvapramāṇa* or negative proof. Indeed, negation, even for those who accept it, *i.e.*, the Bhāṭṭas and the Tārkikas, is not cognised without its substratum being cognised.[46] And, here the substrate Self is not perceived. So, nescience, too, is not an object of *abhāva-pramāṇa*. Nor does the absence of knowledge reside anywhere other than the Self. If the instance of mutual non-existence is cited to show that non-existence can reside in the counter-correlate also, even then, that non-existence is not cognisable because of the incognisability of knowledge which resides in the Self. The Self is not an object of knowledge and, hence, knowledge also cannot be cognised as existent in the Self.[47] Even accepting, therefore, that nescience is the non-existence of knowledge, unreality does not accrue to it simply because it is not known by an *abhāvapramāṇa*.[48] And, nescience is not absence of knowledge.

The known negations of knowledge, it can be shown, cannot be nescience. The mutual non-existence, *itaretarābhāva*, has the object for its substrate while nescience has the Self for the substrate. As for posterior non-existence, *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, origin is accepted, while for *ajñāna*, only beginninglessness has been declared. And, while nescience is removable, *pradhvaṁsa* is not. Even when one says "Knowledge is destroyed", or "Again I do not know" it does not denote the beginning of nescience because of the non-apprehension of its antecedent non-existence. Only the antecedent non-existence, *prāgabhāva*, of knowledge, and not of nescience also, appears. Thirdly, as for the antecedent non-existence, being non-existence, it does not appear in immediate experience as nescience does. If it is said that since antecedent

---

45. dharmiṇi pratyakṣe tadviśeṣaṇatvenābhāvaḥ pratyakṣo'bhavati - *J.V., I.S.* p. 437.
46. na hi abhāvāśrayam apratītya abhāvaṁ pratīyanti abhāvavādinópi - *I.S.*, p. 66.
47. pratiyogibhūtajñānasya aprameyātmasambandhinas-tat-pratītimantareṇa pratītyabhāvāt na prameya - *J.V.* p. 437.
48. jñānābhāvasya abhāvapramāṇāgamyatvāt asattvāprāpteḥ - *I.S.* p. 66.

non-existence of knowledge is removed by knowledge, by this fact of this removal it alone is nescience, it is replied that when knowledge arises, something other than its own antecedent non-existence is removed.[49] When light dawns, for example, it is not the absence of light that is removed. Darkness that is removed is not the antecedent non-existence of light.[50] It is a positive entity. Otherwise, it will be difficult to explain how a lamp taken from one place to another dispels darkness there. It cannot be said that the flames of the light are momentary and that it is intelligible that the antecedent non-existence alone is removed, for, if the above argument were true, then, for the light which stands in the same place for a long time, there being no darkness in the second and subsequent moments, there is the contingence of the extinction of the stream of light even in the presence of oil, wick etc., and the flame not being produced at all, like the hare's horn.

If darkness is not, as it has been demonstrated, the antecedent non-existence of light, it is not its posterior non-existence also, because the destruction, *pradhvaṁsa*, of the momentary flames takes place even in the absence of darkness. And in the instance of the gem, sun, etc., which are effulgent always and which move from place to place, it cannot be said that the darkness in the place which they reach is the anterior non-existence of the light that they shed or that the darkness in the place which they have left is the posterior non-existence of light, for the reason that they are always self-effulgent.[51]

If darkness cannot be the *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṁsa* of light, it cannot be the mutual non-existence of light also. If darkness is said to be the mutual non-existence of light existing in a non-luminous object, it is asked: by this kind of non-existence, is the non-existence of all lights meant or of only one

49. atatprāgabhāvasyāpi jñānabhāve nivṛttyupapatteḥ - *ibid.*, p. 67.

50. na hi pradīpasya prāgabhāvastamaḥ - *ibid.*, p. 67.

51. deśāddeśāntaraṁ gacchataḥ maṇyādesthiratvādeva janmavināśābhāvāt deśāntare tannivartyasya tamasaḥ na prāgabhāvatvaṁ tyaktadeśaprāptasya ca tamasaḥ na pradhvaṁsatvam - *J.V., I.S.* p. 439.

light? If the first, this darkness will never be removed unless all lights are there at once. Thus, even when the sun is there, darkness will not be removed. If the second, then, darkness will not be removed by the presence of lights other than the one of which it is the mutual non-existence or the counter-correlate. Moreover, if one light dispels only its own negation, there will be innumerable other darknesses left untouched. Consequently, nothing will ever be illumined because of the manifold obscurities.

For these reasons it is certain that nescience is not merely negation or anterior non-existence of knowledge, but a positive fact, is indeterminable and is removable by knowledge. It is called *ajñāna*, either because of its conflict with knowledge or because of its being other than knowledge.[52]

52. tacca ajñānavirodhāt jñānaparyudāsena vā ucyate - *I.S.*, p. 69. By knowledge here is meant either the intelligence which is not inert or the psychosis of the mind, reflecting the intelligence, having real as content. jñānamityajaḍaḥ bodhas - tadābhāsa vā cittavṛttiḥ satyārthā - *ibid.*, p. 69,

CHAPTER IV

THE STATEMENT AND REFUTATION OF THE RIVAL THEORIES OF ERROR

Vimuktātman classifies the theories of error into two groups, *viz.*, *sat-khyāti*, the cognition of the existent, and *asat-khyāti*, the cognition of the non-existent.[1] Under *satkhyāti* there are three views: (1) *ātmakhyāti*, *akhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti*, all of which admit that what appears in illusion is something that exists. Under the *asat-khyāti*, the theory of the Mādhyamika Buddhists or *śūnyavādins*, denying reality altogether and asserting that it is the non-existent void, *tuccha*, that appears in the illusion, is mentioned.

While the *ātmakhyāti* theory of the *Vijñānavādins* will not admit the extramental world of objects, the *akhyātivādins* and the *anyathākhyātivādins viz.*, the two schools of Mīmāṁsakas, Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas admit it. Professor M. Hiriyanna observes in his Introduction to the text of *Iṣṭasiddhi* that grouped as realistic and idealistic theories, the theories of error mentioned above may be characterised as the orthodox and the heterodox, meaning respectively the two schools of Mīmāṁsā thought and the school of the Logicians and the two schools of Buddhism.[2] Altogether, there are five theories discussed by Vimuktātman if we add the Advaitin's own theory called the *anirvacanīyakhyāti*.[3] We shall take the theories under *sat-khyāti* first in the order of *akhyāti*, *anyathākhyāti* and *ātmakhyāti* and treat of *asatkhyāti* next.

1

The Theory of Akhyāti

This theory, *akhyāti* or non-discrimination, is offered by the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas as an explanation of error. Non-

1. *I.S.*, I chapter, Kārikā 2, p. 39.
2. *I.S.*, p. XVI
3. ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā tathānirvacanakhyātiriṣyetatkhyātipañcakam.

discrimination naturally implies two *jñānas*[4] which are not, as they ought to be, discriminated and neither of which is in itself erroneous. These two *jñānas* are perception and remembrance. Perception is of the 'this', the substrate of illusion, through the senses. Remembrance is of silver,[5] and it is generated only by the arousal of residual impressions by factors like similarity. The confusion of the presentative and the representative perception or memory is the result of the obscuration of mémory due to the defects in the senses and the non-apprehension of the distinguishing details or particularities of the shell. Thus though there is no single knowledge as "This is silver", yet there is this usage and that precisely is the illusion. Though the two cognitions 'this' and 'silver' are veridical,[6] they bring about the usage of illusion because of non-discrimination. Hence, the non-discriminated cognitions themselves are wrongly called illusions.

The apprehension of silver is not the apprehension of the unreal. The unreal can never be apprehended. And the cognition is of the form "This is the real silver". If the unreal could appear as real, there will not be any certainty whether what is apprehended at anytime is real or unreal. It is not even *anyathākhyāti* or appearance otherwise for the same reasons stated as above, *viz.*, conflict with the experience of a real silver. Nor is it *ātmakhyāti*, because there is the experience of the externality of silver, and not its internality. Nor even is it *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, for the same reason that there is no experience of an inexplicable silver, but the perception is only of a real silver. If the inexplicable silver appears as real, then, cognition-otherwise is accepted and, thus, all the defects of *anynthākhyāti* will set in.

Now, *akhyāti* or non-discrimination is not negation or absence of knowledge.[7] In sleep, where there is no discrimination, there is no illusion. Non-discrimination is not a state of knowledge.

---

4. dve ete dhiyau, na ekaiva - *I.S.*, p. 42.
5. *I. S.* Kārikā I, 7.
6. idaṁrūpyajñāne yathārthe – *I.S.*, p. 42.
7. na jñānahīnā; suṣuptasya abhrāntitvāt - *Ibid.* p. 42

As the non-veridical knowledge is to other theorists, so is non-veridical usage for the *akhyātivādin*. To others, non-veridical knowledge characterises illusion. To the *akhyātivādin*, this function belongs to erroneous usage which has nothing to do with the knowledge of the shell and of silver (which are veridical) but which has everything to do with thinking wrongly that the non-discriminated cognitions are illusions.

The sublating cognition "This is not silver" sublates only the non-discrimination and removes the ground for the usage otherwise through discrimination of shell and silver. It does not sublate any non-veridical knowledge because there has been none.[8]

2

Criticism of the Akhyāti Doctrine

The Prābhākaras are perhaps right in holding the realist view that we have no reason to suspect the intrinsic self-validity of our cognitions. Otherwise, there will be universal uncertainty.[9] Knowledge through the senses never fails, but it always reveals the nature of the object. The Advaitin, too, shares the view of intrinsic self-validity of cognitions. And, if that which appears in a cognition in whatever manner exists in the same manner, that cognition can never be illusory. But how does error arise, as it does, in experience?

If, as the *akhyātivādins* urge, there are only presentative sensory perception of the shell and the remembrance of the silver, and if, further, these knowledges are valid and are successive, what is that element in this situation that causes the illusion of silver? Of course, the *akhyātivādins* will answer: The two knowledges, though valid in themselves, are called illusions because they lead to a usage of activity,[10] not corresponding to

8. tasmāt yadyathākhyāti, tattathā-astyeva iti sthitam - *ibid.*

9. asatópi sattvena khyātisaṁbhave anyatrāpi anāśvāsāt sat sattvena khyati ityapi niścayópi na syāt - *ibid.*, p. 41.

10. yānyathā pravartayatyakhyātiḥ sā bhrāntiḥ, anyathāpravṛttihetorbhrāntitva-prasiddheḥ - *ibid.*, p. 115. The answer to this argument is that mere non-discrimination, as in sleep, does not lead to any practical activity or usage - *suṣuptādiṣvapravṛtteḥ* - *ibid.*

the objects. While the silver is only remembered, not perceived, since it is the shell that is perceived, an activity born of both perception of shell and remembrance of silver is directed to shell wrongly; wrongly because it is the silver that one rushes to pick up and not the shell. There is here an obscuration of remembrance. Illusion is ascribed to veridical cognitions, perception and remembrance, for the reason that they cause a wrong activity.

The question now is: Is the nature of being the cause of the wrong usage, *ayathārtha-vyavahāra-hetutva*, that is ascribed to perception and remembrance, ascribed to them (1) directly or (2) indirectly through the revival of *saṁskāras*? (1) Not directly, because cognitions, in themselves valid, can never cause an illusory usage directly. One shall face the consequence of this position being extended to all valid cognitions and accepting that valid cognitions may lead to illusions, which is absurd.

(2) If indirectly, this possibility of a valid cognition, indirectly leading to illusory activity through the revival of *saṁskāras* in spite of being valid will include all valid cognitions and make them illusory with the result that there will be no certainty anywhere of a valid cognition.[11]

If, on the other hand, it is said that in the case of other valid cognitions, there cannot be illusoriness for they lead to valid usage while in the present case of silver-illusion both perception and remembrance are seen to lead to wrong usage, then, illusoriness should be accepted for these latter two since they are different from valid cognitions leading to right usage and themselves lead to wrong usage. In other words, if we are to avoid the contingence of the undue extension, *ativyāpti*, of illusoriness, on the hypothesis of the *akhyātivādin*, to all valid cognitions, whereby the very possibility of cognitions corresponding to objects and revealing them will be endangered and their realism surrendered, we should draw a line between right, valid

11. kāntākarādigatarajatakhyātināmapi saṁskāraparamparayā ayathārthavyavahārahetutvasaṁbhavāt bhramatvaṁ syāt - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 417.

cognitions elsewhere and the cognitions (*viz.*, perception of shell and remembrance of silver) here in the silver-illusion and say that the latter are illusory and not merely that they lead to illusion or cause it, inspite of themselves being veridical.

What is the determinant by which the validity of perception and remembrance and their causing illusory usage, in spite of their validity, are asserted? If the determinant is the non-discrimination of remembrance from perception, how can there be this non-discrimination when discrimination itself should be as self-manifesting as remembrance and perception, as *jñānas* are self-manifesting to the Prābhākaras? When remembrance is known as remembrance and when perception is known as perception, whence is the possibility of a non-discrimination between them? Or again: if non-discrimination is due to the obscuration of the idea of remembrance, is this idea the very nature of remembrance or something else? If it be the very nature, in its (idea) absence, there will not be remembrance at all. If something different, in the absence of this idea, there will be no non-discrimination.

Further how can this non-discrimination be said to be that of the contents instead of the knowledges? For, as discrimination or difference is always dependent on or refers to the objects. When the objects are known, their difference or non-relation also should be known.[12] even according to the Prābhākaras. If non-cognition of difference between the contents is due to non-cognition of objects in entirety, then, there is the contingence of all cognitions being rendered illusory, since no cognition reveals its contents entirely.[13]

Here, the argument may be couched in a different way by the older school of Akhyātivādins[14] who seem to have admitted

12. bhedāsaṁsargayorvastumātratvāt arthayor-bhāsamānayos-tayorapi bhāsamānatvāt abhāsamānayostu atiprasaṅgāt - *ibid.*

13. yatra kvāpi viṣaye akhyātessarvadā vidyamānatvād asarvajñasya sarvasya- *I.S.*, p. 115.

14. See Prof M. Hiriyanna's Introduction to the text - p. XVII. Jñānottama calls them *ciraṁtanākhyātimatam. I.S.*, p. 418.

a synthesised stage in knowledge where an intellectual construction on the part of the mind is superadded to perception and remembrance. Thus, though the two *jñānas* themselves are valid, the mind of the knower relates those data in a wrong way. The argument is put in this form: The inducement to illusory activity is due to the illusion that the knowledge of coordination, *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, as "This is silver" has arisen while in reality it has not arisen at all; or else there is a third mental knowledge of coordination (in addition to perception and remembrance) and hence the inducement.[15]

But the admission of the third factor, or of the illusion of the rise of the knowledge of coordination is fatal to such a thoroughgoing realists as the Akhyātivādins. Once illusory cognition is admitted to be possible,[16] the self-validity of knowledge is surrendered. If, again, the third knowledge is accepted as illusory, and if, thereby, the possibility of illusion in that way is accepted at all, why should not the first knowledge be accepted as illusory? But the Akhyātivādin is not without an argument here. While invalidity in case of sensory perception goes straight against the realistic position taken by the Akhyātivādins, invalidity ascribed to a mental activity is not thought to be a contradiction in the realistic system.[17] If there were no such rule of self-validity for perception by senses. it may not even do much harm so far as the worldly usages and activities are concerned because something is there in the world to be seen (rightly or wrongly) but it will affect adversely the Vedic authority which has to do only with things unseen. If self-validity is given up, then, there can be no inducement to activity by the Vedic injunctions, which according the Mīmāṁsakas is the sole function of the Vedas. For Veda, too, there is causality only in respect of valid knowledge. Invalid knowledge, however, is caused by some other extraneous factor. This is the reason

15. idaṁ rajatamiti sāmānādhikaraṇyajñāne anutpanne'pi utpannābhimānat-pravṛttiḥ, tṛtiyaṁ vā sāmānādhikaraṇyajñānaṁ mānasam asti, ato vā pravṛttiriti-*I.S.*, p. 43-44.

16. ayathārthajñānābhyupagamāt – *I.S.*, p. 44.

17. mānasasya ayathārthatvepi avirodhāt – *I.S.*, p. 44.

why the first two cognitions are not invalid, but only the third mental factor.

But this argument of the Akhyātivādin also is not acceptable to the Advaitin. If, for the Akhyātivādin, there is no contradiction in treating the mental factor as causing the invalidity, the Advaitin points out, there is no contradiction in treating memory or remembrance itself as invalid and illusory, since memory springs from materials of what is not valid.[18] Obviously, remembrance is not born of sense-perception, but is a product of residual impressions. A valid knowledge is of the hitherto unknown.[19] But memory is only of that which is already known. As such, it is not valid. Even so is illusion, that too, being generated by factors constituting invalid cognition, like remembrance.[20] The aggregate of factors for the valid and invalid cognitions are not the same. Hence, even apart from the fact of being generated by the mere revival of residual impressions, illusion is at any rate not brought about by the aggregate of factors that brings about valid cognitions. Though senses like eye etc., are common to factors of both valid and invalid cognitions, yet it is the defective senses that cause the illusion, and not the sound and healthy senses, like the mind.[21]

The Vedas are defectless and as such there is the causality in respect of valid knowledge for the Vedas by their potency. But it is either out of ignorance of the potency of the words or out of a sense of doubt as to the conflict of the Vedic testimony with perception, and certainly not through the words of the Vedas which have in themselves self-validity, that there arises illusion with regard to their meaning. So, not only the conflict mentioned by the older school of Akhyātivādins with regard to the scripture does not exist; it contradicts the verdict

18. smṛteḥ na ayathārthatve kas'cidvirodhaḥ, apramāṇasāmagrījanyatvāt – *I.S*, p. 44.

19. tatra smṛtivyāvṛttaṁ pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārtha-viṣayakajñānatvam. *V.P.*, p. 3.

20. apramāṇa-sāmagrījanyatvāvis'eṣāt – *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 418.

21. s'uddhaṁ tu abhrānteḥ, manovat – *I.S.*, p. 44.

of direct experience also. Thus, this theory of non-discrimination is not satisfactory.

Further, the doctrine of *akhyāti* is not free from defects of unreliability and emptying knowledge of its content, much as in the case of *anyathākhyāti*. The remembrance is of the silver that exists elsewhere. If illusion is due to the non-discrimination of this *smṛti* and *anubhava*, it amounts to saying that a real silver seen elsewhere is not remembered as such but, due to non-discrimination, is seen in the shell that is presented to the senses. Consequently, the uncertainty, *anāśvāsaḥ*, affects the theory of *akhyāti*, since one cannot be sure in any case of perception whether one sees snything as it really is or sees only the remembered thing seen elsewhere.[22] Also, there is the contingence of the apprehension being rendered contentless if one sees silver where it is not. And these considerations militate against the criterion of truth adopted by the Prābhākaras, *viz.*, practical efficiency. When any cognition is contentless, it cannot possibly lead to any fruitful practical activity.[23]

Of course, the Prābhākaras will say that it is the defect in the senses that leads to non-discrimination and the resultant illusion. But this is not peculiar to *akhyāti* theory alone. It is available, for example, in the case of the *anyathākhyāti* also. A defect not only always retards the production or achievement of the desired effect, but also, doing this, produces just the contrary result. And, one cannot say that when the defect is absent, the cognition is always valid. This is according to the priniciple : when the cause is present, the effect is not necessarily produced.[24] Moreover, there is the contingence for the Akhyātivādin of inferring the immediate cognition through the *probans* of the absence of defect. But what is proper is that only the absence of illusion can be deduced from the absence of defects. The presence

22. arūpyamapi rūpyākārena bhātīti bhrāntau yaddṛṣṭaṁ tasya paramārthasthale yojanādanāśvāso-akhyātimatépi tulyaḥ, smṛtyavivekasya vaktuṁ s'akyatvāt - *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 419.

23. jñānānālaṁbanatāvad-vyavahārānālaṁbanatāp'i *syāt* - *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 419.

24. na hi kāraṇabhāve kāryaṁ bhavatyeva - *I.S.*, 45.

of cognition, on the other hand, is possible only by the presence of the cause of knowledge, and not the absence of defect. Moreover, do those who say that by the possibility of indetermination or uncertainty of the content in one place, the same uncertainty also can be inferred in other places, mean by this uncertainty (*anāśvāsa*), indetermination, *anadhyavasāya*, or invalidity, *prāmāṇyahāniḥ* or doubt, *saṁśaya?* Taking the first alternative, when silver is seen in *haṭṭa* etc., there is no indetermination here in the form "What could it be?"-So, there is no *anadhyavasāya*. If a single cognition cannot be held to be capable of revealing the object, it cannot be made to do so by even one thousand subsequent cognitions. The determination of having content for one cognition cannot be, therefore, through the second cognition. A cognition, in other words, is self-certifying.

And regarding the second alternative, *prāmāṇyahāni*, or invalidity, the determination of having content or of validity cannot be through the pragmatic criterion of practical efficiency. The risk of inconstancy, *vyabhicāra*, is not absent even in the test of practical efficiency.[25] There are cases in which practical efficiency cannot lead to the determination of validity. That is, validity is not determined by constancy, but by the presence of knowledge; nor is, therefore, inconstancy the determinant of invalidity.[26] A *pramāṇa* always reveals the object. Therefore, validity is determined by the presence of the knowledge of the object. For example, there is the validity of the senses when knowledge is there, even though the senses are inconstant in respect of colours like blue, white etc. In the same way, there is invalidity of smoke of the fire inspite of the eonstancy of fire, till it is known by the rise of residual impressions of the pervasion, or universal connection between smoke and fire.[27] If it is said that invalidity is observed to arise in the inference,

---

25. vyabhicārasya samānatvāt – *I.S.*, p. 45.

26. na ca vyabhicārāt aprāmāṇyam, jñānasya pramāṇaphalasya paricchitter bhāvāt – *I.S.*, p. 45.

27. agnyavyabhicāriṇo'pi dhūmasya vyāptisaṁskārānudbodhena tadbodhakatvābhāve sati aprāmāṇyāt – *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 420.

"Sound is eternal, because of perceptibility, like the ether", because of inconstancy, even there the invalidity is not due to the inconstancy, but only because of the absence of the fruit of the *pramāṇa*, *viz.*, knowledge. It may be said that inconstancy is the cause of the absence of the fruit—*i.e.*, knowledge, and that, therefore indirectly it is the cause of invalidity. But, it is replied, the absence of the fruit is the result of the absence of the cause,[28] and the fruit is from the *probans*, *hetu*, which is constant. Therefore, inconstancy is the cause of something not being the *probans*, *aliṅgatva-hetu*, in respect of knowability.[29] It does not determine the invalidity, as contradiction does. This has been already illustrated by the senses being valid inspite of the inconstancy of the object like red, white, etc., because of the revelation of the object.[30]

Thus *anāśvāsa* or uncertainty which is said to be inferred with reference to objects elsewhere from the uncertainty of an object in one place, can neither be indetermination, nor invalidity. It is finally shown that it cannot even be doubt. Obviously there cannot be a doubt from inconstancy in respect of the object which is already determined, as in the case of a pillar which is determined from its tallness. The cognition with regard to the pillar does not proceed from the indetermination as "either pillar or man" to determination as man. Even where it originates, it is of the nature of determination.[31] And, in the context, the question of the cases of indetermination does not arise.

Reverting to the main argument of constancy being the criterion of validity, those who depend upon constancy as the test of validity will reap only inconstancy. For, how is one to know whether a cognition is itself constant? This cannot be

---

28. phalābhāvaśca hetvabhāvāt – *ibid.*, p. 45.

29. vyabhicāro'liṅgatvahetuḥ prameyatvādeḥ – *ibid.*, p. 45.

30. jñānaṁ vyabhicāryapi pramāṇaṁ sattayā bodhaktvāt - *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 420.

31. utpattyaiva ca jñānasya niścayātmakatvāt na aniścayaḥ yuktaḥ - *I.S.*, pp. 45-46.

proved by a recourse to another cognition as that will obviously land us in infinite regress.

Again: if the content is not ensured or guaranteed by the presence of a knowledge of it, how can a content for that knowledge be established? If the content is not established, in what sense is constancy for knowledge to be understood? And, for that matter, how can inconstancy, too, be established? If it is established by knowledge itself, then the same knowledge can be the proof for the object also. Therefore, though there is no rule that a cognition reveals the object as it is, yet, since the defects like uncertainty or unreliability are not there for it is not right to hold to *yathārthatva* with obstinacy as the Akhyātivādin does. In other words, because in some instances knowledge turns out to be erroneous, one need not hasten to save cognitions from unreliability by taking the extreme position that cognitions can never go wrong. The defects of unreliability etc., that is to say, do not necessarily go hand in hand with the fact that cognitions sometimes turn out to be erroneous. So the Akhyātivādin will do well not to lay much store on his uncompromising realism making all cognitions valid by virtue of being cognitions and treating both perception and remembrance as valid and tracing the illusion to the usage following their non-discrimination.[32]

Again: what is this *akhyāti?* Is it apprehension, *khyāti*, or the absence of it, *khyātyabhāvaḥ*? It cannot be the absence, since Prābhākaras do not accept *abhāva* or negation as a category. Nor can it be apprehension, *khyāti*; for, otherwise, all apprehensions likewise will be rendered illusory. Nor can *akhyāti* be wrong knowledge, for, even wrong knowledge is not the *absence* of right knowledge, since absence, *abhāva*, is not accepted by the Prābhākaras.

Moreover, if apprehension itself is illusion, how can it be ever sublated at all? Indeed, one apprehension does not negate another. Nor can it be said that there is no non-apprehension,

32. *I.S.*, verse 4, chapter IV. p. 289.

akhyāti. For, when there is no such non-apprehension, all people everywhere will be omniscient, with the result that all the provisions of valid means of knowledge will become unnecessary and futile, since there will be no one for whom there is anything left to be known. And means of knowledge do not merely revive to memory the things already known, as this will involve an infinite regress. Thus, in the Akhyātivāda there is no intelligible provision and explanation for illusion and its sublation.

Again, the *akhyāti* doctrine does not stand to reason even from another angle of argument, which is as follows: There is the cognition of silver in illusion. In explaining this, the Akhyātivādins say that the silver is remembered, while the shell is perceived, and that both of these, perception and remembrance, are veridical or valid. If silver it is that appears in the illusion, then, how does the silver appear in the shell? Silver-cognition must have proceeded from silver. If it is said that silver-perception is there, not because there is silver, but because of the presence of the latent impressions that are aroused, then silver is a matter of remembrance, as indeed the Prābhākaras admit. But, remembrance is in respect of external objects for those who accept the externality of the object like the Mīmāṁsakas and for those who do not accept the externality of the object like the Vijñānavādins, remembrance will be in respect of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. But, in either case, knowledge of silver is not produced from the shell. To put it in a nutshell, the knowledge of silver which has for its content the external silver is not located in the shell, since that is located in the silver. Similarly, the knowledge of silver located internally is not located in the external shell because of being internal. Even when there is non-discrimination the knowledge of silver cannot arise from the shell. In fact, when there is non-discrimination, the silver-cognition will not be in silver itself. How much less then should it be in the shell!

Further, what is meant by non-discrimination?[33] (1) Is it non-cognition? (2) Or incorrect cognition? (3) Or identity of objects

33. ko 'viveko' grahaḥ kiṁ vā viparītagraho 'thavā arthayoraviveko' rthakṛto dadhiguḍādivat – *I.S.*, verse 6, IV. ch. p. 289.

brought about by objects themselves like curd and jaggery-piece? (1) It cannot be non-cognition because there can then be no apprehension. But it is admitted that even in illusion, there is apprehension. (2) If it were incorrect knowledge, it goes straight against the basic tenet of the Prābhākaras to whom no knowledge is incorrect. (3) If it were identity produced by the two objects themselves, there cannot be the knowledge of any one of these two.

Besides, to the Prābhākaras, knowledge is never immediately given but only mediately inferred through some *probans*. Accordingly, the silver-knowledge being the *probans*, here it is only proper to infer the existence of silver, and not of the shell. But here there is no silver at all. There is only the shell. So, if there is any inference possible, it is of the shell. Otherwise, no cognition is inferrable because of the absence of *probans* the one *probans* available being silver-knowledge and that, too, being contentless.

Moreover, the Akhyātivādins maintain that illusion is the non-discrimination of perception from remembrance and that discrimination is the sublation. Now, how is this sublation possible? Is it by another cognition? This will involve infinite regress. If discrimination between shell and silver that are apprehended and remembered respectively is not established or secured by the fact that one is apprehended while the other is remembered, then, what other cognition can bring about this discrimination? It is not as if one cognition *i.e.*, either perception or remembrance will bring about the discrimination, because shell is *perceived* while silver is *remembered*.

If, therefore, there are two cognitions, corresponding to each *i.e.*, shell-perception and silver-remembrance, how is discrimination vouchsafed between and by these *two sublating* cognitions? If there could be a discrimination by or between these two, the original two cognitions themselves could have been discriminated, in which case illusion could not have arisen.

And, there are no two sublating cognitions here. If another single sublating cognition is required for the discrimination of the one content of one knowledge, there will be the requirement of another knowledge and so on, and thus there will be infinite regress, as already pointed out.

The opponent's argument may be put in this form: The objectness, *karmatva*, of remembrance and perception for shell and silver is being the content of perception and remembrance, and perception and remembrance do not reveal their shell-and silver-objectness, and therefore, discrimination of their objectness is only by another knowledge. But then, a sublating cognition which discriminates the objectness of perception and remembrance for shell and silver respectively, which have been already discriminated, is useless. If shell and silver are not discriminated, what is the aim in getting the objectness of perception and remembrance discriminated by the sublating cognition? And the discrimination between the objects and the cognitions cannot be obtained by one cognition. If the sublating cognition be the discriminator between the objectness of perception and the objectness of remembrance, then, illusion is the non-discrimination between the objectness of perception and the objectness of remembrance which are cognised. Illusion is only of that which is cognised, not of that which is not cognised at all. When thus the objectness of perception etc., has been established by its cognition, another cognition sublating their non-discrimination is not necessary.

Perception and remembrance and objects associated with them being mediate, *apratyakṣa*, their non-discrimination cannot be a matter of perceptual illusion or sublation. Or, the objects of perception and remembrance being immediate and mediate respectively, illusion or sublation cannot be either immediate or mediate. Perhaps, to have both immediacy and mediacy is reasonable. In dreams, for example, it is only mediate. But this situation is not quite palatable to the Akhyātivādin. Thus, illusion is not the non-discrimination of the contents of perception and remembrance.

An analysis of remembrance will show that non-discrimination of the content of memory is not illusion. For memory has no perceptual content. If it had, then, it will possess as much validity as a perceptual cognition. But memory is not non-apprehension. It has a content. Only it is not perceptual. Indeed, cognition is observed even with reference to something that is already cognised. The content of the second cognition may be the same as that of the first perceptual cognition, or less. So, the invalidity of remembrance is not on the ground of contentlessness. Remembrance has a content. Even when memory takes the form "This is already apprehended," it brings out apprehension of the apprehendedness. Remembrance is of a thing of the past. Though the thing itself is not there in sense-contact the latent impressions of the form of the thing are preserved in memory and it is these, when they are aroused, that constitute remembrance. And remembrance is present to Witness-Intelligence, *sākṣin* and not to the mental psychosis.[34] It is because memory is the form of an already perceived object that it is invalid. This memory, which is only a form of intellect, is cognised, as was pointed out, not by another mental psychosis as in the case of other pieces of empirical knowledge, but by the Witness, *sākṣin* itself. So there is no infinite regress or self-dependence in this conception of memory. Also, there is no possibility of non-discrimination.

3

The Statement of Anyathākhyāti—I

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas agree in saying that error consists in cognising the object in illusion as otherwise than what it is,[35] brought about by the defects of the senses. The 'silver' that appears in illusion is not totally a non-existent nothing since a non-existent nothing can never be cognised. Nor is it an existent; otherwise it can never be sublated. The sublation is of the form "This is not silver", and it denies only

34. sākṣiṇ-kṛvassaḥ no dhiyā - *I.S* IV, 18.

35. bhrāntau anyasya anyātmanā avabhāsanāt bhrāntiḥ anyathākhyātiḥ iti giyate - *I.S.*, p. 118.

the identity of silver with the substrate. The silver as it is perceived here and now is denied. It does not mean that the non-existent silver appears and, after sublation, disappears. It only points to the reality of the silver *elsewhere*. So, the argument of the Akhyātivādin, for instance, that everthing is as it verily appears to be cannot be seriously sustained.[36] The Naiyāyikas hold that the silver in the shop is perceived directly by a supernormal perception, *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*, arising out of the memory-images of the special properties of silver. These memory-images themselves are the result of the failure to see the distinguishing features of the shell (which is given in immediate perception as 'this') and of association of the general features of shell that one perceived with silver and its special qualities. Through such recollection, there is said to be a sort of sense-contact with the silver. Thus, there is an actual perception of silver in illusion.[37]

In illusion, there are no two knowledges,[38] as the Prābhākaras would have us believe. There is only one single cognition where the presentative and the representative cognitions distinctionlessly fuse into one as is well illustrated in cases of recognition like "This is that Devadatta", for instance, or "So far this appeared as silver".[39] Inference also is adduced as a proof for the fact that it is the shell that appears as silver.[40] The *hetu* employed

36. yathāpratibhāsaṁ sarvasya sattābhyupagame bhrāntitvāsaṁbhavāt, bādhābhāvaprasaṅgāt – *ibid.*, p 120.

37. S. C. Chatterjee – *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 38.

38. It is not that two knowledges are there and the false identity is between these two. The false identification is between the shell and silver themselves - śuktirajata oḥ svarūpeṇaiva suṣuptayoḥ saṁskāra-sahita duṣṭakāraṇasāmagriviśeṣādeva saṁsargajñānam abhyupagamyate – *I.S.* p. 119.

39. nedam iti ca bādhodaya-samanantarajamupajātam (etāvantaṁ kālaṁ rajatamityāha) iti pratyabhijñānam. *N M.* p. 84.

40. rajatātmanā pratibhāsagocarabhāve pramāṇam anumānaṁ (vivādapadaṁ rajatākāreṇa avabhāsate tadarthino niyamena pravṛttiviṣayatvāt) – *ibid.* p. 83-84. "vivādagocarāpannaṁ purovarti vastu rajatajñānālambanaṁ bhavitum arhati, atadātmakatve sati - tadarthinaḥ tadvyavahāra-viṣayatvāt

is the invariable activity towards it of those who desire silver. The silver, of course, is sublated either by a subsequent perception as "This is not silver", or the disillusionment of one who hastens to pick it up. In the former case it is absence of the objectivity (*viṣayāpahāra*) and in the second case, it is absence of result (*phalāpahāra*), since one gets the shell instead of the coveted silver.

In the Naiyāyika interpretation of error, therefore, a distinctly subject ve element enters. It is the association and the mischief of memory that vitiate the vision and bring about the otherwiseness of the object in the illusion. Neither element in the delusion "This is silver", (the 'this' and the 'silver') is unreal. The Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras agree. While the Prābhākaras cannot afford to introduce any subjective factor in the explanation without prejudice to their thoroughgoing realism, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Bhāṭṭas readily admit the presence of a private element. Illusion is only the wrong perception of identity.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that what appears in knowledge is not a copy or symbol of the thing that is known but the thing as it actually exists.[41] The Bhāṭṭas are *bhedābhedavādins* maintaining that every object is an identity-in-difference, being itself and at the same time undergoing the vicissitudes of change in form and properties. An object is a complex of substance and attributes. This object stands in an external relation to other objects in its neighbourhood. Thus, it has numberless relations, both positive and negative. If it has a positive property like 'cowness' it excludes the property 'horseness'. Thus, an object is constituted not only by what it is but also by what it is not.[42] If an object is shell in a positive sense, it is silver in a negative

---

sampratipanna-rajatavat" - or else, "sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavahāro dharmisaṁsargajñānapūrvakaḥ bhavitum arhati, agṛhītāsaṁsarga-sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavahāratvāt - *I.S.*, p. 119.

41. Hiriyanna's Introduction to the Text of *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. XVIII.

42. śuktissvābhāva rūpyātmā bhāti - *I.S.*, I. I; p. 43. "bhāvāntaram abhāvo'nyo netyuktaṁ tatra bhaṇyate, *ibid.* p. 295.

sense.[43] When the shell, for example, appears in its own form positively, it is valid knowledge; when it appears as silver, it is error. Here the 'negation' of shell is only the existence of silver. It is not the non-existent that appears in illusion. It is only the false *tādātmya* or identity of the silver which exists in its own right with the shell that constitutes illusion. This identity, as we have already seen, is a positive subjective contribution. Our false identification has nothing to do with the object itself.[44] In the words of Hiriyanna, error exhibits an external relation as an internal one.

In the view of the Bhāṭṭas silver is only the negation of shell,[45] on the principle "*bhāvāntaram abhāvo'nyo na kaścidanirūpaṇāt.*" Though both the shell and the silver are real, the shell is the object of valid knowledge as shell; but in illusion, it is the object of knowledge as the silver which is its negation.[46]

4

Criticism and Refutation of Anyathākhyāti

Vimuktātman criticises the theory of *anyathākhyāti* very elaborately. The Chapters II, III, IV and V of *Iṣṭa-siddhi* are devoted to the reasoned refutation of the theory in all its various forms and versions. Whether by *anyathākhyāti* is meant (1) the otherwiseness of the object cognised, or (2) the cognising the object otherwise by the cognition, or (3) the becoming-otherwise

---

43. "What is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the object. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, IV-2-35. Also *N.V.* 1. 1-4 yattad udakādijñānam upajāyate maricīṣu spandamāneṣu, na tatrārtho vyabhicarati..... kiṁtu jñānaṁ vyabhicarati, atasmiṁstaditi bhāvāt.

44. rūpyasya śuktyabhāvātvāt - rūpyaṁ hi śukterabhāvaḥ bhāvāntarasyaiva abhāvatvāt - *I.S.*, p. 46.

45. dvayossattvèpi śuktiḥ svātmanā saṁyakkhyāter viṣayaḥ, bhrāntestu svābhāvarūpyātmaneti vyavasthā - *ibid.*, p. 46.

46. brūhi :kiṁ sānyathākhyātiryānyathābhūtavastudhīḥ yānyathā prathayed arthaṁ svayaṁ vā yānyathā bhavet, *ibid.*, II. 3.

of the cognition itself,[47] the so-called otherwiseness cannot be established unless it be through *māyā*, declares Vimuktātman.[48]

5

Refutation of the First Alternative

If cognition-otherwise is the presentation of the object which has changed, then, there is the contingence of all cognitions being illusions, except the knowledge of the changeless Self.[49] The reason is that change itself, according to the Advaitin, is the operation of *māyā*, and so its knowledge too. Thus, the knowledge of the changing objects is illusion.

Moreover, what is this change in the object? Is it for the object which is the same or which has changed already? Not the first, for a thing which continues to exist in the same manner in which it has existed all the time, there cannot be attributed any change. If it be said that, though the thing is the same, the line of distinction can be drawn by a reference to the various times and places and occasions in which the object has existed, even then the object remains essentially the same; and things like difference of time etc., are accidental. Otherwise, how can it be said that it is the same thing that exists through different times etc.?

It is not the second alternative either. If an object becomes otherwise, having been otherwise earlier, there is infinite regress, since the later changes require the earlier ones. If it is said that the existence in the earlier form in contrast with the future form is itself the change, and that, therefore, there is no infinite regress, then, even admitting that existence in the earlier form is change, what is established here is only the later change, *uttaro'nyathābhāvaḥ*, as preceded by an earlier change; not the dependence of the earlier change on the future change; for, that would involve their mutual dependence. If the earlier form of

47. māyāpi nānyathākhyātirvinā māyām hi sidhyati - *ibid.*, II,2. Śaṅkara observes: A thing can never change its nature. *Bṛh. up.* II. 1. 15.

48. *ibid.*, II.4.

49. ekam anyathā bhāvam abhyupagamya anyāsambhava ucyate - *I.S.*, p. 220

the object is the change in dependence on or consideration of a future form, then, the object cannot have any more change of form again, and will be in the same form. Otherwise, if having become otherwise it still changes, there will be infinite regress. To say that having been otherwise an object becomes otherwise amounts to saying that the same becoming otherwise, having been there, comes about. It results, therefore, in self-dependence. All this, of course, admitting that becoming-otherwise is for the object which stays in its earlier form.[50] But this is not possible. When the change is spoken of for the earlier form in consideration of the future form, it goes against the accepted sense of the expression "becoming-otherwise". It amounts to saying that an object changes while remaining the same as ever, which is unintelligible.

Of course, the object, it may be said, can relinquish its old form and assume another, which is its change. But even then, there cannot be said to have been a change when the object remains the same. And abandonment of the old form itself cannot be called becoming-otherwise. In other words, change must be for something. If the change is in respect of the form of the object, then, however much the form changes, the substrate is the same. Such being the case, there cannot be said to have been a change in the substrate. And, if the old form is abandoned, the abandonment itself is not change. If with the abandonment the thing ceases to be, for which is there a change? For a thing which remains the same, argument of abandonment is not reasonable. There is also the defect of mutual dependence. Only when the form is abandoned, there is becoming-otherwise; and only when there is becoming-otherwise, there is abandonment.

Now, with regard to the form itself with respect of which abandonment is mentioned, the "form" is either non-different, or different or different-*cum*-non-different from the object. It cannot be the first. If it be non-different, then, it is the own

---

50. *I.S.* II. 13.

nature of the object. Thus, it cannot be abandoned. One can either be the renouncer, *tyaktṛ*, or the renounced, *tyājya*, but not both. Without the renouncer, *i.e.*, something that abandons and something that is abandoned, there can be neither a renouncer, nor a renounced, nor the act of renouncing. If the form that is said to be abandoned in the course of becoming-otherwise is non-different from the object, all these three will become illusory.

As for the second alternative: If the form were different from its nature, it cannot possibly be abandoned. If still it were said to be abandoned waiving the objection of improbability of it, it can be seen that the abandonment has not brought about anything new. For, the form which was different from the object already remains different in the same way as before even after the abandonment. If it is said that the form, though different from the object, yet stands in a certain relationship with the object, and at the time of the abandonment it is this relationship that is dropped, this improvisation of a *relationship* does not save the opponent from looking improbable. For, the question whether this relationship itself stands in a relation of difference to the object remains. If it is different from th object, then, the same improbability befalls it as much as it does the form. If, on the other hand, the relationship is said to be non-different, is it non-different from both the object and the form which it relates? Or only either of them? Taking the second poser first, if it is non-different from the renounced, *i.e.*, form, then, since the relationship and form are for all practical purposes one, the defect of improbability will arise here also. If it is non-different from the object that is said to renounce the form, then, how can it be abandoned when it is identical with it? If it be non-different from both, it means that the difference between the object and its form also cannot exist. Since it is all identity and oneness, nothing can ever be said to be adandoned. Even as form cannot be abandoned, part, quality (*aṁśa, guṇa*) etc., also cannot be abandoned for the reasons stated earlier.

The third possibility of difference - *cum* - non - difference cannot be maintained because for what is identical, there cannot be difference, and for what is different, identity cannot be established. And with regard to the abandonment of parts, *aṁśa*, is the part that is abandoned different and non - different as a whole or in parts? If as a whole different, then, there is no identity as a whole, and, nothing remains which can be said to be identical. If, on the other hand, identity is asserted as a whole, then, there is nothing left for which difference could be asserted. If it could be both different and identical, it amounts to saying that one is different from oneself. Thus, part, quality etc., are not different - *cum* - non - different from the object. As such, there is no possibility of their abandonment. The same conclusion is reinforced by such considerations as follow:

The whole, *viz.*, the object, the renouncer, cannot exist without the parts. The whole which is destroyed cannot abandon the part. And if the whole did not abandon, there is no destruction. In other words, there cannot be abandonment unless the whole destroys itself by that means. But, there cannot be a destruction unless the whole abandons.[51] The whole existing cannot abandon and in case of non - abandonment, the whole does not cease to exist. Again, a substance cannot abandon its qualities without ceasing to be what it is. A substance devoid of quality is unintelligible. If a substance is qualitiless, there will be no abandonment either, because there is no quality to abandon.[52]

If it is argued: "The case of part-and-whole relation is different from the quality—substance relation. The whole is constituted of parts and in that sense the parts produce the whole and thus the whole cannot exist without the parts. But the qualities do not produce the substance. Therefore, the substance can exist without the qualities", this argument cannot be sustained because if qualities are different from the substance,

51. *I.S.*, II. 18.

52. *I.S.* II. 19.

there will not be the cognition like, "the cloth is white", where the 'white' is put in apposition to "cloth". Also, if a quality is different from the substance, it must be as different from the substance as pot is from cloth. Consequently, the restriction that the quality should subsist in its locus will have to be given up. And in the interests of the case in issue, when the quality is admitted to be different from the locus, the abandonment cannot take place. So, *anyathābhāva*, or becoming otherwise, is not abandonment of quality. The very same impossibility of abandonment applies even in case of non-difference when the quality is one with the object, or in case of difference-*cum*-non-difference when the substance cannot exist without the quality.

Now, with regard to the abandonment of a state or condition, *avasthā*, more or less the same arguments hold good. An *avasthā* or a condition, *ipso facto*, is a condition of the object. A condition is a condition of the object only in so far as it subsists in the object. If it did not belong to the object, then where is the question of abandonment, as though it once belonged to it and is abandoned now?[53]

With reference to action: Action cannot be abandoned by that which acts; for, when the action has been already accomplished or is being performed, how can it be said to be abandoned? And an action that is not performed at all can never be abandoned. And, in the case of action, for the aforesaid reasons, abandonment of action cannot mean destruction or origination of action itself, for there will then be infinite regress since these origination and destruction themselves are actions. Thus, the patency of the abandonment of action is only an illusion like change, or shell-silver. Only because of taking account of this patency, scripture and *smṛti* enjoin actions. Action does not establish itself. It requires an agent. If merely the fact itself is the establishment of anything, then, one should think that the shell-silver, too, is established. Always illusoriness is only in respect of what is merely patent.

---

53. sati na tyājyā; nāpyasati, asattvādeva, *I.S.*, p. 223.

Now with reference to the *relationship*, if relationship constitutes the very nature of the object, it cannot be abandoned, and its abandonment cannot be the becoming-otherwise. Nor can it be abandoned if it constitutes something totally different from the object.

If a thing abandons its nature, then it ceases to be. It it is born again, the re-origination, if there could be one, is that of the same substrate and there is no becoming-otherwise. But for the thing that has perished, there cannot be any regeneration. If it continues to exist in the destroyed state, and if that destroyed state were said to be abandoned, there is the acquisition of the earlier nature, and consequently, destruction itself becomes useless, as in besmirching oneself with the mire and later washing it. So, for that which exists or for that which does not exist, there is no becoming-otherwise. And there is no becoming-otherwise for a different thing. Thus, becoming-otherwise is a delusion[54] brought about by *Māyā*.

Further when a thing becomes otherwise, what is the relation of the original substrate and its changed form? Is it one of identity or difference? If identity, then the object must be supposed to remain the same and thus, there has been no becoming-otherwise really. If difference, then, to what object does this becoming-otherwise happen? One's becoming-otherwise is not another's. The Vindhyā range of mountains cannot be the becoming-otherwise of the Himālayas.[55] There can be no means of determination whether the changed existence after becoming-otherwise is that of the original object itself. The changed existence of the object cannot bear either the relation of identity or of difference to the object itself.

It may be argued that in the case of milk, clay and gold, for example, the fact of change into curds, pot and ornaments respectively, is observed without involving the destruction of their own nature. Thus, it is a matter of common experience that one

---

54. *I.S.*, II,-26

55. nānyonyasyānyathābhāvo vindhyo himavato yathā - *I.S.*, II, 28

thing changes into another. Indeed, curd is not milk. Yet it is milk that changes into curd when certain causal conditions are given. Does this not demonstrate that things leave their old form and become others? Such being the case, dry logic cannot fly in the face of plain experience. But it is to be asked: to what is this change observed to happen? Is it to gold, or necklace, or gold in the state of necklace? Not the first; for gold is seen always as gold. That is, goldness can never be absent in gold.[56] Nor even the second and the third. Indeed the nature of bracelet is not seen in gold and necklace. Even if it were seen, there cannot be said to be a change any time for gold. For, even in necklace, bracelet etc., which are made of gold, nothing other than gold is perceived. And, since non-goldness is, as has been stated, never observed in gold at any time, how can it be said that gold changes?

When gold is made into a necklace and a bracelet, (it may be argued), these constitute two different states of one gold which persists in them. But this argument is not sound. If gold persists in what are called its states, it should be accepted as necessarily different from the states, as, otherwise, its singleness and persistence could not be accounted for.[57] If gold were not different but identical with the two states there will not be singleness but only duality for gold, since the states are two. Or, if identity were asserted, then if gold were identical with the earlier state, its identity is over with it and there cannot be its identity with the later states. If, on the other hand, there were identity of the states with gold, they are not the two different states of gold but gold itself.

Again, for the gold that is identical with the earlier state, there cannot be persistence in the later state, as has been already said, because of its destruction at the time of the cessation or extinction of the earlier state. If the earlier state does not cease to be, the later state cannot come to be and there will be no becoming-otherwise. If gold were identical with the earlier

56. *I. S.*, II. 32
57. *Ibid.*, II. 35

state, since it persists in the later state also, it is not intelligible to say that it is destroyed with the earlier state. Otherwise, without the persistence, the becoming-otherwise of gold itself will be meaningless. If gold is not destroyed along with the earlier state, then since it is said to be identical with the earlier state, the earlier state also will not be destroyed. Without the earlier state ceasing to be, how can there be a becoming-otherwise?

Now to take up the question: "Are the states different from gold?" If they are different how are they connected with gold at all? If they are not connected, they cannot be its states. Nor are they established independently of object, for, the states themselves must have a locus. Thus, it cannot be demonstrated how the earlier and later states are different, or non-different, or different-*cum*-non-different. So, becoming-otherwise cannot be the change of states. Since it is otherwise inexplicable, the phenomenon of change must be attributed to the operations of *Māyā*.

This can be shown from another angle of approach also. Is the becoming-otherwise intrinsic to the object, or is it due to some external cause? If intrinsic, then, change will be happening to the object always. There will be no restriction why a change should happen at a particular time. If the change, on the other hand, is due to some external cause, then, is the causality of this cause intrinsic or extrinsic?[58] If intrinsic, then, the cause exists always and therefore, there should be change in the object always. If extrinsic, *i.e.*, from yet another cause, there is infinite regress, each cause depending on another.

Again: the thing for which becoming-otherwise is desired is not newly born because of its existence already. If the change or becoming-otherwise is non-different from the object, it is also not born, because of its existence. If it is different, if it is itself existent even without any reference to the object, it is not born newly. If it is non-existent, who is the agent of its birth? What is the material cause of its production? What are the other

58. hetos svata eva hetutā, uta hetvantarāt - *I.S.*, p. 229

causes for its production like the instrumental cause? If origination is for the non-existent, then, it will be agentless. Since origination is an action, it should require an agent. There is also no material cause in case of the non-existent. Otherwise, it will not be a case of non-existence at all. And in the absence of any relation whatever in case of the non-existence, there can be no instrumental cause either. Since the non-existent is not established, it can have no relationship with any cause. And for what is established, there is no requirement of a cause.

Now, even granting that the becoming-otherwise is due to some cause, there can be no becoming-otherwise by the mere presence of the cause. There must be the connection with it for gold. Even accepting that there is such a connection, unless there is a speciality or distinction in the becoming-otherwise resulting from such a causal connection, the becoming-otherwise cannot be said to be a change. Some speciality or distinction must have to be granted. It must be said: the gold becomes otherwise only when the speciality is generated by the association with the cause, and not earlier. But the association with the cause and the speciality for the gold are the very nature of the gold which has not become-otherwise. So becoming-otherwise will be intrinsic to gold with the result that, being there always, there will not be any state of gold that is persistent for any length of time. There will be always change; and no state that can be called earlier. Becoming-otherwise is from one earlier state to a later state. But what can be the becoming-otherwise in the gold? Moreover, if becoming-otherwise is intrinsic to gold, there will be nothing that can be called the existent gold at any time. There is the contingence of the loss of nature for gold. The expression "becoming" in the phrase 'becoming-otherwise" becomes meaningless. What is it that becomes?

If it is argued that though there is identity in the case of necklace and bracelet in the aspect of gold, there is yet difference between them as the different modes of the same substance, the argument suffers from the defect of mutual dependence, *viz.*, when difference of the necklace from bracelet is established, the

difference of mode also will be established; but difference of mode must be established if the difference between bracelet and gold is to be established. This line of reasoning as set forth above applies not only to gold, but to all objects and that shows that the loose expression 'becoming-otherwise', however patent to uncritical observation, cannot really brook an analysis and turns out to be a delusion. And when, thus, there is no change really anywhere, it is established that there is one Reality that is changeless and that is the Self.

Again: When an object is said to change or become otherwise, is it meant that it becomes one with the object into which it is said to change? This is clearly impossible. One thing, even when becoming-otherwise, does not attain the identity of another changeless object.[59] The example of food illustrates the case in point. The food, though associated with many changes like being eaten etc., does not become one with ether or *ātman*, or even with the body.[60] When, as we have seen, it is established that reality is changeless, all perceived changes must be as much the operation of *avidyā* as the food becoming identical with the body, mind or the soul.

Reality itself cannot be said to change. For, when there is admitted change for the attained as much as for that which attains the form of the attained, there will be really nothing that is called the attained. Because no sooner is it attained than it changes. Hence, the attained, or that which anything attains by becoming-otherwise, must be changeless.

If it is said that what is to be attained is nothing but that which has become-otherwise, and that, therefore, there is no question of any non-attainment, two alternatives are possible here. One must be told whether what has become otherwise already is desired to be attained, or when there is desire for attainment, the becoming-otherwise happens subsequently. Taking the second first, there will not be any attainment at all as was

59. *I. S.*, II, 50

60. dehaikyamapi annasya avidyāsiddhameva, na satyam - *I.S.* p. 232

shown earlier, for, by the time A desires to attain B, for example, B becomes C.[61] Thus B can never be attained. If the first, *i.e.*, if what has already become-otherwise is desired to be attained, there cannot be an attainment without a subsequent change in the attained.[62] This will start the chain of old difficulties, *viz*, if that which is desired to be attained changes, there will be nothing which can be attained.

If in order to avoid all the above contingencies, it is said that a changeless object attains a changeless being, as change is postulated in the changeless, there is the contingence of attainment always, because there is no distinction in the changeless object as to any specific moment or mode of change. And attainment itself cannot be the distinction. If it were, it is only for the changeless.[63] Otherwise, if the attainer itself becomes otherwise, as there will be no permanent thing for which change is said to happen, there cannot be the possibility of any attainment.

If the distinction desired is something other than attainment, the attainment or otherwise is only for the changeless. Such being the case, the distinction is immaterial and thus futile. If it is contended that when the object becomes otherwise, what really happens is that, by some special characteristics of the attainer-object, some impediment, obstructing hitherto its becoming otherwise, is removed, even then, if the object regains its own self by the removal of the impediments, the attainment itself is illusory because of the real non-difference of the attainer and the attained. If the attained is something different from the attainer, then, the attainment cannot be brought about by mere removal of impediments. There must be some positive cause which is extraneous to the attainer. Hence attainment is only apparent and illusory.

---

61. yo yadrūpaśca prepsati tasyānyathābhāve tadabhāvāt na tena kiṁcit prāpyate - *I.S.*, p. 233

62. pūrvamevānyathābhūte prepsitèpi paścādvikriyāṁ vinā na tatprāptiḥ khātmanorjva - *I.S.*, p. 233

63. niścalasyaiva sā iṣṭā - *I.S.*, p. 234

Moreover, what is this impediment? Is it different or non-different from the attainer and the attained? If it is an impediment because of its difference from these two, then everything in this world is an impediment. If it is non-different from what is to be attained, then, what is to be attained will also be destroyed along with the destruction of the impediment. If it is non-different from what attains, with its destruction the attainer also will be destroyed. In that case, for whom is there attainment?[65] Even granting that, by the becoming-otherwise, there is the mutual identity of the attainer and the attained, still, there is no ground for saying "This is attained by that", and "not that by this". Therefore, to determine which is the attainer and which is the attained is extremely difficult.[66]

For all these reasons, the shell does not become otherwise and attain the nature of silver. It is thus established that the apprehension of one thing as another is the result of *Māyā*.[67] Similarly, the cognitions of revealing otherwise and becoming-otherwise, too, are due to *Māyā*, and are rejected when *anyathābhāva* or becoming-otherwise for a thing is rejected.[68]

Another difficulty is faced at this juncture. If, as the Siddhāntin affirms, there is really no becoming-otherwise anywhere, what becomes of the scriptural declarations saying that, "Having become a deity, one who realises Brahman becomes Brahman Itself"?[69] There is the *smṛti* text also saying: "Thinking any object, he will become that". If becoming Brahman, as the scripture affirms, is impossible, then, there is no release. Scripture itself becomes purposeless.

So runs the objection. But this objection is groundless. It has already been stated that becoming-otherwise, which really

64. niścalasyaiva punastatprāptir na veti só pi vyarthaḥ - *ibid.*
65. *ibid.*, II, 59
66. *ibid.*, II, 62
67. *ibid.*, II, 63
68. anyathākhyāpanānyathābhāvayośca dhiyaḥ arthānyathābhāvanirāsenaiva nirastatvāt - *ibid.*, p. 235
69. devo bhūtvā brahma veda brahmaiva bhavatītyapi - *ibid.*, II, 65

means the attainment of a new form or a new nature, is not established even by perception and other means of valid knowledge. One thing cannot, in the nature of the case, attain the nature of *another* through any cause. When perception etc., fail to establish becoming-otherwise for any object, the scripture, which is verbal testimony, fails all the more so. For, the very word "another" in the usage "becoming another", its meaning, their relationship and so on, are not clearly established anywhere.[70] The Śāstras reveal the right means of realising what is good for oneself to him who wants to do so.[71] But both the means and the ends belong to the realm of not-self, *avidyā*. The Śāstras do not attach any reality either to the means or to the ends.[72] Therefore, becoming-otherwise is not supported by the Śāstras. Just as it is illusory that one *becomes* Brahman, it is equally illusory that the changeless Brahman changes.[73] If the *jiva* who is identical with Brahman changes either due to knowledge or action, then, for whom will there be the fruit of such knowledge or action? Obviously, when one becomes otherwise, his earlier existence is destroyed and, consequently, the fruit of his actions or knowledge will have no enjoyer. If, as a fruit, a different being with the endowment of pleasure arises, even then the enjoyership is not for the one who did the action or who secured the knowledge. If, on the other hand, he exists, there is no becoming-otherwise for him. Moreover, the person who arises anew, cannot have the enjoyership because of the contingence of the attainment of the fruit of that which was not performed by him, and the destruction of what was performed by the earlier persons without fruit for him. For, if the agent of knowledge and action becomes otherwise at the time of the enjoyment of

---

70. anyādipadapadārtha - tat - sambandhāsiddher anyataśśāstrāsiddheḥ - *ibid*, p. 236

71. hitāhitaprāpti - hāni - sādhanaṁ jijñāsamānasya tatsādhanaṁ prakāśayati śāstram. *ibid.*

72. na tu sādhanasya tatsādhyasya vā anātmabhūtasya sattāṁ pratipādayati, *ibid.*

73. kūṭasthasyāpi puṁso bhrāntyaiva kartṛtvādyanyathābhāvassamasti janmādivat - *ibid*, II. 67

fruit, how can another person enjoy the fruit of the deeds performed by another?[74] For action and enjoyment of the fruit of that action must have the same locus. Knowledge and action cannot be said to be the modifications of the locus, *i.e.*, the person, who is constant or invariable. They cannot be there in the absence of their locus. Nor can they be the nature of their locus itself. For, if modifications are the nature of the locus, then, there is no need to aspire for change and it will be there at all times. Thus, there is no such thing as becoming-otherwise or attaining a new form or a new nature.

If the activity is for one who is already active, there will be infinite regress. If it is for one who is not active, he must be active always, and there will thus be no change. If the person, who acts also changes, then, there will not merely be no action, but also no agent. And, without the agent there will be no action.

Again : If the agent and the enjoyer are identical and if the enjoyer is the agent alone and none else, there will be only the agent and no enjoyer. The person, even after attaining heaven by his actions, will still remain an agent doing actions and not enjoying the fruits thereof. If, on the other hand, the enjoyer and the agent being identical, the enjoyer alone remains, then, being enjoyer always, there will be no agency and, therefore, no action at any time yielding results of enjoyment. And in either case, whether the agent is the enjoyer or enjoyer is the agent with the result that only one of them exists, there will be no becoming-otherwise for the person whose nature is the same as ever.

If, on the contrary, difference-*cum*-non-difference is asserted between the agent and the enjoyer with the consequence that the person is not always an agent and not even always an enjoyer, this is clearly impossible because only identity of form is discernible between the enjoyer and the agent. There is no difference between the agent and the enjoyer for reasons

74. *I.S.*, II, verse 69

enumerated earlier, *viz.*, contingence of absence of fruits for actions performed and fruits for acttons not performed. Even granting that there is difference, the person, who is not supposed to be the agent, alone will have to be considered different from himself.[75]

Thus, the possibilities of difference, non-difference, difference-*cum*-non-difference are found indefensible in the case of the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of action. The experienced fact of agent, enjoyer etc., are only apparent, being superimpositions, due to nescience, on one changeless Ātman, or the Self. Also, Ātman being non-cognisable, any change is unintelligible. For, change is observed only in things cognisable. Even granting that there is a change in Ātman, it is as good as non-existent precisely because it will not be the object of any means of knowledge, like Ātman itself.[76] Also it has been declared that Ātman is one and secondless. For one that knows no other, how can there be any change? For the same reason of this oneness, there is nothing that is attained in Ātman by any other. There is no question of a soul, for example, attaining Brahman, since Ātman itself is the only soul of all existence and it has been shown that there is nothing for Ātman to attain in itself.

6

Refutation of the Bhedābheda-vāda

Vimuktātman makes a refutation of the *bhedābheda-vāda* which asserts the relation of difference-*cum*-non-difference between the *Jīva* or the individual soul and Brahman. The objection is that on release, the individual soul *becomes*[77] Brahman or attains the nature of Brahman. This will not be possible unless the soul is both identical with and different from Brahman. Because of identity, the soul is Brahman itself. Because of difference, Brahman is desired to be attained. It is not possible to say that Brahmanhood is obtained by Brahman itself through its own

---

75. bhāve'pi akartaiva svato bhinno nānyaḥ - *I.S.*, p. 238

76. avedye sannapy avedyatvāt sósatsamaḥ - *ibid.*, p. 239

77. "brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati"; "brahmavid āpnoti param".

knowledge, since Brahman is already established. So when it is said that one attains Brahmanhood, that one must be other than Brahman. Since it is declared that the knower of Brahman attains the Supreme, it is clear that the knowership cannot belong to the inert. Brahman, too, is not inert. There cannot be any non-difference between Brahman and the soul, the former being the known and the attained and the latter being the knower and the attaining. Indeed, there is no impossibility in one attaining another's nature through a knowledge of it. The soul attains Brahman's nature through the knowledge of it. Once this difference of the attainer and the attained is admitted, it is not difficult to accept the difference among the souls themselves. A soul in one body is different from that which is in another body. Then only the distinctions of the released and the bound, the ignorant and the wise, the teacher and the taught, etc., are intelligible. Thus, in the beginningless *saṁsāra*, plurality of selves is to be accepted.

The relation of Brahman to the individual souls is that of whole to the parts, as in the case of the clay and the pot. The *Brahma-sūtra* declares: "He is the part because of the statement of difference'.[78] The *Bhagavad-gītā* puts it: "He is only my part".[79] The part stands to the whole only in the relation of difference-*cum*-non-difference.[80] For, it cannot be said either that the part is wholly different or wholly non-different from the whole; similarly in the case of Brahman-soul relationship. Only in the case of non-difference, such scriptural declarations affirming limitlessness, oneness, secondlessness and being the Self of the individual etc., are intelligible. And, only in case of difference, the statements of knower and known, attainer and the attained, and the statements like "He is omniscient", "He is omnipotent", etc., become intelligible. To this objection of the Bhedābhedavādin, the Siddhāntin makes the following reply:

78. aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt - *B.S.* II. iii. 43

79. mamaivāṁśaḥ - *B.G.* XV. 7

80. aṁśāṁśinośca bhinnābhinnatvaṁ prasiddham - *I.S.*, p. 242

What is the proof for the assertion of *bhedābheda* between Brahman and the individual soul? No means of valid knowledge is proof for that. Perception, inference etc., cannot be the proof because Brahman is not an object of these means of knowledge. Even scripture offers no proof. For, when difference between Brahman and the soul is not established by any external means of proof there cannot possibly be any conception of relationship between them and the words which denote them, and consequently, there is no knowledge of sentence-sense as "the soul is both different and non-different from Brahman". If, on the other hand, difference is established by any external means, then scripture becomes purportless. The purport of the Śāstras is to reveal something that the other means of knowledge like perception are not able to reveal. The realm of the Śāstras is the supersensible. So difference, or difference-*cum*-non-difference, is the product of nescience. Scripture speaks of non-difference alone. The knowledge of non-difference, which is the purport of the Śāstras, arises only on the annulment or sublation of the perception of difference.

Regarding the relation of clay and pot: does anybody perceive the difference of pot from clay in the way he does that of clay from cloth, for instance? On the contrary, everyone sees the pot only as of the nature of clay. Indeed, difference is not, as is very commonly supposed, cognised by means of knowledge like perception. There cannot be the cognition of difference when there is no cognition of the counter-correlate, *pratiyogi* and there cannot be the cognition of *pratiyogi* before there is cognition of difference. To know that pot is different from cloth, one should first know the pot and the cloth as two things between which difference is asserted. But, then, there cannot be the knowledge of two separate things, unless there is already the knowledge of difference. Thus, there is mutual dependence in all attempts to establish difference through perception etc.[81]

81. na cākṣajātināpi bhedo gamyaḥ, asiddhe bhede pratiyogyasiddhes tam vinā bhedānavagateḥ - *I.S.* p. 244.

Again, even granting that difference among objects is cognised by perception, yet difference between the knower, the means of knowledge etc., is not perceptible for the simple reason that the knower is not a perceptible entity. If the knower could be known, there is infinite regress.[82] Thus, the example of clay and the pot does not bring out difference or difference-*cum*-non-difference between the soul and Brahman, but only non-difference. This is further substantiated by the *vācārambhaṇa-śruti* which declares that difference is only nominal and not real.[83]

The question can be posed from another angle also. What is the nature of the individual soul and of Brahman between whom *bhedābheda* is asserted? Is it the nature of intelligence or inertness or both? Or, is one of them alone intelligent? In the first alternative, Brahman and Ātman are both of the nature of pure intelligence and there can thus be no trace of difference between them.

In the second alternative, Ātman and Brahman both being inert, the self-hood, cogniserhip, the quality of being desirous of release etc., will be absent in the soul and Brahmanhood, omniscience, the creatorship of all will be absent in Brahman. In the third alternative of intelligence-*cum*-inertness, it is inconceivable that intelligence should coexist with inertness. In the fourth alternative, *i.e.*, one of them being inert, there cannot be the relationship of part and whole for Brahman and Ātman, as the Bhedābhedavādin would aver. And also, identity cannot be spoken of between them as between the pot and its cogniser, the inert and the intelligent respectively.

Moreover: the Bhedābhedavādin must be asked: Is the world, which is alleged to stand in the relation of *bhedābheda* to Brahman, knowable by Brahman or no? If knowable, then, Brahman and the world stand in the relation of knower and the known. Hence, there is no identity possible, as in the case

82. tasyāpi mānameyatve mātrādyanavasthā - *Ibid.*

83. *Chānd. Up*: VI. 1.4.

of pot and the knower. This is so even in the case of souls. If they are knowable by Brahman, the knower, then, the nature of being Brahman's aspect, being second to him, being subject to sorrow and suffering, and being desirous of getting release— all these will be impossible for them, as in the case of the inert world.

If the world and the souls are not cognisable by Brahman, they will not be established at all to be spoken of. And also there is the detriment to the omniscience of Brahman. Again, conversely, is Brahman knowable or unknowable to the souls? If knowable, then, since the soul is ignorant, the omniscience and Brahmanhood for Brahman can never be established. Also, there is the contingence of difference of the soul from Brahman.

If it is said that both Brahman and soul are cognisable, then, they cannot know one another as the pot cannot know the cloth. They would both be objects of knowledge for another knower. Then, this knower alone will have to be accepted as Ātman and Brahman. And, he himself will be a non-object. Does not the scripture declare: "For whom he is not an object, by him he is known"? Thus, Brahman must be accepted as the only existent and as being the self of all and of the nature of intelligence.

All the changes or becomings-otherwise are, it has been declared, the products of nescience. This is because the world itself is the product of *māyā* or *avidyā*. The Saprapañcabrahmavādin, on the contrary, tends to equate Brahman with the world, tends to say that Brahman is both the knower and the known, the subject and the object. This is plainly a confusion of thought. Knowership and knownness cannot be in one and the same, either simultaneously or in succession. If one is known, it is not the knower. If one is the knower, he is not an object of knowledge. If Brahman is both object of knowledge and knower, then, there should be two Brahmans: *viz.*, Brahman the knower, and Brahman the known. If one Brahman is both

knower and known put together, then He is neither an object nor a subject."[84]

If, again, as the Saprapāncabrahmavādin asserts, the world is the product of Brahman which is all-perfect, then, the world, being a product, and, therefore, being different from Brahman, will be something other than Brahman. One cannot both be the cause and the effect. If the world also is the sense conveyed by the term, 'Brahman', then, it amounts to accepting two Brahmans. If, on the other hand, it is said that Brahman and the world together constitute one Brahman, and not separately or individually, then, where Brahman exists, the universe also will exist along with it, and it cannot be said that the world originated from Brahman because when the universe is absent Brahman also will be absent.

Similarly in the case of the individual souls also. If it is held that the soul being Brahman's part and atomic becomes Brahman by some means, then, one Brahman is already established; the soul becoming Brahman will be another. If the means mentioned above are knowledge, *jñāna*, and action, *karma*, then, through these an already existent Brahman is not brought into being. Indeed, by the operations of the potter, the already existent pot is not produced.

Again, if the soul leaving his aspect of being Brahman's part becomes Brahman, then, Brahman will be devoid of that part. If, thus, there is part-ness for Brahman, it is perishable. In that case, where is its imperishable Brahmanhood?

If it be contended that the difference of soul from Brahman is due to limiting adjuncts and that its identity with Brahman is real and that, where by *karma* etc., the limiting adjunct is destroyed, there is the attainment of Brahman, this position is not far different from the theory that difference is due to *avidyā* which is destroyed only by knowledge. If it is said that as in the gem with its red colour due to the limiting adjunct, the

84. brahma cejjñātṛ vedyaṁ ca brahma dve brahmaṇī tadā, brahmaikam ubhayaṁ taccet na tedvedyaṁ na veditṛ. *I.S*, II. Verse 81.

limiting adjunct has only to be separated and not destroyed, it is to be asked: Is the red colour seen in the gem, born of the adjunct or is it born of illusion?

If the first, then, even when the limiting adjunct perishes, red colour will not perish. The red colour born in the pot through the association with fire continues even when there is no fire. And, the association with the limiting adjunct will be for the Supreme alone because of the non-establishment of the soul previously. If the soul is established previously, the difference due to adjunct will not be in the soul, as this will involve an infinite regress, *viz.*, another limiting adjunct desired for the soul who is already associated with one and this first adjunct itself requiring another and so on. So, the association with the adjunct is only for Brahman in entirety, because Brahman is partless. In that case, there will be only one soul and that is Brahman itself. Where, then, is difference?

Thus, difference in Brahman which is one and partless is illusory. If difference is illusory, then as there is nothing really different from Brahman, non-attainment of Brahman and attainment as well are illusory. Hence, Ātman is Brahman. Extinction of delusion is figuratively called attainment. This is the meaning of "*brahmaveda-brahmaiva bhavati*".[85]

Illusion due to *avidyā* is dispelled by knowledge, and not by action. Thus, there is no becoming-otherwise which is an action.

The same line of reasoning shows that there is no silverness in shell. It is born out of delusion. There is no birth of shell in the form of silver, as clay becomes pot. So, it cannot be said that knowledge-otherwise, *anyathākhyāti*, is the knowledge of that which has become otherwise. If shell has become silver, as the clay becomes pot, then, why is it that silver is sublated and not the pot? Again, pot is produced by external causes, like the

85. *Mund. Up*: III. 2,9. aupādhikasya bhedasya avidyātmakatvāt vidyayaiva tannivṛttau sadāptasyaiva parasyāptaḥ tadbhāvaḥ śrutaḥ - *I.S.*, p. 249. Also: brahmāptir vidyayā mohadhvaṁsādeva upacaryate - *ibid.*, II, 114.

potter, the wheel, etc. In the case of the silver, there is only the perception of it. But perception itself does not produce objects.[86] If it did, all shell-perceptions must produce silver. If the illusion is considered the instrumental cause in the creation of silver, as in the case of a carpenter in respect of a house, then, even when the illusion is over, the silver must remain, just as the house remains even when the carpenter is dead.

It is therefore established that the shell-silver is only *māyā*. The cognition-otherwise is not the cognition of one that has become-otherwise. Thus is rejected the first alternative.

7

Refutation of Anyathākhyāti – II

Among the three alternative suggestions as to what *anyathākhyāti* could mean,[87] the first has been rejected in the last section. The second alternative is that *anyathākhyāti* is that which presents the object otherwise[88] than what it really is.

Prima facie, this position is untenable because first it has been demonstrated how the notion of becoming-otherwise or change, however popular and deep-rooted it is, is in fact an illusion. Secondly it is well-known that knowledge is always of an object that exists there in its own right. In other words, there cannot be a knowledge of an object without the object being there first for the knowledge to correspond to.[89] If knowledge, in *anyathākhyāti*, is said to present the object otherwise than what it is, it is only to be observed that without a change in the object already, there cannot be a knowledge of it. Knowledge always follows its object. If, corresponding to *anyathākhyāti*, there is an object that has undergone a change, then, the knowledge will not be the knowledge-otherwise but

86. jñeyajanma na ca jñānāt jñeyaṁ hyālambya dhībhavaḥ *ibid*, II, 116.

87. evamarthasya anyathābhāvasya, tatkhyāter anyathākhyāpanasya, khyāteḥ svayam anyathābhāvasya ca māyāṁ vinā asiddhervakṣyamāṇatvāt - *I.S.*, p. 218.

88. yānyathā prathayedartham - *ibid.*, III, 1.

89. nahi jñeyaṁ vinā jñānam ityuktam - *ibid.*, p. 254.

only knowledge of the object as it is. If, no the other hand, the knowledge had no corresponding object, then it is contentless and is an illusion.[90] Thirdly, cognition of an object arises by the contact of the senses with the object. When there is no object, how can there be the sense-contact? Without the sense-contact how can there be a cognition?[91] If it is said that *anyathākhyāti* need not presuppose a change in the object, and that it is only knowledge that presents an object which is not associated with a particular place or time as associated with that place and time, how can the object be at a place and time other than its own without a change? Again, if it is silver that exists at some other place and time that is the *adhiṣṭhāna* or locus of the silver perceived here and now, even then, only for that which is cognised in its general aspect as 'This' as in the case of "This is silver"—without the apprehension of its particular differentia there is the *adhiṣṭhānatva*, or the character of being the locus.[92] But there is no apprehension, either in the general or special aspect, of a thing that exists at a different place and time. Otherwise, there is the contingence of illusion even in deep dreamless sleep. How can there be any apprehension of anything without the sense-contact? In dreams, too, this sense-contact is absent. Things that are no more appear in dreams. Therefore, dream-events also are illusory.[93]

It cannot be said that, even though the past things are not existent now, their existence in the past is cognisable, like the cognisability of the pole-star even though it may be at a great distance, for the reasons stated already, *viz.*, if for the illusion born of the senses there is the content of its own object, then, an object of that moment should be granted to exist, as in the case of any other valid sensory cognition. Otherwise, there will be contentlessness. If there is object, the cognition is no illusion.

---

90. *ibid*, III, 9.

91. *ibid*, III, 5

92. sāmānyākārena gṛhītasya viśeṣataśca agṛhītasya loke'dhiṣṭhānatvaṁ prasiddham - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 564

93. svapne tu akṣamapi saṁbṛtam atassutarāṁ tatrārthadṛṣṭir na sambhavatityarthaḥ - *ibid.*, p. 564

If an object, not existent here and now but which existed only in the past, is cognised by a knowledge that is present, it is not impossible that an object which is present may be cognised by knowledge that is past. But is it not absurd? For, in the above case, a blind person would witness and enjoy a dance performance that is being rendered now, by his past perceptions. If a past perception could be instrumental for a present knowledge, then all distinctions between past and present will vanish since even past cognitions will bring about present knowledge. Where then is its pastness?

It cannot be said that the origin of illusion like memory is not through the object but through defect and latent impression, then, what are these latent impressions? Do they point to any object at all or not? If they do, there is detriment to the nature of illusoriness.[94] If they do not, then, of what are they latent impressions?

If the objection is that the knowledge having the present or the future for its content is accepted from inference; that similarly the knowledge of what is to be accomplished arises from the Vedic texts; and that this shows that there need be no simultaneity for knowledge and its object, even then, the object will only be commensurate with the knowledge and the knowledge only commensurate with the object.[95] The knowledge of the past object will be as "This was". The knowledge of the future object will be like "This will be". But in illusion, cognition arises in the form of "This is", as direct perception here and now.

In the case of indirect and mediate inference, it is not the object or the content that is the instrument of knowledge. It is the *liṅga* or the *probans* through special relationship that produces the knowledge having the qualified as the content.[96] Even the

94. asti ced arthaḥ, na bhrāntiḥ akṣajavat yathājñānam artha-sadbhāvāt- *I. S.*, p. 255

95. jñānānurūpa evārtho'rthānurūpameva ca jñānam. *ibid.*, p. 256

96. na ca anumānādiṣvartho jñānajanakaḥ, liṅgādīnāmeva sambandhaviśeṣād viśiṣṭārthajñānotpādakatvāt- *ibid.*

defect, if it were the cause of illusion, does not pertain to the *probans* but only to the senses like eye. So, in inference there is no function for the object. Therefore, it cannot be said that an object, though existent at a different time and place, appears in the illusion as in an inferential knowledge. At the time of illusion, the object is non-existent. And for the non-existent, there is no such thing as difference from the knowledge of it or knowability. Indeed, knowledge is that by which something is apprehended.[97]

If it is said that past etc., are not non-existent like man's horn etc., because of its existence at one time, and that past moments of time must have existed in the past, then, is that past existent *now* or non-existent? If the latter, it cannot be known *now*. In that case, there is no difference between it and man's horn.

So it is existent, not now but at its own time. But at the time of its existence, it is not known as past since it is existent then. This is so in accordance with the principle that when there is no object at the time of knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of it.[98] There can never be a knowledge of the unreal and the non-existent. Even through defect, that is, even though the knowledge is defective for some reason, yet, it is only a knowledge of something that is real and existent and not of the unreal and the non-existent.[99] Even a defect in knowledge is a merit, and not a demerit, if it causes the knowledge of the object.[100]

If it be said that the above-mentioned merit turns into defect when it gives the knowledge of objects belonging to another place or time, and procuring a knowledge-otherwise, it should be known whether the knowledge-otherwise is in respect of the

97. jñāyate aneneti hi jñānam - *ibid.*, p. 257

98. dhīkāle'rthābhāve na kāciddhīssālambanā - *ibid.*, p. 258

99. yato nāsato dṛṣṭir ato doṣādapi sata eva dṛṣṭiḥ, nāsataḥ - *ibid.*, p. 259

100. doṣo'pi arthabodhakas'cec - cakṣurādivat, guṇa eva na doṣaḥ - *ibid.*

shell, for example? Or is it in respect of silver in a different place? Or is it in respect of both? To take the second first: cognition-otherwise is not that of silver; one cannot have a valid knowledge of a silver that is in a different place unless there is a defect. And defect produces only illusions. If, on the other hand, the knowledge of silver at a different place is valid, then, it will never be sublated. But this knowledge is sublated. Moreover, the silver at a different place and time is not in sense-contact, and, therefore, cannot be an object of perception. Otherwise, men of defective vision, too, will have as much knowledge as men with right vision.

The Advaitin holds the view that there can be no illusion in respect of what is apprehended. In the silver illusion, it is not the object that is apprehended that is the object of illusory knowledge. The Advaitin holds that illusion and its object are of the nature of *māyā*. If the object of illusion were the substrate, this substrate, being subject to sublation, is not fit to be the substrate at all. In an illusion, when there is sublation the substrate should remain. The substrate is the basis of illusion and all illusions must have a basis or a locus. The Advaitin holds that Ātman or the Supreme Self is the basis or locus of all illusions.[101] So it is not the apprehended substrate that is the object of illusion.

If the objection is that while accepting that there can be no illusion in what is apprehended by reason of the very fact of being apprehended,[102] yet, there may not be the full and entire cognition of what is apprehended, and this partial cognition results in illusion, then, all cognitions will have to be branded as illusion, because no object is cognised in all its aspects, general and special. If it is said that all the special aspects need not be cognised for a valid perception, and that the perception of any one of them will do, it is pointed out that in the silver-illusion one of the factors causing the illusion is similarity in

---

101. śuktidamaṁśāvaccinnānubhava eva rūpya-bhramādhiṣṭhānam ityarthaḥ - *J.V., I.S.* p. 567

102. tatra gṛhīte na sā bhrāntiḥ, gṛhītatvādeva - *I.S.* p. 259

colour, *viz.*, whiteness. The white colour here is not a mere generality, since a particular substance similar to the shell and associated with white colour is perceived. And similarity can never be mere generality.[103] So, there being the perception of white colour which is a special feature, there should not be any illusion. But there is. If it is said that white colour is a peculiar generality or a particular general feature,[104] and not a special feature, even then white colour is only a particular feature since it excludes other colours like black etc.[105] Otherwise, *i.e.*, if there be illusion even when a particular generality is perceived, then, the contingence of illusion is there even in the perception of shell; for, the speciality called "shellness" is common to all the shells. And there is no particular thing that is fit to be cognised as having no particularities. So, if illusion is said to be precisely this non-apprehension of speciality or particularity,[106] then, as such apprehension of particular thing without particularity is never possible (*nirviśeṣaviśeṣaḥ*), the illusion will always arise. The Vaiśeṣikas divide the category of particularity into two kinds. (1) *Sāmānyaviśeṣa* or general particularity (to which reference was already made) which helps to distinguish one class of things from another though it is common to the members of its own class. For example, "shellness" or *śuktitva*. This is common to all shells, though this becomes a particularity, *viśeṣa*, when it helps us to distinguish shells from other things. This particularity is, thus, both a generality and a particularity. (2) *Antyaviśeṣa* or ultimate particularities which distinguish one ultimate atom from another. These atoms are cognisable only by yogic perception. They are supersensible and, therefore, they are only eternally inferred and not seen.

Now, the Advaitin, who does not accept the *viśeṣa* category of the Vaiśeṣika school, argues that, since these latter kind of

---

103. na hi sāmānyamātrasya sādṛs'yam - *ibid.*, p. 260

104. because it is common to shell and silver.

105. viśeṣa eva kṛṣṇatādi vyāvartakatvāt - *J.V., I.S.* p. 567

106. nirviśeṣo viśeṣaḥ.

particularities, *viz.*, *nirviśeṣaviśeṣas*[107] of the ultimate atoms, are eternally uncognised and are only inferrable, this will be an eternal illusion even if the *pūrvapakṣin's* line of argument is accepted.[108]

Again, if it is urged that there is illusion only when particularities which are fit for apprehension are not apprehended,[109] what is this fitness for apprehension? Is it the fact of being associated with particular features? Or is it that which is obtained by the definition of cognition?

If the first, the answer has been already set forth in the earlier pages, *viz.*, one speciality at least *viz.*, whiteness, is perceived even when a similar object is cognised, and it has been said that all the specialities of an object are never cognised by any one.

In the second alternative, there can be no knowledge of the non-existence of an object. The knowledge of non-existence arises when there is no apprehension of a thing which is fit to be cognised. If illusion is accepted at that stage, there will be no knowledge of non-existence, but only illusion. Thus, the category of *abhāva* must have to be surrendered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka and the Naiyāyika (who hold the *anyathākhyāti* view of error). And, further, non-apprehension is not due to defect.[110] This is acceptable to the Naiyāyika too. Only illusion is due to defect.

---

107 These particularities are infinite since atoms are infinite. viśeṣa tu yāvan nityadravyavṛttitvād ananta eva - *S. P.* p. 12. Since the ultimate atoms are partless, to distinguish them from one another, particularities which themselves do not have any particularities are presumed to exist. see *J. V., I. S.*, p. 568

108. teṣāṁ nityānumeyatvād agrahe ced bhramas sadā syāt iti atiprasaṅgaḥ - *ibid.*

109. antyaviśeṣasadbhāve pramāṇābhāvāt upalabdhi - yogyasyaiva viśeṣasya agrahāt bhrama iti mīmāṁsakadṛṣṭyā codyam - *ibid*

110. Since prior non-existence of the object is beginningless and since non-apprehension follows the non-existence of the object. prāgabhāvasya anāditvāt - *ibid.*

And the knowledge of the shell is not intrinsic.[111] If it were, its non-apprehension might be due to defect. If knowledge of shell be intrinsic, there can be no non-apprehension of the shell.

It has been said that the substrate of the silver-illusion is Brahman conditioned by shell. Brahman is self-luminous. Then, how does the non-manifestation of Brahman occur? It is all due to *māyā*, says the Advaitin. So according to him, *anyathākhyāti* is not possible without the operation of *māyā*.

To take up the thread of the argument again, it is urged by the opponent that non-apprehension cannot be said to be totally unavailing in explaining illusion. The reasoning for this is:

Admitting that *anyathākhyāti* or cognition-otherwise is not due to non-apprehension, yet, when there is the cognition of two entities or individuals there can be no knowledge of their identity. And thus, there can be no illusion as "This is silver". Also, when there is the knowledge of the shell, there can be no illusion as "This is silver". Consequently, the non-apprehension of shell is also a factor in illusion.

To this objection, the Advaitin offers an answer by an analysis of the notion of "individual" and "class".

What is meant by an individual? Is it the exclusion of everything else or is it the substance which indicates the class?[112]

If the first, impossibility of the knowledge of identity for two individuals is not established because there is the knowledge of identity through co-ordination, *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, as "This shell is a substance", for example, in respect of the substance (which is a class-name) and the shell (which is an individual excluding everything else), and which are, therefore, mutually exclusive.

---

111. *I. S.*, III. 27

112. vyāvṛttamātram uta jātivyañjakam

Nor can it be said that in respect of two individuals which depend upon and indicate one class-nature, there is no knowledge of identity, because in respect of two cows, which belong to the same class, but one of which is tame and the other hornless there is the knowledge as "These are cows".

If the knowledge of oneness is said to pertain to the class-nature alone, then, the notion of "two cows" will be an error. The suffix of dual number arises in respect of the word "cow" as in "These are two cows." There is no duality for the class, but only for the individuals.[113] This duality does not militate against their identity, since the individual entities are identical in their class-nature. There is no strict difference between class-nature and individual as in the case of a pot and a cloth, for example. Otherwise, the relation of "class-individual", or 'genus-species" cannot be asserted between them.[114]

It may be urged that there is identity between the individuals only in the aspect of class-nature, and not directly, as between class-natures themselves. In the case of two cows, this is so. But in the case of shell and silver involved in illusion, this is not so. There the identity is not through class-nature as in the case of the cows, but only through non-apprehension due to defect.

This objection is not valid. It is stated that there is no absolute and direct identity between the two individual entities but oniy in the aspect of their class-nature *e.g.* between the cows, and it is stated that this is not the case in respect of shell and silver. But even there,[115] between 'this' and the 'silver', there is no absolute identity. Therefore, the absence of the knowledge of absolute identity between the individuals is not a defect.[116] But, just as the identity-cognition is there between the

---

113. na ca jāter - dvitvam, vyaktyoreva tu - *I.S.* p. 263

114. na ca jātivyaktyor bheda eva ghaṭapaṭavat, jātivyaktitvabhāt - *ibid.*

115. In the notion "This is silver". na ca idaṁ rūpyam ity atrāpi atyantam aikyabuddhiḥ - *ibid.*

116. śuktirūpyayorapi agrahaṁ vinaiva abhedadhīr bhaviṣyati iti agrahasya anupayogaḥ - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 569

two cows as "these are cows" though they are manifested as two individuals, even so, in the case of shell and silver there is the identity-cognition as "This is silver".

Illusion presupposes the identity-cognition just mentioned. Otherwise, if there be illusion even when the class-nature and the individual are cognised as having distinct nature, then, there will be illusion, even when the shell is perceived as "This is shell" which is absurd. In the illusory cognition "This is silver" the "this", cognised by a single cognition as 'this', can be considered as the general nature being common to both shell and silver, and "silver" as the special aspect or feature as it qualifies the shell. Or, alternatively 'silver' may be taken as the general aspect meaning "silverness" and the "this" may be taken as the individual of that class.

Either way, if in "This is silver", the class and the species are as distinctly cognised as all that and if, even so, there is illusion, the same illusion can be brought about even when the shell is perceived in its distinguishing features. But this is not brought about. But, if the above-mentioned position is admitted, there is no contradiction if it is brought about.

If it be urged that the individuals of the two different class-natures of shell and silver, or the class-natures themselves, for that matter, being distinct, there is no knowledge of identity between the individuals *viz.*, shell and silver, then, with reference to the first alternative, it has been said[117] already that in "This is silver", there is identity-cognition, just as there is one in the case of two cows, which, though distinct, are yet perceived as identical as belonging to a class. It is obvious that it is not the class-nature that appears as "This is silver", since the class-nature cannot be given there unless the individual is first presented. And in so far as the natures of individuals, as distinct from class-nature, appear, there is the perception of their difference.

---

117. *I. S.*, III. 33.

The second alternative also is not sound. It has also been already stated[118] that there is the knowledge of identity between two different class-natures as in the case of "shell is a substance". So, it is but reasonable to conclude that though class-natures, as well as individuals, and individuals and class natures, appear different, yet there is an identity cognised between them, which, of course, means that one is not the other, *i.e.*, shell is not silver.[119]

Indeed, as between the shell and the silver, it is not even necessary that the identity is perceived only through the aspect of class-nature. For, between two shell-pieces or silver-pieces, there is the illusion of identity as "This is a shell" or "this is a piece of silver." The knowledge of identity here is not through the class-nature. Similarly, in the case of substance and quality as in "The cloth is white". There are even cases where a general-special relationship, or substance-quality relationship cannot be made out. For example, the statement "The letter'a' is short".[120] Between the tone, *dhvani*, which is short, and the letter '*a*' there is no general-special relationship, nor substance-attribute relationship, nor even genus-species relationship, for those who accept letters as eternal.[121] So, there can be a knowledge of identity through superimposition characterised by indeterminable illusion.

Again, that class-nature is not necessary to get the identity of the individuals can be shown even on another line of reasoning.

If there be no mutual identity between the individuals it cannot be brought about through the class-nature too. If there be identity for the individuals through the genus that is common, then, that identity is something intrinsic. It has been said that

---

118. *ibid.*, III. 29.

119. bhinnajātyorbhedena bhātyorapi vyaktyor ekadhissamastity etāvan mātram - *I. S.*, p. 265

120. hrasvo' kāra ityekadhidṛṣṭeḥ - *ibid.*, p. 266

121. *ibid.* The relation, if relation be the name for it, is one of superimposition. *ibid.*, p. 62 - asatyasyāpi varṇadairghyādeḥ.

if between two individuals that are different, identity is brought about through some other medium, it will be an error.[122]

It may be urged here that if cognition-otherwise is accepted among objects, whose nature is known otherwise, or in other words, if there could be the cognition-otherwise, *anyathākhyāti*, of identity between different individuals, even without the postulation of non-apprehension, then there is undue extension. The defect of the cognition-otherwise will beset even normal valid perceptions of different individuals.

True, this difficulty is the opponent's own doing. He wants to save the notion of one-many which are mutually conflicting. To the Advaitin, this is no difficulty at all since he holds that oneness is the Reality sublating the experience of duality and difference and that difference is superimposed on the one Self, due to *māyā*. And as all perceptions and activities arise out of *māyā*, there is no difficulty in explaining facts which are otherwise a riddle.

If the argument is that when there is non-cognition of the difference of silver in a shell, silver, which is non-existent, appears, and not when difference of silver from shell is cognised and that, therefore, non-cognition of difference can be shown as the cause of illusion, this is not sound in the case of *anyathākhyāti* or cognition-otherwise where one is said to appear as another. For, in cognition-otherwise, there is some cognition. But non-cognition is absence of cognition. How can there be a cognition-otherwise when nothing is cognised?[123] Thus non-cognition is not a cause of illusion.

If non-cognition of any of the factors involved in illusion is not the cause of illusion, cognition or positive apprehension,

---

122. akṛtaṁ ced aikyam anyanimittaṁ bhinnayor bhāti, tad bhrāntam eva syāt - *ibid.*, p. 266

123. Moreover, if, as the Bhāṭṭas believe, shell is the non-existence of silver, how is it that when the shell which is the locus of the absence of silver is not perceived, siver is perceived?
kathaṁ vā śuktau sā nāstīti, tadabhāva-dharmiśuktyagrahe? *I.S.* p. 270

too, can never be the cause of illusion. If it could, then, all cognitions will become illusions. There is no illusion in anything that is apprehended. Indeed, the "This" aspect in illusion, "This is silver", which is the substrate, does not appear as not "this" at any time. If the "this" is said to appear as "silver", then, the knowledge that arises should be of silver alone and not as "This is silver". Even then, there is no cognition - otherwise or illusion in what is apprehended.

Nor can it be said that the appearance of the form of silver in shell in illusion is understood from the fact of sublation, because when sublation occurs there is simply no silver. Otherwise, it is not sublation at all. The sublating cognition, while cancelling the shell - nescience, cancels silver that is born of that nescience.

Further, what is this non - apprehension of the shell in the illusion? Is it the absence of perception or the knowledge of something else?

Again, if it is negation of perception, is it a non - entity or some other positive entity? If the first, there being no existent, there can be no question of non-apprehension of that non-existent.

If it were some positive entity, then, if it were something apprehended, the answer will be given in the sequence. If it is some other apprehension, it means that the non - apprehension only means another apprehension of the shell. So, there is no non - apprehension.

If, as the second alternative says, non - apprehension is the apprehension of something else, then, even when shell is apprehended, there will be illusion when there is knowledge of something else. Similarly, there will be no illusion even when the shell is not apprehended and when there is no apprehension of something else.

But how is it possible that illusion occurs in something that is not apprehended when there is no apprehension of something else? It is possible as in the case of the fire-spark in the glow-worm in darkness when there is no apprehension of something

else. And in the case of dreams, there is no cognition of anything through the senses. Thus, illusion is possible even when there is no apprehension of something else. So, if the opponent's view is that the non-apprehension of shell is apprehension of something else, the view stands self-condemned.

If it be said that the apprehension of shell is the non-apprehension of something else and the apprehension of something else is itself the non-apprehension of shell and that, therefore, without the apprehension of something else there is no absence of shell-apprehension, if this be the argument, then, if without the apprehension of one thing, there will not be non-apprehension of another, then, there being the necessity of the knowledge of one thing always, there will be no possibility of deep sleep at all.

Or, again, if the apprehension of shell and something else are themselves their mutual non-apprehension, then, there being apprehension of both always their non-apprehension also will be simultaneous,[124] because of mutual dependence. Therefore, to say that there is no non-apprehension of shell when there is non-apprehension of something else is unreasonable.

Nor can it be said that mutual apprehension of shell and something else is itself mutual non-apprehension. If non-apprehension itself is apprehension, then all will be omniscient. On the other hand, if apprehension itself is non-apprehension, there will be only universal blindness.

Again, if it is said that mutual non-apprehension is only the mutual apprehension of shell and the something else, there will be apprehension of an object always and no prior non-existence of that apprehension. Otherwise, if apprehension is occasional, moments of the absence of apprehension will have to be accepted, which is repugnant to the opponents. Consequently, eternal cognition of all objects will end in universal omniscience. Or

124. yadi śukteranyasya ca graha evānyonyāgraho nānyaḥ, tadā ubhayorapi sadā sahaiva grahabhāvād agraho'pi sahaiva syāt - *I. S.* p. 272. See *J.V.*, *I.S.* p. 573

else, when there is no non-apprehension at any time, for any one, of any object, apprehension itself will be futile, since there is nothing to be newly known. The objects will be eternally revealed to all, like the light of the sun. Thus, the objects being self-luminous, the difference of the knower, known and knowledge can never be established. And, the secondless, differenceless self-luminous Self alone is the Reality. Therefore, the view, *viz.*, non-apprehension is the apprehension of something else is not reasonable.

To avoid this difficulty, if it be said that non-apprehension of shell is absence of apprehension, and not apprehension of something else (which view has been shown indefensible), then it should be made clear whether non-apprehension is something other than apprehension, or it is a non-entity, *avastu*, or it is apprehension? (This third alternative has been already rejected but later a fresh difficulty is pointed out and so it is not a repetition).

To take up the first alternative, if the antecedent non-existence, *prāgabhāva*, of apprehension is something other than apprehension, there is nothing contradictory in admitting cognition even at the time of its prior non-existence, because it is something other than its own prior non-existence. If apprehension is assumed to exist even at the time of the non-existence of other objects, *advaita* or non-duality will have to be accepted.[125]

If it is said that apprehension and non-apprehension cannot co-exist, true; when there is non-apprehension, there cannot be apprehension because there is no object. But, if, as the opponent urges, apprehension were something other than non-apprehension, there is no absurdity in supposing that apprehension and non-apprehension co-exist, which is absurd.[126] Conflict cannot be said to exist in spite of difference. If apprehension and its

125. anyābhāve ced vastunassattvam, advaitaprasaṅgaḥ. *I. S.* p. 274
Non-apprehension is because of the non-existence of the objects. If all objects are non-existent, and if only apprehension exists, that is what exactly Advaita says.

126. *ibid.*, III. 65

negation do not co-exist, then, for what is there difference from what? Difference and conflict are found in the case of two individual entities which exist at the same time. There cannot be a conflict between what exists and what does not exist.[127]

Again, if at the time of its own antecedent non-existence, apprehension cannot exist, it can never come into existence since the antecedent non-existence always exists. If it is said that apprehension comes into being when its antecedent non-existence is destroyed, then, if this destruction of the antecedent non-existence conflicts with the antecedent non-existence of apprehension, then, because of this conflict, the destruction can never be there at the time of the antecedent non-existence, as in the case of apprehension itself.

If the destruction of the antecedent non-existence does not conflict with antecedent non-existence, there cannot be apprehension even when the antecedent non-existence is destroyed.[128]

If it is admitted that the destruction of the antecedent non-existence[129] conflicts with the antecedent non-existence of apprehension, then at the time of the existence of the destruction, *nivṛtti*, of the antecedent non-existence, *prāgabhāva* or antecedent non-existence cannot exist. But even then, antecedent non-existence of apprehension will have only this *nivṛtti* or destruction as its counter-correlate, since it is this *nivṛtti* that does not exist at the time of the existence of the antecedent non-existence and exists at the time of its non-existence. The counter-correlate, therefore, is not the apprehension, since apprehension arises only after the *nivṛtti* of the *prāgabhāva*.[130] And, if the antecedent non-existence is removed even without the origination of apprehension, then, there is the contingence of absence of origination for apprehension, as in the case of a man's horn.

---

127. *ibid.*, III. 66

128. because even at that time the antecedent non-existence of apprehension exists.

129. pragabhāvanivṛtti.

130. nivṛttyanantarakṣaṇe janmābhyupagamāt - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 574

Or, if the example of man's horn is not suitable since there is patency of reality for apprehension, then, we can say that apprehension is beginningless like Ātman, or Self, there being no antecedent non-existence for it. If it were beginningless, then it is also destructionless, and is devoid of other modifications. Thus, apprehension is immutable.

It may be said that though beginning and end, anterior non-existence and posterior non-existence, are not there for apprehension, still mutual non-existence is not absent. For example, when one says that there is the apprehension of shell, this apprehension is not that of pot. Then, where is the all-pervasiveness and oneness claimed for apprehension by the Advaitin ?

This objection is not sound. For, if when one says that the apprehension of shell is not in the pot, it is meant that something other than apprehension is there, then, what is the difficulty in accepting apprehension as all-pervasive?[181] For instance, when there is water etc., in a pot, how does this affect the all-pervasiveness of ether? Moreover, according to the Bhāṭṭas, what is non-conditioned by space is all-pervasive. Therefore, apprehension, which is not conditioned by space, is all-pervasive.[182] And, the shell-cognition being all-pervasive and immutable, there cannot be a cognition different from it. Thus, non-duality of shell will result.[183] If it is said that like the apprehension of shell, other apprehensions and their objects exist because of immutability of these cognitions as well, and that, there cannot be shell-non-duality, this is not a defect, since shell, its cognition and the aggregate of other objects appear as shell. Being of the nature of the shell, difference cannot be

---

131. The Bhāṭṭas hold that *abhāva* is *bhāvāntara:* When the apprehension of shell is said to be absent in the pot, what is meant is not the non-existence, which the Bhāṭṭas do not accept, but only that something else exists. But this something else does not mean the limitedness of apprehension, *graha. ibid.*

132. des'ato'paricchinno graho vibhussiddhaḥ – *I. S.*, p. 276

133. tatra śuktyadvaitamato bhavet - *ibid.*, III. 70

established. And cognition also is eternal and one. The question is: is difference intrinsic in cognition, or due to the difference in objects or in cognisers? Not the first; difference cannot be intrinsic. The manifestation as one in objects is the proof of their oneness, and as diverse, the proof of difference. There is no such diverse form manifested in cognition. There is no difference in cognition due to difference in objects because it is the same in regard to two objects and it has been shown that the shell-cognition, for example, has all things as content,[184] or in other words, there is shell-non-duality. Similarly there is no difference in cognition due to difference in cogniser, because of eternality and all-pervasiveness of cognition.[185]

If it is thought that if apprehension is eternal there will be no knowership for the intelligent persons, it is replied that this is precisely the operation of *avidyā* or nescience. Similarly, if the absence of apprehension, *agraha*, which is said to be the cause of illusion, is accepted at all, then it should be the operation of nescience and therefore, indeterminable. since the negation of cognition,[186] has been shown to be nothing different from the cogniser, the cognised or any other cognition. Since negation of apprehension is none of these and since there is no other alternative, it should be accepted that there is no negation of apprehension. If it were desired, it should be accepted as illusory and indeterminable being product of nescience.

Having shown that non-apprehension is not available to the Anyathākhyātivādin in the explanation of illusion, it is now necessary to show that similarity, *sādṛśya*, also is not available either.

In what aspect does the apprehension of a similar object become useful in illusion? Is it in respect of the cognition of

---

134. asati cāgrahe grahasya kauṭasthye sarvavastuviṣayatve ca saṁbhavati sati, aikyameva nyāyyam - *ibid.*, p. 278

135. grahe nitye vibhau ceṣṭe jñabhede'pyasya kā bhidā - *ibid.*, III. 73
Also for the reason of inconstancy in cognition and appearance together, see *I.S.*, III. 74.

136. Which according to the Bhāṭṭas can only mean some *bhāvāntara* in the form of cognition, cognising the cognised.

silver? Or in respect of being otherwise?[187] That is to say: Is it in respect of the cognition of silver existent in other places, or is it in respect of the otherwiseness of its cognition?

If the first, a relationship between silver and the similar object, which gave rise to illusion, must be determined, as in the case of fire and smoke, showing their invariable concomitance. Similarity gives rise to the valid knowledge of comparison. So, it is not defective and illusory. If it were, then knowledge through comparison also will become illusory which is an undesirable contingence. So, similarity cannot be the cause of illusion.

For another reason also, similarity is not the cause of illusion. There are cases of illusion where similarity does not enter as a factor at all. For example, "The conch is yellow", "Milk is sour", "The sun is dark", "There are two moons", "The letter 'a' is of *svarita* accent",—these are not illusions arising from similarity. It may be that there are other factors like defective senses that are components of such illusions, but never similarity.

Moreover, no object is totally dissimilar from any other. There is bound to be some similarity or other between objects. So, if similarity were the cause of illusion, it should be present in every perception to some degree. Then illusoriness will beset all of our perceptions. If knowledge of a similar object or object in general which existed in the past is said to be the cause of illusion, then, this knowledge, once originated, will bring about illusion always. And it will be produced in the sleeping person, in the person with the closed eyes and in the person who is unconscious, since no sense-contact seems to be necessary now if the knowledge of a thing of the past could produce the illusion.

If it be said that the knowledge is not of a thing of the past, but that knowledge and illusion occur at the same time, this cannot be because two co-existent entities like the horns of the cow cannot be said to be causally related. Also, two cogni-

137. rūpyabodhe anyathātve vā bodhe cedbodhayānayoḥ - *I. S.*, III. 83

tions cannot be there in the same mind simultaneously.[138] Again, knowledge and illusion cannot co-exist because of the conflict in having the same object.[139] If they have different objects for content, then what is the content of illusion different from that of knowledge? Indeed there cannot be an illusion of taste from the knowledge of colour.

If, in order to avoid this defect, it is said that in the same knowledge there are elements of apprehension and illusion, even then, between these two elements, there cannot be cause-effect relationship. It cannot be said that the element of illusion is brought about by the element of apprehension, because of oneness of knowledge. Or, there is the contingence of the nature of apprehension for illusion. Illusion, too, is apprehension but it is an apprehension whose objects is not in contact with the senses and is infested with defects as there is the difference of usage like that of bull and cow though the bull has *gotva*.[140]

If it be said again that illusory cognition is that cognition which has the aspect of apprehension or which has for its content the aspect of apprehension which is born of the contact of the content with the senses (the content being fit for such contact—*svārthayogyākṣam*), then, this illusion will not be possible in dream where the senses do not function. For, taking the example of colour, is the specific cognition of colour alone the aspect of colour-illusion, or apprehension in general? In either case, there cannot be the illusion of colour in dream. First, because the senses do not operate there is the impossibility of the perception of any colour. With reference to the apprehension n general, if mere apprehension could cause the illusion, then, there can be the illusion of taste when fire is seen at a distance.

If it is said that there can be in dream the illusion of colour etc., from the apprehension by mind of colour which, however,

---

138. yugapaj-jñānadvayāyogācca-*I. S.*, p. 282

139. na ca sahaikasminnarthe bhramagrahau staḥ virodhāt *ibid.*

140. yathā balivardasya gotve'pi gauriyaṁ balivardo'sāviti bhedavyavahāro'vāntarabhedāt tathā grahasya bhramatve'pi doṣotthatvāt bhramatvam iti arthaḥ - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 578

does not exist, this is not sound, for, even in the waking state there is no observation of that which does not exist by mind alone exclusively. So, this is impossible in dream also. Therefore, a colour-illusion arising out of immediate contact can be dismissed as impossible. And, even mediate knowledge is not observed in the waking state through mind of an object that does not exist without the mediation of a middle term or the *probans*.

It cannot be said that an apprehension of a non-existent object can take place in dream because of the defect of sleep, for, then, that there is an apprehension of a non-existent object itself will be an illusion, not being produced by sense-contact and being produced only by defects. If again it is said that there is illusion in dream through mind alone, when the object which is cognisable by that is apprehended and not when it is not apprehended, then, colour-illusion, for example, which is not cognisable by mind but only by direct sense-contact, will never be possible in dream. But such illusions are found to occur

Nor can it be held that non-existent objects like colour etc., appear in dream without the operation of the senses through the superimposition of each other, due to the defect of sleep because this will entail the risk of the impossibility of any knowledge of the waking state which sublates the dream-illusion for the following reasons: Sublation must make known the substrate. But the *pūrvapakṣin* says that the non-existent appears in illusion in dream. This means, when the illusion is lifted and sublated, there will be no substrate. Non-existent objects that are said to appear in dream without the operation of sense-contact due to the defect of sleep only are multitudinous, each superimposed on the other. These are not cognisable by the senses precisely for the reason of their non-existence. And, even if they are cognisable, they are not cognisable by one sense-organ because of their multitudinousness. But many sense-cognitions are not possible at the same time. And further, they are seen in illusion as mutually superimposed only due to defect of sleep. Thus, there is no possibility of knowing the true nature of these apparent objects through any means. Thus, dream-illusion will be

unsublated.[141] Nor can there be such sublation through the apprehension, at the same time of their mutual non-existence, because of endlessness.[142] And it will be quite unreasonable to say that valid knowledge of colour etc., being due to defect, comes out of that same defect, because there will then be never an illusion from defect. And, consequently, it cannot be the cause of revelation or cognition-otherwise. And, if defect that reveals the true nature of things, as the senses do, is the sublater of the illusion brought about by another defect, there may be sublation of an illusion in the dream and not of the dream itself. Thus, whether there is the defect of sleep or no, there cannot be anything like sublation in dream. That is, if there is no defect like sleep, defect being absent, true koowledge will be there and no necessity for sublation.[143] If there were the defect of sleep it has been shown that that there can be no sublation.

The same line of reasoning applies in case of shell-silver. That is, if illusion is of the silver that exists in a different place, then, whether the defect is present or absent, there cannot be the sublation of the illusion. If there were no defect, then shell will be perceived as shell. If there were defect, this is not in respect of the silver that exists elsewhere. For, the apprehension in illusion is not as "That is shell", but only as "This is silver", and the sublation is only of the form "This is not silver but this is shell", A defect does not present an object that is non-existent here and now.[144]

So, by all this reasoning, it is clear that the cognition-otherwise is not of silver.

In verse 20, at the beginning of the essay, three alternatives were formulated, *viz.*, Is the cognition-otherwise that of the shell, or the silver or both? Taking the second alternative first, the answer has been set forth. Now to take up the first alternative :

---

141. teṣāṁ svarūpagrāhī sarvasvapna-bhrama-bādhātmā jāgradbodho na jātu syāt – *I. S.*, p. 283

142. nāpi ekadā anyonyābhāvagrāhī vā tadbodhaḥ, anantatvāt – *ibid.*

143. doṣābhāve jñānakāraṇamevāsti doṣabhāve ca na samyagjñānam, *J. V.*, *I. S*, p. 579

144. doṣaysa āvartamānagrāhakatvābhāvāt. *ibid,*

8

The cognition-otherwise is not of the shell

There is no cognition-otherwise or cognition of silver in the shell. For in illusion it is not silver that is in contact with the senses. If silver is merely remembered, then, there is no illusion since it is known for what it is, as something seen somewhere else and remembered. If it is said that illusion is due to incorrect remembrance, what is this incorrect remembrance? Is it non-apprehension of the aspect of silver, or non-apprehension of the distant place at which silver is said to exist?

If the first, it is wrong to say that there is the cognition of silver in the shell. If it be said that there is the apprehension of the whole silver in the shell by the remembrance of an aspect of silver, all due to defect, how is it that, when there is the non-apprehension of an aspect, there is the apprehension of the whole? Or, if the cognition of silver is in respect of an aspect, how can there be the illusion in an aspect?

In the second alternative, the distant place is not apprehended. Then, how can there be the separate cognition of the silver in shell by itself[145] without a reference to its own place? If it be said that silver requires some place, that the place of shell is perceived and that this is enough for illusion to be produced in the shell, this is not proper, for it is not the *cognition* of silver, but silver that requires a place. The place for the *cognition* of silver is silver itself. So, the knowledge of silver should be only in silver, and not in shell. Otherwise, the illusion will not be of the form "This is silver" but will be, "There is silver in shell", which is not the case.

Moreover, since silver has been cognised distinctly from shell, it cannot be said that there is the illusion of silver in the shell because of the incorrect cognition of shell. Indeed, is not cognition-otherwise through non-discrimination?[146]

---

145. svātantryeṇa grahītum aśakyatvāt. *ibid.*, p. 580

146. aviveke hi anyathāmatiḥ – *I. S.*. III. 103

If it is asked how there could be the discrimination or distinct perception of silver from shell unless there is discrimination of shell from silver, the reply is that this involves the defect of mutual dependence between the discriminations of shell and silver.

Thus, the first alternative, *viz.*, the cognition-otherwise of shell has been shown to be impossible. The third alternative, *viz.*, cognition-otherwise of both remains.

9

The cognition-otherwise of both shell and silver

The cognition-otherwise cannot be with reference to both shell and silver. For, if both are perceived, how can there be the cognition of one as the other? If both of them are not perceived, as in the case of deep sleep, there cannot be any cognition-otherwise. It cannot be said that it is through the non-discrimination of the natures of shell and silver which are perceived that there is cognition-otherwise; how can there be non-discrimination when there is apprehension of their natures? If it be said that the apprehension is not of shell and silver in their entirety but only in their aspects, and that non-discrimination is thus possible, then, there must be the cognition of one aspect in another aspect. But the knowledge "This is silver" can never arise if silver is perceived only in its aspect and not as a whole.

If it is said that the shell and the aspect of silver are the general and the particular respectively and that, therefore, there can be the cognition as "This is silver", then, the cognition of silver must be declared as *asatkhyāti* or apprehension of the non-existent. The silver is not merely one aspect, or two aspects. It is perceived as 'this' in entirety as an object, and not as a particular aspect related to a general.

And in case of apprehension or non-apprehension of silver or apprehension of the aspect of silver there is the impossibility of the cognition of silver as an aspect or aspects in shell. Thus,

the cognition of the aspect of silver as related to the shell as a particular to a general is, if anything, the cognition of the non-existent, which is not tenable.

Moreover, when there are the apprehensions of the shell and the aspect of silver, how can there be any illusion, since there is their discrimination?

If there could be non-discrimination between them, what is this non-discrimination?

Here, if difference be the nature of the aspect (of silver), then, when there is its apprehension, (in other words) if there be the discrimination of the aspect of silver from shell, then there is no question of non-discrimination. If difference, on the other hand, is not the nature of the aspect, but something different, then, there cannot be an illusion because of the non-apprehension of difference which is different from the aspect of silver.

If non-difference is the nature of the aspect of silver, then, the apprehension of the aspect is the apprehension of non-difference always. Thus, there will be illusion always because its difference from the shell is not perceived at any time.

To avoid this difficulty, if it is said that non-discrimination is the apprehension of the non-discriminated objects, even then, when there is the *apprehension* of non-discriminated objects, there can be no illusion. Indeed, there is no illusion in an object apprehended in another place from the apprehension of another object.[147] Otherwise this will affect even normal perceptions, because of too wide an application.

Therefore, there cannot be the cognition of silver in the shell; nor the cognition of shell in the silver; nor even the cognition of identity between them. And the cognition of another thing in a different place etc., is not illusion.

147. na hy anyavastugrahād anyatra gṛhīte bhramaḥ, atiprasaṅgāt – *I. S.*, p. 286

Here are three alternatives: (1) If shell is cognised as silver, then it is surely silver. If not, how can it be known as "This is silver"? (2) If silver is cognised by silver-knowledge, then, silver appears as it is, and not otherwise. (3) If nothing appears, how can it be said that it is knowledge? That which never appears does not appear. That which does not appear does not appear otherwise.

Therefore, the second alternative interpretation of *anyathākhyāti, viz.*, knowledge which shows the object otherwise than what it is, is self-contradictory, like the son of a barren woman.

10

Refutation of Anyathākhyāti - III

The three alternative interpretations of *anyathākhyāti* were mentioned *viz.*, the object becomes otherwise, the cognition reveals otherwise, the cognition becomes otherwise. Among them, the first two have been refuted and rejected. The third alternative is now taken up.

If *anyathākhyāti* means the becoming-otherwise of cognition, what is this becoming-otherwise, if it were not revelation-otherwise (which has been shown to be untenable)? If it is said that the origination of the cognition of silver in the shell is the otherwiseness of knowledge and that this is not revelation-otherwise, then, if the cognition be that of silver, it should have originated from silver, not from shell. If it be of shell it must have originated from shell, and not from silver. Thus there is no otherwiseness.

It may be argued: just as the mule born of a horse by an ass is not a horse, but only a mule, so also the silver-cognition, though it is born in a shell, is not the correct cognition of the shell. But, when the cognition is not born of silver, how can it be a cognition of that silver? The mule born of a horse and an ass is not a right analogy. Because, there is the patent experience that there is no cognition of silver born of non-silver.[148] But there is no mule born of she-mule. The instance

148. na hi arūpyajā iha kācid rūpyadhīḥ prasiddhā – *ibid.*, p. 288

cannot be likened even to the inferential knowledge, which is not born of its object directly and it cannot be said that the immediacy here felt in the illusion is due to defect. For, the inferential knowledge, too, must have an object and there is no silver here at all. If there were a silver, there will be no illusion at all.

Nor can it be said that though it is not born of silver, because it has form of silver it can be called "silver-knowledge". For, the cognition can never have the form of silver unless it has an association with that silver. If it is said to arise through latent impressions, then, silver becomes a matter of remembrance. But even remembrance must be traced to the external object,[149] which must have been once perceived. Even for those who do not accept the existence of external objects and who say that objects are only the forms of mental cognitions (as the *vijñānavādins* of the Buddhist persuasion do),[150] the silver, though it may not exist externally, is not cognised in shell and is not traced to shell.

Moreover, the silver-cognition cannot, it is found, be in the silver even when there is non-discrimination. Then, how can it possibly be in the shell? To explain: non-discrimination can be understood in three ways: (1) non-cognition, (2) incorrect cognition and (3) identity of objects brought about by objects themselves like curd and jaggery piece, when they become mixed and made into a delicacy.

In the first case of non-cognition, there will not be any apprehension. Then where is the question of silver being perceived in the shell? In the second case of incorrect cognition, this has been already criticised in detail in the refutation of *anyathākhyāti*

---

149. For those who accept external objects.

150. anāliṅgitabāhyārthā, buddhāveva smṛtiryataḥ – *I. S.*, p. 289

bāhyarūpyagata taddhīs-
tatsthatvānnaiva śuktigā |
tathāntarāpyāntaratvāt
naiva syādbāhyaśuktigā. ‖ – *I. S.* IV. 4

as revelation-otherwise.[151] In the third case, when shell and silver are together made into another object like curd and jaggery-piece, there cannot be a knowledge of either silver or shell in that third product. Thus, there can be no illusion there.[152] When there is discrimination of shell and silver, there can be, of course, no illusion.

Moreover, how is the silver-cognition known to have shell as content, when the shell is not apprehended by it? To the Bhāṭṭas, knowledge is only inferable. If that inference of knowledge has silver-cognition as *probans*, then, it can be inferred only as having silver as content as in the case of other silver-cognitions. If it is inferred as having shell for content, then, it should have shell-cognition as *probans* and, hence, it should be only shell-cognition. If by the cognition of one, a cognition having another as content is inferred, there is the contingence of undue extension, *ativyāpti*. Nothing can be said about any cognition because one does not know whether the cognition is itself or something having a different content. And, when all is said and done, there can never be a silver-knowledge here because there is no silver. So, if anything, there is only shell-cognition because of the existence of shell. Or else, no cognition is inferable because of the absence of the *hetu* or the *probans*. It is not thus wise to say that the generation of the knowledge of one thing in another object is otherwiseness for cognition.

If it is urged that the cognition of silver, though located in silver, appears as located in shell because of defect and that, therefore, it is *anyathākhyāti*, how does this appearing otherwise of silver-cognition happen? Is it by the silver-cognition itself or does it result from another cognition?

Not the first; because the silver-cognition is located in silver. And this cognition does not illuminate itself. It is the illuminator of the object. If it were itself the illuminated, it cannot be the

---

151. Refutation of *anyathākhyāti* - Part II - supra

152. śuktirūpyābhyāṁ kṛte vastvantare anyatarajñānaṁ na syāt - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 582

illuminator. It cannot be both because it is partless.[153] So this cognition rooted in silver, cannot show itself as otherwise than what it is; *viz.*, as located in the shell. Nor the second alternative. That is, silver-cognition cannot appear as located in shell even by another cognition, since there is no apprehension of shell and silver-knowledge by one and single cognition. In other words, when there is no apprehension of shell how can the silver-cognition appear as located in shell? Similarly, if there is no apprehension of silver-cognition, the apprehension of cognition by another cognition, resulting in cognition-otherwise, is not possible. Even supposing that there is the apprehension of shell and silver-cognition by one cognition or two cognitions, what is the meaning of the expression "as" in "as located in shell"? *Appearing "as located in shell"* is not indeed possible without *māyā*, when cognition-otherwise has been rejected by reasoning.

11

Refutation of Anyathākhyāti (IV) in the Expression "Negation is another Positive Entity and Nothing Else" of the Bhāṭṭas

Kumārila has stated that there is no negation in the sense that negation is only another positive entity and not an independent entity because of the impossibility of explanation otherwise.[154]

Silver is the negation of shell and is a positive entity. Thus, when the shell appears in the form of silver, it appears as it is not. Hence the cognition of silver in shell is a cognition-otherwise and erroneous. This position of the Bhāṭṭas is unsound. For what is the result of the assertion "negation is only another positive entity"? The terms 'positive entity', 'another positive entity' and 'negation' will all be synonymous. If negation, according to the statement in the *Ślokavārtika*, is not established

153. na svayaṁ rūpyaniṣṭhatvāt nātmānaṁ bhāsayatyapi - *and* bhāsyatvena samāptatvāt bhāsyatve bhāsikā na sā; bhāsikā cenna na sā bhāsyānānaṁśatvāt sahobhayam - *I. S.*, IV: 10, 11

154. bhāvāntaramabhāvo'nyo na kaścidanirūpaṇāt - *Ślokavārtika* - p. 245; *Vibhramaviveka*, V. 127, p. 14

as distinct or different from another positive entity, then, there can be no 'another positive entity' at all, since 'another entity' involves difference and difference cannot be established without the exclusion of each other's nature as in "This is not that". Otherwise, there is the contingence of accepting difference in one and the same thing. There is also the defect of mutual dependence, *anyonyāśraya, i.e.*, without the cognition of difference, there cannot be the exclusion of each other's nature, and there cannot be the exclusion of each other's nature unless there is the cognition of difference first. Moreover, when it is said that the negation of a positive entity is only another positive entity, is this 'another positive entity' the same as the first positive entity or no? If it is, then, it is no more 'another' positive entity. If it is not, then it is not a positive entity but only a negation. And, between a positive existent and a negation, no difference can be established.

Thus, a positive entity, another positive entity and negation will all be synonymous, with the result that when it is said that "Cognition in the form of negation is illusory" (*abhāvātmanā khyātir mṛṣā*) it would be tantamount to saying that all cognitions in the form of positive existence are illusory—since negation and positive entity are synonymous.

Further, even granting that silver is another existent different from shell, is it intrinsically the negation of shell, without dependence on a counter-correlate, *i.e.*, shell? Or is it the negation of shell having the shell as its counter-correlate? If it is the first alternative, there is the contingence of the knowledge of the negation of shell always in silver, since it requires no counter-correlate. If it does require a counter-correlate, *i.e.*, shell, then, without the cognition of shell, the cognition of silver in the shell will not be an illusion, since, otherwise, silver will not appear in the form of its (shell) negation and if it is not cognised in the form of negation, there will be no illusion.[155]

---

155. svābhāvātmanāpratīteḥ - *I. S.*, p. 297
svābhāvatvaṁ ca rūpye na bhavati svataḥ kiṁtu pratiyogikṛtam. ato yatkṛtaṁ rūpyasyābhāvatvaṁ tadapratītau na bhrāntissyāt iti bhāvaḥ. *J. V., I. S.*, p. 667

If the first alternative is still preferred and if it is said that silver is not a negation with reference to shell, but that the nature of negation is intrinsically existent in it and that this nature is manifested by means of absence of cognition of the counter-correlate, *i.e.*, shell (*abhāvamāna*) and that, therefore, it does not appear always[156] to the senses, then, illusions cannot be said to be the products of senses but only known by means of *anupalabdhi*. That is, cognitions of the positive entities as expressed in "This is silver", "This is serpent" in illusions will never be illusions, since they are born of the senses. If they are illusions, they will have to be the cognitions of negation. Therefore, the cognitions in the shell, of negations of shell (*i.e.*, silver) etc., should be accepted as illusions; and this is neither accepted nor observed in experience. It has been said also that silver-perception will not be an illusion if it could appear without reference to the counter-correlate, *viz.*, shell of which silver is said to be the negation; because then the silver-perception will not be the perception of negation. Negation always requires a counter-correlate.[157]

If, instead of having silver as a negation, it is said that silver is not a negation, but intrinsically an existent entity other than the shell, then, there will be the cognition of this existent silver always as "This is an entity different from shell", which is not the case.

If, silver is, not intrinsically, but only in relation to shell, an existent object, then, the cognition of silver in the shell will not be an illusion without that cognition of shell since the cognition of silver, by supposition, requires the cognition of shell. But, then, if there is the cognition of shell, where is the illusion?

If it is said that the nature of being another existent object, *bhāvāntara*, for silver, originates with reference to shell,[158] then

156. Only after sublation as "This is not silver" that silver as the negation of shell is manifest (after disillusionment).

157. pratiyogitvenāpekṣyamāṇaśuktipratītiṁ vinā yā rūpyapratītir bhavati sā bhrāntir na syāt abhāvapratītitvābhāvāt - *J,V., I.S.*, p. 586

158. bhāvāntaratvaṁ rūpyasya janyaṁ cec chuktyapekṣayā - *I.S.*, V. 10

the cognition of silver need not be restricted only to the time of the presence of the shell. It can be there always even when the shell is not there. For, a thing once originated is found to exist even after its cause has perished; as in the case of the house built by masons. The house may survive the masons who built it. If it is said that silver is manifested with reference to shell, and that thus, there is illusion, no; for (i) *without* the *manifestation* with reference to shell, the cognition of silver in the shell will not be an illusion, since there will not be the cognition of an existent object at all (which results in illusion), and (ii) *with that manifestation*, too, there is no illusion, because, then, there will be the clear perception of difference between shell and silver.

Thus, in illusion there is the cognition of silver alone and no cognition of another existent object. Therefore illusion cannot be defined as the cognition of an object in the aspect of another existent object. It can be described only as different from the cognition of the existent, due to *māyā*, or different from the cognition of the non-existent brought about by the operation of *māyā*.

Further, if the Anyathākhyātivādins urge, as they do, that silver, being the negation of shell, is only another existence, (*bhāvāntara*),[159] we ask: is *the nature of being another existent object* (*bhāvāntaratva*) *different* from the existent silver or *non-different?* If different, is it existent, *sat* or non-existent, *asat?* If existent, then, the *bhāva*, silver and the *bhāvāntaratva*, nature of being *bhāvāntara*, must be perceptible distinctly, in which case there will be no illusion.[160] If non-existent, then a non-existent object, according to the Bhāṭṭa Anyathākhyātivādins, being cognised by the means of cognising negation, *abhāvamāna*, illusion can no more be characterised as the cognition of the existent. Even supposing that it is due to defect that the non-existent is cognised as existent, silver-cognition will not be an illusion; for, it will be illusion, not when *it* (*bhāvāntaratva*) is perceived as

159. rūpyaṁ śukterabhāvaḥ bhāvāntaratvāt - *I. S.*, p. 295

160. bhāvāntarātmakhyātiḥ na bhrama - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 587

existent, but only when the cognition of *it* (*bhāvāntaratva*)—and this on the alternative that *bhāvāntaratva* is different from silver—as existent is absent. In other words, the nature of being the *bhāvāntara* or *another existent object*,[161] must be cognised if there is to be no illusion. Only when it is not cognised as existent there is illusion. So, illusion does not consist in the cognition of the non-existent as the existent.[162]

Of course, the above argument grants that the *bhāvāntaratva* of the silver, that is different from silver, is of the nature of the non-existent. But, that itself is not sound. For, how can there be the distinction of difference or non-difference in what is non-existent?

Now, harking back to the first two alternatives *viz.*, is the nature of being another existent object, *bhāvāntaratva*, different from silver or non-different? The first alternative of difference has been rejected. With regard to the second alternative, *viz.*, non-difference, if the *bhāvāntaratva* is non-different from silver, then, how can there be any cognition-otherwise when there are no two objects? Indeed, cognition-otherwise arises when, between two objects, one is perceived as the other. So, it is not reasonable to say that illusion is the cognition of one as another, and that negation as shell is another existent object. If, as the Anyathākhyātivādins urge, non-existence is only a *bhāvāntara*, or another *existent*, there will be no negation anywhere. All non-existence is some existence somewhere and at some time. The result will be, there being no negation anywhere, all objects will be ever-enduring and endless.[163] Thus, the usage of negation itself will be rendered illusory. Kumārila's statement: "There is no negation apart from another existent object because of the absence of valid means of knowledge", has no meaning or content, if there

161. bhāvāntaratva.

162. doṣād asataḥ sadbuddhigamyatve'pi na rūpyadhīr bhramassyāt kiṁtu asati sadbuddhirity. *J. V., I.S.*, p. 587

163. sarve vastu sarvagataṁ kūṭasthaṁ sadāprakāśaṁ ca yadā prāptaṁ tadā atredaṁ nāsti imaṁ na jāne ityādivyavahāro bhrama iti - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 668

is no negation or non-existence.[164] If *abhāva* is intelligible at all, then, it is of the nature of what is not cognised.[165] Otherwise there will be the cessation of all activities and knowledge.[166]

If it be contended that since negation is an existent, the statement of Kumārila is not contentless (*nirālaṁbana*), what then is the meaning of the statement?[167] If it is "negation (or *abhāva*) is something different from another existent object (*bhāvāntara*) and itself is an existent, because of the possibility of another proof for it," then, negation as different from another existent object is not denied. Consequently, that negation itself is another positive object cannot be maintained. Therefore, it is clear that, on the Bhāṭṭa view, all empirical usages of negation will come to a standstill,[168] because *abhāva* is not shown to be different from *bhāva*. If they are to be admitted, then, negation must be accepted as of the nature of *māyā* which is the basis of all empirical usages of negation.

If *abhāva* is not accepted as of the nature of *māyā*, a little analysis will reveal the contingence that there can be no valid cognition of *abhāva* before the establishment of the existent object. Unless first some existent object is cognised, how can the negation of it be cognised? For, certainly negation requires a counter-correlate. And, when thus there is no valid cognition of negation, there will be only the sensory, indeterminate, knowledge of the mere existent, (*sanmātra*), with no limitation of space, time etc.[169] Thus, when the mind is occupied with the cognition of the bare existent, there can be no cognition of

---

164. Since the statement mentions the absence or negation of *abhāva* and the valid means of knowledge in the matter of negation.

165. *i.e.*, not an existent, but a negation.

166. sarvasambandhisakalābhāvavaiyarthyāt - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 668

167. *i.e.*, "Non-existence is only another existent and nothing else". —bhāvāntaram abhāvo'nyo na kaścidanirūpaṇāt.

168. bhāvamātrasya abhāva - vyavahārānarhatvāt abhāvavyavahāralopa - *J. V.' I. S.*, p. 588

169. sanmātra - grahaṇarūpena jāte nirvikalpapratyakṣe deśādyavaccheda aspuraṇāt - *ibid.*, p. 589

negation of that. Thus, the cognition of *abhāva*, being contentless, is not valid.[170]

If it is said, as it is by the Prābhākaras, that *abhāva* is not an object (so there is no cognition of it also) by itself but that it arises only when there is the non-cognition of what will ordinarily be cognised even without the corresponding object of *abhāva*, and what is desired to be cognised,[171] then, if *without the corresponding object* there could be the usage of negation, the same could apply to the case of positive entities; there can be the usage of negation even when pot, for instance, is cognised positively, and there can be the knowledge without the corresponding content or object of that knowledge. What then is the use of an object[172] in any knowledge? The usage of negation must have negation as its object. If the usage of negation, on the other hand, arises because of the non-functioning of valid means of knowledge, then, all usage of negation will be like deep sleep (where no valid means of knowledge arises or operates).

If it is said that the usage of negation arises, not out of mere negation of apprehension through valid means of knowledge, but when there is no apprehension of what is desired to be apprehended; and by the expression "what is desired to be apprehended", the attainment of all the requisites of knowledge of the counter-correlate of negation[173] is meant, this argument is of no avail for the Prābhākaras who do not recognise any negation (or *abhāva*).[174] There cannot be a distinction like "This is desired to be cognised while this is *not*" for one who does not admit *abhāva*. Thus, there is no such thing as mere non-apprehension and non-apprehension of what is desired to be

---

170. nirviṣayatvāt na kāpyabhāvadhīḥ pramā - *I. S.*, p. 301

171. jigḥṛkṣitārthe tadagrahāt tadabhāvavyavahāraḥ - *I.S.*, p. 302
This is the position taken by the Prābhākaras, who do not accept *abhāva*, whether as of the nature of *māyā* or no.

172. abhāva prameya eṣṭavya - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 589

173. upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāpti.

174. abhāvasya aniṣṭatvāt- *I.S.*, p. 116

cognised. Moreover, the desire for knowledge is fruitful and intelligible only in knowledge, and not in its negation. The presence or absence of desire for knowledge does not usher any distinction in negation or non-apprehension. If there could be a distinction in negation, it will no more be a negation.[175] Negation is non-apprehension and non-appearance. Then, how is it known that there is the usage of negation in the absence of negation? If the negation of knowledge could appear, negation of the object of that knowledge could appear much more.[176]

The Bhāṭṭas would perhaps answer: The cognition of negation is the empirical usage of negation resulting from the non-apprehension of the object when there is the entire aggregate of the causes of the knowledge of counter-correlate, (such as desire for knowledge etc.), with the exception of the object.[177] The defect in this argument has been already pointed out in refuting the Prābhākaras. That is, non-apprehension, which is negation, is not affected by such distinctions as the presence of the desire for knowledge and its absence; and non-apprehension cannot be the cause of the usage of the cognition of negation[178] by its own capacity as the eye perceives the object by its own capacity. Negation cannot be the locus of any positive potency like that of the eye to perceive negation of pot on the ground; otherwise it will cease to be negation. So, it cannot, like the eye, cognise things without itself being seen. And the eye, too, cannot see absence but only presence.

If it is said that, some apprehension being essential, when there is the entirety of the causes like the desire for cognition etc., and if there is still the non-perception of the object, it follows that the object must be absent; and that, when there is

175. viśeṣavattve bhāvatvaprasaṅgāt - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 589

176. grahābhāvasyaiva grāhyābhāvabhānakāraṇatvāt - *ibid.*

177. jigbṛkṣādisarvagrahaṇa - sāmagrīparipūrtau agrahāt abhāva - vyavahāro'-bhāvadhīrbhavati – *I. S.*, p. 303

178. yadajñātaṁ kāraṇaṁ tacchaktivaśeneti niyatam. abhāvasya ca bhāva-rūpaśaktyāśrayatvāyogāt, tadātmatve vā abhāvatvahānāt nājñātasya kāraṇatvam *J. V., I. S.* p. 668

the absence of the desire for knowledge, etc., non-apprehension may be taken as being due to their absence, even then, when the particular determinate object is not established, the distinction of the absence of the desire for knowledge (non-apprehension of the object resulting from that) and the absence of the object alone (when all the other conditions are present) leading to non-apprehension is also not established. As has already been pointed out, perception presents to us only the positive objects indeterminately and not determinately.[179] So, if non-apprehension is said to be the cause of the cognition of negation, desire for knowledge etc., not being the determining factors, non-apprehension will be there always. And, non-apprehension, too, is never possible,[180] when only the mere existent is cognised by direct perception.

If it is said that the knowledge of the negation of the object is secured from the knowledge of the absence of the required means of knowledge, then, the knowledge of the absence of the required means of knowledge, too, depends upon the knowledge of the absence of the means of knowing *that*—and in this way, there will be only infinite regress.

If it is said that the absence of means of knowledge does not require any means of knowledge, then, this is arbitrary and thus, if this is the case with the absence of the *māna*, why not the means of knowledge be without any means? Otherwise, the absence of the means of knowledge, too, shall be capable of being known as a pot. If not, the absence of the pot, too, will be unknowable. If the absence of the knowable were also unknowable, then, the absence of pot etc., must be unknowable. Thus, negation or non-existence is not a means of valid knowledge in respect of the negation of the knowable.

---

179. bhāvamātragrāhakasya vyāvṛttigrahaṇe vyāpārābhāvāt – *ibid.*, p. 590

180. pratyakṣeṇa sanmātre gṛhīte virodhāt tatra tāvadagraho na ghaṭate anyaccādyāpi asiddhaṁ, yatra agrahassyāt – *ibid*, p. 668

The Advaitin holds that even in perception, apart from scripture, one is presented only with non-different reality which is merely *sat* and which is one and infinite.

Further, if the means of knowledge does not have a means of knowledge for it to be known, then, we ask whether the unknowable means of knowledge is inert or intelligent. If the first, then, there will be universal blindness. If the latter, there is the contingence of non-duality,[181] self-luminosity and eternality for it, because of the non-establishment of negation, origin etc., for it. Thus one self-luminous knowledge is established. But as all this is not quite acceptable to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, it has to be concluded that the *means* of knowledge is not without a means of knowledge to know it.

Further, with regard to the *absence* of means of knowledge for the absence of means of knowledge,[182] two alternatives can be conceived: Is the absence of the means of knowledge for absence of the means of knowledge which is unknowable, self-luminous or does it require an extraneous proof?

If the first, it will be always known and as such the knowledge of negation of that means of knowledge by which the absence of knowledge (*mānābhāva*) is known, will always be there, since the absence of that means of such knowledge is self-luminously present always. The Bhāṭṭa's argument earlier is that absence of cognition means absence of object. Here since absence of cognition is always self-luminously present, knowledge of the absence of the object also must always be there. If it is said that even then knowledge of negation need not follow when desire for knowledge etc., are not there and that knowledge of the negation of the object need not be always present, then, desire for knowledge etc., must be considered as the cause of the knowledge of negation. Positively, if knowledge arises when desire for knowledge etc., are there, and negatively, if in their absence, the knowledge also is absent, then, it has to be decided that desire etc., are the cause for knowledge of negation and not non-apprehension. For in the case of non-apprehension being the cause, there is no negative evidence, *vyatireka*. One is not able to say that in the absence of non-apprehension, knowledge of

181. advaitapātaḥ – *J.V., I.S.*, p. 590

182. mānabhāvo na vimānaḥ – *I.S.*, p. 304

negation does not arise. Because first in case of non-apprehension being non-cognisable, there cannot be any knowledge of negation which is conditioned by non-apprehension. When non-apprehension itself, in other words, is not known, it being said to be the means of knowing negation, negation, too, will not be known. Secondly, if non-apprehension is self-luminous, the self-luminous being eternal, the self-luminosity of the absence of the means of knowledge of negation does not allow any non-apprehension at any time and thus, non-apprehension is not the cause of the knowledge of negation.

It has been shown that non-apprehension is not the cause of the knowledge of negation, holding that desire for knowledge etc., are the cause. Now it remains to be shown that causality for desire for knowledge etc., too, cannot be maintained. If there is the cognition of negation when there is desire for knowledge etc., there will not be the knowledge of the counter-correlate when desire for knowledge exists. That is to say, the cognition of the counter-correlate of negation cannot be having the same cause of desire for knowledge etc. If desire for knowledge is the cause of the knowledge of the counter-correlate, it cannot be the cause of the negation. The one and the same desire, in other words, cannot be the cause for both cognition of negation and of its counter-correlate,[188] without self-contradiction.

Every object, according to the Bhāṭṭa, is constituted by both what it is and what it is not. It is said to be *sadasadātmaka. Abhāva* or negation, according to the Bhāṭṭas, is also implicative of a *bhāva*, affirmation. The cow, the *bhāva*, the positive existent, has the *abhāva* or negative element in it in that it is *not* a horse. The argument is that if desire for knowledge etc., is the cause of the knowledge of the negation, it cannot be the cause of the knowledge of affirmation, *bhāvāntara*, which this negation implies.

Moreover, if desire for knowledge is the cause of the knowledge of negation or affirmation, then, the Bhāṭṭa doctrine that knowledge is inferred from the cognisedness (*jñātatā*, *prākaṭya*)

183. bhāvābhāvadhiyoḥ viruddhakāryayoḥ ekakāraṇakātvā-saṁbhavat – *J.V.*, *I.S.*, p. 590

of the object produced by the cognition, will have to be given up as the object is no more the cause, but only the desire for knowledge.[184]

Now regarding the second alternative *viz.*, the non-self-luminosity of the absence of the means of knowledge:

If the absence of the means of knowledge is the cause of the knowledge of negation, without itself being apprehended (like the eye, for example, which itself is not seen while it sees other things), then, that itself must be known at some time or other. Otherwise, there is no means of knowing and asserting that as the cause of the knowledge of negation at all.[185] But there is no means of knowing that absence of the means of knowledge. So non-apprehension is not the cause of negation.

12

Refutation of Inferability of Knowledge

With reference to the Bhāṭṭa's argument:

"From the existence of the fruit of valid knowledge the existence of valid knowledge is inferable; when there is no observation of the fruit, there is the knowledge of the absence of valid knowledge," this argument need not be entertained seriously because there is no invariable concomitance or connection between the non-observation of fruit and the negation of knowledge, by which there can be a legitimate inference of the absence of valid knowledge from that *probans*, just like the inference of the negation of smoke from the *probandum*, *i.e.*, the negation of fire. And the negation of the object cannot be inferred from the absence of valid knowledge, as the existence of fire is accepted even in the absence of smoke-inference. Similarly, the absence of the valid means of knowledge is no ground for inferring the absence of the object.

Now, the Bhāṭṭas may further urge that valid knowledge is a function, and as such impermanent,[186] because its presence

184. arthasya ca anumeyādeḥ kāraṇatva-kalpakābhāvāt – *ibid.*

185. sa vedyaḥ kadācit, anyathā tasya taddhetutvāgateḥ – *I.S.*, p. 304

186. mānaṁ kriyātvād asthāsnu – *ibid.*, p. 305

depends upon the presence of the object and is thus occasional. And being not perceptible, it is ever inferable through the *probans* of the presence or absence of the fruit *viz.*, the existence of the object. Such being the case, when there is the absence of experience of the object, the absence or valid knowledge, too, is naturally inferred. For, the presence of valid knowledge is established only by the presence of the experience of the object. There is no other means. But in case of fire, there is permanence for it. It is not occasional. It is otheswise established also through perception, for instance. Hence there is no negation of fire even in case of the absence of smoke-inference. So runs the objection.

This objection is not good. For, the fruit of the valid knowledge, *viz.*, the experience of the object establishes only the object and not the valid knowledge itself.[187] Nor does the Bhāṭṭa say "I know the absence of valid knowledge", after knowing the absence of the fruit of the knowledge *viz.*, experience of the object. So, absence of knowledge is not inferred from the absence of the object. And the existence of the object is accepted, as has been stated in the case of fire even when there is the absence of valid inferential knowledge. The absence of the object also is accepted through the cognition of negation, *anupalabdhi* only, and not through the non-origination of the valid means of knowledge of the counter-correlate *i.e.*, object.[188]

Or, if it is said: the absence of the valid knowledge or the knowledge of that absence is because of the non-origination of the knowledge of the presence of valid knowledge, then there can be no knowledge for the Bhāṭṭas at any time. Indeed, when there is the origination of knowledge having the *object* as content, then, there need be no inference, having the content as *probans* as to the presence of valid knowledge. So the knowledge of the *mānabhāva*, or the presence of the valid knowledge, is not there then. And the Bhāṭṭas themselves hold that it does not arise at other times, being a function, being impermanent and being

187. na tāvat tatphalam eva mānasiddhiḥ, tasyārthasiddhatvāt – *ibid.*

188. arthābhāvo'pi abhāvadhiyaiveṣṭaḥ, na tu tadbhāvamāna anudayādeva – *ibid.*

inferable from the results.[189] Thus, knowledge is never possible for them. Consequently we must say that the object which is apprehended by the cognition and which is the fruit of that knowledge does not exist for them.

It was pointed out by the *siddhāntin* that the Bhāṭṭas will not say that after cognising the absence of the fruit of knowledge they know the absence of valid knowledge. Now, even supposing that they will say so, (*viz.*) when the negation of fruit is known, the knowledge of the negation of *pramāṇa* results, what is the proof for the negation of fruit? How is it known?

If it were self-evident, then, its negation can never be established. For that which is self-luminous, how can there be negation? Again, if both negation and existence are intrinsic to the fruit because of being self-manifest, and not extrinsically established by any *pramāṇa*, then if the negation of the fruit of knowledge is established by the same means by which its existence also is established, the proof of negation itself will be the proof of existence, and thus, existence itself will be non-existence and it will be there always and as such, there cannot be an inference of knowledge from that because, it is not an effect, being always present. If there could be an inference of knowledge from that which always exists, the inference shall be there always or never, and it cannot be occasional, as the Bhāṭṭas believe. Or else, if what exists always is not the existence but the negation of the fruit of knowledge, even then, there can never be an inference of knowledge from the fruit of knowledge which is ever non-existent. Even if there could be an inference, it is not occasional, but is there always or never. This is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas for whom knowledge, being a function, is only occasional.

Again: if the valid knowledge of the positive presence of the fruit of knowledge is itself the valid knowledge of its negation, the same possibility can occur elsewhere also, where the fruit is not present. Thus, negation being non-different from the counter-correlate of negation (*bhāva*), everything will be existent. The

189. The fruit of knowledge.

opposite cannot be *i.e.*, everything will not be negation, because there cannot be negation unless there is the positive entity.[190] Thus, the existent is everything and the search for a proof of negation by the *Bhāṭṭas* is a wild goose' chase.

It cannot be said by them that intrinsically the *fruit* of knowledge *i.e.*, the experience of the object, is a positive entity by virtue of its being self-luminous. But it is negation because of its non-appearance or non-manifestation. Thus, their valid cognitions *i.e.*, cognitions of the positive aspect and the negative are not identical. So, the defect of negation being identical with positive existence with the attendant undesirable results for the Bhāṭṭas is really not present.

The course of the above argument is not sound because the non-appearance of the fruit of knowledge does not imply its non-existence even as the non-appearance of the object does not imply its non-existence;[191] unless, of course, the opponent maintains that the fruit of the means of knowledge *i.e.*, experience of the object itself in its very nature is mere appearance. If, however, it is mere appearance by its very nature, its negation is not different from its non-appearance. In that case, its negation cannot be established either intrinsically, or by fruit, or by any other source.

For, first, is the negation of the fruit, self-luminous? If so, it will not differ from the positive entity and it will no more be negation. Secondly, the fruit itself will not obviously establish its own negation. When the fruit exists, its negation cannot exist and *vice-versa*. Thirdly the negation of the fruit *i.e.*, knowledge of the object is not known by any other third person because fruit of knowledge is a non-object and, therefore, is not cognisable, like colour etc. Otherwise, it will surrender its self-luminosity. Whoever knows any positive entity, only he can know its negation also; not any third person. Also, if the fruit that is knowledge be cognisable, the valid means of knowledge

190. bhavatantratvādabhāvasya – *J.V., I.S.*, p. 391

191. abhāne'pi phalasya nāsattvaṁ yathā arthasya – *I.S.*, p. 306

by which it is cognised should be well-defined, in which case it will cease to be knowledge.

It cannot be said that the fruit that is knowledge of the object is known without the aid of any means of knowledge. For, in that case, even knowledge can be cognised in the same way, with the result, there will be no need for the Bhāṭṭas to say that knowledge is inferred through its fruit—*i.e.*, knowledge or experience of the object. And, if the fruit is cognisable, then, it is inert and loses the title of a *phala* or fruit of a means of knowledge, like intellect, colour etc. And a fruit that is inert cannot be said to be useful in knowing the object as the inert lamp is; for, the lamp, too, only dispels the darkness. It cannot bring about the immediate awareness of the object. The inert can never be established by another inert.[192]

If the fruit, *phala*, is inert, and if thus it is non-eternal, it must have been non-existent earlier than its origination and will be non-existent after its destruction. In other words, it must have its prior non-existence and posterior non-existence like a pot. If it is said that the fruit of knowledge is an attribute of the Self, and not an independent substance, then, prior and posterior non-existences must have to be stated as the attributes of this Self also. But the Self cannot be either the substrate or the nature of these non-existences of the fruit of knowledge or the fruit itself in case of their non-eternality and perceptibility, for the Self is eternal. Nor can something other than the eternal Self be their substrate etc., because of its being non-eternal, and, therefore, inert. And it is not conceivable that the fruit of knowledge has for its locus something that is inert. And when all is said and done, the fruit is of the nature of cognition.

Further, the fruit cannot be the quality of the Self; because they are not cognised in a single cognition,[193] as in the example

---

192. dīpasyāpi andhakāra-vyāvṛttimātrakaratvameva na tu jaḍasya kvāpyaparokṣya-vyavahāra-pravartakatvaṁ dṛṣṭam – *J. V., I. S.*, p. 591.

193. tadgrāhyaikadhīsaṁbhave tasmin guṇini guṇasya sadasattve te sidhyataḥ, na tu ekabuddhyayogyatve tayoḥ – *I.S.*, p. 308.

of the cognition "The cloth is white". Nor can the fruit be the quality of that which is other than the Self, for example, the inert pot. If the fruit *i.e.*, cognition is the quality of pot in the pot-cognition, it means a subscription to the materialist's (*bhūtacaitanyavādin*) doctrine that intelligence is only a quality of the elements. Secondly, if cognition is the quality of the pot, then pot will not appear through the cognition, as it will not appear through its own colour (which is its quality). Thirdly, the quality of an inert object cannot be non-inert like the intelligence.

Inteligence cannot be said to be produced in the cognition unlike colour which is also a quality of the object. If intelligence were produced in the object by the cognition, for one thing, it will become an object of knowledge like the object (e.g., pot) itself of which intelligence is said to be the modification. For another, if intelligence were a modification of the object, then, the object cannot be said to be established by that intelligence. Thirdly, if intelligence were produced in the object by the act of knowing, then, that should continue to be in the object even when the act of knowing is over. The house built by the carpenter, mason and others continues to exist even after these people are dead. It cannot be said that that which is produced by the cognition perishes when its parent-cognition is no more, for, the residual impressions of the cognition are there, though not the cognition itself.

So, intelligence is neither a quality of the object, nor a modification of it. It is eternal, non-perceptible. It can also be shown that it is changeless, *kūṭastha* and is not destroyed at any time.

For, a thing that has come into being by the operation of some cause does not perish by itself. In other words, if a thing was born due to some cause, it must die due to some cause also. In the same way, if intelligence is something that is produced, then, it will not die of its own accord. If intelligence is not obtained at all, there is no practical efficiency for it, like illumining another or it will not appear at all.

It was said that what is produced by an extraneous cause does not die of itself. If intelligence was intrinsically perishable, there is no coming into being for it, and much less the capacity to illuminate. For that which is naturally perishable, there is no beginning or birth.[194] And the totally non-existent has neither birth nor death. And there is no birth for that which is already existent; nor destruction, when the character of the existent persists.

Therefore, destruction, too, must be due to external causes and not intrinsic. These causes are not available in the case of intelligence which is not the product of any function or activity. If it were a product of a cause outside it, then it will have destruction and will perish due to the operation of that cause outside it.[195] But it is not the product of any activity or function, as the Bhāṭṭas seem to urge. Secondly, intelligence is manifested by the cognition. This cognition, too, cannot be the cause for the destruction of intelligence because it exhausts itself in the generation of intelligence.[196] Nor, thirdly, can another cognition be its destroyer; since the fruit of this cognition is something different from that of the one of which it is said to be the external cause of destruction. Moreover this another cognition cannot be one that is not born yet; because, not being yet born, it cannot come into conflict with or contradict any other cognition. Nor can it be one that is born; because once it is born, without destroying the other cognition in mention, it is clear that it is not in conflict with that cognition.[197]

Again, it cannot be said that the later cognition destroys the earlier one, just as the state of being a bracelet for gold is destroyed by being made into a necklace. For, the states or modifications in gold cannot exist together at the same time. In

---

194. nāśasvabhāvasya ca kathaṁ janma – *I.S.*, p. 309

195. If there is an external cause for the destruction of intelligence, is it (1) external cause like activity (2) the cognition that manifests it or (3) another cognition. All the three alternatives are unsound.

196. tajjananopakṣayāt na tāṁhanti – *I.S.*, p. 310

197. nājātā hanti saṁvittāṁ na jātāpyavirodhataḥ – *I.S.*, V. 37

the example of the gold, the substrate is one of which bracelet and necklace are modifications. But the sameness of such a substrate for cognitions has not been established. If, however, one such substrate is assumed, what could be the nature of that substrate? Here seven alternatives are possible. (1) Is it one in respect of all objects? (2) or is it different in each object? (3) or in respect of each knowledge? (4) or in respect of each sense-organ? (5) or in respect of each mental psychosis? (6) or in respect of each cogniser? and finally, (7) is it existent in the object or non-object?

To take up the first six alternatives one by one; If the substrate-cognition, *saṁvit-prakṛti*, is one in respect of all objects, and if, thus, the whole substrate is known in a cognition, then all objects must be known in a single cognition. And that single cognition will make the cogniser omniscient. This is not true.

(2) If there is a substrate-cognition for each object, as this substrate-cognition covers every aspect or capacity of the object, the perception of the object in a single cognition must be the perception of the capacity of the object also. But it is not intelligible how the perception of the object can, in the same cognition, present its capacity also.[198]

(3) Thirdly, if the substrate-cognition is one in respect of each knowledge, or *pramāṇa*, then in direct perception, when there is the knowledge of colour, there will be the knowledge of taste at the same time, since the knowledge arising out of the five senses is all direct perception.[199]

(4) If the substrate-cognition is one in respect of the object known through each sense-organ appropriate to it, that is, if each sense-organ has its own substrate different from others, even then, because the substrate is one, there is the contingence of

198. yāvad guṇako yāvacchaktiko yāvadaṁśako vārthaḥ taṁ prati cedekā saṁvitprakṛtis tadā ghaṭadṛṣṭyā tacchaktiḥ pratyakṣā syāt kṛtsnaghaṭavyāpakaprakṛteḥ phalibhūtatvāt – *J.V., I.S.*, p. 593

199. rūpadṛṣṭyā rasekṣaṇaṁ syāt indriyapañcakajanita—jñānasya pratyakṣatvāt. *ibid.*

seeing all the colours at the same time, so far as the ocular perception alone is concerned. For all colours are objects of ocular perception[200] and the intelligence-substrate is the same for all these without difference.

(5) Or, to avoid this difficulty, if it be said that for each psychosis, *vṛtti* of the mind for object, of cognition like blue, red, etc., the intelligence-substrate is different, then, there will be no destruction for a cognition that has once arisen. Only when there is a second cognition, the first cognition is said to be superseded. When there is only one unique cognition for each object separately, the second cognition cannot be thought of. So, there could be no supersession.[201] And the further common difficulty in all the above-mentioned alternatives is that where there is the cognition of an object in one person, there cannot be the cognition of the same object for another person. This is so because the substrate cognition is one and undivided in the person.[202] Consequently, it cannot be dispersed or distributed among different persons. Indeed, one gold, for example, wholly becoming the necklace cannot become bracelet at the same time. And again in all the alternatives, there will be no possibility of deep sleep because of the presence of some knowledge or other always. Thus there are difficulties in each of these alternatives.

With reference to the sixth and seventh alternatives, is the *saṁvitprakṛti*, producing cognition in every knower located in the object or the knower?[203] That it cannot exist in each object or all objects has been shown earlier.[204] If it exists in the knower, is it knowability or knowership for the knower that is brought about due to its existence in him? If the first, how can there

---

200. sarvasyāpi rūpasya cākṣuṣatvāt sarvarūpāvabhāsaka-saṁvit-prakṛteḥ phalibhūtatvāt – *ibid.*

201. uttarasamvidutpattyā hi pūrvadhvamsas tvayeṣyate. na ca ekadhivṛttiviṣaye saṁviddvayaṁ dṛśyate – *ibid.*, p. 594.

202. ekasyāḥ prakṛteḥ aneka-pariṇāma-virodhāt – *ibid.*

203. The sixth alternative also proceeds on the assumption that *samvitprakṛti* is one, and not different.

204. alternativer 1 and 2, *I.S.*, IV, 41 to 43

be the knowability for the object (as against the knower) without this substrate, *samvitprakṛti*, since the function of the substrate-intelligence is exhausted by effecting the knowability of the knower by having the knower as its knowable?[205]

Moreover, a person knows himself as one only.[206] And a person knowing himself thus exhausts the substrate—intelligence which is, (as has been supposed by the opponent in the discussion), one and undivided, and not many, with the result that the person cannot have the knowledge with regard to other objects and persons.[207] Not knowing other men and things is equivalent to deep sleep, being an absence of knowledge.

Also, there will be one knowledge only in the person always, because there will be no knowledge other than the one which, as has been said, has exhausted itself, and the first knowledge will never be cancelled or superseded by any subsequent knowledge.

Or, taking the second alternative, if it is the knowership that is brought about due to the existence of the substrate in the knower, this knowership cannot be with reference to Ātman or Self as content, because Ātman or Self is unknowable.[208] Nor can it be even with reference to the objects, which are not Self, as content. For, when the Self itself is not established (as the *knowership* is said to be brought about by the existence of the substrate-intelligence)—the not-self can be established much less. If on the other hand it is said that the Self is established by itself, then, how far is it proper to say that its knowership is dependent on something else, like the *saṁvit-prakṛti*?

Moreover, if substrate—intelligence and, thus the cognition, resides in the knower, then, the material cause of that cognition is in the knower. How then is there immediacy in perception,

---

205. jñātṛāśrayaprakṛteḥ jñātureva jñeyatva-saṁpādane parikṣayāt – *I.S.*, p. 670

206. ekaṁ svātmānaṁ jānātityekajñaḥ – *ibid.*

207. tasmin svātmajñe puruṣe sati anyeṣāṁ puṁsāṁ tadviṣayasaṁvinna syat svasaṁvitprakṛtessvasaṁvinmātre parikṣayāt – *ibid.*

208. na tāvadātmaviṣayaṁ jñatvam, tasya ajñeyatvāt – *I.S.*, p. 311.

for the object which is devoid of any intelligence or cognition or the material cause of it?[209] If the knowledge existent in the Self *is itself* immediacy in perception with reference to the object, then, so far as the Self is concerned there is no distinction between one object and another, and all objects, and not merely this or that object, will be known and established. Or else, none at all.

If the distinction is said to be that only with reference to *that* object which is the cause of the generation of a specific knowledge, there is immediacy and not for any other object, what is the result of that immediacy? Is it the appearance of the object or the knowledge or both? If the object, does it appear intrinsically or extrinsically?

If intrinsically, then object will appear anyway despite the immediacy of knowledge. So, knowledge is futile. If knowledge alone appears, then, the object does not appear. Thus again knowledge is futile. If both are said to appear and if the object is said to be pervaded and manifested by knowledge, *i.e.*, extrinsically, even then if knowledge alone pervading the objec, appears, the object is not manifest. If the object also is said to be manifested, then, if the establishment of the object is by the manifestation which is produced by knowledge, then, knowledge is futile, because establishment is by manifestation and not by knowledge. If it is said that manifestation, however, is in turn produced by knowledge, then some valid means of knowledge should be pointed out to establish this manifestation of knowledge. If knowledge is not an object of knowledge, as it certainly cannot be and is not, how can its being the material cause of manifestation be known? Even if knowledge or intelligence is the material cause of manifestation of the object, manifestation can be only of the Intelligence and it cannot be produced in the object because the object is inert. If the inert also could be manifest, there is no manifestation necessary. For, if the inert could appear

---

209. That is, there cannot be the immediacy for the intelligence residing in the knower in the matter of objects which are external to the knower because of being external to the locus of intelligence.

it is no more inert and will become non-inert And there will be no means of knowing that it is the inert that becomes luminous or manifest.[210]

Again: if intelligence exists in the knower, how does it reach the object?[211] It cannot be said to be all-pervasive on the ground that the knower is all-pervasive. For, intelligence then would pervade all the objects without distinction. Consequently, there will be knowledge always. If the pervasion is not there always, what is the evidence for its origination and pervasion at any time?

If intelligence is self-luminous, and if this self-luminosity is proof of such pervasion of the object by it, then, its origination and pervasion of the object cannot be known either by itself (because it is self-luminous) or by anything else (as otherwise it will become an object like pot etc.). If it is said that intelligence is not cognisable by a proof or *pramāṇa*, but that the *knower* apprehends it and that, as such it is not comparable to pot etc., then, it is not proper to say that the knowership accrues to Ātman or the Self due to that intelligence, since it is Ātman that knows it, and since the Self is self-established.

So, *saṁvit* or knowledge and its material cause, do not exist in or belong to the knower because the knower cognises them as he cognises mind etc., and mind etc., are not then different from knowledge in so far as both are knowable. Thus, the *saṁvit* and its material cause, because of being known by the cognising Self, are inert and for the inert there cannot be the character of being the consciousness or the cause of it. And, it cannot be non-inert for there is nothing conscious other than the Self.

Nor can it now be said that the Self transforms itself into intelligence, and is thus the material cause of intelligence, for the

---

210. jaḍo'pi prakāśate cet, kiṁ prakāśena kṛtena. nahi tasmin kṛtepi jaḍo'rthaḥ prakāśo bhavet. bhaveccet, jaḍo nāma na sidhyet. tadā jaḍaḥ prakāśi-bhavatityapi na jñāyeta - *I.S.*, p. 312-313.

211. Hitherto the argument proceeded on the assumption that the intelligence pervades the object and it was tried to establish the impossibility of immediacy. Now, that pervasion is said to be impossible.

Self is changeless and cannot enter into any relation of cause and effect, evolute or evolvent. Even if intelligence is accepted to be the modification of the Self, what about the other objects which are inert or intelligent? How are they established? Other schools of thought like that of the Bhāṭṭas will not be able to explain.

But in Advaita, they are established not by the transformation but by transfiguration, *vivarta*, of Brahman. So, it is concluded that Intelligence is neither a quality, nor a function or product of a function, nor a modification of anything else. Its relationship to Ātman under any of these categories is impossible to defend.

Ātman itself is Intelligence, is of the very nature of Intelligence. There is nothing other than Intelligence. The distinction of knower, known and knowledge are due to nescience. Intelligence-Self which is immediacy itself appears in all the triune distinctions of knower, known and knowledge. The world of objects, too, is secured only due to the conditioning of pure Intelligence by nescience. All the empirical usage is made possible only because of that conditioning.[212] The Self or *anubhūti* or experience is the soul of all and it is immediacy. And since the Self which is immediacy is the nature of all things, immediacy can be said to be in the knower, knawn or in knowledge without distinction or harm.[213]

Yet knowledge or experience is considered to be a fruit by the common man, though really experience is beginningless. It is already self-established. But it seems to be established anew. This is precisely the illusion. The illustration of space or ether will bring out the truth clearly. Ether or space, though unlimited in itself, seems to be limited by the hollow of the well. The hollow of the well gives the space there an appearance of shape which ether in itself does not possess. In the same way, though the Self or experience in itself does not know any change, it appears to be

212. mi byācitsaṁsargāj jaḍasya vyavahāraviṣayatvaṁ saṁbhavati – *J.V., I.S.*, p. 594.

213. Immediacy exists in the knower, so declare the Prābhākaras; the Bhāṭṭas that it exists in the object; and the Bauddhas that it exists in the means of knowledge. *J.V., I.S.*, p. 595.

secured in the form of knowledge when the senses come into contact with the object. The production or origin of knowledge, however, is only an illusion.

From all this discussion it is clear that Bhāṭṭa's position that the existence or non-existence of knowledge is inferred from the existence or non-existence of the fruit or experience of the object, is indefensible for the reason that the fruit or experience is not an object of knowledge. Surely, what is not an object of knowledge at all cannot serve as *probans* in an inference.

Moreover, if, as the Bhāṭṭas urge, knowledge is inferred when the object is known, it should be accepted that when the object is known the inference of knowledge results from that. Is there not here the defect of mutual dependence? When knowledge is established, the known object is established, and when the known object is established, knowledge is inferred.

The *probans* for the inference of knowledge from the knownness of the object is thus vitiated.[214] It cannot be said that the object, and not the knownness, is the *probans* for the above inference; for, only that which is associated with knowledge is spoken of as known. For, it cannot be said that when there is an object, there is the knowledge of it. Even when there is no knowledge, there can be the object.[215] So, there can be no inference of knowledge as the Bhāṭṭa seems to believe.

If knowledge itself is knowable by *pramāṇa* and similarly the knower also, this clearly involves an infinite regress: the knower of a knower, the knowledge of knowledge. *Pramāṇa*, like action being dependent on the knower, does not pervade its own substrate—*viz.*, knower, the Self, which is of the nature of knowledge.

This position of knower and knowledge is comparable to that of agent and action. The agent and his action are not the

214. jñānasiddhau jñātārthasiddhis tatsiddhau ca jñānānumiti paraparāśrayād asiddho hetuḥ - *ibid.*

215. jñānabhāve'pi arthasadbhāvabhyupagamāt - *ibid.*

objects of that action of his. For, objectness and agency cannot be in one, simultaenously and because, though the action may differ, the agent is one. The agent and his action cannot be the object of any other agent and his action, because by the same reasoning, that agent and his action also will have to be taken as the object of yet another agent and his action. Thus again, there is an infinite series of agents, actions, instruments therefor, etc.

The same reasoning is to be adopted in the case of know r and knowledge also and the infinite regress there, too, is quite apparent. Knower and knowledge are not the objects either of themselves or of other knowers and knowledges, like agent and action because of infinite regress.[216] It cannot be said that the object in the case of knowledge is an established fact while the result of an action is something to be accomplished. For, there is really no difference in the two cases. In both the cases, there is no establishment either before the *pramāṇa* or before an action respectively. So non-establishment is common.

If the contention is: with reference to the agent, he must be an established one. He must be there before he could start an action. But the case of the cogniser (or knower) is different. He can be a cogniser without being necessarily cognised either by himself or by others. Otherwise, either there will be infinite regress or mutual dependence. Infinite regress, if he is known by others. If the first cogniser is established through another cogniser's knowing, the second cogniser also is a subject to the same condition, and in this way there is infinite regress. Mutual dependence will arise if the *agent* (cogniser) establishes himself by knowing himself. To know oneself, one should exist first. To exist, one should know oneself. So, the cogniser need not be cognised to be established. The same reasoning applies to cognition also.

If this be the argument, there is agreement from the Siddhāntin's side over the fact that the cogniser and the cognition

216. pramāṇaṁ na svāśrayaṁ svātmānaṁ ca vyāpnoti paratantratvat kriyāvat - *ibid.*

can exist without being cognised, if they appear without any *pramāṇa*, *i.e.*, if they are self-luminous. For, if these, cogniser and cognition, are not there, there could be no certainty whether one knew an object or not after the object has been established. That is, the object will not appear, as the colour will not appear in the absence of light. Objects will not be known to exist unless there is the knower and there is the cognition of the object. If an object could appear even in the absence of the cogniser and his cognition, it must necessarily be self-luminous; as much self-luminous as the cogniser and the cognition themselves. But the object is not self-luminous. For one who does not accept the fact, as the Bhāṭṭas do not, that cognition is self-luminous and that ignorance is illumined by that, nothing will appear or that which appears should be self-luminous. Therefore, the cogniser and cognition are not objects either of themselves or of others.

It is concluded that as there cannot be another positive entity or negation, error is not cognition-otherwise. If silver is existent, illusion and sublation are not possible. Nor even if it is non-existent; so, it is established that silver is really inexplicable, *anirvacanīya*. Hence the Bhāṭṭa dictum that silver as the negation of shell is only another positive entity stands refuted.

The Refutation of Anyathākhyāti (V) of the Naiyāyikas

That which appears in illusion, say the silver, does not exist either in the place where it is seen, nor any where else as the Naiyāyikas seem to think. That which is sublated can nowhere exist. The *this—aspect* (*idamaṁśa*) alone remains after sublation. It sets the limit to sublation and thus is unsublatable. And there is no sublation without limitation, as the Buddhists believe.

The notion that the sublated silver exists elsewhere arises because it is presumed that whatever is sublated in a place must exist elsewhere. The basic idea behind this presumption is that a non-existent thing can never appear and, so if a thing that appeared in a place is sublated there as not being existent, it should necessarily exist in some other place. The distinction

between existent and non-existent is not one of uncompromising dichotomy; nor is there the rule that the existent alone should appear. The nature of illusion is precisely this and it defies the dichotomy of the existent and the non existent. That the silver so sublated here exists elsewhere is at best only a presumption and is not borne out by immediate experience. If there is the immediate experience of silver existing elsewhere, there will be no illusion at all. Its illusoriness is brought about when the silver appears in the locus where it is not.

If the Anyathākhyātivādin wants his realism to be retained, he should accept that what appears here exists here only. If the fact of sublation militates against the existence of the apparent silver where it appears, then, it can as well be said that the absence of apprehension elsewhere is proof positive that it does not exist elsewhere. If anything could exist even where it is not perceived, anything could be said to exist anywhere. To say that silver that does not exist here, is perceived here, is to indulge in contradiction, for if there is no silver, there can be no perception of silver and if there is no perception of silver at all, where is the question of anything like the silver existing elsewhere being the content of the perception of silver here in *this* place? If the perception of silver has any content, that content should be where it appears to be.[217]

Of course, there is the subsequent negation of the silver. This also is perceived. This does not come into conflict with the earlier perception of the existence of silver in the place where it is negated. Even if this negation is granted to conflict with the perception of positive existence of silver, it is so much the worse for negation, for it may have for its content the absolute non-existence (*pāramārthikābhāvā*) of the silver and not the non-existence of the perceived silver because of this silver being the content of perception. There can be non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of something only when that something will ordinarily be perceived had it existed but yet is not perceived. This is not what happens in the case of illusory silver. It is indubitably perceived.

217. yathā tadrūpyaṁ khyāti tathaiva tadasti iti abhyupeyam - *I.S.*, p. 130.

Perception is a primary source[218] of knowledge and when silver is perceived here and now, the content of that perception is also here and now.

If silver is sublated it is sublated in the place where it was perceived. If it did not exist in that place, it could much less exist in the place where it did not even appear. If anything could exist even without being apprehended, this non-apprehension being common both to this silver and hare's horn etc., hare's horn etc., could also be supposed to exist. One cannot say, in other words, that hare's horn does not exist on the ground that it is not seen anywhere.

It is true that silver is seen as a real thing in some places and this is not the case with the hare's horn. But, though hare's horn does not exist, hare exists and horn, too, exists on cow's head, if not on a hare's. It is not hard then to imagine a horn on the head of a hare. It may be argued that the horn on the cow's head is unsublated but the silver under discussion is sublated, and as such should be presumed to exist elsewhere than where it appears. Sublation in one place implies existence elsewhere.

In reply to this Vimuktātman asks: Is it that a thing is sublated where it is or elsewhere? If the first, then even the real horn will be sublated where *it is* and will be found elsewhere. If the second, since the reality for *this* silver in *this* place is found elsewhere, and since no sublation is possible where silver is perceived to exist, and since sublation of silver is said to take place only elsewhere, the reality of silver is to be postulated only in the place where it appears and not elsewhere.

If it is rejoined that what is existent elsewhere is rejected here, then, what is presented here not being sublated, it is pointless to posit its existence elsewhere. If *this* silver alone is said to be the reality elsewhere, since it has appeared here, (been brought over here), its sublation ought to take place only

218. pratyakṣasya ca pramāṇajyeṣṭhatvat - *I S.*, p. 131.

elsewhere. If it is said that what is real elsewhere did not transport itself here physically, but appeared as if it were here, how does one know this? Not from the appearance of silver for, one says only "This is silver". If it is said to be known by sublation, even sublation will be only of the silver existing elsewhere, and not of the silver here. The silver cannot be in both the places. And it has been shown that silver cannot be negated where it exists. Otherwise, even the real horn on a cow's head will be negated in its place. Hence, without appearance, no existence could be presumed[219] lest it should apply to hare's horn etc.

Sublation of silver in the place where it appeared cannot, as it has been pointed out earlier, be the ground for presumption of its existence elsewhere. If it existed elsewhere, sublation should take place only there. Just as silver is said to be where it appears, it can be said that it exists where it is sublated. Without some probability, sublation cannot be thought of. This probability is absent elsewhere where silver is said to exist, for, there is not even its appearance there. In fact, probability is only on the side of postulating the existence of silver here, as only here the sublation takes place. It is not as though there is no sublation of silver elsewhere for the reason that silver is real there.

This logical difficulty in fixing the existence of silver arises because silver is taken either as real or as totally unreal. On either of these assumption, a satisfactory solution of an illusion will never be found precisely because what we are confronted with here is a *silver* in *illusion*. If the silver exists and appears, there is no possibility of sublation. If it is said that it appears but does not exist, how is it that what is totally non-existent appears?

Those who hold other theories of error, taking silver as real or unreal, should tell us whether anything given in experience either as real or unreal is as it is given, or is there a possibility of this appearing as otherwise than what it is?

219. atah na khyātiṁ vinā sattā kalpyā - *ibid*, p. 132.

If the first, the cognitions "This is silver" and "This is not silver" will have their corresponding objects and there is no need for postulating the existence for silver elsewhere. If the second, all trust in knowledge will go as no knowledge will reveal the object as it is. Even the sublating cognition will reveal the object only as otherwise than what it is.

The result will be universal uncertainty. It is only the cognitions that should determine the objects for us. If they fail in this function, there is no other substitute. Hence, there is no such thing as an invalid cognition.[220] All cognitions are valid. And valid cognitions are never sublated. Cognitions having different contents cannot sublate each other; nor cognitions having the same content for that matter. It is established that cognitions are never sublated since there is no such thing as invalid cognition. What is sublated is only the nescience which produces the indetermniable object in illusion.

If the Anyathākhyātivādin maintains that the existence otherwise of silver is postulated because of the impossibility of its obtainment in the situation of perceptual experience otherwise, and because silver itself must somehow or other be a constituent in the immediate perceptual knowledge, the question is how existence otherwise of silver in an unknown form can be of any use in the appearance of silver in a normal way? The unknown silver that exists otherwise cannot be a constituent in the immediate perceptual experience; because it is not perceived there like a pot (which is not the content of the silver-cognition). As such, the presumption of the silver existing otherwise for safeguarding its obtainment as given in the immediate perception is useless.

If the appearance of silver is not normal but due to nescience, as the Advaitin says it is, the unknown existence of silver may be a useful suggestion. But that is not acceptable to the Anyathākhyātivādin. He may argue that just as, even according to the Advaitin, the real silver, though unknown, still

220. na aythārthajñānaṁ kiṁcid abhyupeyam - *ibid.*, p. 133,

plays a part in the illusion of silver in it, similarly, the unknown silver existing elsewhere really may play a part in producing the illusory silver here. But the Advaitin will say that illusion is, according to him, produced by nescience and that, therefore, the real being unknown or concealed by nescience is intelligible. This is not open to the Naiyāyikas. The silver-illusion is brought about by the nescience of the shell, not out of the nescience of silver. The existence of silver elsewhere is not at all relevant to the phenomenon of illusion. It is the shell that appears as silver due to nescience.

It is not as though both silver and shell are there as some people contend, and the illusion is due to the false coordination. It is perfectly unnecessary to postulate two where the situation becomes quite intelligible even by the postulation of one existent, *viz.* shell. If silver, too, were existent like shell, it has to appear in the sublating cognition, but this is not observed.

The Anyathākhyātivādin cannot persist in saying that the non-existent (according to him) silver does not appear where the distinctness of the non-existent from the existent is not known. When one says "This cloth is white" the knowledge of the substance and attribute is presupposed. To say that the non-existent does not appear when the non-existent is not known is, as was pointed out, like saying "one's mother is barren". One should rather say that the non-existent does not appear to valid means of knowledge or that it does not appear in the form of the existent.

Even if this be admitted by the Anyathākhyātivādin, he is not out of the depths yet. If the statement that "the non-existent does not appear in the form of existent" is the qualification introduced in the statement, "The non-existent does not appear," it will imply that the non-existent appears as non-existent. If this be maintained, this will not be a rejection of *asatkhyātivāda*, but only of the *anyathākhyātivāda*.

If the argument is that since the cognition of the existent is not that of the non-existent and *vice versa*, the non-existent does not appear as *existent*, this will again reinforce the

impossibility of *anyathākhyāti*, as the existent is perceived as existent and the non-existent is perceived as non-existent.

Moreover, even an existent does not appear as another existent. The non-existent can appear as existent much less. *Anyathākhyāti* is not available even when one existent appears as another. If another existent is also existent, it is not cognition otherwise. And it cannot be non-existent. In the same way, non-existent appearing as another non-existent, too, is not *anyathākhyāti*. If the non-existent is said to appear as existent, is that non-existent a mere nothing or a positive something? If the first, it is not acceptable to the Anyathākhyātivādin as being a realist he does not acknowledge the non-existent appearing as existent. It is not the second because non-existent cannot be existent. If it is neither, it is only inexplicable. And the inexplicable is not open to proof. Yet it is given in experience; and hence it can never be denied as an apparent presentation brought about by the nescience of the shell.

The Anyathākhyātivādin of the Nyāya school maintains that the silver is real, but elsewhere in the market-place. How can it ever come into sense-contact of the percipient subject? In this way, existence elsewhere and non-existence face a common difficulty. If the existent elsewhere can come into sense-contact due to certain defects, this contention is open to the non-existent here also. And the difficulty is that the *sadvādin* can never admit a non-existent factor in any situation. The non-existent, according to Advaitin, can appear due to nescience, and can be perceived by an apparent sense-contact.

If the contention is that what is real alone, as accepted by the Anyathākhyātivādin, can come into sense-contact due to defects but not the inexplicable as accepted by the Advaitin, even then only what is at a different place could be made to appear *here*, and not what existed at a different time. Sense-contact is only with that which is present, however distorting the defect might be. Even the defect cannot be a substitute for the eye; it cannot produce a second vision. Nor will it take the vision to some other place. Otherwise, the shell in which the silver-illusion

takes place will never be perceived. If the vision is made continuous from the place of illusion to where the silver exists, one must behold all the things that lie in between. There is also the question of mediacy. Silver is perceived immediately. If it existed elsewhere, this immediacy will be difficult to explain.

All this accepting that silver is in sense-contact. But even that is not admissible because illusion is not generated by the senses; otherwise even the perception of the 'this'—element which is not illusory will become illusory since it is in contact with the sense of vision.[221]

To both the Anyathākhyātivādins and Anirvacanīyakhyātivādins, it is common that the silver that appears as *'this'* in illusion does not exist in that form. As such it cannot be *sat* or real. And it is not a rule that only that which exists should appear in illusion. If the illusory object is not existent, it is not in sense-contact.[222] Thus in silver-illusion, there is no question of silver existing elsewhere appearing here as the Naiyāyika contends.

13

Theory of Ātmakhyāti

The theory of *ātmakhyāti* or *self-cognition* is held by the Vijñānavādins or the Yogācāras of the Buddhist persuasion. The theory declares that in error, the cognition need not be referred to any external object for the simple reason that no such external object exists. Error, according to them, is only the appearance of the form of the cognition itself as external.[223] When we are said to see silver in illusion, we are in reality 'seeing' only the idea of silver. What exists is really the cognition or idea of silver which appears to lie in the external world. The illusory cognition is its own object. When the sublating cognition arrives,

221. The Naiyāyikas assert that the sense-contact in mention is supernormal. *alaukikapratyakṣa*. For the reasons adduced above, this category is not tenable.

222. When Vimuktātman says that *asat* appears as *sat*, by *asat* he means only the inexplicable. asataḥ asmatpakṣe anirvācyatvāt - *I.S., J.V.*, p. 497.

223. jñānākārasyaiva bahiravabhāso vibhramaḥ - *N.M.*, p. 99.

what is denied is not the cognition of silver, but the notion of the externality of the content of the cognition.[224] In the sublating cognition "This is not silver", it is the 'this'-aspect that is sublated, and not the silver.

The Ātmākhyātivādins are Satkhyātivādins who hold that in error one perceives an existent, and not a non-existent. The totally non-existent entities like the sky-lotus, the son of a barren woman etc., cannot come within the realm of experience. The very fact of there being an experience of silver establishes the existent character of silver. The inference is of the form: This silver is real, because of the possibility of its being experienced, like the real silver. Or else, this silver is not unreal, since there is no absence of experience as in the case of real silver. Absence of experience is the pervading *probans* for the unreality of sky-lotus etc. Hence, as there is the absence of the absence of experience, the pervading *probans*, there is the absence of pervaded unreality of silver.[225]

But, then, if silver appears to be external and if this appearance is the sublatable illusion, what happens to the doctrine of the perception of the existent, *satkhyāti*, which holds that "a thing exists as it appears"?[226] The Ātmakhyātivādin answers this question by pointing out that, though it is generally true that a thing exists as it appears, this silver-illusion can be explained differently on account of the occurrence of the cognition of a stronger sublation. The sublating cognition, as we have seen, is of the form "This is not silver", negating, not the silver, but only the 'thisness'. Only thus the sublation is intelligible. Silver is not denied, but only the 'this'. So, the illusion refers, not to the unreality of silver, but to its apparent externality. And it is silver that is perceived even in illusion and this silver does not vanish on sublation. Thus, no damage is done to the *satkhyātivāda* or the doctrine of the existent. If the silver, too,

---

224. bāhyatvasyaiva bādhato rūpyābhādāt ca - *I.S.*, p. 40.

225. vyāpakākhyānābhāvāt vyāpyāsattvābhāvaḥ - *ibid.*, p. 40.

226. yad yathā pratibhāsate tattathaiva.

is supposed to be sublated, there is unnecessary prolixity in that both the 'silver' and the 'this' must be taken to be sublated. Illusion and its sublation are rendered quite intelligible by negating the *externality* of silver-cognition, and, consequently, it is superfluous to suppose that the silver, too, together with its externality, is unreal and is sublated.[227]

If it is said that both silver and its externality need not be sublated, and that silver can be supposed to be sublated instead of the externality, this is not helpful; for, if the substrate 'silver' is sublated, the 'thisness', also will go along with that. Thus, both of them will have to be taken as sublatable, which is redundant. It cannot even be said that even if the 'thisness' is negated, it need not follow that silver is only a form of our internal cognition; for, silver at some other place may be the substrate. The negation of 'this' may mean 'elsewhere'. This argument of the Naiyāyika, too, is not helpful because what is remote in space and time cannot be the content of the immediate and present perception.[228] So, the silver must be identical with the cognition that is internal and that is of the nature of residual impressions.[229] Thus, there are no two things here as in other theories, cognition and the content; there is only silver which is one with its cognition. This theory is therefore describable as pistemological monism.[230]

14

Refutation of Ātmakhyāti

However much the Ātmakhyātivādin may try to save the reality of his silver-cognition, it ends in signal failure on closer analysis. For (1) if erroneous cognitions could arise without any counter-part, this will make our very experiences doubtful. There will be universal uncertainty of knowledge. This will entail the

---

227. *I.S.*, p. 40
rajatasya dharmiṇo dharmasya cedantayā bādhe gauravāt - *ibid.*, p. 99.

228. ativyavadhāne saty aparokṣānupapattau - *N. M.*, p. 100

229. dhiya eva rūpaṁ vāsanākṛtam - *I. S.*, p. 41

230. See M. Hiriyanna's Introduction to *I. S.*, p. xxii

consummate view that the external world is a figment of imagination, as the Yogācāras are not averse to pointing out.[231] (2) The Yogācāra is not slow to admit that a totally non-existent entity cannot even appear in experience. He has tried to save the reality of silver by appealing to an inference based on the dictum, "Silver must be real because it is experienced."

But in the process what happened to the 'externality' or 'thisness'? Is it existent or non-existent? That it is not the former is obvious. If the latter, how did it happen to appear in experience in association with silver which is internal? If silver is real how does illusion arise at all? If it is obviously due to the illusory externality, how did this 'externality' come to be there to create an illusion? If it is existent, then, it is real like the silver and there will be no sublation of externality. If it were non-existent, how can the non-existent appear? If it could, whither the *satkhyātivāda?*

The Vijñānavādins argued that there will be prolixity if both silver and its externality are supposed to be sublated when by the sublation of the externality alone one can secure a satisfactory account of illusion and sublation. But this, too, is not a sound contention. For, prolixity is a defect only when there is an assumption.[232] Here the sublation of silver is not an assumption. It is an experience. The experience of sublation is in the nature of negating the silver in the error "This is silver". And this sublating cognition is self-manifest.[233] Hence the question of prolixity does not at all arise.

Again according to the Yogācāras, as to the Prābhākaras, knowledge is self-manifesting or self-revealing. If silver is only a form of knowledge, then, this should be self-evidently clear to the Yogācāra. Then, how can there be error?[234] Further, even accepting that error is possible, sublation of error should mean

---

231. *ibid.*

232. kalpanāyāṁ hi gauravaṁ doṣaḥ – *N. M.*, p. 101

233. bādhānubhavasya svayaṁ samviditatvāt – *ibid.*, p. 101

234. Hiriyanna, Introduction to *I.S.*, p. xxiii

that one cognition is known by another. For, there are no objects, but only cognitions. If this be so, it flatly contradicts the self-manifest character of cognitions. How can a cognition be self-revealed and revealed by another at the same time?[235]

Moreover, if there were no external objects at all, how does the Yogācāra get the notion "outside as it were"?[236]

Thus the *ātmakhyāti* doctrine fails to carry conviction.

15

The impossibility of sublation of the shell-silver in the Sat-khyātivāda

Those (the Akhyātivādin, Ātmakhyātivādin and the Anyathākhyātivādin) who hold the *sat-khyātivāda*, (*viz.*, what is perceived in an illusory perception is existent) as against the *asatkhyātivāda* on the one hand and *anirvacaniyākhyātivāda* on the other, do not realize that they cannot possibly account for the sublation of the silver, for instance, that appears in the shell. While admitting the unreality of that which appears in illusion, these theorists somehow want to retain the existence of silver. The Akhyātivādins take shell-silver to be real as remembrance. The Ātmakhyātivādins deem it to be real as cognition. The Anyathākhyātivādins consider it to be existent elsewhere or in some other positive form. All these explanations take the presented silver away from the place where it appears and place it somewhere else. They are constrained to do so, of course, without recording any great success in offering a satisfactory explanation of error.

The difficulty arises for them because of their presuppositions. They are stubborn in holding that the illusory object *i.e.*, shell-silver is existent in some manner and is known as such by knowledge.

The Satkhyātivādins do make a distinction between valid and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is incorrect knowledge.

235. *ibid.*

236. *I. S.*, IV. 14

Whence is this incorrectness in knowledge? Is it the failure to grasp the object in entirety (*artha-nyūnatva*)? Or is it that something more than the entire object is grasped (*artha-adhikatva*)? If the first, no cognition can be said to be valid since no cognition can claim to have grasped the entire object in all its aspects. If it be the latter, it follows that knowledge has overreached itself and that there is an excess of this knowledge which has no corresponding object. A knowledge with no object for it is hardly worth the name of knowledge. The word *jñāna* means something through which an object is known.[237] Hence even though a knowledge does not reveal the whole object, yet to the extent it reveals, the object corresponding to that must be admitted to exist. But it is impossible that there is a knowledge without an object.[238] It follows then that there is no such thing as incorrect knowledge for the Satkhyātivādins. And since there is knowledge of shell-silver, shell-silver must exist. The very fact of its appearing in knowledge is its proof.[239] Conversely, if silver is not there, its cognition, too, will not be there.

Regarding the argument that silver is admitted to exist but not in the form of shell, it only means that there is no such knowledge corresponding to the manner in which the silver is not. The Satkhyātivādins do not accept even negative cognitions as devoid of objects. What are we to say about positive cognitions? Thus, on the presuppositions of the Satkhyātivādin there is no unreality for silver like the so called real silver itself. Otherwise real silver will become unreal, for, the Satkhyātivādin is not able to point out any difference between them.

But he may attempt to reinstate the existent quality of silver by saying that the first cognition "This is silver" testifies to the existence of silver (though the second sublating cognition: "This is not silver" negates it). If, on this account, there is silver

237. jñāyate 'rtho' neneti hi jñānam; ato jñeyārthābhāve tajjñānamapi na syāt - *I. S.*, p. 105

238. jñānaṁ ca nārthaśūnyamasti – *ibid.*

239. jñānameva pramāṇam - *ibid.*

existent in the form of shell and does not exist so, it clearly must be said to have a dual nature of existence and non-existence at the same time because in whatever way the silver might be known, (existent or non-existent), these knowledges must have contents corresponding to them. But this non-existent element cannot be admitted by the Satkhyātivādin into anything that is given in knowledge.

The judgment: "This is silver" expresses the identity of silver and shell. By virtue of this judgment, the reality of silver appearing in the form of shell must be accepted, because of being so given in knowledge. Even granting unreality for the identity of silver with shell, the very usage of the illusoriness of the silver is dependent on the fact of the illusory object being presented and sublated where it was presented and thus, the Satkhyātivādin will not be able to talk in judgments like: "The silver is unreal because of its non-existence", which is the only well known form of sublation, as for him, the silver is real; and therefore, the unreality etc., will have to be attributed only to that *identity* of silver with shell.

If it is said that the identification of silver with shell is illusory because of the non-existence really of any such identity, and that this illusoriness and non-existence that really belong only to the false identification, are transferred by a figurative usage to silver also which is real and that the usage thus becomes: "The silver is unreal", the reply is that such a figurative usage can as well be extended to the real shell also. For, like silver, it is one of the counter-correlates of a false identification. It is as much a partner in the falsity and as much culpable. What applies to silver applies equally to shell, and *vice versa*. If it is argued that shell is directly perceived in its own place as it is even after sublation of illusion has taken place, but not so silver, the fact of silver being perceived directly is also undeniably in some place for the Satkhyātivādin who accepts the reality of silver. Otherwise it cannot occur even as the content of memory. If it is said that the silver, though seen elsewhere is not seen as identified with shell, the same can be

said of shell also. It is not experienced as one with silver in that other place. If it were, it will be real and there will be no sublation of its identification with the silver as "This is not silver". In other words, there is no question of identification of real shell with real silver elsewhere.

If it is said that unlike silver the shell seen in the illusion is recognised as such even after illusion has been sublated, it follows that because of the absence of recognition of silver as persisting after illusion unlike shell, it is unreal like the identity itself. And this is not *satkhyātivāda* any more.

Hitherto, the discussion was proceeding granting the sublation of identity only and it was pointed out that the fact, universally admitted, of the sublation of silver remains a riddle for the Satkhyātivādin. Now it remains for us to show that the supposed sublation of identity, too, is unwarranted. Indeed, the sublating judgment is not of the form: "There is no identity", but only of the form: "This is not silver". But there it has been seen that silver is real and thus remains unsublated. In a similar way, if identity is given in perception, then on the Satkhyātivādin's presupposition, it should, *ipso facto*, be real, in which case there is no question of its being subject to sublation. It boils down to this that there is nothing sublatable under the sun since all cognitions are alike valid for the Satkhyātivādin.

It may still be argued here that the identity is certainly sublated. It is true that the negating judgment is "This is not silver" and not: "There is no identity'. But this is because the illusion did not start as: "There is identity between these *two*", which implies the cognition of *two* things separately. How then can there be identity? Illusion, on the other hand, starts with a coordination, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* as "This is silver". As the illusion is "This is silver", so the sublation is of the form: "This is not silver". The sublation should be commensurate with the illusion. Thus it is only the identity that is sublated. In the light of this attempted justification, one may like to know whether the sublating cognition "This is not silver" arises when difference between shell and silver is apprehended or when it is

not apprehended. If the second, did the cognition of difference alone sublate the illusion? Or something else? Not the cognition of difference, because this cognition is not of the nature of denial. It cannot be said that the cognition of difference sublates the knowledge of identity because they are opposed to each other. Then, the knowledge of difference will not obtain in an object where there is knowledge of identity, because of the conflict itself. If it did, it means that there is no conflict, and thus the cognition of difference will not sublate that of identity. If the cognition of difference arising with reference to the object where knowledge of identity has already arisen, is the sublater of the latter, then, the knowledge of identity as "This is silver" arising subsequently with reference to that object will sublate the knowledge of difference. In other words, knowledge of identity and knowledge of difference are not the sublaters of each other. Both being cognitions, have their own objects, and both are valid in their own way. But they are not related as sublater and sublated. One who has got the certainty of the knowledge of identity as "This is silver" will have no knowledge as "This is different from silver" and *vice versa*. Even if one has, it does no harm. Doing no harm, it is not an illusion. Otherwise there cannot be an object having many forms, having both identity and difference, because of their mutual conflict. Thus, it follows that the knowledge of difference by itself is not the sublater of identity.

Nor is it something else. For when there is no cognition of difference, difference remains unknown; the sublating 'something else' will remove the total unity of the silver, the 'this' and their identity together. This is not welcome to anyone.

To revert to the first two alternatives proposed *viz.*, does the sublating cognition arise when difference between shell and silver is apprehended or when it is not? The second of these alternatives has been answered. The first alternative is answered presently.

Difference between two things is their mutual non-existence. Shell is not silver and *vice versa*. If the cognition of this mutual

non-existence is said to be the sublater of identity, this will mean that all cognitions of mutual non-existence will be sublaters. This, perhaps, may not be the case when the mutual nature of the two objects, e.g., shell and silver, is first known and the knowledge of mutual non-existence may act as sublater.

But again the doubt is: does this sublating knowledge of mutual non-existence arise in the objects which are the objects of the knowledge of mutual existence or elsewhere?

If the second, the knowledge of mutual non-existence can operate only in the objects wherein the knowledge of mutual existence has not arisen. How then can this negation sublate another knowledge with which it has no connection or which is not its sphere? Surely, the knowledge of mutual non-existence of pot and cloth does not sublate the knowledge of pot and cloth.

If the first, *i.e.*, if the cognition of mutual negation has the same objects cognised by positive knowledge as existent in themselves, it will result in the contradiction of the negative cognition having a positive content and thus becoming a positive cognition. And the positive cognition will only be strengthened by the support that the negative cognition lends to it by having the same existent content. Hence, the positive and the negative cognitions cannot have the same object. If the negative cognition has a different content, it will not be a sublater like a negative cognition (*i.e.*, cognition having the non-existent as its content) which arises when there is the non-cognition of what is ordinarily perceptible. If it is said that the cognition of negation which arises when there is the non-cognition of what is obtained reveals the non-existence in different place and time, but that, in the present context, the cognition of negation reveals the non-existence of the object in that place itself, even thus, if it has a different content, it does not sublate; if it has the same content, it only strengthens the verdict of the positive cognition.

Besides, two questions that arise here are: (1) Is the identity of shell and silver sublated in illusion? Or (2) is the identity of

'this'-aspect and silver? Not obviously the first because that identity has not been apprehended. Nor even the second, because that will involve the apprehension of mutual difference which does not happen at the time of the illusion. Indeed, one becoming the other is thinkable only when there are two entities, and not when there is only one. If it is suggested that one locus of the two aspects appears, that does no harm, for it is not their mutual nature or identity and the identity is not sublated. The sublation is not of the form: "There is no locus of the aspects". If the locus it is that is sublated, by its sublation both shell and silver are sublated because of being its aspects. This is undesirable for the Satkyātivādin. Nor is it observed in experience.

It may be urged that if the locus is the aggregate of the two aspects, then when there is the sublation of the aspects there will be the sublation of the locus. But it is not so. It is a different one coming into being by the mutual identity of shell and silver at the time of illusion. That, too, is sublated by the sublation of mutual identity as: "This is not silver", just as the cloth is destroyed by the disintegration of the texture of the threads. Hence, the absence of sublation as of the form "There is no locus" is not a fault.

This argument will be right only when the negation of mutual identity is the sublater. But that is not the case. This negation will not be the sublater. It was stated earlier that identity between silver and shell is impossible both when difference between them is either known or unknown. Consequently denial will be denial of what is not obtained.

Earlier, the opponent argued that the knowledge of mutual non-existence arising from the knowledge of difference is the sublater. Mutual non-existence can be known only after difference is known. When the difference between shell and silver is known the mutual non-existence is not known at that time; nor is it known prior to the knowledge of difference because difference then is not known. What will this knowledge of mutual non-

existence sublate? When knowledge of difference, supposed to sublate the knowledge of identity, arises, (if it could arise at all, for it has been shown earlier in these pages how it cannot arise annulling the knowledge of identity), it will not be opposed to the knowledge of identity and the knowledge of mutual non-existence will be only in accordance with this. Thus, when the knowledge of difference "This is not silver" has arisen, the cognition "This is silver" is doubly strengthened.

Of course this was said only granting that knowledge of difference is possible. But that, too, is not possible. Knowledge of difference requires the counter-correlate which is different from correlate. One cannot be one's own counter-correlate. What is the counter-correlate here? It cannot be the "this"—element, (*idamaṁśa*) in "This is silver". The reason is that the 'this'-element is not at all perceived. It is not possible to say that the 'this'-element, though not perceived *as different* from silver, is yet perceived in some general way and as such it can be the counter-correlate. It is not correct to assume, for example, that when ten objects are simultaneously apprehended, each of these ten objects is apprehended as different from the other nine simultaneously. It does not happen that way. Hence, that which is *merely* apprehended cannot be a counter-correlate. It is all the more so when it is positively cognised as identical. Thus the 'this'-aspect and the silver cannot be the counter-correlate one of the other.

If it is said that that which is *known as different* is the countercorrelate, to be known as different, counter-correlate must be known, and this counter-correlate in its turn will require the knowledge that it is different and so on. There will thus be infinite regress.

The cognition that reveals 'silver' reveals only its identity with 'this'-aspect, and not difference. And this identity can never be sublated on the presuppositions of the Satkhyātivādin. Both knowledge of difference and of non-existence are not useful in sublating the error of identity. We have three possible alternatives here.

Does the knowledge of difference etc., directly remove the error? Or indirectly through the removal of its cause? Or, thirdly, through revealing the non-existence of the object?

Not the first two alternatives, for, to the Satkhyātivādin, the object appearing in the so-called illusion and the cause of illusion are real. And knowledge will never remove that which is real.

It cannot be the third: for, the non-existence of anything is revealed only by the *pramāṇa* of non-cognition. In order that it may be so revealed, the non-existence must be that of something that exists or could have existed really. Thus, the identity between shell and silver also must have to be treated as real. And it is not possible to establish the non-existence of the identity between silver and shell.

What is this that is called negation of identity? If it means that there is no identity at all, then two alternatives arise: (1) Is identity the form of that for which there is non-existence by its very nature? Or (2) is imerest non-existence the nature of the identity? The first is not possible for the Satkhyātivādin like the Prābhākara. For, he holds that non-existence is only *another* positive entity and this is not the positive entity that is the counter-correlate of non-existence. Hence, identity cannot be the form (*rūpa*) of its own negation.

Not the second alternative, too, because the identity has no form of non-existence since it is the content of the positive cognition: "This is silver" and because it is not the content of the negative judgment: "This is not silver".

If it were said to be non-existence, it will be revealed by the knowledge of non-existence and not sublated. But the opponent's claim is that identity should be sublated. Otherwise there is no error at all.

Even granting that it is non-existence, it is non-existence of what? Of shell and silver? Again what kind of non-existence is it? If it were prior and posterior non-existence of shell and silver, these can never be known at the time of the illusion,

because of being prior and posterior to it. If it were mutual non-existence this should be known in the form; "This is not silver", and not as "This is silver" (a form in which identity is indeed manifested). So identity cannot be the non-existence of shell and silver. Thus, it transpires that it is only existent and real, apprehended as such. If the non-existence of this identity were to be revealed at all, it would be revealed elsewhere, but certainly not at the place where it is apprehended.

For this same reason, there is no sublation of the knowledge of identity by that of mutual non-existence revealing the non-existence of identity. Both in the case of identity having non-existence as its very nature and non-existence having identity as its very nature, the knowledge of mutual non-existence has only the knowledge of identity as its content because of the nature of non-existence for identity. If anything, the knowledge of identity is further strengthened and not sublated, by the knowledge of the mutual non-existence of shell and silver.

If it is said that the knowledge of mutual non-existence reveals the same identity otherwise (as "This is not silver") than what it was before (*viz.* "This is silver") and that as such there could be the nature of sublation for this knowledge, there are two questions here: (1) Is the non-existence of identity revealed by the knowledge of non-existence as another form of it (*i.e.* identity) like existence? Or (2) is it revealed as different from identity? In either case there is no harm for the identity cognised earlier. For if there is no form of identity at all, nothing that is its form or related to it can be known. As such, there is no damage to the existent aspect of identity. If, moreover, something different from identity is revealed by the knowledge of mutual non-existence, then identity ceases to be the object of that knowledge. This means that identity exists. Therefore, nothing that is known in the form of an existent can be cancelled by the knowledge of non-existence (*abhāva-jnāna*). Hence it is not useful in illusion. Even difference does not sublate, having difference as its subject-matter. Thus there is no sublation for the knowledge "This is silver". This is what will

happen to the theory of *sat-khyāti* which avers that anything exists as it is known.

16

The Doctrine of Asatkhyāti—its Statement and Refutation

The Mādhyamika nihilists explain that in error the utterly non-existent entity appears.[240] In the silver-illusion, for example, the sublating cognition arises as "This is not silver". The silver that appeared is now denied in the place in which it made its appearance. So, one has to conclude that what was totally non-existent appeared there. Otherwise, it will not cease to be there when the sublating cognition arrives.

The Anyathākhyātivādins suppose that a part of what appears in error has no being; but the Asatkhyātivādin will urge that the whole of what appears is false. Otherwise the negative import of the sublating cognition as "This is not silver" will not be understandable.[241] The Anirvacanīyakhyātivādin will, while admitting that silver is sublated at the place in which it appears, will insist that the sublating cognition does not so much bring out the total non-existence of silver as the absence of any reality or existence for it. Silver according to him is neither existent nor non-existent. The Śūnyavādin cannot see the point of this. Absence of reality is non-reality or non-existence.[242]

It cannot be said that it is impossible that a totally non-existent thing, *tuccha*, can ever appear in experience and that a barren woman's son, the mon-horn etc., are not fit for perception and that the totally non-existent silver does not differ from these non-entities. For, even the Śūnyavādins do not say that the totally non-existent has any capacity to appear in knowledge,[243] but it is due to the capacity of the cognition itself, *jñānasāmarthya*, which is distinguished by its own peculiar intrinsic nature-

240. atyantamasantam artham avabhāsayanti saṁvideva vibhrama ityācakṣate. *N. M.* - p. 102. See *I. S.*, I. 52

241. tasya nedaṁ rajatam iti bādhāt tucchatāvagamāt - *I. S.*, p. 154

242. ko'nyassattvābhāvo' sattvāt - *ibid.*, p. 155

243. na khalvatra jñeyasāmarthyam ādriyāmahe - *N. M.*, p. 102

svabhāvabheda, (which is different from the son of a barren woman, sky-lotus etc.), that the non-existent is manifested.[244] In the place where silver-error occurs, there is no silver and consequently there is no sense-contact with the object. Still there is the origination of cognition of silver because of the internally differentiated residual impressions.[245] And this is no strange phenomenon and it should not surprise the Advaitins at least for whom the subjective nescience produces the cognition of the non-existent.

Moreover, if it is not the non-existent, *tuccha*, that is cognised, there can be no experience of sublation in the form "This is not silver" which affirms that the non-existent appeared. Here the non-existent is seen to be capable of being perceived in its own form as non-existent. If it is the existent that is cognised both in the illusion and the sublating cognition, there is no possibility of any illusion or its sublation. For, the cognition of the existent can never be sublated either by the cognition of the existent or of the non-existent. Nor does the cognition of the existent sublate either the cognition of the existent or of the non-existent, as in the case of the cognition of real silver. Thus, as no relation of the sublated and the sublating is observed between two cognitions of the existent, it should be granted that in illusion the non-existent alone appears as existent.[246] And the sublating cognition brings its non-existent character to light.

If it is asked by the Anyathākhyātivādin: "How can the direct perception "This is silver" be sublated by the indirect

---

244. svapratyayāsāditādṛṣṭānta - siddhasvabhāvabhedaṁ vijñānameva sataḥ prakāśanam - *N.M.*, p. 103

245. yadyapyadhipati sahakāryyālāmbana samanantarātmakebhyaḥ pratyayebhyacaturthaś - cittacaittāḥ samutpadyante iti hi saugata-sthitiḥ - *N.M.* p. 103
tathācāsya asatprakāśana-śaktir avidyeti giyate - *ibid.*
The Buddhists classify the world of reality into two categories: (1) The intellect (*Citta*) and (2) its products (*Caitta*). Mind and its products originate in dependence upon four kinds of Cause. They are: The auxiliary cause, the senses, the substrate, and the cognition that is immediately prior to any specified cognition.

246. asataḥ eva sadrūpeṇa khyātir bhrāntiḥ - *I. S.*, p. 155

knowledge "This is not silver?"; the perception of silver can be sublated only by the direct perception of shell", it is no fault here; for, the knowledge "This is silver" is weak because it is illusion, though it is direct perception. But the knowledge "This is not silver", though not direct perception, is stronger because it is valid.[247] If, on the other hand, "This is silver" is *not* illusory, then, even direct perception cannot be the sublating cognition, because of both of them being of equal strength.

This answer of the Śūnyavādins is given *accepting* for the sake of argument that the shell-cognition sublates silver-cognition. But his position is that shell-cognition is not the sublater. It is the cognition of the unreality of silver that is the sublater. How can an existent object of direct perception sublate the silver? If it is because of mutually conflicting or opposed nature, there is no conflict between the cognitions of any two positive entities, as between those of pot and cloth; much less between those of the same object. So, if the silver-cognition is sublated, the sublated is unreal. Then, the unreality of silver is obvious. The Advaitins accept the absence of reality for silver when they hold that the cognition "This is not silver" is the sublating cognition. So it is clear that it is the non-existent that appears as existent in illusion.

Moreover, the silver, though elsewhere real, appears in illusion in a unique way in coordination, *sāmānādhikaraṇya,* with the shell.[248] That is why it is said to be an illusion. As in this coordination with the shell, even the Sadvādins or those that say that only the existent appears in illusion, agree that silver is unreal. And this kind of silver-appearance is unique only to illusion. Therefore it is that the Asadvādins subscribe to the doctrine of the appearance of the non-existent. Even the

---

247. idaṁ rajatamiti jñānasyāparokṣatve'pi bhramatvāt durbalatvam. nedaṁ rajatamiti jñānasya parokṣatve'pi pramāṇatvāt prabalatvam - *J. V., I. S.*; p. 506

248. rūpyam anyathā sadapi ¦deśāntare buddhau vā sadapi yathā śuktisaṁsṛṣṭatayā bhrāntau bhāti na tathā kvacidapi asti ityarthaḥ-*J.V., I.S.*, p. 507

Advaitins admit the unreality in terms of *anirvācyatva* of silver in coordination with shell.

The Advaitins may object that it is the cognition of the existent shell that annuls the silver that is born of the nescience of shell and that, therefore, it is the cognition of the existent and not the non-existent that constitutes the sublating cognition. But even for the Advaitins, the sublating cognition is of the form "This is not silver", which speaks of the non-existence or negation of silver anywhere. So, the cognition of the non-existence of silver is justly the sublating cognition, because of patency.

Not only is there patency for this; also there is non-patency for the statement that silver is the product of shell-nescience. Nescience is only absence of knowledge.[249] If silver is really the product of that nescience, it amounts to saying that it is a product of non-existent something and not of *māyā*. If *māyā*, too, is nescience, that also is non-existence with the result that its product will not have indeterminability but will have only unreality. Thus, being born of that, silver is really non-existent. Even admitting that that which is born of the non-existent is existent, it is not at any rate indeterminable. Even if *māyā* is indeterminable, silver that is born of non-existence cannot be indeterminable. And there is no birth for the real or the existent. If it is said that though silver is real and birthless in the unmanifest condition merged in its cause, it has birth when it becomes manifest as an effect, even then, for the form that is manifested there is non-existence earlier. Thus, silver is not of the nature of *māyā*.

If reality for the manifest form is desired in the unmanifest condition in the causal potentiality, then, if they, *i.e.*, the manifest effect and the unmanifest cause, are identical, then, there will be no distinction of the unmanifest and the manifest, cause and effect. If they are different, then, even when the unmanifest cause is present, the manifest effect will not be present. Thus,

249. ajñānaṁ ca jñānābhāvaḥ - *I. S.*, p. 158

the manifest effect i born of the non-existent, and is not of the nature of *māyā*. If it is said that for the non-existent there is no birth for the simple reason that it is non-existent, then, for the existent also there is no birth, for the reason that it is existent. If it is said that for the real there is birth due to operation of *māyā*, even through *māyā*, the birth of the thing is not of a nature that is established, because of the very establishment. If it is of a nature that is not established, then birth is from the non-existent. Thus, the birth of all is only from the non-existent. Thus from the non-existent only, the non-existent is born, and there is nothing indeterminable. And indeterminability is not patent anywhere. If anything is not real, it is unreal. The counter-correlate of the real is the unreal.[250]

There is also the scriptural declaration: "At the beginning there was only the unreal here and the real was born of it".[251] So, being the cause of everything, the non-existent is the Brahman. Its attainment is liberation.[252] This nothingness is indicated in the scripture: "*na pretya samjñāsti*". The *anāvṛtti śruti*, or the non-return declaration (*na ca punarāvartate*) becomes intelligible, only on the Śūnyavādin's account.

17

Refutation of Asatkhyāti

The Asatkhyātivādin is wrong in saying that by the sublating cognition "This is not silver", only the non-existence of the silver that appears is made known. The sublating cognition informs us only about the absence of the empirically real silver. It shall be explained as follows: It was said by the Asatkhyātivādin that the *vijñāna* or mind alone is, by its internal distinction, and by virtue of the residual impressions of earlier knowledge,[253]

---

250. asadeva hi sataḥ pratiyogi prasiddhaṁ nānyat kiṁcit - *I. S.*, p. 160

251. asad vā idamagra āsīt tato vai sadajāyata. asadeva idamagra āsīt tat sadāsīt.

252. saṁsāriṇāṁ śūnyatāprāptireva mokṣaḥ - *I. S.*, p. 160

253. kevalaṁ samanantarapratyaya - lakṣaṇa - pūrvavijñānamātrāt svabhāva - vaicitryavaśāt vijñānamutpadyate.

produces or manifests the non-existent and that such a kind of manifesting capacity is called *avidyā* even by the Advaitin.

Now, what is this capacity of the mind, *vijñāna* to manifest? What is it capable of? If it were the non-existent, is this non-existent something that is produced by the potentiality as an effect is produced, or is it only manifested (or made known) by it? Not the first; because being an effect is incompatible with the concept of the non-existent. The non-existent cannot be an effect. Even if it is admitted that the mind or *vijñāna* produces the non-existent as an effect, then it can only be said that the mind has the capacity to produce that effect and not the capacity to manifest.

Nor the second; because over and above the illusion as "This is silver", there is no other illusion that is born of i, and that has the non-existent as its content.[254] If the second illusion like that is abmitted, a second manifestation with regard to that is necessary and thus there is infinite regress. In other words, if by the manifested entity one means that it is the content of its cognition, even then, what is that cognition having the *asat* for content? Is it a *jñānāntara* (or a second knowledge) or is it the same as arising from its locus or content *viz.*, the *asat*? It cannot be the first because there is no other second knowledge than that of the *asat*. If there were, that would involve a third knowledge, and so on. Thus there will be infinite regress.

If it is said that though the potentiality of *vijñāna* or mind that has reference to the illusion "This is silver" has no capacity to give a second knowledge (the knowledge that has the non existent as the content, other than the knowledge "This is silver"), it is itself the illusion and that, therefore, there is no infinite regress, this. too, is not sound; for, the same cognition cannot be both the illuminated and the illuminator or the originator and the originated. If the cognition, in other words, itself is

254. idaṁ rajatamiti bhramavyatirekeṇa tajjanitāsadviṣaya - bhramāntarasyānupapannam - Citsukha's *Ṭikā*, *N. M.*, p. 105

the manifester of the non-existent, how can it be the manifested at the same time, for one thing? For another, to say here that the cognition has the power to manifest is meaningless, when the cognition itself is the manifestor. It cannot be said that one and the same thing is both the locus of a certain power and the object of that power at the same time. And the power cannot properly be said to exist without the potentiality to manifest.

If it is said that even the potentiality need not be admitted, and that the cognition which is secured by its own cognition can *itself* be the manifestation of the non-existent thing, then, how far is it reasonable to speak of the *relation* of the existent cognition and the non-existent content as is intended by the sixth case in "Of the non-existent" (*asataḥ*)? The relation of the real and the unreal is possible only if one accepts the indeterminable *māyā*. If the relation between the two is said to be merely the dependence on the non-existent for explanation, it passes one's understanding how the featureless nothing, which the non-existent is, can be helpful in any explanation.

Indeed, the condition of being the explainer and the explained is not possible without a connection. The class name, 'cowness', for example, is explained only with reference to the individual cow, *viz.*, *Khaṇḍa*. The non-existent entity, on the other hand, cannot have any relation. Then, how can one speak of the existent cognition as dependent on the non-existent for any explanation? Nor can the cognition import something, *viz.* knownness or unknownness into the non-existent by which one can say that it is its own,[255] for, a non-existent entity cannot be a substratum.

---

255. In the case of pot etc., knownness, and though fit to be known, unknownness due to the absence of conditions of knowing are spoken of, due to the possibility of a knowledge of pot. Thus, there is a connection between pot and knowledge. This is not possible in the utterly non-existent.

jñātatā vā jñānapratibaddhahānādi vyavahārayogyatā vā ghaṭādiṣu jñānena janyate iti mūlasambandho'sti tadvat asati nāstityarthaḥ - *Ṭīkā* on *N.M.*, p. 107

If it be said: without the *asat* or the non-existent, there cannot be a cognition of it; therefore, this invariable connection of non-existent for a cognition of it is there, this is an erroneous argument. The existent cognition is neither born of the non-existent, nor identified with it. How can then an invariable connection between them be spoken of?[256] Therefore, to say that there can be the manifestation of an absolutely non-existent thing is meaningless.

If the non-existent is mentioned as an object of cognition, it is due to nescience. That is why the expression *"vikalpa* is devoid of an object and it follows verbal knowledge".[257] Thus, the silver denied in "This is not silver" denotes only the non-existence of the real silver and not the silver that appeared in illusion. With regard to the latter it is only the product of nescience which gets the name of knowledge.

Moreover, there cannot be an experience of the non-existent and the non-established. The cognition of the non-existent is a contradiction in terms because the so-called cognition of the non-existent has no content. Is the non-existent something existing differently from the existent or no? If the first, it is not a non-existent nothing, because it is said to exist, though different from the existent. If the second, to say that there is an experience of the non-existent is wrong. So, the cognition of the non-existent is only an illusion and is of the nature of *māyā*. The Advaitin uses the terms *asat* and *sat*, non-existent and existent in the empirical sense. Even then, in the expression, "the non-existent does not exist", by the 'non-existent', it is not the Śūnyavādin's nothingness or void that is meant, but only that which is *māyic* and inexplicable. And that which is inexplicable is so because it is neither real nor totally unreal. As it has appearance in experience, it becomes fit for usage and expression. The Advaitin is forced to use the term *'asat'*

256. sadasatoḥ tādātmya - tadutpattyorabhāvena nāvinābhāva - Citsukha's *Ṭīkā N. M.*, p. 108

257. śabdajñānānupati vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ.

or '*tuccha*' in the sense in which the Śūnyavādin uses it only due to his desire and earnestness in dispelling the illusion under which the Tucchavādin labours. So, that the Advaitin uses the term '*tuccha*' is no strong reason to say that the void is fit for meaningful expression having a corresponding content. Neither the totally valid, nor the totally unestablished comes in for criticism but only that which is illusory. Thus the illusion of the non-existent constitutes a matter for criticism. Indeed, the non-existent does not get an ontological being by merely being an illusion. If that were the case, the silver in the illusion will secure an ontological being. All that appears as having an existence in illusion is thus the work of *māyā*. And there is no cognition of the non-existent even.

Again, even according to the Śūnyavādins it is not the something that exists somewhere that appears within the illusion; otherwise his position will be indistinguishable from that of the Satkhyātivādin. It is not even silver that appears in the illusion, according to the Advaitin. It is something that is not silver that appears as silver.[258] That is why the illusion. If it were the non-existent that appears in illusion, like the silver, non-existence will accrue to the non-existent itself. Thus, there can be no cognition of the non-existent.

It is apparently open to the Śūnyavādin to say: just as the *asat* or the non-existent is said not to be established on the ground that if it exists and is different from the *sat* it is not *asat* and that if it does not exist different from *sat*, it is *sat* only and thus, is not established at all, the *māyā* of the Advaitin, too, shares the same fate since it is neither different from *sat* nor non-different from it. But this is not true. *Māyā* has been described as indeterminable,[259] not so the *asat* of the Śūnyavādin.

---

258. na ca rūpyamapi bhrāntau bhāti, tasyārūpyatvāt ataḥ arūpyameva rūpyamiti bhāti - *I. S.*, p. 163

259. sadasadbhyām anirvācyatvāt - *ibid.*, p. 165

The Śūnyavādin here may protest: when it is said that the *asat* does not exist, it is not its non-existence that is mentioned; nor even the *sat* that is different from *asat*, but only the *asat* is meant. So, even when *asat* is said to be non-existent different from *sat*, there is no non-establishment of *asat*. Similarly when it is said to exist different from *sat*. Though the term 'exist' is inappropriate in the case of *asat*, it is used to denote the nature of *asat* so that it may be useful to those who want to know its nature. This is not odd. For, even the Advaitin uses the term 'exist' with reference to *māyā* in describing illusions, though *māyā* is indeterminable.

Moreover, when *asat* is said to be different from *sat*, this difference is not due to the existence or reality, *sattā*, that is said to accrue to *asat* when it differs from *sat*, as the Advaitin would wish it to be. The other-ness of *asat* than *sat* is because of the impossibility of the form of *sat* for *asat*.[260] *Asat* does not appear in the form of *sat*, nor *sat* in the form of *asat*. In the case of pot etc., their existence or counter-correlateness is due to their being the basis or substratum of the attribute of difference. But there is no contingence of identity of *asat* with *sat* because of the absence of this attribute of difference in the *asat*. For, it has already been said that the so-called difference of *asat* from *sat*, unlike the difference of pot from cloth, is not the cause of reality or otherness of the *asat*. The otherness is due to the unique appearance or manifestation of *asat* in a form other than that of *sat*.[261] This idea also is not strange. For, those who uphold difference, *bhedavādins*, say that though there is no difference for difference itself from the substrate, it does not on the account become the essential nature of that substrate. Similarly, though there is no difference for the *asat*, it does not become the essence of the *sat*, for it has an appearance dissimilar to that of *asat*. The usage of the absence of cloth, the absence of pot, prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, etc., become meaningful, not because of the intrinsic differences in the non-

260. atadrūpatvāt - *ibid.*, p. 166

261. atadrūpena pratiteḥ - *ibid.*

existence, or *asat* itself, but only because of the differences of the existent entities – as in the usages "difference among the pots", "difference among the pieces of cloth", etc., though pot and cloth in themselves have no difference intrinsically as their very nature; or, even as the Advaitins hold, as in the case of the difference in space that is differenceless due to the adjuncts like the vessel, well etc. So, the non-existent is not an unestablished entity. It is not established also that if the *asat* is other than *sat*, then there will be existence, *sattva*, for *asat* also.

The Siddhāntin's reply to this above objection is: whether the non-existent is something that exists apart from the existent *sat*, or it is not different from the *sat*, it is an existent only, and cannot be a non-existent, as has already been said.[262] With regard to the alleged dissimilarity of form in which the *asat* is said to appear, (*atadrūpa*), *i.e.*, dissimilar to that of the *sat*, there is the danger of mutual dependence in this notion. For, only if difference is established, dissimilarity will be established; and only if dissimilarity is established, difference is established. If there could be the dissimilarity of form even when difference is absent, then there is the contingence of the absence of the form of *sat* even for the *sat*, and the absence of the form of *asal* even for *asat*, since no difference is required.

Again: if the *asat* has a form, it is existent and real like pot. If it does not have a form, then, how can it be said that *asat* appears in a form dissimilar to that of the *sat*? Only for that which has a form, difference can be spoken of. If it could be spoken of, difference itself must be deemed an *asat* or non-existent, since that which difference is to characterise has no essence and a form. Even in the example of space, quoted by the opponent, if space has no form, it has to be deemed as *asat* as in the case of difference. If space did have form, then, it cannot be an example for *asat* that has no form like difference. Only that which has a form can have an essence.[263] The usage

---

262. sato' nyatve ca asatas sadantaravat sattvam, ananyatve ca sadeva nānyad iti asato' siddhiḥ - *ibid*, p. 167

263. rūpavattve bhedasyākāśādeśca sattvat svarūpasiddheḥ - *ibid.*

of difference in space arises, not because of any intrinsic difference in space, but because of the difference of the adjuncts like pot etc. So, if for the non-existent there could be ascribed a form, it will no more be non-existent. And the usage of difference due to adjuncts, too, in the case of the formless, essenceless *asat*, is quite unintelligible and impossible.

So, the example instanced by the Asadvādin (*i.e.*, that difference itself has no difference but on that account it does not become one with that which differs), to support the view that though the non-existent has no internal difference, it does not for that reason become one with the existent, *sat*, and that *asat* appears all the same differently from *sat*, is not proper.

Moreover, even between difference and the different (*bhedin*), if there is a difference, and not oneness, in nature, as the Asadvādin asserts, then, they will have to be seen as two different things. If, on the contrary, there were no such difference between them, there is the contingence of the absence of difference, not merely between the difference and the different (*bhedin*) but among all the things in the world, like pot and cloth. Thus, the perception of difference, like the perception of the non-existent *asat*, must have to be understood as illusory. Hence, if the case of difference could be an example for *asat*, it is only in so far as both of them, difference and *asat*, are illusory, and not otherwise.

Consequently, the Advaitin's position stands unassailable - *viz.*, if the *asat* is not different from *sat*, then, like the *sat*, *asat* also will be *sat*. The expression of 'is' or 'is not' is singularly inapplicable in the case of the non-existent which is totally characterless and essenceless. But for *sat*, because of reality, there is an essence, core of being. And for Advaitin's *māyā*, there is establishment because of appearance in experience.[264] Thus, illusion is not the perception of *asat* as *sat*; it is the work of *māyā*, and is indeterminable - *anirvacaniya*.

---

264. sato vāstavarūpena māyayā abhāsarūpena svarūpasiddheḥ - *J. V., I. S.*, p. 155

18

The Establishment of the Theory of Anirvacanīyakhyāti

The Advaitin holds that error is the cognition of an indefinable object.[265] The object that appears in illusion is neither *sat* (real) nor *asat* (unreal), nor *sadasat*, real-unreal. It is different from any of these categories of existence and non-existence,[266] *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. It is not a non-existent because it appears in experience. And what is a totally non-existent nothing like a barren woman's son can never appear in experience to any one. The immediately perceived presence of the illusory object can never be dismissed as a void or nullity. The very necessity that man feels to account for the appearance of the illusory object indicates that it is not a figment of imagination.

The illusory object, on the contrary, is not existent or real because it gets sublated at the touch of right knowledge. That which claims a title to reality should have persistence, and should be the content of knowledge at all times. The silver in illusion, for instance, vanishes when the knowledge of shell arrives. Sublatability then proves, not the non-existence, but the negation of reality for the silver. And it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a thing as both real and unreal.

Therefore, the silver in illusion is really indeterminable as real or unreal.[267] The Satkhyātivādins like Bhāṭṭas, Naiyāyikas, Prābhākaras and Yogācāras and the Asatkhyātivādins like the Mādhyamika Buddhists, cancel out each other by their mutually contradictory arguments.[268] The fact of appearance goes against the Mādhyamikas. The fact of sublation is detrimental to the interests of the Satkhyātivādins. And between themselves they unknowingly establish the indeterminability of the illusory silver.

---

265. anirvācanīyārthāvabhāsaṁ vibhramam - *N. M.*, p. 111

266. sadasattvābhyām anirvacanīyāvidyātmakatvābhyupagamāt - *I. S.*, p. 47

267. *I. S.*, I. 9

268. khyāter nāsat, bādhāt na sad ityanyonyapakṣaṁ nirākurvadbhir vādibhireva rūpyasyānirvacanīyatvaṁ sthāpitam - *I. S.*, p. 47

If the silver as it appears in the illusion is real, then, there can be no sublation, as in the case of real silver. And the phenomenon remains unexplained. If the silver, on the other hand, is unreal as it appears, then, there cannot be an experience of it even in illusion. It cannot be said that a part of the form in which the silver appears, though not the entire form, is unreal; for, even that part which is not real cannot appear and that part which is real can never be sublated. In either case, the fact of illusion and its sublation remain unexplained.

The silver that exists elsewhere cannot be apparent and sublated here and now. While sublation takes place here as "This is not silver", to say that the silver exists elsewhere though sublated here is to admit the cognition of the non-existent. Indeed, one says that the silver exists elsewhere only on the ground of the fact that the sublation has taken place here and now. The silver elsewhere is supposed on the basis of the sublation here. When, therefore, the sublation takes place here, it is unreasonable to suppose the existence of silver elsewhere.

The Anyathākhyātivādin argues as follows: only the silver is sublated, and not the knowledge; if that knowledge, too, is sublated, then, the knower and the fruit of that knowledge, too, would have to be taken as non-existent; when the knower is non-existent, the sublating cognition will be without any basis; consequently, nothing will be sublated; thus only that which is obtained through knowledge is sublated; the implication of the argument being that since the cognition of silver is unsublated and since knowledge must have a content, the content must be elsewhere, though not here.

The struggle to save the reality of silver in the above argument is bound to fail because the sublation becomes intelligible even without the reality of silver or its cognition. The 'This'-aspect is real and its cognition is really the sublating factor. If the silver-cognition is not there, shell-cognition is there. So, there is no contingence of the non-existence of the knower. If silver-cognition is admitted to be unsublated, its content, *viz.*, silver, too, must be admitted. Thus, there will be no possibility of

sublation, as in the case of the real silver. Otherwise, let the real silver, too, be sublatable. Hence, if the silver is sublated, its cognition, too, shares the same fate. Thus, there is no basis for *anyathākhyāti* here.

The theory of *ātmakhyāti* does not fare better. Where there is no silver outside, there cannot be a cognition having that as its form. There cannot be a cognition without a content. In the *asatkhyāti* view, this is all the more so. In the *akhyāti* view, too, since there can be no cognition of that which does not exist, there is the contingence of there being no illusion at all, It is clear, therefore, that when silver is non-existent, there is no cognition of it. While the Akhyātivādin, Anyathākhyātivādin and the Ātmakhyātivādin will not grant the existence of silver then and there at the spot of illusion, they will assert that silver-illusion is the perception of an existent, and not of a non-existent. The Asatkhyātivādins, on the contrary, hold that it is the non-existent that appears in illusion.

On both these varieties of explanation, the actual cognition of silver at the spot of illusion is not satisfactorily dealt with. It is not the silver elsewhere existent, or the representative or memory-revival of it, or the silver-form of the internal cognition or the totally non-existent, that is perceived in illusion. It is the silver that appears to be at the spot where it is perceived. So, this silver can neither be real nor unreal. It cannot be real because it is sublated. It cannot be said to be existent elsewhere because it is perceived here and sublated here. But that it is not an existent is clear after sublation. So, neither the Satkhyātivādins nor the Asatkhyātivādins are able to explain the phenomenon of illusion. That is why the Advaitin holds that the silver is the product of shell-nescience and therefore, indeterminable.[269]

The indefinability that characterises the silver in illusion does not mean the incapacity of being defined. If it were to denote

269. śuktireva svājñānajarūpyarūpā bhātīti siddham - *I. S.*, p. 136
Also *I. S.*, I. 33

the inability to define what its nature is, then, silence is the only course open to us, and no discussion will be possible. The fact is that ordinarily known categories of existence and non-existence do not apply to illusory silver. It belongs to a category different from these. So indefinability denotes an ontological status of silver, not to be compressed into the usual modes of thought like existence and non-existence. Normally existence is opposed to non-existence and it is obvious that one cannot be both at the same time. But as a fourth mode: appearance of existence and subsequent sublation, and consequent lapse into non-existence must have to be accepted as otherwise there cannot be any acceptance of illusion and its sublation. While the totally non-existent and the really existent present no problems, the seeming and the sublatable exercise our imagination. They demand an explanation that is unique as the situation of their occurrence is singularly unique. Indefinability is not bankruptcy of explanation but points to an intriguing situation not easily comprehended under any usual modes of thought. It emphasises the *uniqueness* of the illusory. While the other theories of error attempt to force the phenomenon of illusion into the known ways and categories, and analyse it into its experiential components to explain illusion away and thus fail, the theory of indefinability recognises the challenging element in the illusory situation not to be reduced to its experiential components—*viz.*, the existent silver, or the non-existent silver. Indefinability is the name given to this peculiar ontological position and not incapacity to define. This is indeed established by the proof, *arthāpatti* or presumption. The illusory situation cannot be otherwise Intelligible if we do not assume that it is indefinable. An absolutely non-existent thing like man's horn cannot be an object of cognition and an absolutely existent thing cannot be negated or sublated. As, here, the silver is neither of the above, any explanation of illusion is unintelligible if we do not assume its indefinability.[270]

It can be argued in the reverse way. The silver is different from a non-existent thing; therefore there can be no sublation.

270. tadihobhayānyathānupapattyobhayavilakṣāṇatā rajatāder āśrīyata - *N. M.*, p. 116

And it is different from an existent thing, therefore, there can be no cognition of it. But this is *prima facie* wrong. For, the grounds for absence of sublation and absence of cognition are really existence and non-existence respectively and not difference from the non-existent and difference from the existent respectively. Why should the absence of sublation be explained with reference to a non-existent thing, when there is the straight way of explaining it with reference to the existent? There is no use referring absence of sublation to it for explanation, if we would avoid redundancy or prolixity. While the existent will explain the absence of sublation, why bring in the difference from the non-existent as the ground of non-sublation?

But it may be doubted whether the Advaitin, too, is not committing the same error of prolixity, *gaurava*. He, too, must admit, as he does, that difference from the existent and difference from the non-existent are grounds for sublation and cognition respectively. The reply of the Advaitin is: even admitting the prolixity, how is then the explanation of illusion otherwise intelligible? If, as the opponent holds, absence of cognition and absence of sublation are because of difference from the existent and difference from the non-existent respectively, even then, cognition and sublation must have to be described in terms of the existent and the non-existent respectively. This cannot be said with regard to silver, because the cognised and the sublating cannot be the same entity. It cannot be said that the silver being existent and real elsewhere and unreal only here, cognition and sublation become intelligible. Though silver may be existent elsewhere, there is no proof of its appearing here in immediate perception. So, cognition of silver and its sublation are unintelligible on this account. Therefore, difference from existence and difference from non-existence are not grounds for non-cognition and non-sublation respectively. It is much more reasonable to say that an absolutely existent thing can be the reason for the absence of sublation and an absolutely non-existent thing can be the reason for the absence of cognition and that difference from existence and difference from non-existence are grounds for sublation and cognition respectively: sublation because

of difference from reality, cognition because of difference from unreality. Thus, illusory cognition and its sublation become intelligible.

But how can silver be said to be different from both an existent and a non-existent, when there is first the cognition of silver as "This *is* silver", and when there is the subsequent cognition as "This *is not* silver?" The cognition of silver as an existent is precisely the illusion. What is perceived is only the '*this*', the substrate of illusory silver. The ascription of reality for silver is the result of the superimposition of the unreal on the real.[271] In other words, the 'reality' of silver is really the reality of this substrate only. It is only borrowed reality. So, there is no contradiction with experience for the assertion of indefinability. The earlier cognition of silver as '*existent*' being precisely the illusion, its sublation is intelligible. Thus, because of immediate experience silver is said to be not utterly non-existent, like the child of a barren woman; but because of later sublation it is said to be not totally existent like a pot. Thus indefinability stands to reason.

According to the Vivaraṇa tradition in Advaita the apparent conflict between the first cognition of silver as existent and the subsequent sublation is solved by pointing to the three distinctions of reality (to which attention has been drawn in these pages). Brahman is the absolute reality. And ether etc., are reality conditioned by *māyā*. Silver in illusion is reality conditioned by *avidyā*, the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* being that the former is the cause of any perversion of reality without confusing its locus, while *avidyā* is so, confusing the locus.[272] While Brahman is the wielder of *māyā*, the individual soul is in the control of *avidyā*. When silver is perceived, it is the result of

271. This is not unique in the Advaitin's interpretation. Even the Anyathākhyātivādin affirms that the silver that exists elsewhere appears in the present *adhiṣṭhāna* or substrate as "This is silver". Here, too, the 'this' is not silver, as is evident from sublation. So, silver is superimposed on the 'this'.

272. svāśrayam avyāmohayanti viparītapravṛttihetur māyā, svāśrayaṁ vyāmohayanti tathāvidhaivāvidyeti bhedaḥ - Citsukha on *N. M.* p. 119

individual nescience. It has neither the absolute reality of Brahman nor the empirical reality of ether etc. Thus it is only apparent, *prātibhāsika*.[273] In this way, too, the indefinability is established.

With reference to the doubt whether the sublating cognition "This is not silver", which denotes the non-existence of silver is not in conflict with the earlier statements of the Advaitin that silver in illusion is neither existent nor non-existent, it is replied that the content of the sublating cognition "This *is not* silver" has for its content, the non-existence of real silver.[274] Thus there is no conflict with experience for the statement that silver in illusion is different from non-existence.

If it be asked whether the silver perceived in illusion does not stay, as it is not *that* that is sublated and as it is not *its* non-existence that is spoken of, but only that of the impure silver, it is only to be replied that the silver in illusion is of the nature of nescience arising out of ignorance of shell. That is why it is perceived in the spot where shell only remains after right knowledge arises. When the nescience with reference to the real nature of shell reigns supreme, silver is seen. But once that nescience is lifted, silver is no more there but only the shell. Being the product of nescience, silver is only indefinable and goes with its cause.[275] Moreover, the natural cause of the illusory

273. paramārthasad - vailakṣaṇyābhiprāyeṇa cānirvācyalakṣaṇam - *ibid.*, p. 119
This explanation by the Vivaraṇācārya is considered to be more reasonable by Ānandabodha himself.
sādhiyān evāyamapi samādhiḥ - *ibid.*

274. nedam ityavabhāsasya paramārtharajatābhāva - viṣayatayā nānubhavavirodhaḥ - *N. M.* Citsukha's *Ṭikā*, p. 119.

275. To the question: how can the empiric silver which is not in immediate contact with the senses here be said to be non-existent here, Ānandabodha replies that it is occasioned by the appearance of the silver (*rajatābhāsa*) here.
rajatābhāsa-prasaṅgasyaiva tatpratiṣedhanimittatvāt - *N. M.*, p. 120
If what appears to cognition at a certain place could be denied or negated then and there, then the same may happen to shell also. If it is said to be reasonable because the whole situation is illusory,

and indefinable silver is only the indefinable nescience and this is beginningless.

If the cause is some existent, then this cause cannot produce a totally non-existent effect. That is, the effect will have some reality, like pot. In the same way, an absolute non-entity, *asat*, can never be the cause of anything. Thus the material cause of the occasional silver is only the nescience that is different from both an existent and a non-existent. The inference here is the same as the one by which, by elimination, pleasure etc., are known to reside in the Self, and not in the eight substances.[276]

And if nescience had a beginning, then another material cause for this nescience would have to be sought out, with the result of infinite regress. The essence of a situation brought about by nescience is that it is sublatable.[277] And this applies neither to the existent, nor to the non-existent, nor to both. Thus, error must be granted to be the work of the indefinable nescience and its sublation is only by knowledge.

---

then it is asked: Does the negation throw up the absence of silver that is in a different condition, or the absence of the same? If the former, the negation will be: "the silver was here, but not now". But that is not the way in which sublation takes place. If the latter, as in the case of real silver where the second cognition in conflict with the first cognition cannot arise, in this illusion also, the second cognition will never arise in conflict with the first. So, it is the indefinable silver that is the content of *mithyā-jñāna*.

276. sukhādayaḥ samavāyikāraṇajanyā guṇatvāt ity anumānena sāmānyataḥ samavāyikāraṇasiddhau, ayāvaddravyabhāvi-viśeṣaguṇatvenānityasparśavad anādhāratvāt, asmadādi-pratyakṣaguṇatvena ca paramāṇvanādhāratvāti aśrāvaṇatvena ca anākāśaguṇatvācca dikkālamanasāṁ viśeṣaguṇaśūnyatvāti aṣṭadravyātiriktādhārāḥ sukhādayaḥ siddhyanti yathā tathā atrāpi-Citsukha on *N. M.*, p. 123

277. bādhagocarabhāvam anvirvācyalakṣaṇam - *N. M.*, p. 124
pratipannopādhau pratiṣedham eva bādhaṁ tadgocarabhāvaṁ ca bādhaka-pratyaya-pravedanīyam anirvācyalakṣaṇam ācakṣate - *N. M.*, p. 125

PART IV

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF RELEASE

1

Release, according to the Advaita Vedānta, is transcendence of error. Epistemologically, empirical error is dispelled by empirical means of knowledge. Metaphysically, the primal nescience is destroyed by the intuition of Brahman. The enquiry into the nature of truth is to attain the highest Beatitude, the Supreme Bliss. The fruit is of two kinds: (1) principal and (2) subsidiary. Happiness and non-existence of misery are principal fruits. The *means* of accomplishing either of these fruits is the secondary fruit.[1] Again, happiness is of two kinds: (1) the surpassable (*sātiśaya*) and (2) the unsurpassable (*niratiśaya*). The surpassable bliss belongs to the ordinary experience arising out of the contact of the senses with the objects and internal organ-psychosis, (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). The Upaniṣad declares about this happiness: "Other beings subsist in dependence on but a fraction of this same Brahman-bliss".[2]

The unsurpassable bliss is Brahman itself. The Scripture has it: "He knew Bliss to be Brahman",[3] "Brahman is Knowledge-Bliss".[4] Release is the attainment of this Brahman that is of the nature of Bliss. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself.[5] The attainment of release is not the attainment of a world beyond in the nature of a paradise; nor is Brahman-bliss sense-generated. This Bliss-Release is not some thing to be attained at all. It is attaining, as it were, what is ever attained.

---

1. *V. P.*, p. 152
2. *Bṛh. Up.*, IV. 3. 32
3. *Taitt. Up.*, III. 6
4. *Bṛh. Up.*, III. 9. 28
5. *Mund. Up.*, III. 2. 9

Release, according to the Advaita Vedānta, is not something that does not exist now and is accomplished; it is the very nature of the individual. Freedom and Bliss are his essence. The notion that he does not have this now is precisely the illusion. And this illusion, as much as any epistemological errors that were described in the earlier pages of this thesis, is dispelled by knowledge.

For example, in the case of one who labours under the delusion of snake in the rope, the words "That is not a serpent" removes the snake-illusion. The snake was not there to be removed now. Only the ignorance of the person is removed by the knowledge. For another example, a person who thinks that he has lost his golden ornament but who really has it round his neck, does not bring the ornament into being on being told that he has the ornament all the while on his person. The ornament was not newly attained because it was never lost. Only the ignorance of the person is removed.

Similarly, Brahman is the Self. It is the only Reality. It is ever established. The individual soul has this Brahman-nature and the Self is Brahman. That it is the not-self is the notion that it has bred out of ignorance. When the true nature of the soul as Brahman-Bliss is revealed by scriptural declarations as "Then he knew the Self alone in the form "I am Brahman",[6] the ignorance vanishes. There is nothing attained which was not there already.

Different schools of thought in India hold different views with regard to the nature of release. The Mādhyamika Buddhists say that the final release consists in the cessation of the continuous succession of cognitions that are defiled by afflictions like passion, aversion and so on. The cessation of the individual, with his ceaseless current of cognitions as that of a lamp, is release.[7] The Yogācāra Buddhists say that release comes with

6. *Bṛh. Up.*, I. 4. 10

7. pradīpasyeva nirvāṇaṁ vimokṣas-tasya tāyinaḥ - *N. M.*, p. 270
baddhasya ātmanaḥ bandhena saha nāśa eva mokṣaḥ - Citsukha, on *N. M.*, *ibid.*

the origination of the stream of pure cognitions undefiled by any form of objects and acquired by an intense concentration.[8] The Naiyāyikas say that final release consists in the individual acquiring his nature by getting rid of qualities like cognition, pleasure, pain, effort, merit, demerit, etc.[9] According to the Vaiśeṣikas, when the soul is rid of the qualities produced by contact with names and body, it regains its independence.[10] The Sāṅkhyas say that release is at hand when the intelligent *puruṣa* is discriminated from the *prakṛti*, and as devoid of merit, demerit, etc.[11] The Jainas say that at release, there is the permanent rising up of the soul divested of all limiting adjuncts like the body, the senses and their activities and all *karmas*.[12] The Vaiṣṇavas and the Kāpālikas maintain that the final release consists in acquiring an imperishable body etc.[13] The Śaiva Siddhānta holds that on release, the soul attains to the status of Śiva himself, though not one with him.[14]

Śaṅkara holds that release is eternal unsurpassed bliss attained, as it were, on the cessation of nescience. The Advaitin does not find the characterisation of release given by the other schools of thought satisfactory. The Mādhyamika account is unsound. If final release consists of the total cessation of the stream of cognitions, like the putting out of the lamp, then, to whom is this the goal? Is it to *those who have* the stream of cognitions, or to the stream of cognitions themselves? Not tne first; because those who have the cognitions are, to the Mādhyamika, momentary selves continuously perishing and becoming. No relationship could be established between these fleeting selves and final release. Nor can it be the second alternative.

---

8. viṣayākārādy-upaplavaśūnyo yaścittasantānaḥ tasyotpāda eva mokṣaḥ - *ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. ātmaviśeṣaguṇānām atyantocchedaḥ
11. Citsukha on *N.M.*, p. 271
12. pralīna-nikhilopādheḥ kṣetrajñasya satatordhvagati-lakṣaṇam-*N.M.*, p. 270
13. akṣayaśarīrādilābham - *ibid.*, p. 271
14. Nilakaṇṭha on *Brahma-sūtra* IV. 4. 4

Since the stream of cognitions, to the Mādhyamika, is of the nature of the self, desiring the cessation of cognitive stream to get release will amount to desiring the destruction of the dear self. Surely, one's own destruction cannot be one's own goal.[15] Moreover, without the partaker of the fruit, how can there be a fruit at all? Fruit to whom?

The Yogācāra definition of final release, too, is defective. There cannot be any attainment of release for him who works for it, since all the cognitions, earlier than the origination of the pure cognitions that constitute release, are momentary. So, final release cannot be for them. There could be no relation, in other words, between the cognitions and the final release. Moreover, if we assume the stream of cognitions even at the time of release, then, an association with misery etc., also cannot be avoided. If even after the knowledge of the reality the assumption of the stream of cognitions is not got over, then it amounts to saying that all miseries exist even at the time of release.

The definition of final release offered by the Naiyāyikas, too, is quite unsound. Mere cessation of sorrow alone cannot be the human goal. It is negative, and cannot thus be the end of all human endeavour. Moreover, the absence of pain cannot be the human goal without being cognised. And since, according to the Naiyāyika, at the time of release special qualities like cognition etc., are destroyed, even the state of the total absence of pain cannot be cognised. Thus, the state of release will be indistinguishable from a dead condition of unconsciousness.[16] One can prove that in release there is nothing. But this is possible only when there is awareness that there is nothing but awareness. How can the total absence of awareness be cognised without there being some awareness? Release cannot be compared to dreamless sleep where, it may be thought, there is total absence of awareness. But the fact that there is remembrance like "I slept well", shows clearly that there has been the con-

15. svecchodasyāpuruṣarthatvāt - *N.M.*, p. 272
16. *ibid*, p. 277

tinuity of consciousness even during the dreamless sleep-condition, being aware of the total absence of anything else. Therefore, the Advaitins hold that in dreamless sleep, it is the supreme Bliss that is experienced.

The Jaina view of the soul going up on release can bring, at best, only weariness.[17] Moreover, for the soul that is all-pervasive, there cannot be anything like going up or down. If the soul, on the other hand, is of a medium size, then there is finitude and transiency for it. The view of the Kāpālikas and Vaiṣṇavas that final liberation consists of acquisition of an imperishable body is not acceptable since, like our own bodies as example, this kind of release being something obtained as an effect, will wither away.[18] The Sāṅkhya view also is not free from defects. It does not say that Puruṣa is of the nature of Bliss.[19] Again, Puruṣa is passive and indifferent. No awareness of Bliss would be associated with Puruṣa which, on that account, ceases to be the human goal. For all these reasons the Advaitin thinks that release is of the nature of unsurpassed Bliss and cessation of nescience.

2

Knowledge the only cause of release

As nescience or ignorance is the cause of bondage, the destruction of this can come about only by knowledge. There are scriptural declarations to this effect: "Realising That alone, a man transcends death", "Neither through action, not through offspring, nor through wealth," etc. There is the testimony of the traditional codes also: "Release is attained only through knowledge whereby one is liberated from transmigratory existence. Through actions, a creature is fettered; through knowledge it becomes released." There are certain Advaitic thinkers like Maṇḍana who think that release comes, not by action alone,

17. bahulāyāsahetutvat - *ibid.*, p. 281

18. asmadādiśarīravat kṣaya śrutānumānasya kāryatvāviśeṣeṇa śakyanivāraṇatvāt - *ibid.*

19. na ca ānandarūpaḥ puruṣo'bhyupagato yena sa eva prakāśamānaḥ puruṣārthaḥ - *ibid.* p. 282.

but action in conjunction with knowledge. They quote *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* in support of the view that neither knowledge alone, nor actions alone will bring about release, and that they should be combined. "Into blinding darkness enter they who worship ignorance; into darkness more dense than that, as it were, they who delight in knowledge". "Knowledge and ignorance, he who knows the two together, crossing over death through ignorance attains the immortal through knowledge".[20]

Maṇḍana in his *Brahma-siddhi* gives his support to this doctrine of *jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda* in his own way. This combination of knowledge and action consists not merely in the combination of repeated contemplation, a special form of mental activity, with the indirect knowledge of the one Absolute Reality derived from the texts of the scripture,[21] but also in the association of that contemplative activity with rites prescribed by Vedas.[22]

Maṇḍana enumerates some seven theories of the earlier and contemporary thinkers advocating combination of action and knowledge as the means to release.[23] These are: (1) All the injunctions in the scripture serve to turn the minds of men away from their mundane natural inclinations to the meditative activity prescribed for redemption. (2) All the injunctions are meant to destroy desires through enjoyment, thus paving way for the meditative activity bringing about redemption. (3) Actions are necessary in the discharge of the three debts, *ṛṇa-traya*,

---

20. andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti ye vidyām upāsate |
tato bhūya eva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṁ ratāḥ ||
Also: vidyāṁ cāvidyām ca yastadvedo'bhayaṁ saha |
avidyayā mṛtyuṁ tirtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute ||
- *Iśa. Up.* 9,11.

21. The knowledge that arises from the Mahāvākyas is only mediate (*parokṣa*), and involves a relation in some manner (*saṁsṛṣṭaviṣaya*). The knowledge that accrues from the texts should go through the fire of contemplation, (*upāsanā*), before it could turn into immediate realisation. This doctrine is known as *prasaṅkhyāna*.

22. S. Kuppuswamy Sastri: *Introduction to Brahma-siddhi*, p. xxxiv

23. *ibid.* xxxiii

which is the way to redemption. (4) The actions prescribed in the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda bring about their own fruits and also lead to redemption. (5) All *karma* or action is meant to purify men preparing them for redemption. (6) The Self-knowledge should be treated as secondary or subsidiary to actions prescribed in the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda. and (7) Action and knowledge are fundamentally opposed to each other.[24]

Maṇḍana accepts the fourth and fifth of the above theories and discards the rest.[25] The rites like *agnihotra* etc., are highly valuable accessories to the repeated contemplation (*abhyāsa*) on the meaning and purport of the scriptural statements like "That thou art", and bring about the *brahma-sākṣātkāra*. He emphasises the view that those who have chosen the way of renunciation secure Brahman-realisation without the performance of the rites.[26] But through meditation accompanied by the performance of the prescribed rites release comes much sooner than otherwise without the performance of rites.[27] Maṇḍana's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtra*,[28] as supporting his own view of *jñānakarma-samuccaya*, is that though the goal or destination can be reached even without the help of a horse, it can be reached much quicker and with greater ease and convenience with a horse than without it.[29] This is different from what Śaṅkara would see in the same *Brahma-sūtra*. Śaṅkara urges that the utility of the horse is in drawing the chariot and not in ploughing, and that, similarly, the prescribed rites like sacrifices are useful only in so far as they prepare the individual for the final knowledge.

The final knowledge of Brahman does not stand in need of any action, though actions may be helpful in preparing the way for knowledge by creating a desire for it. The scripture declaring:

---

24. *B.S.*, pp. 26-28
25. S. Kuppuswami Sastri: *Op. cit.*, p. xxxiii
26. *B. S.*, p. 36
27. *ibid.*
28. sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruter aśvavat - III. 4. 26
29. *B. S.*, p. 37

"The *Brāhmaṇas* desire to know that Self by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, gifts, and by austerity,"[30] only brings out the fact that the generation of a desire to know the Self and thus a preparation for that knowledge is the utility of rites etc. When it is further said that what is called austerity is only celibacy (*brahmacarya*),[31] celibacy is exalted and praised as a sacrificial rite, and thus it is clear that sacrifices, like celibacy, are instrumental to the purification of the mind. They have no place or competency in the matter of final release which is the fruit of knowledge. As already stated, like the horse which is competent only to draw the chariot, but not to plough, even so, the sacrifices and other duties performed are useful in generating the desire to know and not in the final result of Self-realisation.[32] The practice of qualities like continence, patience, control of the mind etc., is the internal discipline, *antaraṅgasādhana*, and the performance of sacrifices etc., are the external discipline, *bahiraṅgasādhana*, for the Self-knowledge.[33] But the Self-knowledge does not stand in dependence on any of these in bringing about the fruit of Self-realisation. The *Īśa* text "Only by doing actions here" (*kurvanneveha karmāṇi*) comes only to praise knowledge. as a Brahmajñānin has nothing to achieve because later on the Upaniṣad goes on to say that actions do not adhere to the *brahmajñānin*.[34] The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text says that the Brahmajñānin, one who has realised his Self, is not interested

---

30 *Bṛh. Up.* IV. 4. 22

31. *Chānd. Up.* VIII. 5. 1.

32. āśramakarmāṇi vidyayā phalasiddhau nāpekṣyante utpattau cāpekṣyante- *S. B.* III. 4. 26

33. *ibid*, III. 4. 27. See also III. 4. 47. Where only renunciation is the way to release. The *Chāndogya* text "on return one should be a householder" (VIII. 15. 1) means only that as a householder, one has grea opportunities to practise disciplines like non-violence, conquest of the senses etc., and this paves the way to final knowledge. But householder's life is not indispensable. Here Maṇḍana agrees with Śaṅkara. See *S. B.* III. 4. 17, *B S*,, p. 36

34. *Īśa-Up*: 2. *S. B.* III. 4. 14. yāvajjīvaṁ karma kurvatyapi viduṣipuruṣe na karma lepāya bhavati vidyāsāmarthyād iti tadevaṁ vidyā stūyate.

in the perpetuation of his family, *i.e.*, in producing children.[35] Śaṅkara has been repeatedly saying that release is a matter of immediate eternal experience, and not something to be produced at sometime and place by any activity.[36] There is neither an instrument, nor a something to be achieved after the Brahman-intuition.[37]

Vācaspati Miśra, author of *Bhāmati*, agrees with Śaṅkara that the utility of performance of one's duties pertaining to one's station, or *āśrama*, in life ends in creating a *desire* to know only. It may be argued: "If one who performs rites in order that he may get the desire to know has a desire for the Veda, (which prescribes the rites) then, the desire to know exists already. If there is no such desire already, the desire to know, instrumental to final knowledge of liberation, cannot arise, because without the rites which are prescribed in the Veda the desire cannot arise. In other words, even to perform the rites, from which the desire to know is said to arise by the Advaitin, there should be a desire for the Vedas, in which case, the desire is there already. If there is no such desire already in this way, no desire can be induced in the individual later because even the first desire to perform the rites is not there since the desire for the Vedas, too, is absent.

To this, Vācaspati replies by the example of a lean man who, in order to remedy the leanness, turns naturally to taking more food, which, because of his distaste for food, (this distaste itself being the cause of leanness), he cannot take, and to whom, therefore, is prescribed some medicine. In the same way, the person who has, by virtue of the clarity of intellect generated by obligatory and expiatory rites practised without a desire for fruit during many prior existences, gained the faith in regard to the sense of the scripture that Brahman is of the nature of

35. *Bṛh Up.* IV. 4. 22

36. anubhavārūḍhameva ca vidyāphalaṁ na kriyāphalavat kālāntarābhavi- III. 4. 15.

37. *Bṛh. Up.* II. 4. 14

unsurpassable Bliss and that Brahman-realisation is only through knowledge, develops a desire to know Brahman through knowledge alone. Yet such desire or taste to hear the scriptural texts on Brahman does not arise because of the presence of obstructing causes like the sins accumulated in the past births. Such effects of the sins as obstruct the effort to hear and study the scripture are nullified by the performance of the prescribed rites. Otherwise due to the residua of sins, the tendency may be towards prohibited conduct, thus intensifying the darkness of sins. So, such prescription of performance of rites is intelligible.

Prakāśātman and the followers of *Vivaraṇa* school, as against the *Bhāmati* school, hold, however, that the instrumentality of acts and sacrifices taught by scriptural texts: "That is to be reflected on, contemplated", "That is to be sought, that, verily, is to be desired to be known", apply or are directed to knowledge that is signified by the stem in the word "desire", in "they desire", etc. Even in secular usages like "He desires to go on a horse", "He desires to kill with a knife", the instrumentality of horse etc., are understood to relate only to going etc. So, too, the imperative suffix in all the texts mentioned above has relation only to knowledge.

But this will raise a difficulty. Does the Advaitin accept that the practice of rites etc., is carried on right to the time of the dawn of knowledge? What will happen then to the theory, to which the Advaitin is wedded, that only by him who has renounced is reality known? No, says the Advaitin. There is practice of *karma* till the purification of mind is complete, when the desire to know the Self arises. Then renunciation follows. Thus, it can be said that knowledge arises both from renunciation and action. An example will make this clear. Before the seed is sown, there is ploughing of the land. But after the sowing there cannot be a ploughing. In this way, it can be said that the growth of rice etc., results both from ploughing and not ploughing. Similarly, both renunciation and action can be said to be the cause of knowledge. Sureśvara observes in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*: "*Karmas*, securing for the intellect through its

purification a leaning towards what is within, achieve their object and disappear, even as clouds at the end of the rainy season".

The difference between the *Vivaraṇa* view and the *Bhāmatī* view is said to be this: On the *Vivaraṇa* view, even though *karmas* are abandoned after securing the desire for knowledge (desire, which is a channel to knowledge), yet, they are supposed to generate knowledge by securing means, which lead to the fruit when accompanied by cessation of activity, *viz.*, unhindered hearing (study), reflection and contemplation, through the attainment of an excellent preceptor. On the *Bhāmatī* view, however, actions cease after securing the desire to know, capable of generating activity in respect of hearing. Hence, they, *i.e.*, *karmas*, do not generate knowledge.[38]

38. *S. L. S.* Tr. by S. S. S. Sastri, pp. 331-335.

CHAPTER II

TRANSCENDENCE OF NESCIENCE

1

Release is cessation of nescience. Now, an interesting question of the nature of this cessation of nescienee is raised. The cessation of nescience is either real or unreal. If it is real, then, is it as real as Brahman? In that case, there will be two reals and the theory of non-dualism must have to be given up. If, on the other hand, the cessation is unreal, then there can be no release at all. Again, even assuming that the cessation of nescience is real, is it the same as the Self or something different from it? If it is the same, then, there should be the cessation eternally. If it is other than the Self, as aforesaid, duality cannot be avoided.

If the cessation of nescience, again, is accepted as illusory or unreal, what, then, is its nature? If it is indeterminable, or *anirvacaniya*, then it is of the same nature as nescience and the effect of nescience. In this case, there will not be any release, since causal nescience will be persisting even after its effect is destroyed. Moreover, how can nescience itself be the cessation of nescience? It cannot be said that cessation is non-existence and an emptiness. For in that case, it cannot be realisable through the effort of the individuals yearning for it. If it were said to be non-existence, but not emptiness, even then, is it determinable or indeterminable? If the first, there is duality of this and Brahman, both being real. If the second, there is no release.

Non-existence can be the extinction of only existence and existence only of non-existence. But nescience is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both combined. There is nothing which is of the form of existence and non-existence and which can be said to be the cessation of nescience. No other forms or alternatives are conceivable.

But when all is said and done, the fact of the cessation of nescience itself is well-known, and cannot be disputed. If it cannot be any of the alternatives, existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent and indefinable it must be something different from all these, *pañcamaprākāra*.[1] Cessation of nescience is not an existent. So, there is no fear of the duality of two reals, Brahman and this cessation. It is not indefinable like nescience, and, thus, it cannot be the effect of nescience.[2]

Some Advaitins hold that the Supreme Self is the cessation of nescience. But this, Ānandabodha dismisses as impossible for the reasons mentioned earlier *viz*, there would be the cessation of nescience eternally, as the Self is eternal. Other Advaitins say that there is no harm in having the cessation as indefinable. The argument that if it be indefinable, it cannot be said to be the cessation of a nescience that itself is indefinable, and that nescience itself will continue to be present even after cessation, is not very disturbing. For, indefinability for the cessation could be justified if nescience has the adjunct of *removability* by knowledge.[3] This removability by knowledge makes the cessation of nescience different from nescience. For that which is extinct

---

1. See *NM*, p. 355
2. *ibid*, p. 356

   Sarvajñātman has this verse referring to Vimuktātman whom he calls as *Muktikovidāḥ*:

   citibhedam abhedam eva vā dvayarūpatvam atho mṛṣātmatām |
   parihṛtya tamo-nivartanaṁ prathayante khalu muktikovidāḥ ||

   Sarvajñātman accepts the *pañcamaprakara* theory. pañcama-prakāra avidyānivṛttir iti yaṁ vidvāmsaḥ kathayanti taṁ vayam abhyupagacchāmaḥ ityarthaḥ – Rāmatīrtha on *Saṁ. Sār*, IV, 12

3. anirvācyatvena avidyātadvilāsānyatarātvasādhane
   nivṛttimattvam upādhir ityarthaḥ - *N.M.*, p. 358

   na ca vayaṁ bhāvābhava - pramāṇa - gamyatayā ajñānasya anirvācyatvaṁ brūmaḥ; api tu jñānamātra-apanodyatvāt rūpyavat - *I S.*, p. 63

   atra ca ajñāna-nivṛttes tādṛśam eva anirvācyatvaṁ khaṇḍyate yādṛśam ajñānasya jñāna-nivartyatvena anirvācyatvam - *I S., J.V*, p. 452

   Otherwise, the inference of the illusoriness of the world adopted by the Advaitin will be badly damaged.

there cannot be extinction again. Now, it can be asked: how can that which destroys and that which is destroyed be without difference? But, what does this question mean? Does it mean that there should be no similarity between them? It cannot be so; otherwise, there will be totally nothing in common between the pot that is destroyed and its posterior non-existence. One does say that it is the posterior non-existence of pot. To this view, Ānandabodha is agreeable.[4]

2

Vimuktātman's View

The view that *avidyānivṛtti* or destruction of nescience does not conform to any of the known categories, but belongs to the fifth alternative, *pañcamaprakāra*, is, in fact, a theory enunciated by Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. The verse in Ānandabodha's *Nyāya-makaranda*, which follows Vimuktātman's thought, quotes Vimuktātman in support of the theory that *avidyānivṛtti* is of the fifth order.[5]

---

4. svamatena pariharati - Citsuka on *N.M.*, p. 357

5. na sannāsan na sadasan nānirvācyopi tatkṣayaḥ yakṣānurūpo hi balibhir ityācāryā vyacīcaran - *ibid.* p. 355. See *I.S.*, p. 85. Also *I.S.*, *J.V.*, p. 452.

There are notions, like difference of the soul from God, of nescience to its locus *viz*, Brahman, which are neither nescience nor its products but which are not real *Avidyanivṛtti* also belongs to the same category. However, Jñānottama adds that the fifth mode of removal is illusory, pañcamaprakāra-nivṛttir mithyā ityeva rahasyam - *I.S.*, *J.V.*, p. 452. Yet *avidyānivṛtti* is not *śūnya;* its proof is the experience of the removal - ajñāna-nivṛttau kim pramāṇam iti cet, nivṛttiprasiddhireva - *I.S.*, p. 86. The *pañcama-prakāra-avidyā-nivṛtti* has been expressed as follows: pañcamaprakārā avidyā-nivṛttiḥ na sati nāsati, na sadasati na sadasadvilakṣaṇā, na jñāna-nivartyā, kim tu ajñāna-aprayuktā jñānajanyā ajñānapratiyoginī jaḍā brahmavadeva muktau api anuvartate, arthakriyākāritvarahitā ca. See Anantakrishna Sastri's *Satabhūṣaṇi*.

Madhusūdana in his *Advaita-ratnarakṣaṇam* says that there is neither reality nor non-existence for the world; but there is only Brahman which is the locus and *svarūpa* of the superimposed world and its non-existence. adhiṣṭhānam eva adhyastasya svarūpam, tadabhāvasyāpi iti siddhāntara-

The objection, as we have already noted, is this: If the removal of nescience is real, then there will be a second Reality, Brahman being the first. If it is the Self itself, then Self being eternal, the absence of nescience also will be eternal, in which case there will be no *avidyā* to account for the world. And, *avidyā* will be causeless. If it had a cause, the Self, being the same as this *avidyā*, too, will have a cause and origin, and, thus will cease to be the Self. And there will be no locus for nescience, the Self being non-eternal. Or, nescience itself will have an origin. If the removal of nescience is non-existence, then, if the non-existence, too, is the Self, all the difficulties of the non-existence of the Self will arise, chief among them being: nescience itself will be without a locus. If this removal, on the other hand, is an attribute of the Self, then, either this attribute is different or non-different from the locus *i.e.*, Self. If it is non-different from the Self, the difficulty has been pointed out. If it is different from the Self, it cannot have the Self as its locus.

If the removal of nescience is unreal, the world will become real. It cannot be both real and unreal. If it is indeterminable, then, the same nescience which is also indeterminable will exist and there will be no release. And, there is no other alternative. It cannot be void because void cannot be the ultimate goal of all endeavour, and it cannot be established. Again, the non-existence is the removal of the existent alone; similarly, existence is the removal of non-existence alone. But nescience is neither existent nor non-existent nor both. It is indeterminable. Its removal, therefore, cannot be either existent, or non-existent or both or indeterminable. One indeterminable is not the removal of another indeterminable and, further, it is knowledge that is known to be the remover of nescience. Therefore nescience is the absence of knowledge, and its removal is the existence of knowledge.

---

basyam. Even the negative texts like *asthūla* etc., inform only the Self and not the negation of *sthūlatva* etc. asthūlādi vākyānāṁ ca sthūlādi-vilakṣaṇa-ātmasvarūpa-mātra-bodhakatvam, na tadabhāvabodhakatvam.

Vimuktātman answers that there is a fifth alternative to us.[6] The four forms of removal enumerated, *viz.*, real, unreal, real-*cum*-unreal, and indeterminable, pertain only to the determinable entities. The removal of nescience which is indeterminable must be reasonably of another nature. Verily, the oblation must be commensurate with the deity.[7]

Vimuktātman offers an alternative to the view of the *pañcama-prakāra* in the eighth chapter of *Iṣṭa siddhi*, holding that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is indeterminable, with this difference that while *avidyā* is removed by knowledge, *avidyā-nivṛtti* is not.[8] We shall see the problem a little closer. The objection seems to be as follows: Nescience is unreal; its destruction also must be unreal since destruction has nescience as its antecedent and since, thus, destruction itself can be said to be produced from nescience. An effect follows from its cause which is its antecedent and which ceases when the effect is produced. In this sense, here, the effect can be said to be the destroyer of its cause.

The argument is ingenious but hollow. If destruction has nescience as its antecedent material cause, it will exist only so long as that cause exists. With the disappearance of the material cause, the effect also should disappear. When nescience is destroyed, nescience-less states follows; there is no transformation of the material cause *viz.*, nescience. And, sharing the nature of nescience, how can the destruction of nescience be a destruction at all? Again, whatever has an origin is the product of nescience. If destruction is said to originate in whatever manner, it is nescience still and thus nescience would not have been destroyed.

---

6. *I.S.*, p 85

7. yakṣānurūpo hi baliḥ - *Ibid*, p. 86
   Prof. Hiriyanna compares the concept of *pañcamaprakāra* to what the mathematicians call an 'imaginary number'. It means that the explanation in question is one to which we are driven by the considered conclusions of the Advaita doctrine.
   Introduction to Iṣṭa-siddhi: p. xxxv

8. *J.V., I.S.*, p. 433. See also *I.S.*, VIII. 15

3

Destruction not originating from Ātman or from itself

The alternative suggestion is that the destruction of nescience can be said to originate from Ātman, if not from nescience. But this is plainly impossible. Ātman cannot be said to have been modified into this destruction as it is changeless. Nothing that is inert is born of Ātman. And for consciousness there is no origination. Nor can this destruction be said to be born, being itself non-existent, from nothing. Nowhere is it observed that a non-existent nothing is born of nothing.

So this destruction of nescience can neither be real like Ātman, nor unreal like the void. Is it then indefinable? Vimuktātman at least in the last chapter of his work (*I.S.* VIII. 2) seems to answer in the affirmative.

4

Destruction of nescience is not origination of anything else

It is clear then that the unreal destruction of nescience is not born from its antecedent cause *viz.*, nescience, and that destruction of nescience is not the origination of anything else. If there could be anything else, it could only be Ātman; but this is unreasonable because Ātman is unoriginated. It may be suggested that Ātman itself is the destruction of nescience and not the originated Ātman; but then the destruction of nescience will always be there since Ātman is eternal, which means that nescience and bondage could never be there.

Another course open is to say that, while admitting that the destruction of nescience is not something from Ātman, nor Ātman itself, it may be taken to be the negation of anything other than Ātman which will be one way of establishing the secondlessness of Ātman. But the old question whether this negation is the same as Ātman remains, with the attendant difficulty that since Ātman is eternal, there will be the negation of nescience always; in short, there could be no nescience, and therefore, no bondage. If we assume that the negation of the existence of anything other than Ātman is not Ātman itself but

something different, the concept of non-duality must have to be abandoned. We are back at the dilemma again. Vimuktātman solves the dilemma in the same way as indicated earlier. The non-dual Ātman is not incompatible with nescience itself, much less with its negation.

If non-duality is construed to mean non-possession of duality for Ātman, it is not incompatible if it were the same as Ātman. If it were not, there could be no bondage for bondage is duality. If non-duality is, on the other hand, construed as being the locus of nescience and its products consumed by knowledge, either this consumption of nescience is the same as Ātman, or different. In either case there is difficulty as noted earlier. So this construction of the meaning of non-duality fails to be satisfactory.

The destruction of nescience is not the origination of anything else, whatever may be the case with regard to the positive determinable entities. But nescience is determinable neither as real nor as unreal. And, *pramāṇas* which destroy nescience do not produce anything as the destruction of the pot produces potsherds. If it did, it would cease to be *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* reveals only what is already existent and does not *create*. And, knowledge itself is beginningless and eternal and, therefore, it cannot be said to be arising from the operation of *pramāṇas*.

If it is urged that if the destruction of nescience is not the origination of something positive and is merely a negation of nescience, no cause could be thought of to operate in mere negation and that, therefore, destruction should result in something positive so that cause could intelligibly be said to operate, then, on the same ground it can be shown that no positively previously non-existent can be said to originate from destruction as it is said that no cause could operate in what is non-existent. Much less could it operate in the case of the existent because of existence itself. If the existent is said not to be in conflict with non-existence which is merely a negation, the previous non-existent entity can continue to be non-existent for ever as there is no conflict with a positive existent which puts an end to non-

existence. And so, if the positive entity that is said to originate on the destruction of nescience is previously non-existent, then it can never be said to originate because of the non-operation of cause. If it were previously existent, there is no need for its origination at all.

If the existent is said to originate annulling the previously existent, then, if this annulment is by virtue of being an existent, when an existent exists all the other existents must be annulled. Even the existent that annuls will not exist because of conflict with its own existence. If self-conflict is said to be impossible on the ground that confiict is always with another, then it must be confessed that conflict is in virtue of *difference* and, not of *existence*. But then, there will be conflict of the existent with what is non-existent, since the non-existent is *different* from the existent. If it is asked how there could be difference in that which does not exist, it can be equally asked how there could be difference within the existent itself without sacrificing its oneness. In view of these difficulties the destruction of nescience is not *itself* the origination of a positive something.

Even assuming that destruction, though not the same as origination, coincides with the origination of something else happening simultaneously with it, no point is gained because what applies to things that have a beginning in time like pot does not apply to nescience which is beginningless. When the pot is made clay is no more there. This is because pot is the modification of clay. But nescience is not a modification of anything else. It is beginninglessly there.

5

Removal of Nescience not determinable by Pramāṇa

That nescience is destroyed is a patent fact. Yet this destruction is not established by any *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* always dispels ignorance and makes things known. If the *avidyānivṛtti* is established by *pramāṇa*, it will have to be supposed that in establishing the *avidyānivṛtti* itself, the *pramāṇa* dispels an ignorance of *avidyānivṛtti*, and this means an *avidyānivṛtti* of the first *avidyānivṛtti*. The second *avidyānivṛtti*, too, must have

to be established by a *pramāṇa* with the same result as above. Thus, there will be infinite regress and no one can say, "There has been a removal of my nescience".

6

Knownness and Unknownness of Objects

The indefinability of the removal of nescience is reached by an analysis of the knownness and unknownness of objects. When the object or the Self is known there is the removal of nescience. The knownness and the unknownness of the object can neither be said to be the nature of the object so known nor of something else. Knownness cannot be the nature of the object because of inconstancy and futility of *pramāṇa*, inconstancy because knownness is absent prior to the rise of the *pramāṇa*; futility because if the object has the nature of knownness, it should be always there, and, therefore, there is no need for a *pramāṇa*, which makes something hitherto unknown known.

Unknownness, too, cannot be the nature of the object because unknownness is removed. If it were the nature of the object, then, with its removal the object itself will be removed. It is contradictory to say that the non-established object is the product of *pramāṇa* and the established object is destroyed by *pramāṇa*. Moreover, if *pramāṇa* itself could be the originator and destroyer of the object, since *pramāṇa* itself is inert, the world would be void of intelligence and nothing could be known.

Even for Ātman whose nature itself is knowledge, knownness through *pramāṇa* is inconstant because of its absence prior to the rise of *pramāṇa*.

Again, if knownness and unknownness were the nature of the object, then, *pramāṇa* can only reveal the object as known or unknown. If the object is known as unknown, it amounts to saying that nescience itself is known since it qualifies the unknown object. But nescience can never be known by any *pramāṇa*.[9] For this presupposes that once nescience was unknown and at

9. *ibid.*, VIII. 18

some other time known. The unknownness earlier would mean accepting nescience for nescience. But there is no nescience for nescience itself. Otherwise, there will be infinite regress. Further, if the object is known as unknown, there is the futility of the *pramāṇa*, Yet, it cannot be said that nescience is not destroyed by *pramāṇa*, for, otherwise, *pramāṇa* becomes purposeless.

It has been shown above that the object cannot be known as unknown. It cannot be known as known either, for the obvious reason that *pramāṇas* are not necessary for things already known. Otherwise, there will be infinite regress.

This puzzle points to the indefinable character involved in the removal of nescience.

8

The meaning of Ātman-knowledge

There are scriptural declarations like "All this is Ātman", "When Ātman is known", "By hearing which the unheard", "From the knowledge of which, O, revered one!" But does it mean that when Ātman is known everything, including nescience and its products, is known?

The answer is in the negative. Firstly nescience is not knowable. Secondly, if nescience and its products are known, even assuming that they can be known by the knowledge ot Ātman, they would no more be nescience; they would be Ātman itself. For, Ātman-knowledge must have only Ātman as its object. Thirdly, if what is not Ātman also is known by that, why should it be called Ātman-knowledge instead of "non-Ātman knowledge" or "Ātman-non-Ātman-knowledge?" If anything, it should be knowledge of non-Ātman only since things that are not Ātman are numerous, just as a village is called a Brahmin-village for the reason that in that village Brahmins are predominant in number. Fourthly, in this case, it can never be said that when one is known everything is known. Knowledge of everything is only through knowledge of everything.

How then is the scriptural text that by knowing Ātman everything is known to be understood?

Vimuktātman says that the text only means that nothing that is unknown and yet to be known will remain.[10]

The meaning is that the unknownness of the phenomenal plurality of things relates only to indeterminable nescience, and is consumed without vestige by the knowledge of Ātman. In the case of pot being known, for example, there are things other than pot which remain to be known. But the case of Ātman-knowledge is dissimilar. When Ātman is known, there is nothing else to be known, nescience being destroyed as a whole. Just as a person advised to know the hundred elephants running about in a small enclosure says: "I have known" meaning that there is nothing unknown to be known, so is the case here.[11]

Or alternatively, the meaning of the text: "When Ātman is known everything is known", may be taken to be that with the knowledge of Ātman, everything becomes Ātman. Just as people say: "All that water in the lotus-pond and that army has become that place itself when that place is seen",[12] even so when nescience and its products are destroyed by knowledge, Ātman alone remains like the place in the saying.

The destruction of nescience, it has been said, is only the known Ātman.[13] The locus of nescience is only the Self. This is apparent from the Śruti texts "*inaro māyābhiḥ pururūpa iyate*", "*māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt*" etc. So only destruction of nescience is meant, and not knowability of nescience and its products by such declarations as above. Only thus are to be construed the other declarations like: "By hearing which the unheard", etc., "All this is Ātman", "All this is Brahman only", as the

10. nājñātaṁ jneyaṁ kimcid avaśiṣyate ityarthaḥ: *ibid.*, p. 370

11. *ibid.*, p. 370

12. *ibid.*, p. 371

13. jñāto hyātmā ajñānadāha, *ibid.*

statement: "That pond, army etc., is that place itself",[14] would be construed.

It is fairly settled now, therefore, by the foregoing analysis, that knownness and unknownness are not the nature of things. They are not knowable by their respective *pramāṇas*.

The second alternative *viz.*, that knownness and unknownness are different from the object need not detain us long since then knownness and unknownness do not even *appear* as different from the object.

Yet, there is no disputing the fact that when an object is known, nescience is removed by the *pramāṇas*.[15] Knownness itself is not known because of infinite regress. Yet it is patent. This knownness, therefore, is the removal of nescience with regard to the objects of experience. So is the case with Ātman-knowledge also. Knownness of Ātman is through the knowledge of Ātman's immediacy (*aparokṣatā*) gained through the study of the Vedāntas culminating in the Supreme oneness of Being, the *Aupaniṣada-puruṣa*. This knownness alone is the removal of nescience. Once removed, nescience does not rear its ugly head again, because it has no cause. Since it is the cause of everything that has origin, when it itself has been consumed by the fire of wisdom, there is the cessation of all becoming.

Therefore, when the fire of nescience is quenched, nothing else is born, much less nescience itself. Hence the destruction of nescience is only the immediate experience of Ātman (*aparokṣānubhava*) generated by the study of the scripture. Though this *avidyānivṛtti* is not something existing over and above Ātman, yet, the faet of it is not established before the rise of knowledge. that is why there is no fear of *avidyānivṛtti* being there always.

---

14. See *ibid.*, p. 371

15. mānāttadakārataya jñāne jāte tasya vyavahārayogyatā arthasya jñātatā nāma - *I.S.*, p. 371

8

Destruction of Nescience involves no Duality

The objects of experience are inert, being the products of nescience which is inert. So the destruction of the inert nescience cannot be itself inert. Nescience itself, in other words, cannot be its own destruction. That knowledge alone removes nescience is a common observation. Nor even is it that the Ātman-Intelligence is the destruction of nescience since Ātman is there when nescience is there.[16] Still, the destruction of nescience is not always there like Ātman, as otherwise, there would then be no need for the destruction to be caused. Therefore the destruction of nescience is not real. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the destruction of nescience is real, it is only Ātman itself, and, so, there is no snag of duality of Ātman and destruction of nescience. But the destruction is not real. The destruction of the unreal can never be real. If it could be, it cannot be through knowledge. Knowledge does not create anything; it reveals. And destruction is only for the unreal, and not for the real. So, since the destruction of nescience is neither Ātman itself nor anything pertaining to nescience, it is only inexpressible.[17]

Ātman is the fruit (*phala*)[18] when it is known through *pramāṇa*, though it is eternally self-luminous. For things like pot etc., there is only knownness, and not the nature of being a fruit (*phala*) or being knowledge itself. In the case of Ātman, being intelligenee, there is, in addition to having knownness, also being the fruit (*phala*). Knownness and being the fruit are stated for Ātman because Ātman, though eternally self-luminous, is yet known only through the source of scripture. It is thus

---

16. nāpyajaḍa ātmā tannāśaḥ, tadbhāve' pi tasya bhāvāt - *I.S.*, p. 372

17. anirvācyastannāśa iti sthitam - *J.V., I.S.*, p. 623.

18. When a psychosis comes into contact with, say, a pot, there is generated in the pot a reflection of intelligence; and it is this reflection that reveals the pot, and is called the *phala*. Cp. *I.S. cit pratibimbaṁ hi asmākam phalam iṣṭam* - *J.V.*, p. 623

that there is no contingence of the destruction of nescience always. And also, since it is Ātman which is the fruit of Ātman-knowledge, there is no question of *avidyānivṛtti* being a second real. Moreover, the annihilation of nescience is only through knowledge. Otherwise, the existence of scripture is rendered purposeless. Destruction of nescience by knowledge is declared by the scripture as much as Ātman's identity with Brahman, its nescience, its transmigratory character, the world of plurality, final release through knowledge, final release while embodied. All these ideas are accepted only because scripture declares them.

Just as fire accompanied by wind consumes dried grass, Ātman, mounted upon the *pramāṇa*, consumes its nescience, and, along with it, the *pramāṇas* also. *Avidyānivṛtti* does not mean anything negative, because classification like negative and positive obtain only in the realm of nescience. The author of the *Vārttika* puts it "The knowledge of the Supreme Ātman, the nescience being itself unreal, fighting shy to kill the already dead, consumes the negative character also. Having burnt the classification into positive and negative entities through the fire of Ātman as "not this", "not this", and removed the darkness and the error created by it, itself enters the fire".

9

Maṇḍana's views

Maṇḍana, in his *Brahmasiddhi*, has tried to answer the dilemma that if the removal of nescience is real, then, there will be detriment to the singleness of Brahman and if it were unreal, then, the world will be real. His *advaita* is known as *bhāvādvaita* or *sadadvaita*, the theory of the single positive reality.[19] The negation of the world in the scriptural expressions like "*advitīyam*" "*asthūlam anaṇu ahrasvam*" "*neti, neti*" and the removal of nescience (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) are negative realities, and do not come into conflict with the non-dualism of

19. Prof. Kuppuswamy Sastri has been inclined to translate it into *ens-monism*. See Intro. to *B.S.*, p. xii.

Advaita. Advaita, in the sense of *bhāvādvaita* or *ens monism*, excludes only a second *positive* reality.[20] The total negation of the world and the removal of nescience are the only two negations which should be accorded reality. They are not annulled by the Brahman-intuition.[21] Though Maṇḍana in one or two places equates the removal of nescience with Brahman-realisation, *vidyā*,[22] yet, on the whole his can be called the *bhāvādvaita* where the negative realities of *avidyānivṛtti* and *prapañcābhāva* are maintained as not in conflict with non-duality of Brahman.[23]

---

20. The term *bhāvādvaita* itself has not been used by Maṇḍana, however much it may be implied in his views. Ānandabodha, with reference to *avidyā-nvṛtti*, uses the term *sadadvaita*, same as *bhāvādvaita*.

21. See *Laghucandrikā*, Nirnayasagar Edn., p. 326

cp: *Advaita-siddhi*: vastutaḥ tu avidyānivṛtteḥ pañcamaprakāratvaṁ ca bhāvādvaitaṁ ca anabhyupagama-parāhatam. p. 467.

When the shell is unknown, it is seen as positive silver; and when known, it is the negation of silver. Its character as negation of silver is its distinguishing feature. Similarly, when the Self is not known, it is the positive world. When known, it is the negation of world which is its special (*asādhāraṇa*) nature. Sureśvara has said: sthūlāpahnutiratra syāt vastu yatpāramārthikam | nābhāvaniṣṭo'nyatrāpi niṣedhaḥ kim uta akṣare ||

Even realists like the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas do not locate negation in mere non-existence. Much more so in the case of Advaita Brahman.

22. avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ sa saṁsāra udāhṛta
vidyaiva cādvaya śāṇta tadastamaya ucyate.
B. S., Niyogakāṇḍa: Verse 106

avidyā saṁsāraḥ; vidyaiva cāvidyānivṛttiḥ - *ibid.*, p. 121

23. With reference to *avidyānivṛtti*, Maṇḍana says: If *avidyā* is absence of knowledge, then, knowledge is its removal, as the prior non-existence of knowledge is removed by knowledge. If *avidyā* is a positive error as the silver-illusion, then in the case of silver-illusion, the knowledge of shell dispels the illusion, and reveals the shell. Just as the destruction of the pot and the production of potsherds do not occur at different times by different operations but at the same time in the same act, so also here, reality is intuited and nescience destroyed at once, and similar is the distinction between the removal of nescience and Brahman-knowledge - See Śaṅkhapāṇi's *Com.* on *B. S.*, p. 249

Whatever may be the differences of opinion on details, the fundamental tenet of Advaita, *viz.*, the transmigratory life must have to be transcended in the fulfilment of one's own being stands. For Advaita holds that *brahmabhāva* is one's *svabhāva* or nature. Release is not something alien to us to be secured anew. It is our essence that is the import of the text "That art Thou". To be that eternal Bliss is, then, the goal of the embodied souls bound to the flesh. The Light is within. Only one should see.

(*contd.*)

Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā* holds that *avidyā-nivṛtti* is the very Self: nivṛttirātmā mohasya jñātatvenopalakṣitaḥ. Nirnayasagar Edn., p. 382. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaita-siddhi* agrees with Citsukha. *Advaita-siddhi*, Nirnayasagar Edn., p. 467.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. B. C. of Relativity: Bertrand Russell.

Advaita-brahma-siddhi: Sadānanda.

Advaita-siddhi: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. (Nirnaya Sagar Edition)

Aitareya Upaniṣad.

A Handful of Popular Maxims: Jacob.

Akhaṇḍārtha: Article by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrin, *Journal of Oriental Research*, Vol. XII.

Appearance and Reality: F. H. Bradley, Library of Philosophy: Edited by Muirhead; Second Edition, 1908.

Bhagavad-gītā.

Bhāmati Catussūtri: Vācaspati Miśra: Tr. by S. S. S. Sastrin and C. Kunhan Raja (Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras):

Bhedadhikkāra: Nṛsiṁhasvāmin; Free rendering in English by S. S. S. Sastrin and Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan.

Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana with the *Vyākhyā* by Śaṅkhapāṇi. Edited by S. Kuppuswamy Sastrin, Madras.

Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika: Sureśvara.

Comparative Studies in Vedantism: M. N. Sircar.

Conditions of Knowing: Sinclair: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1951.

Contemporary British Philosophy: Article by W. R. Sorley: Library of Philosophy, Edited by J. H. Muirhead, 1925.

Criticism of Experience: D. J. B. Hawkins.

Darwin and Hegel: Ritchie: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., New York, 1893.

Defence of Idealism: May Sinclair; Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1917.

Elements of Constructive Philosophy: J. S. Mackenzie: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1917.

Enneads: Plotinus.

Foundations of Empirical Knowledge: A. J. Ayer: London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1947.

Gopālikā: Ṛṣiputraparameśvara.

History of Indian Philosophy: Das Gupta, Vols. I and II.

History of Western Philosophy: Bertrand Russell.
Indian Philosophy: S. Radhakrishnan, Vols. I and II.
Indian Psychology, Perception: Sinha.
Indian Epistemology: Jwala Prasad.
Indian Idealism: Das Gupta.
Indian Logic and Atomism: A. B. Keith.
Indian Logic in the Early Schools: H. N. Randle: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Indian Realism: Sinha.
Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays: John Dewey.
Iṣṭa-siddhi with Jñānottama's *Vivaraṇa*: Edited with Introduction and Notes by M. Hiriyanna, G. O. S., Vol. LXV.
Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad.
Jivanmukti Viveka: Vidyāraṇya.
Kalpataru on *Bhāmatī.*
Kant's Theory of Knowledge: H. A. Prichard: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1909.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
Kena Upaniṣad.
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakādya: Śrī Harṣa, Translated by Ganganath Jha, "Indian Thought" Series.
Logic of Hegel: Wallace: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1894.
Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa.
Māṇḍūkya Kārikās: Gauḍapāda.
Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
Mimāṁsā-sūtras of Jaimini.
Muṇḍakopaniṣad.
Naiṣkarmyasiddhi: Sureśvarācārya.
Nature of Truth: Joachim.
Nature of Thought: Blanshard, Vol. I and II.
Nyāya-bhāṣya: Vātsyāyana, English Translation by Jha.
Nyāyamakaranda by Ānandabodha with Citsukha's *Ṭikā*: Chowkhamba Series, Banares.
Nyāyamañjarī: Jayanta: Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.
Nyāyasūtras: English Translation by Jha.
Nyāya Theory of Knowledge: S. C. Chatterjee.
Nyāyavārtika: Uddyotakara, English Translation by Jha.

Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyaṭikā : Vācaspati Miśra.

Our Knowledge of the External World: Bertrand Russell: The Open Court Publishing Co., London, 1914.

Outline of Philosophy, An: Bertrand Russell: George Allen and Unwin Co., Ltd., London, 1927.

Padārthadharmasaṅgraha : Praśastapāda, Translated by Jha.

Pañcadaśi : Bhāratitīrtha Vidyāraṇya.

Pañcapādikā : Padmapāda : Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

Philosophy of Advaita: T. M. P. Mahadevan.

Philosophy of G. E. Moore: Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. IV, Ed. by Schilpp.

Philosophy of Plotinus: W. R. Inge: Luzac & Co.

Philosophical Essays : Bertrand Russell.

A Primer of Indian Logic: Prof. S. Kuppuswamy Sastri.

Present Philosophical Tendencies: R. B. Perry: Longman's Green & Co., 1912.

Śabara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Mimāṁsā-sūtras.*

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtras.*

" " " *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*

" " " *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.*

" " " *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.*

" " " *Bhagavad-gitā.*

Śāstradīpikā : Pārthasārathi Miśra.

Śatabhūṣaṇi : Mm. Anantakrishna Sastrin.

Ślokavārttika : Kumārila, English Translation by Jha.

Saṁkṣepaśāriraka : Sarvajñātma Muni.

Sambandhavārttika : Sureśvara, Translated with Notes by T.M.P. Mahadevan.

Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha : Appayya Dīkṣita, Translated by S. S. S. Sastrin: University of Madras.

Siddhāntabindu: Madhusūdana Sarasvati: Gaekwad Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV.

Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

Six Ways of Knowing: D. M. Datta: George Allen and Unwin Co., Ltd., London, 1932.

Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha : English Translation by Cowell & Gough.

Sphoṭa-siddhi: Maṇḍana.

Śrī Bhāṣya : Rāmānuja.

Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

Study in Philosophy and Psychology: G. F. Stout: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1930.

The Structure of Thought: Ludwig Fischer; English Translation by W. H. Johnston: George Allen & Unwin Co., Ltd., London, 1931.

The Systems of Vedānta : Deussen; The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, U.S.A., 1912.

Tarka-bhāṣā : Keśava Miśra, English Translation by Jha: Indian Thought, Vol. II.

Tarkasaṅgraha : Annaṁbhaṭṭa; English Translation by Athalye.

Tattva-bindu : Vācaspati Miśra.

Tattvacintāmaṇi : Gaṅgeśa.

Tattvapradipikā : Citsukha: Nirnayasagar Edn.

Tattvaśuddhi : Jñānaghanapāda, Edited by S. S. S. Sastrin, University of Madras.

Thought and Reality : P. T. Raju.

Vedanta Philosophy : Max Muller.

Vedāntakaumudi of Rāmādvaya.

Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha : Vidyāraṇya, English Translation by S. S. S. Sastrin and Saileswara Sen: Andhra University Series.

Vivaraṇa : Prakāśātman.

Vedānta Paribhāṣā : Dharmarāja; English Translation by S. S. S. Sastrin: Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras.

Vedāntasāra : Sadānanda.

Vṛttiprabhākara and *Vicārasāgara*: Niścaladāsa.

World as Will and Idea, The : Schopenhauer, English Translation by Haldane and Kemp.

Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali.

INDEX